

JURNAL KAJIAN WILAYAH

Volume 8

Nomor 2, Desember 2017

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JURNAL KAJIAN WILAYAH

Volume 8

Nomor 2, Desember 2017

DDC: 361.6

Nazli Aziz

**PERDEBATAN KEMISKINAN DI DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT
PARLEMEN MALAYSIA**

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 89-99

ABSTRAK

Artikel ini menyajikan prediksi perdebatan tentang isu kemiskinan di Malaysia yang diungkapkan di Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Parlemen Malaysia. Dengan menggunakan teknik penelitian kualitatif, fokus utamanya adalah masih adanya isu kemiskinan di Malaysia yang disematkan dalam Pernyataan Resmi (Hansard) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Namun demikian, menganalisis isu kemiskinan secara kualitatif akan mengundang keabsahan, dan bersifat ambigu serta terbuka terhadap tantangan. Terlepas dari keberhasilan pemberantasan kemiskinan di Malaysia, masalah kemiskinan selalu diperdebatkan hampir di setiap sidang parlemen di Dewan Rakyat. Jika Malaysia berhasil memberantas kemiskinan, mengapa anggota parlemen masih memperdebatkan isu kemiskinan di Dewan Rakyat sampai sekarang? Untuk memahami masalah ini, catatan Pernyataan Resmi, Hansard, Dewan Rakyat (1990-2012) digunakan untuk menggambarkan komposisi isu kemiskinan di daerah perkotaan dan pedesaan di Malaysia secara kualitatif. Kajian-kajian sebelumnya mengenai kemiskinan di Malaysia dievaluasi kembali dengan meninjau kembali perdebatan yang dikutip dari Pernyataan Resmi, Hansard, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Tujuan utamanya adalah untuk memahami apakah ada dan sejauh mana pengentasan kemiskinan menguntungkan masyarakat dan menyebar ke seluruh wilayah di Malaysia.

Kata kunci: Parlemen Malaysia, Hansard (pernyataan resmi), Anggota Parlemen, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, pengentasan kemiskinan.

DDC: 305.6

Gilang Maulana Majid

**KEHIDUPAN PELAJAR MUSLIM INDONESIA DI JERMAN:
TANTANGAN DAN PELUANG**

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 101-113

ABSTRAK

Imigrasi orang-orang yang melekat pada agama tertentu di negara yang mana sebagian besar penduduknya tidak memeluk agama yang sama selalu menjadi topik yang menarik untuk dieksplor, terutama ketika menyangkut wacana mobilitas siswa di dunia pendidikan tinggi. Banyak faktor harus diperhitungkan sebelum seseorang membuat keputusan ke negara mana untuk melanjutkan studi. Sebagai umat Islam yang mematuhi nilai-nilai agamanya, setiap faktor yang mendukung kesalahan seseorang akan dipertimbangkan. Studi ini mengeksplorasi kehidupan pelajar Indonesia Muslim yang

belajar di Jerman. Studi ini berangkat dari motivasi belajar, konsep *push* dan *pull factor* yang kemudian diperkaya dengan perspektif agama. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan bahwa meskipun ada tantangan yang dihadapi para siswa ini sebagai seorang Muslim, namun masih ada peluang menarik yang mereka alami ketika tinggal di Jerman yang kemudian dianggap sangat penting dalam kaitannya dengan keislaman mereka. Menyadari pentingnya wacana semacam ini bagi para imigran Indonesia, baik itu mahasiswa maupun non-pelajar, maka perlu penelitian lebih lanjut dengan topik yang sama.

Kata kunci: Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, Jerman, *push-pull factor*, pendidikan tinggi, haji

DDC: 324.1

Indriana Kartini

PERAN UNI EROPA SEBAGAI AKTOR INTERNASIONAL DALAM MISI MONITORING ACEH

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 115-123

ABSTRAK

Keterlibatan Uni Eropa (UE) dalam Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) merupakan salah satu cerita sukses dalam penyelesaian konflik secara damai. Dalam misi ini, UE mampu menunjukkan kepada dunia bahwa mereka merupakan salah satu aktor signifikan dalam politik internasional. Harus diakui bahwa UE merepresentasikan *uncertain image* (gambaran yang kurang jelas) dalam politik internasional yang tingkatannya tidak dapat disejajarkan dengan negara-bangsa. Artikel ini menganalisis apakah UE memainkan peran signifikan sebagai aktor internasional dalam proses perdamaian di Aceh melalui pendalaman terhadap kerja AMM. Dengan memandang UE sebagai entitas yang terlibat dalam isu-isu khusus dan dengan menekankan pada kehadiran UE di kancah internasional melalui keterlibatannya dalam AMM, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa UE memainkan peran signifikan sebagai aktor internasional.

Kata kunci: Uni Eropa, aktor internasional, *Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)*, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)

DDC: 305.8

Manggala Ismanto

GERAKAN MASYARAKAT ADAT SAMI DAN KONTESTASI SUMBER DAYA ALAM

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 125-136

ABSTRAK

Agenda utama dalam gerakan adat atau *indigenous movement* adalah memperjuangkan hak politik dan budaya komunitas etnis yang menjadi minoritas sesuai dengan keunikan historis serta praktik budaya yang mereka miliki. Seperti yang dikatakan oleh Kymlicka, bahwa hak-hak minoritas juga harus diperjuangkan karena mereka berada pada sistem yang diatur oleh mayoritas yang berpretensi menghasilkan ketidakadilan. Gerakan Masyarakat Adat Sami di Norwegia merupakan bentuk perjuangan panjang untuk memperoleh hak secara mandiri untuk mengelola sumber daya alam. Saat ini masyarakat Sami berjuang untuk mempertahankan keunikan identitas budaya dan praktik hidup yang telah dimiliki secara turun-temurun. Tulisan ini ingin melihat pembentukan gerakan masyarakat adat Sami di Norwegia serta praktik gerakan sosial yang dilakukan untuk menuntut perubahan sosial terkait dengan *self-governance* dan otonomi pengelolaan sumber daya alam.

Kata kunci: Gerakan Masyarakat Adat, Sami, identitas, otonomi, pengelolaan sumber daya alam

DDC: 305.6

Zaenal Abidin Eko Putro dan Cahyo Pamungkas

**AGAMA KHONGHUCU DAN BUDDHA DALAM LINTASAN
SEJARAH KOREA**

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 137-153

ABSTRAK

Masyarakat Korea Selatan merupakan masyarakat yang heterogen dari sisi agama. Agama Khonghucu dan Agama Buddha telah berkembang di Korea sejak berabad lampau. Agama Khonghucu sangat mengandung unsur-unsur filsafat pemikiran, politik, dan kebudayaan yang berakar dan berpengaruh ke dalam pembentukan etika dan identitas bangsa Korea. Agama Buddha juga berperan dalam pembentukan dasar-dasar identitas dan kebudayaan Korea. Selain Agama Kristen, Islam dan Katholik, agama setempat atau shamanisme juga tetap dipeluk sebagian masyarakat Korea Selatan. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjawab pertanyaan bagaimanakah situasi kehidupan beragama di Korea Selatan dan bagaimanakah kedudukan Agama Khonghucu dan Buddha dalam sejarah perjalanan bangsa Korea. Tulisan yang dihasilkan dari penelitian literatur ini ini juga dimaksudkan untuk mendeskripsikan bagaimanakah kondisi Agama Khonghucu dan Buddha di Korea pada masa kini dan bagaimana perannya dalam membentuk kebudayaan dan identitas nasional Bangsa Korea.

Kata kunci: Agama Khonghucu, Agama Buddha, shamanisme, teks-teks Xu she, dan budaya massa.

DDC: 330.9

Ahmad Helmy Fuady, Erwiza, Muzzar Kresna dan Saiful Hakam

**RESEARCH SUMMARY CRISIS, GROWTH AND CHANGES IN SUB SAHARA
AFRICA: EVIDENCE FROM KENYA**

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 155-161

ABSTRAK

Sejak 2008, perekonomian dunia telah dibayangi oleh tekanan krisis keuangan global. Dengan hubungan global yang relatif kuat, sulit bagi Kenya untuk sepenuhnya keluar dari krisis tersebut. Kenya juga mengalami krisis pangan, krisis politik pasca pemilu dan krisis keamanan. Namun, ekonomi Kenya, sejak awal tahun 2000an, terus bertumbuh tanpa banyak terpengaruh oleh krisis. Dengan pendekatan sejarah dan ekonomi, penelitian ini berangkat dari keingintahuan yang sederhana tentang bagaimana perkembangan ekonomi Kenya selama krisis. Studi ini meneliti tiga sektor yang bertahan hidup dan berkembang selama masa krisis, yaitu sektor pertanian (teh, kopi dan bunga potong), infrastruktur, dan teknologi keuangan. Selain itu, studi ini juga menggambarkan peningkatan peran China dalam perekonomian Kenya, ketika negara-negara donor lainnya berada dalam krisis.

Kata kunci: Krisis, sektor pertanian, pembangunan infrastruktur, teknologi keuangan, China

DDC: 327.1

Paulus Rudolf Yuniarto

TINJAUAN BUKU

**CHINA BELT ROAD INITIATIVE: PEMBANGUNAN INFRASTRUKTUR DAN
PERLUASAN HEGEMONI EKONOMI TIONGGOK DI DUNIA**

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 163-168

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Nazli Aziz

POVERTY DEBATES IN THE DEWAN RAKYAT OF THE MALAYSIAN PARLIAMENT

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 89-99

ABSTRACT

This article highlights the nature of parliamentary debates in the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) of the Malaysian Parliament related to the poverty issues in Malaysia. Using qualitative research technique, it focuses on the untold story of poverty in Malaysia that buried in the Dewan Rakyat Hansard. Analysing poverty issues qualitatively, however, can be ambiguous and open to challenge. Despite the success story of poverty eradication in Malaysia, poverty issues have always been debated in almost every parliament proceeding in the Dewan Rakyat. If Malaysia is so successful in eradicating poverty, why the Members of Parliament (MPs) are still debating the issue in the Dewan Rakyat to date? To understand this issue, it uses Hansard records of the Dewan Rakyat (1990-2012) to narrate the multifaceted of poverty issues in both rural and urban consistencies in Malaysia, qualitatively. It re-evaluates the previous works on poverty in Malaysia by examining the debates extracted from the Dewan Rakyat Hansard. The aim is to understand whether and to what extent the poverty eradication agendas have benefited communities and spilled over throughout the constituencies in Malaysia.

Keywords: *The Malaysian Parliament, Hansard, members of parliament, Dewan Rakyat; poverty eradication.*

DDC: 305.6

Gilang Maulana Majid

**THE LIFE OF MUSLIM INDONESIAN STUDENTS IN GERMANY:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 101-113

ABSTRACT

Immigration of people attached to a certain religion in a country where most of the population do not embrace the same religion has always been an interesting topic to explore, especially when it is regarding the discourse of student mobility in higher education world. A lot of factors must be taken into account before one makes a decision on which country to continue the study. As Muslims adhere to certain religious values, any factor that supports one's pioucity would be ideally weighed. This study explores the life of Muslim Indonesian students studying in Germany. Departing from the

study motivation, the concept of push and pull factor is then enriched with religious perspectives. The research findings show that even though there are challenges that these students face as a Muslim, there is still an interesting opportunity that they have experienced when residing in Germany and later deem most significant in relation to their Islamicity. Realizing the importance of this kind of discourse for Indonesian immigrants, be it student or non-student, a suggestion of further research under the same topic is emphasized.

Keywords: *Germany, hajj, higher education, Muslim Indonesian Student, push-pull factor*

DDC: 324.1

Indriana Kartini

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR IN THE ACEH MONITORING MISSION

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 115-123

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) involvement in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was one of the successful story in the peaceful conflict settlement. In this mission, the EU has been able to show the world that it is one of significant actor in international politics. Admittedly, the EU represents uncertain image in international politics as if it can not be seen at the same level of sovereign-states. This article examines whether the EU played a significant role as an international actor in the peace process in Aceh through an indepth-look at the work of the AMM. By viewing the EU as an evolving entity which engaged in particular issues and by addressing its international presence in the context of its involvement in the AMM, it can be concluded the EU has played significant role as an international actor.

Keywords: *the European Union, international actor, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)*

DDC: 305.8

Mangala Ismanto

SAMI INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE'S CONTESTATION

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 125-136

ABSTRACT

The main agenda of the indigenous movement is fighting for political and cultural rights of ethnic minority communities in accordance with unique historical and cultural practices that they have. As Kymlicka said, minority rights must also be fought because they are on a system that is governed by the majority who pretend to produce injustice. Sami Indigenous Movement in Norway is a form of a long struggle to obtain the right independently to manage natural resources. Currently Sami struggling to maintain the uniqueness of the cultural identity and living practices that have been owned for generations. This paper would like to see the establishment of indigenous peoples' movement Sami in Norway as well as the practice of social movements committed to demanding social change related to self-governance and autonomy of management of natural resources.

Keywords: *Indigenous movement, Sami people, identity, otonomy, natural resource management*

DDC: 305.6

Zaenal Abidin Eko Putro and Cahyo Pamungkas

KONFUCIANISM AND BUDHISM IN THE HISTORY OF KOREA

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 137-153

ABSTRACT

South Korean society has a plural society with its different religious background. Khonghucu (Confucianism) and Buddhism have grown in the country for the last several centuries. Khonghucu teaches philosophy and thinking about politics and culture which form identity and ethic of Korean society. Likewise, Buddhism has a role in establishing basic identity and culture of Korean society. Other religions such as Catholic, Islam, Protestant, and shamanism are also followed by Korean. This article tries to respond the question about religious environment among Korean society, especially the question for the ground of Confucianism and Buddhism in Korean history. This article is resulted from a desk literature research which also aims at describing the current development of Confucianism and Buddhism and their role in forming culture as well as identity of Korean people.

Keywords: *Confucianism, Buddhism, shamanism, Xu she scripture, and mass culture.*

DDC: 330.9

Ahmad Helmy Fuady, Erwiza, Muzzar Kresna and Saiful Hakam

RESEARCH SUMMARY CRISIS, GROWTH AND CHANGES IN SUB SAHARA AFRICA: EVIDENCE FROM KENYA

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 155-161

ABSTRACT

Since 2008, the world economy has been overshadowed by a heavy pressure from the global financial crisis. With a relatively strong global relationship, it is difficult for Kenya to fully escape the global financial crisis. Kenya has also gone through a food crisis, the post-election political crisis and the security crisis. In fact, the Kenyan economy, since the early 2000s, continues to grow without much affected by the crises. With history and economics approach, this study departs from a simple curiosity, to know how Kenya's economic development is during the crises. This study examines three sectors that survive and thrive during times of crisis, namely agricultural sector (tea, coffee and cut flowers), infrastructure, and financial technology. In addition, this study also describes the increasing role of China in the Kenyan economy, when other donor countries are in crisis.

Keywords: *Crisis, agricultural sector, infrastructure development, financial technology, China*

DDC: 327.1

Paulus Rudolf Yuniarto

BOOK REVIEW

BELT ROAD INITIATIVE: A CHINESE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC HEGEMONY IN THE WORLD

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 8 (2) Desember 2017: 163-168

POVERTY DEBATES IN THE DEWAN RAKYAT OF THE MALAYSIAN PARLIAMENT

PERDEBATAN KEMISKINAN DI DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT PARLEMEN MALAYSIA

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Diterima: 08-08-2017

Direvisi: 14-09-2017

Disetujui: 02-11-2017

ABSTRAK

Artikel ini menyajikan prediksi perdebatan tentang isu kemiskinan di Malaysia yang diungkapkan di Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Parlemen Malaysia. Dengan menggunakan teknik penelitian kualitatif, fokus utamanya adalah masih adanya isu kemiskinan di Malaysia yang disematkan dalam Pernyataan Resmi (Hansard) Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Namun demikian, menganalisis isu kemiskinan secara kualitatif akan mengundang keabsahan, dan bersifat ambigu serta terbuka terhadap tantangan. Terlepas dari keberhasilan pemberantasan kemiskinan di Malaysia, masalah kemiskinan selalu diperdebatkan hampir di setiap sidang parlemen di Dewan Rakyat. Jika Malaysia berhasil memberantas kemiskinan, mengapa anggota parlemen masih memperdebatkan isu kemiskinan di Dewan Rakyat sampai sekarang? Untuk memahami masalah ini, catatan Pernyataan Resmi, Hansard, Dewan Rakyat (1990-2012) digunakan untuk menggambarkan komposisi isu kemiskinan di daerah perkotaan dan pedesaan di Malaysia secara kualitatif. Kajian-kajian sebelumnya mengenai kemiskinan di Malaysia dievaluasi kembali dengan meninjau kembali perdebatan yang dikutip dari Pernyataan Resmi, Hansard, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Tujuan utamanya adalah untuk memahami apakah ada dan sejauh mana pengentasan kemiskinan menguntungkan masyarakat dan menyebar ke seluruh wilayah di Malaysia.

Kata kunci: Parlemen Malaysia, Hansard (pernyataan resmi), anggota parlemen, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, pengentasan kemiskinan.

ABSTRACT

This article highlights the nature of parliamentary debates in the Dewan Rakyat (House of Representatives) of the Malaysian Parliament related to the poverty issues in Malaysia. Using qualitative research technique, it focuses on the untold story of poverty in Malaysia that buried in the Dewan Rakyat Hansard. Analysing poverty issues qualitatively, however, can be ambiguous and open to challenge. Despite the success story of poverty eradication in Malaysia, poverty issues have always been debated in almost every parliament proceeding in the Dewan Rakyat. If Malaysia is so successful in eradicating poverty, why the Members of Parliament (MPs) are still debating the issue in the Dewan Rakyat to date? To understand this issue, it uses Hansard records of the Dewan Rakyat (1990-2012) to narrate the multifaceted of poverty issues in both rural and urban consistencies in Malaysia, qualitatively. It re-evaluates the previous works on poverty in Malaysia by examining the debates extracted from the Dewan Rakyat Hansard. The aim is to understand whether and to what extent the poverty eradication agendas have benefited communities and spilled over throughout the constituencies in Malaysia.

Keywords: The Malaysian Parliament, Hansard, members of parliament, Dewan Rakyat; poverty eradication.

¹ This article is mostly based on the proceeding, entitled "Poverty Eradication: A View from the Malaysian Parliament" of *Persidangan Transformasi Sosial Kebangsaan* (The National Conference on Social Transformation), 27-28 Nov. 2013, organised by Universiti Malaysia Sabah. Author is a senior lecturer at School of Social and Economic Development as well an associate fellow both at Institute of Oceanography and Environment (INOS), and Kenyir Research Institute (IPK), Universiti Malaysia Terengganu (UMT). He can be reached at nazli_aziz@umt.edu.my

INTRODUCTION

There are many scholarly works have been published on poverty in Malaysia to date. Malaysia is considered as one of the most successful stories of poverty eradication in the world after the affirmative action of the New Economic Policy (NEP) (1970-1990) was introduced by the second Prime Minister, Abdul Razak. Using quantitative methods, scholars show the reduction of poverty in Malaysia statistically. While data and statistics provided by the state agencies help us to understand the success of the poverty eradication, I highlight the untold story of poverty that has been raised in the Malaysia Parliament in this article qualitatively.

Scholarly literatures and data by the various state agencies in Malaysia inform us little about the poverty debates in the Malaysian Parliament. By analysing the *Dewan Rakyat* (House of Representatives) Hansard² to understand poverty issues, I explore the extent to which the Members of Parliament (MPs) use the Malaysian Parliament to express their concerns to government. My focus is the narrative debates on poverty issues and politics in the *Dewan Rakyat*. I analyse the *Dewan Rakyat* Hansard within the time framework of the 8th parliament to the 12th parliament (1990-2012). Since the 1990s, Malaysia has experienced a rapid economic growth and urbanisation which contributed to reduce of the poverty level. I question *whether* and *to what extent* the data and statistics represent the “reality” of poverty in Malaysia after the New Economic Policy (NEP) ended in 1990.

METHODOLOGY

I revitalize and refresh the discussion on poverty in Malaysia by employing qualitative technique of archival research. This article is an exploratory examination of poverty using the debates in the *Dewan Rakyat* as a case study. I use the words *whether* and *to what extent* to avoid subconscious assumptions and perceptions

² Hansard is a parliament report that contains the parliament debates in verbatim during the parliament sitting. The Malaysian Parliament Hansard contains the *Yang di-Pertuan Agong*'s (the monarch and head of the state of Malaysia) speech, bills and acts tabled; the attendance of MPs; questions and answers of the parliament sittings; MPs votes and so forth.

clouding the analysis. As I will highlight in details below, I use the *Dewan Rakyat* Hansard of the Malaysian Parliament (1990-2012) to capture “insights”, “complexity of social behavior” and “unknown quality” (Gerring, 2007, 4-7) of data gathered. Integrating inferences and interpreting the puzzle of the story is important in any case studies to produce a coherent case empirically. As the only elected representatives in Malaysia, understanding MP's views are crucial who have “situated knowledge” (Mitrom, 2003, 72) in providing unique and research-worthy insights into the parliament affairs. Through a narrative focused on the MP debates in the *Dewan Rakyat*, I seek to understand the nature poverty issues in the Malaysian politics. Contrary to the existing works that examine poverty and quota using quantitative data, I revitalise and refresh the discussion by triangulating verbatim data of Members of Parliaments' debates, extracted from the Hansard.

Poverty eradication has always been on the federal government agenda in Malaysia, with programmes to eradicate poverty and rural development undertaken using a top-down approach. Often, citizen input on development is ignored by the government. Poverty eradication and the quota system for *Bumiputera* (son-of-the soil) within the scope of different affirmative action policies (in particular the NEP) have been vital in uplifting the economic status of the working class group in Malaysia. Existing works show that the different views of scholars about the Malaysian government's top-down approach in addressing the poverty issues. Whether they agree or disagree with government mechanisms to eradicate poverty, the similarity in their arguments is that Malaysia is a success story in terms of poverty eradication and restructuring economic inequality between ethnic groups. Specifically this success has been directly associated with the quota system in education, public sector and public equity for a particular ethnic, namely the Malays, using institutionalised mechanisms.

Interestingly, Smits (2009) argues that the institutionalised mechanisms used by many governments to address poverty have become the source of controversial debates since the

1980s because it may undermine democracy. Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, have established their own welfare policies that have taken into account their own political and cultural background for the purposes of supporting low income families. To Smits, none of the programmes have met targets to eradicate poverty. Under economic rationalism based on neo-liberal perspectives, led by the American and then followed by the western European governments since the 1990s have reformed their welfare programmes to encourage the recipients to actively look for jobs and enter the labour markets, gradually implementing the bottom-up mechanisms. Their footsteps have been followed by Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in which the role of governments in providing welfare support has been reduced to promote individual responsibility.

THE *DEWAN RAKYAT HANSARD* AND POVERTY ISSUES

Poverty issues matter in Malaysia's politics. The existing scholarly work only used the official statistics of government agencies to examine the poverty eradication in Malaysia (Sloane-White, Beaulieu 2010; Van Dodge 2012; Lange 2009). The exclusion of Hansard records has left the reality of poverty debates in parliament unnoticed. Hansard records are under-utilised in the examination of poverty and decision-making in Malaysia. Interestingly, the *Dewan Rakyat* Hansard records offer a significant source of data that reveal how the Malaysian MPs articulate their thoughts in the poverty debates.

The *Dewan Rakyat* Hansard is a vital source to investigate the MPs' concerns on poverty in Malaysia. The Hansard records provide the "raw emotion and feeling" of MPs when debating poverty issues. The *Dewan Rakyat* Hansard shows whether the MPs are standing for political party or citizens when raising poverty issues in the Malaysian Parliament. The contents of the *Dewan Rakyat* Hansard enlighten us to understand MPs' stands on poverty and public policy from inside the parliament prior to decision-making in Malaysia.

The *Dewan Rakyat* Hansard, to some extent, illustrates the resistance amongst the MPs of both government and opposition to the executive agendas. In the poverty issues, MPs become the *mediators* between the constituents and government to channel the poverty issues in the parliament. The *Dewan Rakyat* Hansard shows a level of resistance amongst the MPs to be the rubber stamp for the federal government from both the government and opposition MPs because ministers and bureaucrats in Putrajaya have little contact with the community at large. This is a point of difference for this article, and contradicts the monotonous argument that MPs functions are merely as rubber stamp in the *Dewan Rakyat*. Often, to validate the argument of rubber stamp culture in the Malaysian Parliament, the sources that are referred to by the authors are based on government practices via executive power, the Malaysian Constitution, Statute Paper, Parliament Standing Orders and Parliament Order Papers. Because of the "novelty" of Constitution and other governance documents related to parliamentary affairs, often the conclusion made becomes too legalistic without "human soul" or sufficient consideration of the complex human relationships that are given voice during the process. However, the "conflicting interests" between personal views and party obligations are captured and unveiled through the analysis of Hansard.

The *Dewan Rakyat* Hansard, thus, does greater justice for the reluctant MPs who have been forced to accommodate, rather than voluntarily embrace legislation that may appear to be simply function of the rubber stamp culture in the Malaysian Parliament. If the study only concentrates on MP votes in the Malaysian Parliament, it does not reveal much of the process involved and thus may not necessarily reflect the outcome made by the legislative body. The *Dewan Rakyat* Hansard enlightens us as to why the MPs raised the poverty issues and the purposes for them being raised morally and politically.

DEBATES ON POVERTY

NEP has contributed significant impacts in combating poverty in Malaysia. Based on the official government statistics, Malaysia has experienced a significant poverty reduction from 49.3% (1970) to 29.2% (1980) to 16.5% (1990), and to 5.7% (2004) (Rahimah, 2012, 38). According to the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development, the number of hardcore families were decreased to 44,463 in August 2010. It shows a significant reduction of 10,515 families in two years. The Deputy Prime Minister had informed the *Dewan Rakyat* that there were 54,977 hard core poor families in Malaysia in the parliament sitting on 14 May 2008 (Najib Razak, DR.14.05.2008). Most of the recipients of *e-kasih* were from the poor states such as Sabah, Sarawak, Kelantan, Kedah and Terengganu. Sabah and Sarawak remained as the two poorest states within the federal up to 2012. However, a few MPs challenged the validity of data related to the hardcore poverty provided by the state agencies. For example, the Kuala Lipis MP, Mohamad Shahrum Osman doubted the validity of the hardcore poverty statistics that were provided by the government. He claimed that there were two different statistics provided by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and Ministry of Rural and Regional Development (MoRRD) (Mohamad Shahrum Osman, DR.18.02.2009).

Despite of a few affirmative actions that have been introduced by the federal government after 1990, the NEP remained as the focal point of debates in the *Dewan Rakyat*. The NEP outcomes and their consequences were still being debated in parliament, two decades after the policy officially ended in 1990. For example, Khalid Abdul Samad, the Shah Alam MP, asked the government in 2010 to explain the reasons why the NEP failed to meet its objectives (Khalid Abdul Samad, DR.14.12.2010). The polemics have centered on a new need for a policy approach that is inclusive due to many of the perceived consequences and flaws that have arisen from the implementation of the NEP. The NEP has been debated because of the government's failure to reach targets to eradicate poverty and increase Bumiputera equity. The interviews and Hansard data establish the notion that the NEP has contributed to what

MPs perceived as new problems in Malaysia, such as the increasing gap between the poor and rich amongst the citizens, and the growing and increasing relative poverty amongst citizens in the first decade of the 21st century.

Furthermore, some MPs perceived that affirmative action also contributed to the Bumiputera being unproductive and lacking competitiveness, as well as the abuse of public procurements, projects and loans. MPs believed that these problems occurred because the government allowed cronyism and nepotism during the implementation of the NEP and this has continued as a culture amongst the elite up until the present time. What MPs perceived is also supported by existing scholarly literatures on this subject. Scholars have argued that the implementation of the NEP has been abused by the politicians and has indeed fostered cronyism and nepotism in Malaysia (Gomez, 1990, 1991, 1996; Gomez & Jomo, 1999). The gap between the rich and the poor Malays has also certainly been widened and contributed to greater economic inequality amongst the ethnic groups (Ho, 2003; Jomo, 1994), and nourished a complacent attitude amongst some Malays and thus made them less competitive in developing survival skills (Gomez & Jomo, 1999; Mahathir, 2011; Plate, 2011).

Data from Hansard indicate that debates about affirmative action are concentrated on the privileges given to the Bumiputera under Article 153. This article has been used to justify the strategy to increase Bumiputera equity. Ibrahim Ali, the Pasir Mas MP, questioned the rationales of the New Economic Model (NEM)³ as he believed that they were not sufficient to protect Malay privileges as stated in Article 153 of the Constitution (Ibrahim Ali, DR.14.12.2010). Ibrahim Ali, an independent MP and the President of Perkasa (an ethnic Malay NGO), was against

³NEM (2011-2020) was introduced by Najib Razak, under the *1Malaysia* programme. Under the *1Malaysia* concept, NEM is subjected to the *Economic Transformation Programme* (ETP) and the *Government Transformation Programme* (GTP). The NEM main objective is to generate economic growth faster if Malaysia is to be a high income developed state in which Mahathir, UMNO and Perkasa (an NGO) have considered would weakening the Malay preferential treatment. The NEM was announced in parliament in 2010 during the Budget 2011 presentation.

the idea of dropping 30 per cent Bumiputera equity ownership as proposed in the NEM. He was one of the MPs that have advocated for quota allocations for Bumiputera remaining in the NEM. Strong opposition from UMNO and Perkasa has made the National Economic Advisory Council (NEAC) to amend the original version of the NEM to protect the Malays' interests. However, opposition MPs argued that it was about time that Article 153 was re-examined. For example,

One of the pillars in the Constitution is the privileges of the Malays and Bumiputera. [But I'm questioning] the method used here. We use the Malay and Bumiputera privileges only to enrich a few leaders and give a very small portion to the ordinary citizens. Therefore, it is acceptable for us to study article 153 again (Anwar Ibrahim, DR.19.2.2009).

Another problem is the competing and overlapping tasks between different ministries.⁴ This has contributed to a situation where responsibilities and policies often overlapped. These ministries are responsible to inform the parliament about the programs that they oversee. This has also caused confusion especially on

⁴ An example involving bureaucracy and red-tape is the 1AZAM programme of *e-Kasih* to eradicate hardcore poverty by 2010. *e-Kasih* is a government programme to register poor households nationwide. *e-Kasih's* target is the poor family, single or sick elderly person, ill family members that need treatment, disabled persons, and so forth. Under *e-Kasih*, the government has created a few platforms to facilitate or/and create jobs for citizens through the 1AZAM programme. The 1AZAM programme can be divided into four sub-programmes which are the AZAM Kerja (labour sector), the AZAM Tani (agriculture sector), the AZAM Niaga (business sector), and the AZAM Khidmat (services sector). The Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development is responsible for co-ordinating the 1AZAM programmes of *e-Kasih* that are conducted by the different ministries and government agencies such as the Ministry of Human Resources for AZAM Kerja, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-Based Industry for AZAM Tani, the Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia for AZAM Niaga and AZAM Khidmat. Meanwhile, in East Malaysia, the state governments appointed their own agencies. In Sarawak the agencies responsible for the 1AZAM programme are the Department of Agriculture, the Bintulu Development Authority, the Sarawak Bumiputera Development Unit, the Sarawak Timber Industry Development, FAMA, LKIM, GIAT MARA and the Sarawak Labour Department. In Sabah, the agencies involved are Sabah Usaha Maju Foundation, the Department of Agriculture Sabah, the Sabah Fishermen Cooperation, the Sabah Rural Development Cooperation, the Department of Fisheries Sabah, and the Department of Women Affairs Sabah (Hen Seai Kie, DR.09.12.2010).

data validity and the actual state agency that is responsible and accountable for decision-making, tasks and resources. The multiple state agencies that are involved in a given government program also, to some extent, has created difficulties to MPs in the execution of their tasks. Nancy Shukri, the Batang Sadong MP, raised the issue related to the effectiveness of the 1AZAM program since it involved different ministries and multiple state agencies at federal and state levels (Nancy Shukri, DR.09.12.2010). For example the ministries and government agencies involved in poverty eradication are the Prime Minister's Office, the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development (MoWFCDD), the Ministry of Rural and Regional Development (MoRRD), the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (MoHLG), Majlis Perundangan Ekonomi Melayu (MAPEM), Majlis Perundangan Ekonomi Negara (MAPEN), YBK, Amanah Ikhtiar and so forth.

Hansard data indicate that often the one-off administrative service expenses are bigger than the total amount of aids channeled to citizens. For example, Zuraida Kamaruddin, the Ampang MP, asked the government to explain the reasons why the one-off administrative service expenses of the welfare department was bigger than the assistance provided. She argued that the government should reduce the red-tape, and overlapping and unnecessary bureaucracy, to improve the delivery system and the resources available to providing welfare to citizens. In the Auditor General's Report 2009, low income individuals in Tawau, Sabah, had to wait for two to eight months to get the assistance from government agencies. Zuraida claimed that the government took from 17 to 500 days to channel the allocation of RM2.4 million to the deserving recipients (Zuraida Kamaruddin, DR.8.12.2010).

Questions also raised by MPs regarding the methods employed by Putrajaya to empower the poor groups. Abdul Hadi Awang, the Marang MP, questioned the methods used by the government in implementing some policies to enhance the socio-economic status of poor citizens. He argued that budget allocation was not good enough if the body that managed a particular program

failed to deliver it. He claimed that MAPEN had not carried out their duties effectively and the modus operandi of MAPEN was different from what had been agreed upon during the policy-making process. Hadi claimed that the initial modus operandi involved and engaged different stakeholders such as state agencies, opposition parties, academicians and NGOs (Abdul Hadi Awang, DR.30.04.2008).

The competing and overlapping tasks by various state agencies of the different ministries were perceived by MPs as a mechanism for the politicians to get more government projects through the government programs. Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, the Permatang Pauh MP, agreed that the NEP had contributed to the development and reduction of poverty in Malaysia. She, however, urged the government to re-examine any policy resemblance to the NEP as they had become a factor that had nourished cronyism, manipulation, and the self-serving abuse of power amongst the elite politicians. She argued that it was about time that the affirmative action policies included all marginalised citizens in Malaysia.

[This] is very unfortunate for Bumiputera when only a minority of the rich [Bumiputera] urge [the NEP] to continue. What we must care about is the future of the majority of Bumiputera – Malays in villages, Kadazan, Murut, Iban, Bidayuh and others in remote rural areas and along the coast. Any new approach to tackle poverty has to take into account the poor and marginalised Chinese and Indians as well (Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, DR.05.05.2008).

Under the NEP, the government focus for poverty eradication was mainly in the rural constituencies, especially from the 1970s through the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the focus has shifted to include the urban constituencies as well because of the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation that was highly concentrated in the major urban areas such as Klang Valley, Penang and Johor. The rapid industrialisation and urbanisation has driven the steady internal migration of the rural citizens to urban constituencies. The population concentration and the high cost of living in the major urban areas like Kuala Lumpur/Klang Valley, Johor Bahru and George Town has

created housing problems which has contributed to the emergence of relative poverty in today's Malaysia, even if absolute poverty has been dramatically reduced.

ACROSS THE DEVIDE: THE VOICE OF *DEWAN RAKYAT*

The poverty eradication programmes have always been a top-down approach in Malaysia. Although Malaysia is a federal state, Putrajaya (previously Kuala Lumpur) has always played a vital role to govern the poverty issues. Between 1990 and 2012, there were two programmes that had been established by the federal government to eradicate poverty that directly impacted upon hardcore families in Malaysia. The two programmes were the Development Program for the Hard core Poor or Program Pembangunan Rakyat Termiskin (PPRT) and *e-Kasih*. Prior to the 21st century, generally the aid given under this program was in the form of one-off-aid, and did not contribute to value-added activities or proper vocational training. However, the strategy has been since changed through the provision of better technical skills and vocational training support, in order to ensure the sustainability of recipients' abilities to cope and adopt with the changes in life-style and surroundings as Malaysia continues to develop.

In April 2008, Muhammed Muhamad Taib, the Minister of the MoRRD, informed *Dewan Rakyat* that Putrajaya was focused on six core strategies to tackle poverty eradication in rural constituencies. The first strategy focused on upgrading the quality of basic infrastructure, and social utilities and amenities such as the road system, alternative roads for villages, water and electrical supplies. The second focused on eradicating hard core poverty via development schemes for people and mega agricultural projects of the agropolitan. Third, intensifying the human capital development for rural citizens through vocational training and along with the fourth, integration of development programmes for isolated and underdeveloped villages were both key strategies for increasing value-added activities within the program. The fifth strategy was to narrow the digital gap between the rural

and urban areas by providing infrastructure and info-structure such as information technology (IT) centres in villages and rural districts, while the sixth and final strategies were to develop industry based on the agropolitan project (Mohammed Muhamad Taib, DR.30.04.2008).

The six core strategies were the continuation of previous government strategies in responding to citizens' demands by intensifying the development of basic infrastructure, utilities, rural information and communications technology (ICT) programmes, and so forth (Muhammed Mohammad Taib, DR.20.05.2008). The MoRRD claimed that providing basic infrastructure and amenities to rural areas was on track as the supply coverage for treated water in the rural areas in the Peninsular was 97 per cent, while it was 63 per cent in Sabah and 62 per cent in Sarawak. The supply of electricity to rural areas in the Peninsular was 99 per cent, in Sabah it was 76.26 per cent and in Sarawak 84.08 per cent. Finally, the coverage of roads that were sealed roads (excluding highways) in rural areas in the Peninsular was 95 per cent, in Sabah 40 per cent, and in Sarawak this figure was 34 per cent in 2007 (Muhammed Mohammad Taib, DR.20.05.2008).

It has become the duty for MPs to disseminate information about state programs on combating poverty in Malaysia to citizens and providing the lists of poor citizens to the government agencies. MPs have been one of the backbones to trace and give feedback to the government agencies. MPs helped their constituents by providing lists of the needy to the federal government. MPs' offices have been responsible for combating poverty with programs such as the PPRT, *e-Kasih* and the *Projek Cari* (the Search Project) that target a wide range of welfare dependents, including poor families, single or sick elderly persons, stateless children, ill family members who need treatment, disabled persons who have not registered with the Department of Welfare, depleted households, and households without basic necessities. Zuraida Kamaruddin, the Ampang MP, provided a good example of the above. For example, through *Projek Cari*, Zuraida claimed that she cooperated with the state agencies at federal level to search out and notify the marginalized individuals

or detect isolated cases [which have been overlooked under *e-kasih*] that need assistance. All MPs that I interviewed, regardless of whether they were Barisan Nasional (BN) or PR or in the urban or rural constituencies, have worked with the Welfare Department to focus on poverty eradication in Malaysia within the PPRT and *e-Kasih* programs.

In principle, MPs agreed that the battle to eradicate poverty should not be politicized. They agreed that those who qualified must be helped, regardless of their ethnic background and political affiliations. There should not be special preferences for one particular ethnic group and political allegiance. MPs provided the list of the needy families/individuals to the state agencies. However, they did not have the power to make the final decision or to ensure that the target groups actually receive the help from the agencies as claimed by key informants, Zuraida Kamaruddin, the Ampang MP; Fong Po Kuan, the Batu Gajah MP; and Siti Zailah Mohd Yusoff, the Rantau Panjang MP.

In the early 1990's, the Bukit Mertajam MP, Chian Hen Kai, claimed that the government practiced favouritism based on party alliances in selecting the recipients of poverty programme aids. He claimed that Bumiputera who earned RM5000 had received assistance while some who had earned only RM300 were denied. He, therefore, urged the government to reconsider and change the policy to ensure that only the deserving individuals received help, to ensure political allegiance was not a factor (Chian Hen Kai, DR.02.01.1991).

Although the government denied any political influence in the process of providing assistance to the poor, findings from interviews, on the contrary, reveal that most MPs perceived that poverty assistance delivery and coverage, to some extent, was actually influenced by political allegiance. Interview data indicate that there is a strong consensus amongst opposition MPs that the government gives priority to the BN constituencies. MPs from the opposition felt that it was always about the government constituencies and the opposition constituencies. Potential recipients are often scrutinised first

before receiving assistance. The opposition MPs also claimed that opposition party members often did not get help from the government agencies even though they are supposed to be non-partisan. Furthermore, all opposition MPs suggested that the poverty eradication policy had been abused by UMNO elite for its own vested interests.

Raja Ahmad Zainuddin Raja Omar, the Larut MP, is an example of how an MP urged political allegiance as a must criteria to decide on the allocation of government resources to citizens. He suggested that the government should carry out studies to ensure that opposition supporters amongst the low income groups did not get assistance under the PPRT project. He expressed his frustration in the *Dewan Rakyat* because the poor families who supported the opposition were amongst the recipients of the PPRT program (Raja Ahmad Zainuddin Raja Omar, DR.23.02.2000). However, the Deputy MoRRD, G. Palanivel explained that poverty eradication did not take political allegiance into account (G. Palanivel, DR.23.02.2000).

The opposition MPs' claim that only their constituencies had been discriminated against by the government is arguably inaccurate. Hansard indicate that the government constituencies in East Malaysia were also fighting to get better treatment from the federal government. This argument is based on the consistency of pledges and statements of frustration made by the government MPs of Sabah and Sarawak in parliament. The Sabah and Sarawak MPs claimed that there was always a tendency for the federal government to be deliberately selective and biased in providing assistance to combat poverty, whether this was a regional or ethnic bias.

POVERTY DEBATES: THE "EVOLUTION"

Prior to Malaysia's 12th General Election (2008), based on data extracted from the Hansard, the *Dewan Rakyat* was functioning more as a venue for government briefing their agenda and success rather than debating the national issues. However, the debate cultures had changed gradually since then, especially under the fifth Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad

Badawi (2003-2009) who allowed parliament to be more "transparent and independent". During Mahathir tenure as the Prime Minister (1981-2003), Hansard data indicate that in parliament, as expected, the cabinet tended to use the *Dewan Rakyat* to brief and inform MPs what the federal government has done and how successful the poverty eradication programs were, rather than re-evaluate and advocate the discussed programs. Depending on the MP's political party affiliation, generally MPs had tendency to echo the cabinet's agenda if they were government MPs, and criticised it if they were opposition MPs.

Prior to 2008, Hansard data suggest that often MPs echoed government explanations during parliamentary sittings. For example, Che Ibrahim Mustaffa, the Sungai Petani MP, simply praised the government by repeating what the government had delivered through the budget. Che Ibrahim Mustaffa said the government had done a great job by repeating what the minister had informed the parliament about, such as RM6 billion allocations for poverty eradication programme in rural districts: RM80 million for the subsidy scheme for paddy fertilisers, RM12 million for fishermen and farmers, RM416 million for new settlements, restructuring land use and replanting the rubber trees, RM346 million for water supply, and RM16 million for electricity supply in rural districts (Che Ibrahim Mustaffa, DR.02.01.1991).

The questions asked by MPs were rather standard during parliamentary sittings. MPs asked what the government had done to tackle poverty and to lessen citizens' burden when the oil price was increasing globally (Razali Ibrahim, DR.30.04.2008). This type of question is often answered by cabinet ministers using a standard format, such as making reference to the government reviewing mid-term budget of the Malaysia Plan. For example, when the oil price reached US\$120 per barrel on the international market in 2008, the cabinet informed the *Dewan Rakyat* that the government would undertake a mid-term review of the 9MP. Parliament approved RM4 billion under the scope of people oriented budget to subsidize basic needs such as rice, flour, cooking oil and so forth as well as construction materials to ensure the upgrading

of infrastructure projects in rural constituencies and the construction of low-cost flats for poor citizens were not affected (Abdullah Badawi, DR.30.04.2008). This trend, however, has changed since the 12th Parliament. In the first sitting of the first term of the 12th Parliamentary debates, issues of poverty and up-graded quality of life dominated the concerns of opposition MPs of DAP, PAS and PKR.

In between 1990 and 2013, poverty issues in East Malaysia, especially in Sabah, were constantly highlighted by MPs in parliament. Their concerns were focused on the problems related to the lack of infrastructure, or facilities for better living conditions and activities to boost the economy. Meanwhile, the MPs of *Semenanjung* (Peninsular Malaysia) had moved toward discussing a new type of poverty, which is relative poverty. This kind of poverty has risen because of the rapid urbanisation process and the global impacts on the Malaysian economy of certain types of increased trade opening. MPs felt that hard core poverty was not a major issue in many constituencies in the Peninsular, but it was in rural Sabah and Sarawak. However, these MPs perceived that the high level of income inequality was becoming a significant problem, especially in the urban constituencies.

Rather different than the BN MPs from *Semenanjung*, Hansard data reveal that the government MPs of Sabah and Sarawak have taken a different tone when questioning government programs and policies. Their behavior in questioning the government's promises to citizens is actually inclined towards and similar to that of the opposition MPs in parliament. For example, the Tanjung Manis MP, Norah Abdul Rahman, questioned the federal government's perception about the status and significance of East Malaysia. She felt the federal government had ignored East Malaysia in terms of economic development (Norah Abdul Rahman, DR.05.05.2008). She was not alone as the MPs of Kinabatangan, Kalabakan, Gaya and Batang Sadong were amongst the most active legislators who advocated citizens' concerns, demands and frustrations in the parliament. MPs from Sabah and Sarawak felt that East Malaysia had been sidelined and the East Malaysia was

the *Cinderella* in the federation. Analysis based on Hansard records show that often the MPs from East Malaysia were skeptical about cabinet answers in parliament.

Abdul Ghapur Salleh of Kalabakan was one of the BN MPs that had consistently advocated and disputed the government programmes on poverty eradication in the *Dewan Rakyat*. Frustrated with the rhetoric, he suggested that the cabinet should visit the poor constituencies in Malaysia rather than rely on data provided by officials. He claimed that poverty in Sabah was at 24 per cent of its population and 800 per cent higher than poverty at the national level (Abdul Ghapur Salleh, DR.12.05.2008). The Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister's Office, S.K. Devamany informed parliament that the government only provided assistance to poor families and responded to citizens' demands based on data and statistics provided by the state agencies (S.K.Devamany, DR.12.05.2008). However, as argued by MPs of East Malaysia, statistics did not always portray the actual situation (Bung Mokhtar Radin, DR18.02.2009; Lau Ngau Siew, DR21.02.2000). The Batang Sadong MP urged Putrajaya to pay closer attention to her constituency as the reality was worse than what statistical data suggested (Nancy Shukri, DR.07.05.2008).

The common answer given by the minister in the *Dewan Rakyat* is that the government always allocates a bigger budget to Sabah and Sarawak than other states in the Peninsular. For example, the Minister of Integration, Culture, Arts and Heritage, Mohd Shafie Apdal denied that East Malaysia had been sidelined from the major development by Putrajaya. Shafie stated that both Sabah and Sarawak had been allocated a bigger budget in the 9MP compared to the 8MP. The allocation for Sabah, which was RM15.7 billion or 7.8% in the 9MP against RM13.2 billion in the previous 8MP, was the highest amongst the 13 states in Malaysia. Meanwhile, Sarawak received RM13.4 billion or 6.7% in the 9MP compared to RM12.8 billion in the 8MP. Mohd Shafie explained to the parliament that RM189 million was allocated for Sabah to tackle poverty amongst the Bumiputera with emphasis given to Orang Sungai, Rungus, Bisayah, Suluk and

Sulu. Meanwhile RM139 million was allocated to Sarawak to help poor Bumiputera there, in particular amongst the Bidayuh, Kenyah, Kayan, Kadayan, Penan and Luang Bawan (Mohd Shafie Apdal, DR.05.05.2008).

CONCLUSION

The *Dewan Rakyat* Hansard provides new insights of the unexplored poverty polemics in Malaysia. The parliament proceedings indicate the complexity of the poverty issues and politics in Malaysia. Within the time framework of this article, the 12th parliament became the era where the MPs across the divide questioned and challenged the federal government more openly in the parliament related to the affirmative action in combating poverty in Malaysia. I employ qualitative research technique of archival research to examine how MPs, to some extent, are still impartial in undertaking their role as citizen representatives. That is to say that the Malaysian MPs are not always constrained by partisan interests when debating poverty issues in the *Dewan Rakyat*. Contrary to the popular perception that the role of the *Barisan Nasional* MPs as a “rubber stamp” to the federal government, I argue that they had been given a “venue” to question the authority related to the poverty issues in the Malaysian Parliament. However, they still faced some limitations as to in-line and coherent with the government agenda since the poverty policies in Malaysia had always using top-down approach. Based on the Hansard data, MPs agreed in general that the federal government was able to address and reduce, over time, the hardcore poverty and restructure society in Malaysia, even if they had misgivings about the implementation of the NEP.

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THE LIFE OF MUSLIM INDONESIAN STUDENTS IN GERMANY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

KEHIDUPAN PELAJAR MUSLIM INDONESIA DI JERMAN: TANTANGAN DAN PELUANG

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Diterima: 10-08-2017

Direvisi: 20-09-2017

Disetujui: 10-11-2017

ABSTRAK

Imigrasi orang-orang yang melekat pada agama tertentu di negara yang mana sebagian besar penduduknya tidak memeluk agama yang sama selalu menjadi topik yang menarik untuk dieksplor, terutama ketika menyangkut wacana mobilitas siswa di dunia pendidikan tinggi. Banyak faktor harus diperhitungkan sebelum seseorang membuat keputusan ke negara mana untuk melanjutkan studi. Sebagai umat Islam yang mematuhi nilai-nilai agamanya, setiap faktor yang mendukung kesalahan seseorang akan dipertimbangkan. Studi ini mengeksplorasi kehidupan pelajar Indonesia Muslim yang belajar di Jerman. Studi ini berangkat dari motivasi belajar, konsep push dan pull factor yang kemudian diperkaya dengan perspektif agama. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan bahwa meskipun ada tantangan yang dihadapi para siswa ini sebagai seorang Muslim, namun masih ada peluang menarik yang mereka alami ketika tinggal di Jerman yang kemudian dianggap sangat penting dalam kaitannya dengan keislaman mereka. Menyadari pentingnya wacana semacam ini bagi para imigran Indonesia, baik itu mahasiswa maupun non-pelajar, maka perlu penelitian lebih lanjut dengan topik yang sama.

Kata kunci: Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, Jerman, push-pull factor, pendidikan tinggi, haji

ABSTRACT

Immigration of people attached to a certain religion in a country where most of the population do not embrace the same religion has always been an interesting topic to explore, especially when it is regarding the discourse of student mobility in higher education world. A lot of factors must be taken into account before one makes a decision on which country to continue the study. As Muslims adhere to certain religious values, any factor that supports one's pioucity would be ideally weighed. This study explores the life of Muslim Indonesian students studying in Germany. Departing from the study motivation, the concept of push and pull factor is then enriched with religious perspectives. The research findings show that even though there are challenges that these students face as a Muslim, there is still an interesting opportunity that they have experienced when residing in Germany and later deem most significant in relation to their Islamicity. Realizing the importance of this kind of discourse for Indonesian immigrants, be it student or non-student, a suggestion of further research under the same topic is emphasized.

Keywords: Germany, hajj, higher education, Muslim Indonesian student, push-pull factor

INTRODUCTION

Immigration has been a major factor that shapes the Muslim population in Germany today. The first Muslims to come to Germany in large numbers were the guest workers from Turkey who started to arrive in the 1960s (Keller, 2017). The peak of the migration was between 1971 and 1973 during which around half a million of Turkish labours came (Kilinc, 2014, 5). In 1973, following the economic recession, the recruitment was banned but at the same period, the government introduced family reunification law allowing Turkish immigrants to bring their spouses and non-adult children (Oner, 2014, 72). Therefore, Turkish immigrants are currently considered the largest minority group in Germany constituting 2.4% of the total population; while German makes up 91.5 % (CIA World Factbook, 2018). In terms of religion, Germany is a Muslim-minority country with only 4.4% of the total population embracing Islam— compared to the adherents of Roman Catholic that make up 29% and Protestant that have 27% (CIA World Factbook, 2018¹). In fact, 50.6% of those Muslims are of Turkey origin (Keller, 2017).

Interestingly, dating back again in the early 1970s, Indonesians were the second largest group of foreign students in Germany after the Turkish (Welcker, 2016, 9). Although 87,2% of the total population in Indonesia are Muslim (CIA World Factbook, 2018²), Welcker (2016, 16) wrote that Christians make up less than 60% of total Indonesian immigrants in Germany³. Their presence could be explained by the fact that, in the past, it is mainly Indonesians with sufficient financial means who were able to come to Germany for study and these often have been Christian Chinese-Indonesians (Welcker, 2016). In 2015, there are 3,626 Indonesian students studying in Germany (DAAD, cited from Lestari 2016). Within this number, it is believed that the disparity of the religious belief of the students

¹ Estimation in 2015

² Estimation in 2010

³ Unfortunately, Welcker does not put the exact year of the statistics in his writing. Also, there is no accurate figure. It was based on an interview with Deutsch Indonesische Gesellschaft (Indonesian Community in Germany, DIG) Cologne in 2015. However, this rather intriguing finding is still included here.

might be varied as today there are more ways to reach Germany besides self-funding scheme, i.e. scholarship⁴ – making the opportunity to study abroad becomes more open.

The question drawn from the description above is what will happen to the Muslim Indonesian students that undergo the change of status from being part of the Muslim-majority society in Indonesia to become members of Muslim-minority community in Germany. How do they then make their adjustment process in the new country? What kind of challenges do they face? More importantly, what kind of experiences do they find in Germany that might not be found in Indonesia but are worthy to share? After all, to what extent will they still recommend Germany to their Muslim colleagues in Indonesia – who are in search of country destination for study – among other Muslim-minority countries?

Taking the results of interviews made with five Muslim Indonesian students as the source of empirical data, this article departs from the common motivation that they have when choosing Germany as their destination country for study. Then their life as a Muslim in Germany will be explored to see if Germany has special condition that could be another point of attraction for Muslims to decide the country as their study destination. This article attempts to contribute to existing literature on push and pull factor of a country as a study destination by employing Muslims' point of view in the discussion. The findings found in this research can serve as a reference for any Muslim Indonesian student before selecting a study destination country. Divided into three broad sections, the first section of this article contains the theoretical and methodological framework of the study providing a review of related literature and the data collection process. The second section presents the findings and discussion of the study. While the last section carries out a brief conclusion and suggestion for future study having the same topic.

⁴ DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), offers a vast number and types of funding opportunities and programs to foreign students so that they can study, research, and gain practical experience in Germany (Comp, 2010: 197). Popular scholarships given by Indonesian government are LPDP, *Beasiswa Unggulan*, and DIKTI (Arta 2016).

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Theoretical Framework

Two main concepts are highlighted in this research, those are the discourse of push-pull factor and third space. Those concepts suit the discussion about study abroad program very well since they cover both pre- and post-departure phase of the students. A lot of consideration must be taken even before a decision on where to study is made. The kind of goals that they want to achieve in the future becomes part of the reasons of why the students should study overseas and not remain in their country of origin. To elaborate the process of selecting a study destination, Mazzarol and Soutar (2002, 83) break it down into three stages. The first stage involves the identification of the students' "push" factor – referring to the condition in their country of origin that triggers them to study abroad, for instance, the lack of quality that universities in the country of origin offer (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002). In the second stage, the students identify the "pull" factor within the destination country, meaning they search for the factors that make the country more attractive than another (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002). After being finished with the search stage, they choose an institution as the final step (Mazzarol and Soutar 2002; Sasson, 2017, 182).

Mazzarol and Soutar (2002, 83) elaborate the second stage further into six "pull" factors that could influence students' decision on selecting the study destination. The first factor deals with the students' level of *knowledge and awareness* of the destination country that is much influenced by the availability of information about the destination country (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002, 83). The second is any *personal recommendation* about the destination country received from other people; while the third is about *cost issues*, be it financial costs or social costs as in the case of racial discrimination (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002, 83). *Environment* such as physical climate or lifestyle in the destination country becomes the fourth factor to influence (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002, 83). The fifth factor is *geographic proximity* of the destination country to the country of origin;

and the final factor is related to *social links* as in whether there has been friends or families that have the experience of living or studying in the destination country (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2002, 83). The concept of pull factor here will be applied in the discussion section to see any aspect that makes Germany more attractive as a study destination in the point of view of a Muslim.

Furthermore, once students are finally abroad, they will find exposures that might not be found in their country of origin. For Muslim students who move from a country where the religion is the majority, like Indonesia, to a Muslim-minority country, in this case Germany, the change of that status will enhance their understanding because of the new experiences they find in the new space. This kind of space is, based on Bill Ashcroft, also referred as "a transcultural space, a 'contact zone,' . . . that space in which cultural identity develops" (2009, 108, cited from Ghasemi, 2017, 25). When having such space, students can have more reflection on themselves that later allows them to have greater chance to undergo self-development process (Carlson et al., 2016). Bhabha suggested that this happened because people have the opportunity to take new positionings between themselves and the other (1994, cited from Zubair et al., 2017, 19) which later, to put it in the context of Muslim students, results in the stimulation of their intellectual and religious development (Carlson et al., 2016, 57). The post-departure phase encountered by the Muslim students is then evaluated to learn whether the experiences in the destination country are worth sharing or not. The discussion about third space will be directly related to the topic of the performance of Hajj – an experience in which all participants in this study deem as the most valuable one – by exploring the narration given by the students and see how they make meanings of the Hajj pilgrimage.

Methodological Framework

Primary and secondary data are used in this research. While the secondary data were collected from sources such as government publications, websites, journal articles and

book chapters, the primary data were gathered through a series of interviews and a utilization of simple questionnaire. Bearing the above research questions and theoretical framework in mind, open-ended and in-depth interviews were considered the most suitable approach to explore the experiences of each participant. A list of semi-structured questions was prepared before the interviews but rather as a guidance that could be visited once a question was done answered by the participants. Questions focused on the: challenges, difficulties, and positive experiences when living in Germany; the Hajj experience of the participants; and the extent of their personal recommendation for any Indonesian Muslim student intending to study abroad after taking the opportunity to perform the Hajj from Germany into consideration.

The technique of simple random sampling was employed within the population of ‘Muslim Indonesians who were active students enrolled at a university in Germany and have had performed the Hajj during their study’. As a result, five students are set as samples in this study, but their names are kept anonymous to give them more freedom when answering the given questions. The contacts of four participants were collected from the database of the former Hajj performers that Indonesian Hajj service provider in Germany, FORKOM⁵, has, while one was from the author’s personal acquaintance. All of them are students in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) fields. They are,

- Participant 1: a 24-year-old female bachelor student studying at Humboldt University of Berlin and performed Hajj in 2016.
- Participant 2: a 24-year-old female bachelor student studying at Julius Liebig University of Giessen and performed Hajj in 2016.
- Participant 3: a 26-year-old male master student studying at Hafencity

University of Hamburg and performed Hajj in 2017.

- Participant 4: a 31-year-old doctorate student studying at Goethe University of Frankfurt and performed Hajj in 2017.
- Participant 5: a 38-year-old doctorate student studying at RWTH Aachen and performed Hajj in 2016.

Four interviews were made using online phone call and one was via direct meeting. They lasted between 15 and 45 minutes, were not audio-recorded but the answers were written down during interview. To ensure that all participants approve the way the data are presented, this article was distributed to them first before being submitted.

In addition to the qualitative interviewing method above, a small portion of quantitative approach is also applied in this research in form of a simple questionnaire to enrich the collection of data. The questionnaire was developed using Google Forms with only three questions to fill. The first question is an open-ended question asking about “the students’ motivation for studying in Germany”; while the second and third question are modelled after the five-point Likert scale that was used to measure the level of agreement or disagreement of the participant for the following statements: a) Living in Germany as a Muslim is not difficult and b) The easiness of performing the Hajj from Germany can be taken into consideration by any Indonesian who wants to continue their study in a Muslim-minority country. In the one-to-five scale, point 1 stands for ‘strongly disagree’ and point 5 is for ‘strongly agree’. Quantitative element added here is only with an intention to complement the qualitative data gathered from the interviews so that the author could avoid subjectivity when assessing the degree of the attitude of the participants towards two statements above that were also asked during the interview. Although the quantitative data were not analysed statistically due to the small number of the participants involved, pointing out the attitude of the participants toward two statements above using numbers that represent their level of agreement or disagreement helps the author to

⁵ FORKOM (Forum for Communication of Muslim Indonesian Community in Germany) was founded in Karlsruhe in 1994 as an initiative from some Indonesian Muslim students. Not only does it bridge communication between Islamic lectures across Germany, but it also facilitates people intending to perform Hajj and Umrah during their residency in Germany as it has cooperation with a Turkish travel agent, Balcock

come up with clearer data representation. After all, the findings will be analysed by categorizing the given answers based on the broader theme each answer belongs to and applying the theoretical framework mentioned above. Also, it is important to realize that due to the small number of participants, the results of this study cannot be generalised.

DISCUSSION

Participants' (Common) Motivation for Studying in Germany

Almost every academic discipline in Germany has a long and outstanding tradition of success. In addition to that, Luget (2014) mentions two reasons keeping Germany attractive as a destination country for study: first, excellent higher education staff members and infrastructure, and, second, no tuition fees at public universities. Based on the data gathered, four of five participants in this study have their motivation resonated with the first reason. While Participant 2 said it as “very good education quality”, Participant 3, 4, 5 testified for the advancement of technology as the pull factor that attracts them to coming to Germany to which Participant 3 specifically praised its advancement of the field of renewable energy and modern geomatics. In this part, the pull factor mentioned is about *knowledge and awareness* of the destination country, meaning that the participants were aware of the reputation for the quality of the education in Germany (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2012, 83).

Furthermore, Participant 3, combined with the statement of Participant 4, referred Germany's economic development as another consideration when deciding it as their study destination. This is true as Germany ranks fourth in both world's rankings of Human Development Index and Gross Domestic Product (UNDP, 2018; World Bank, 2016). This strong economy guarantees the students to enjoy the free tuition fee available at the public universities. “The cost for studying in Germany is not as expensive as other [first] countries,” Participant 2 supported this after making comparison to Singapore and Australia. As presented in the first section,

cost issues can also become another factor that influence students' decision when selecting a study destination (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2012, 83), and in here, financial costs are taken into consideration by the three participants. Meanwhile, Participant 1 stated that she did not choose Germany but rather followed her father who had to bring his family with him by reason of continuing his study in the country. Though the pull factor might not come from the internal side of the student, but the *social links* factor, “related to whether a student has family living in the destination country” (Mazzarol and Soutar, 2012, 83), happened to be the reason of Participant 1 studying in Germany. On another occasion, Participant 2 interestingly mentioned the presence of Turkish immigrants as another factor that motivates her to choose Germany as destination country. The implication of this relates to her religious factor, which is the fourth factor according to Mazzarol and Soutar namely *environment* (2012, 83). She believed that their presence could support her religious life as a Muslim that requires her to follow the lifestyle that goes along with the Islamic values. In short, each participant in this study has their own concern when it comes to motivation for studying in Germany, be it educational, economic, social, or religious factor.

The Life of Muslim Indonesia Students in Germany

Mosques and *halal* food – two things mentioned in the interviews – are the easiness that most Muslims living in Germany today can enjoy as the early immigrants already paved the way for them. As explained by Participant 4 who had the experience living in Spain, France, and the United Kingdom when doing his master, living in Germany – in this case, Frankfurt – as a Muslim is considerably easier compared to those three previous countries because of the large number of Turkish immigrants present in the city. “Back in the United Kingdom and France, I was in cities that have less access to mosques and *halal* food. I think it is not easy to find a city that is more Muslim-friendly than Frankfurt,” he added. Participant 5 supported the view that living in Germany as a Muslim is regarded easier

as sometimes he still can pray five times a day at mosque since in Aachen, there are at least five big mosques that are always busy during the prayer times. However, still, being compared to the situation that one finds in Indonesia, in Participant 4's words, "where one can spot mosques by walking (at least in the Island of Java)", finding a place to pray is somehow quite a challenge. Participant 3 also recounted that when he was at the campus and there was no mosque nearby, the students prayed under the stair. "Even when it was for the Friday prayer, Muslim students from different background would gather under the stair and then the Turkish student usually started to take the lead by giving a lecture before the prayer." As a PhD student, for Participant 4, praying when being at the campus could also mean performing the prayer in an office where he shared with his non-Muslim colleague. As he recounted, "sometimes you need to ask for permission to your colleague first before praying. Though, to my experience so far, none of my four previous colleagues ever had a problem with me praying in the office". It is also quite often to have a prayer room that is not only for Muslim as Participant 1 shared her experience of "praying in a *ruheraum* (relaxation room) that is used by all religion".

Regarding food, the participants living in big cities such as Frankfurt, Berlin, and Hamburg basically do not experience any difficulty in finding the *halal*⁶ eatery or butchery since they can easily spot many *halal* shops owned by Muslim immigrants. Kadir mentions what main features that need to be met when identifying whether a food is *halal* or not, that is "one, the *halal* animal, like chicken, sheep and cattle, has to be slaughtered in the Islamic way as prescribed by God, and, two, the food should be acquired through *halal* means" (2008, 103). Nevertheless, Participant 3 noticed that the condition in smaller cities in Germany might be different as they have less *halal* shops. Therefore, one should "make anticipatory adjustments to reduce uncertainty before actually entering the new environment" (Black et al. 1991 cited from Yijälä, 2012, 762). Anticipatory adjustment here refers to any preparation that one makes before moving to the

⁶ Permissible under Islamic law (Kadir, 2008, 93)

new country (Black et al. 1991 cited from Yijälä, 2012, 762). In this occasion, Muslim Indonesian students should equip themselves with some information about the availability of *halal* food in the potential city where they are going to study. In fact, this strategy was applied by Participant 2 where she researched about the availability of the Muslim Indonesian community in Hannover first – a city where she had a test before entering the university – prior to her arrival in Germany. The community that she had contacted before the departure then helped her by showing the locations of mosques that exist in the city. In that way, she can have some knowledge on where to pray or stay active in any kind of Islamic activities and reduce the level of uncertainty to succeed her religious needs. After all, this subsection provides any Indonesian Muslim student who wants to study abroad with an information dealing with the challenges that one might face when studying in Germany and learn how the participants here handled the situation.

Hajj: A Momentous Experience

For Muslims, Mecca is the holiest spot on earth in that those, who have the means both financially and physically, receive the obligation to visit at least once for Hajj as the completion of five Pillars of Islam⁷. There stands the Ka'aba – a point on the globe towards which Muslims around the world face during all their *salat* (prayer) (Kadir, 2008, 61). The Hajj (major pilgrimage) occurs in the month of Dhul Hijjah, the twelfth month of the Islamic lunar calendar (BBC, 2009), while the Umrah (minor pilgrimage) can be performed at any time of the year. During the Hajj period, there are more than two million Muslims gather⁸ while outside the period, thousands of Muslims perform the Umrah everyday (Kadir, 2008, 59). The importance of performing the pilgrimage for Muslims is written on Hughes's work as

Among devotees the prevalent, strongly held belief is that a pilgrimage to a sacred

⁷ The five Pillars of Islam are Faith (witness), Prayer, Charity, Fasting, and the Hajj (Pilgrimage). See Edgar 2002.

⁸ The average of total pilgrims from 2007 to 2016 is 2,393,635 (General Authority for Statistics, KAS, 2018)

centre brings religious merit on the Day of Judgement. ... It is believed that every step taken in the direction of pilgrimage to Mecca washes out a mortal sin (1975, 136, cited from Werbner, 2015, 34).

Hence, it is not surprising that all Muslims regardless of their age would try their best to afford going to pilgrimage, more specifically, the Hajj.

However, as the status of Indonesia is the largest Muslim population in the world – with a total of 222 million Muslims (Muslim Pro, 2018) – the Ministry of Religious Affairs already has its long waiting lists for any Indonesian wanting to register themselves for the Hajj. According to the website of Kemenag, the shortest waiting time for the regular Hajj found to be for the residents of the regency of Southwest Maluku in which the new registrant can depart in 2022 at the earliest (2018). The longest waiting time is for any new registrant in the Sidrap and Bantaeng regency, South Sulawesi, that needs to wait until 2054 for the departure (2018). Meanwhile, the quotas in big provinces such as DKI Jakarta, Central Java and East Java are already booked until 2035, 2038, and 2040 respectively (2018).

In contrast to the situation that Muslim Indonesians face when applying for the Hajj from the country, the findings found in this research show that these Muslim Indonesian students take the benefit of their status as student in a Muslim-minority country. “In Germany, the quota provided is still not fully filled, thus I was still able to apply for the Hajj only one month before the departure. It is impossible to have such situation in Indonesia,” said participant 4 that made the decision only a few months before the embarkation. He said that at that time the quotas at some travel agencies were already full, but he kept looking for any available option until finally he found one. “I am quite sure that as long as the requirements are complete, and the quota is available, even if it is only two weeks before the departure, the bureau would still be likely to proceed”. Different from participant 4 that organized the Hajj using Arabian Travel Agency, participant 3 used the same travel agency as the rest of the participants in 2016 but he registered only a month before the closing date

of registration from the bureau. “I registered in February 2016 and the deadline was in March.”

When asked about tips on choosing a travel agent as the Hajj organizer, participant 5 testified for the advantage of taking a bureau offering guidance in Indonesian language and compared it with the situation that his colleagues – that are also awardees of the same scholarship with him – encountered.

“My colleagues in the UK and Japan also performed the Hajj. However, I would feel insecure if I were them since they needed to organize everything by themselves. While the bureau I chose accompanied us with an Indonesian guide ready waiting for us in Saudi Arabia.”

Participant 2 also suggested any Indonesian wanting to perform the Hajj to choose the bureau she used over other agencies for two reasons. First, for the single women, it is very recommended to use the service of the bureau because they will find them the *Mahram*⁹. “I do not think that Turkish or Arabian travel agency can find an Indonesian a *mahram* for the Hajj pilgrimage.” The second is also about the language reason. She told that her colleagues – though they are spouses – they used another travel agency that did not provide them a guide with Indonesian language proficiency. As a result, when performing the Hajj, they went from one place to another by themselves. “Sure, the travel agency I used charged a little more expensive fees, but the assistance was really worth it.”

As another suggestion, Participant 3 emphasized that the Indonesian students should try to afford to perform the Hajj while they are young and able. “It was my savings from working part-time for a year.” Participant 2 also had to save the money she got from working part-time for three years. “At first I only wanted to perform the Umrah. But, a colleague asked why I did not save the money for the Hajj instead. Since the cost was reasonable¹⁰, I then chose to

⁹ A mahram is an adult of sound mind whom she is forever forbidden to marry because of blood ties or for a permissible reason. His presence is required so that he can look after and protect the woman. Otherwise, the woman is not permitted to travel without a mahram (Salih al-Munajjid 2011).

¹⁰ In 2016, the cost was around 4,800 Euros or around

wait a little longer.” Being seen from the age perspective, this is of course a matter that is worth considering since, according to Kemenag (2008), the age range of 41-50 years old is when most Indonesians apply for the Hajj; and 51-59 years old comes second. 31-40 years old, the age range where two participants of this study belong, ranks the third; while the age range of the rest of the participants, 21-30 years old, comprises only 5.3% of the total applicants. Seeing that the waiting time for these applicants ranges from five up to thirty-five years, an opportunity to perform the Hajj while studying abroad might be another pull factor to be considered for any Muslim student when digging for information about a destination country.

What makes the discourse about Hajj more interesting is because of the effect brought by the performance itself in which one could then reflect on his/her religiosity following the completion of the ritual. *Tawaf* – the act of going around the Ka’aba seven times in an anti-clockwise direction which becomes first act of the pilgrim upon arrival in Mecca and the final act before leaving it (Kadir, 2008, 67) – is one of the most notable moments referred by participants in this study when being asked about their memory of the pilgrimage. Participant 2, 4, and 5 similarly expressed that the *ta’waf* was a great reminder for them not to be arrogant at anything. Simply put, being in the middle of millions of Muslims makes Participant 5 think that he has nothing to boast about, especially recalling his status in Germany as a doctorate student. “I have a very limited knowledge about Islam, and hence, still need to learn everything from the basic including how to read the Qur’an.” While in Participant 2 and 4’s words, *ta’waf* reminds them that anything they own today is only God’s possession and human beings are only given a chance to have it temporarily in this world. Having exposure on a series of rituals performed collectively during the Hajj is another moment that the participants deemed as a reminder that they then carry the

80,000,000 Rupiahs. While in 2018, FORKOM announced the price of the Hajj that is 5,200 Euros or around 6,5 million Rupiahs more. As a comparison, the price of Hajj plus in Indonesia per 2018 is around 138 – 151 million Rupiahs with an estimated waiting time of 7-8 years after the application made (Arminareka 2018).

responsibility to become a better Muslim with the status of Hajj labelled on them. More expectation is given, as experienced by Participant 3 who is getting more invitation after returning from the pilgrimage being asked to share his knowledge for the Indonesian community in Hamburg. “Through the talks, I encourage the older people to perform the Hajj sooner.” Participant 4 echoes this view by stating that he feels relieved because he has completed all the five pillars of Islam in which the Hajj might be a special case since it starts to become obligatory for those who are financially able. Finally, an expectation to visit Mecca again is what was mentioned by Participant 2 and 3 that regard the pilgrimage as an exceptional marker in relation to their identity as a Muslim. As Participant 2 explained, “I know about the Prophet Muhammad p.b.u.h. before but have never felt so close to him until I visited the Mecca and really felt the loss.” While, Participant 3 keeps being reminded of the journey anytime he hears prayer call and prays in group. In short, the Hajj experience successfully leads the performers to enjoy a different level of religiosity that might imply to an inspiration where one wants to develop a new religious lifestyle afterwards (Buitelaar 2015, 17-18). Considering the huge impact of the ritual to the performers, the possibility of performing the Hajj while young and studying might be considered as value-added which one could take into consideration especially when setting up targets alongside educational agendas which then would imply to the discourse of push-pull factor of a study destination country and the country of origin of the students.

Do We Recommend Germany? Keeping the Hajj in Perspective

Before stepping into the discussion of whether these participants recommend Germany as a study destination, the responses gathered from the questionnaire will be discussed first. Three students agree with the statement saying that ‘living in Germany as a Muslim is not difficult’ – while one disagrees, and one answers neutral. Based on the interview, the challenges that the participants ever faced include topics such as, one, the struggle when one wants to

follow the commands of Allah, two, prejudice against Muslim, and, three, seasonal variation.

The first is the experience of Participant 2 in relation to her field of study that is medicine. “Due to hygienic reason, I was asked to remove my headscarf when entering the surgery room. I refused and asked them to give me a sterile cloth instead,” she recounted the moment she needed to join a practicum at her department. Also, when applying for a part-time job at a hospital, it was quite difficult for her unless she applied for a job at a Catholic hospital because they still tolerate headscarf. While for male immigrants, the challenge mentioned is about the activity they have at Friday noon that conflicts the time for obligatory Friday prayer. Unlike in Indonesia where everyone is given a pause during that specific prayer time, since Germany is not a Muslim-majority country, it is understandable that the government do not accommodate this issue in social policy (Boz et al., 2012, 99). The solution is the mosques in Germany usually have two turns for the prayer with the approximate interval of one hour. It is either due to the small size of the mosques in that they cannot accommodate all the worshipers at the same time or the time for break of the people working does not match the time for Friday prayer. “For instance, they have Friday prayer at 1 p.m. and again at 2 p.m., and we do not do this in Indonesia. There we have it only for one time,” Participant 3 said.

The second, prejudice against Muslim, is also experienced by Participant 2. Relevant with Wilamowitz-Moellendorff’s findings stating that “prejudice is more common among persons with lower educational levels” (2003, 14, cited from Rosenow-Williams, 2012, 142), she, who lives in Giessen – a considerably smaller region compared to where other participants live – was once yelled at by an adult when she was riding a bicycle. “A woman in veil riding a bicycle!” she recalled. Participant 3 believed that prejudice is felt more by the Muslim women as they wear a ‘visually identifiable’ veil (Rosenow-Williams, 2012).

“In big cities, the people are socially better, more educated and tolerant. Some even

admire Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him I believe. Maybe it would be different if it is in (ex)-Eastern Germany. Shortly, men do not suffer much since our appearance is not so different from the society,” (personal interview with Participant 3)

This is in line with the findings of Rosenow-Williams declaring that “prejudices are more dominant in the Eastern German states, where direct contact with Muslims is much rarer in those areas” (2012, 143). Correspondingly, the statistics in 2014 also show that only “around 9% of total Indonesians in Germany residing in the Eastern part of the country” (Welcker, 2016, 12). Thus, the information that should be highlighted by any Muslim female student who wants to study in Germany is regarding to the choice of the city where the destination institution is located.

The last challenge is the seasonal variation that affects not only the prayer times but also the fasting hours during Ramadan. Different from the prayer times in Indonesia that are relatively unchanging, the Muslims living in Europe need to adjust themselves with the schedule that fluctuates as sunrise and sunset times change. Participant 5 noticed that even though Muslims can pray Fajr quite later which is at 6 a.m. or 7 a.m. during the winter but since the temperature is very low, it is still quite challenging for him personally to go outside and pray at a mosque due to the coldness. Conversely, even though it is not cold during the summer, but he has to pray around 4 in the morning that makes it a challenge again for him to wake up and go to the mosque “especially after staying up at night waiting for Isha that comes around 11 p.m.”. However, this brings these participants to experience a jurisprudence of Muslim minorities that they might not possible to apply in Indonesia with the exact same reason, namely significant change of prayer times. Participant 3 explained that since the night time in summer is shorter, there are some people that pray Isha right after finishing the Maghrib prayer because they need to have some extra hours for sleep before waking up at 3 or 4 a.m for the Fajr prayer. In winter, though people are awake during the day but due to the rush hours, they also combine the Dzuhur and ‘Asr considering that the interval is very short¹¹.

¹¹ The shortest interval of the prayer times during the day in

Another ritual that is also challenged by the seasonal variation is fasting. “When Ramadan happens to be in summer, then the Muslims will have to fast for a longer period¹²,” Participant 4 added. Here, despite the challenges above, such experiences are what Carlson et al. refers as “the advancement of [one]’s intercultural understanding and a vision of the harmonious co-existence of people” (2016, 57). In this context, the discourse on ‘third space’ is very applicable since these students were situated in a space that made them experience different cultures due to the difference of ethnic group composition within the society and geographical location. In effect, the students have more chance to undertake the self-development process by reflecting these phenomena on themselves.

Going deeper to the concept of third space, besides the Hajj, these participants also discover experiences that might not be found in Indonesia, yet in fact resulted in more religious development process. Participant 2 becomes more aware of her religion when she lives abroad. “When I was in Indonesia, I was quite ignorant. But when moving to Germany, I started to study more about Islam and get involved in Islamic activities more frequently such as becoming the committee of mosque and part of team of donation-seeker”, she recounted. This possibility to change the lifestyle that one usually has into a new one resonates the findings in Carlson and Jacobsson’s work proving that study abroad can apparently be “a reflexive emotional identity project” (2016). Not limited to internal turning point events, witnessing other people turning point is also of an amazement for Participant 3. As he informed, “in Hamburg, I saw some Germans converted to Islam. I was amazed because they were enthusiastic in learning about the religion.” Similarly, Participant 4 also said that seeing a process of conversion is one of his most impressive experiences in which, to his observation, this kind of phenomenon is

2017 happened in December with Dzuhur at 12.20, Asr at 14.06, Maghrib at 16.23 and Isha at 17.50. While in summer, the latest Isha prayer was at 23.08 – with Maghrib at 21.40 and Fajr at 03.48 (IIS, 2017).

¹² The longest in 2017 was when they had to stop eating at 03.47 and broke the fast at 21.40. Relatively shorter compared to the fasting time in Jakarta at the same date in 2017 in which the Muslims could still eat until 04.41 and had the break at 17.51.

more findable in Germany than Indonesia. In the same positive fashion, Participant 5 recalled that his participation in *lailatul qadr* events (i.e. *itikaf*¹³) was remarkable because back then in his hometown, Pekanbaru, such events were not held so often at the mosques. But in Aachen, he was in a mosque together with Muslims from various levels of age from kid to adult. “Then during the *Eid ul-Fitr* prayer, I was side by side with people from different ethnic and racial backgrounds, yet as we got together, the difference was vanished,” he reminisced the series of Ramadan activities he had in Germany.

Considering all these experiences that one is much likely to acquire when living as minority, the question that arises is then how significant the discourse on Hajj would influence these participants to recommend Germany as a study destination. In the questionnaire, the statement, “The easiness of performing the Hajj from Germany can be taken into consideration by any Indonesian that wants to continue their study in a Muslim-minority country”, is included to see the level of agreement or disagreement that the participants have towards the statement. The word ‘easiness’ here refers to the facts that,

- a) There is no long waiting list required – as the Participant 4 said that he registered only a month before the embarkation,
- b) The price is somehow reasonable – compared to the waiting time and types of Hajj embarkation in Indonesia, and
- c) The availability of an Indonesian bureau cooperating with a Turkish travel agency.

As a result, three participants ‘strongly agree’ with the statement; while one agrees, and the other one disagrees. According to the interview, the one who disagrees did not recommend Germany because of the situation in the country that she does not think everyone can deal with. She knew that a lot of Indonesians

¹³ *Itikaf* is to stay in a mosque for a particular time period in the worship of Allah. In the state of *I’tikaf*, a person can stand, sit, sleep, etc; and there is not one particular ‘form’ that this retreat must be carried out in (unlike the *salat* which has a specific form to it). What is important in this period is to obey the commandments of Allah, to refrain from the things which He has prohibited and to be in the service of Him (Bhimji n.d)

leave Germany with failure to get a degree. She added,

“Not everyone can juggle between study and work. If someone wants to study here because of the affordable cost for study, that is fine. But, if it is only for the Hajj, I do not think that it is worth the risk. I would suggest Egypt or Saudi Arabia over Germany.”

Taking a different viewpoint, Participant 2 thought Germany as an ideal place to study because of its affordable cost of living, free tuition fee policy, and complete facilities. In connection with the Hajj, she remembered that her colleague in New Zealand told her that the price for Hajj package there¹⁴ is way more expensive than in Germany in which she believed that the distance between New Zealand and Saudi Arabia also counts. An interesting thing to notice here is that *geographic proximity* which is the fifth factor in Mazzarol and Soutar’s pull factor discourse (2002, 83), is mentioned as a point for consideration not to the country of origin of the student, but to Mecca.

Meanwhile, Participant 3 believed that the large number of Turkish immigrants¹⁵ in Germany has somehow paved the way for the easiness of Muslim life inclusive to the Hajj bureaucracy; so that it becomes more attractive compared to other countries such as the United Kingdom or Australia. In a slightly different manner, Participant 4 suggested that even though performing the Hajj from Germany has been proven easy, but the Muslim Indonesian student – who has not chosen a destination country – should look up any information on the price and requirement in other Muslim-minority countries, such as Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom. He argued that a requirement of visa that should be valid for at least a year in Germany is of an obstacle itself for some

¹⁴ In 2018, the price for Hajj package from New Zealand is 10,560 New Zealand Dollars or equals to 104,195,520 Rupiahs; while in Germany it is 5,200 Euros or equals to 87,360,000 Rupiahs (Almarwah 2018; Forkom 2018; Currency on 19 March 2018)

¹⁵ See for example Yurdakul (2009) to learn how Turkish immigrant associations strive for the rights and needs of the Muslim society

students. Most of the times, students fail to meet this requirement due to the shorter amount of time they have for the study program. This suggestion accords with an information displayed on the website of British Haj Travel stating that the applicant only needs to provide a proof of their United Kingdom residency without any minimum duration of validity needed. To sum up, although the opportunity to perform the Hajj from Germany seems wide open – especially due to the long tradition of Turkish immigrants in the country – information on Hajj in other country might be of an important knowledge to collect before someone decides the destination country for study.

CONCLUSION

This article aims to explore the life of Muslim Indonesian students in Germany covering their motivation for coming to the country, challenges faced as a Muslim, and opportunities that they can get when residing in the country. After conducting interviews with five participants and analysing the interview result, it is concluded that push and pull factor has been a useful concept to uncover the reasons making Germany more attractive than other study destination countries. Reasons such as the good reputation of the universities and the low cost of studying are the pull factors highlighted earlier by the participants. Environment is another pull factor mentioned in the findings referring to the presence of Turkish immigrants in the country. It is found that their presence has made these Muslim Indonesian students experience a much easier life as a Muslim – ranging from the easiness in finding Mosques, buying *halal* food, and performing the Hajj. Interestingly, the latter one is deemed as the most valuable experience for the participants as they compared the relatively easy situation in performing the Hajj from Germany with the current situation in Indonesia regarding to Hajj embarkation. The Hajj experience has also been a factor that leads the participants to undergo religious development phase often offered in third space. Moreover, the availability of an Indonesian beruau cooperating with a Turkish travel agent in Germany is also said as another thing that could be taken into consideration by any prospective

student who wants to continue their study in Germany. In short, though Germany, as a Muslim-minority country might not offer the same ease of performing the Islamic religion as other Muslim-majority countries – Indonesia in particular – but the opportunity of performing the Hajj and having predominantly Turkish immigrants within the Muslim population might be the niche that Germany appeals to prospective Muslim Indonesian students, or Muslim students in general. After all, it is highly suggested for future researchers to work under the same topic yet explore different study objects in order to enrich the references of Indonesian students who are in search of a study destination country.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR IN THE ACEH MONITORING MISSION

PERAN UNI EROPA SEBAGAI AKTOR INTERNASIONAL DALAM MISI MONITORING ACEH

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Diterima: 04-07-2017

Direvisi: 14-09-2017

Disetujui: 12-10-2017

ABSTRAK

Keterlibatan Uni Eropa (UE) dalam Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) merupakan salah satu cerita sukses dalam penyelesaian konflik secara damai. Dalam misi ini, UE mampu menunjukkan kepada dunia bahwa mereka merupakan salah satu aktor signifikan dalam politik internasional. Harus diakui bahwa UE merepresentasikan uncertain image (gambaran yang kurang jelas) dalam politik internasional yang tingkatannya tidak dapat disejajarkan dengan negara-bangsa. Artikel ini menganalisis apakah UE memainkan peran signifikan sebagai aktor internasional dalam proses perdamaian di Aceh melalui pendalaman terhadap kerja AMM. Dengan memandang UE sebagai entitas yang terlibat dalam isu-isu khusus dan dengan menekankan pada kehadiran UE di kancah internasional melalui keterlibatannya dalam AMM, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa UE memainkan peran signifikan sebagai aktor internasional.

Kata kunci: *Uni Eropa, aktor internasional, Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)*

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) involvement in the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was one of the successful story in the peaceful conflict settlement. In this mission, the EU has been able to show the world that it is one of significant actor in international politics. Admittedly, the EU represents uncertain image in international politics as if it can not be seen at the same level of sovereign-states. This article examines whether the EU played a significant role as an international actor in the peace process in Aceh through an indepth-look at the work of the AMM. By viewing the EU as an evolving entity which engaged in particular issues and by addressing its international presence in the context of its involvement in the AMM, it can be concluded the EU has played significant role as an international actor.

Keywords: the European Union, international actor, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)

INTRODUCTION

After three decades of conflict, the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement or *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM) which was fighting for an Aceh independent state eventually agreed to end the conflict by signing the Memorandum of Understanding on

August 15, 2005. The agreement, henceforth Helsinki Accord, was facilitated by the Crisis Management Initiative chaired by former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, with the support of the European Union (EU). In this peace process, the EU played a key role in fostering the Helsinki Accord, by supervising the implementation of

the agreement. The EU also led a peacekeeping mission, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) from 15 September 2005 until 15 December 2006 in cooperation with some of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) member states. This mission regards as a watchdog to ensure the peace process in Aceh.

This paper will critically examine whether the EU played a significant role as an international actor in the peace process in Aceh through an in-depth look at the work of the AMM. I will argue that the EU played a key role as an international actor in the AMM. This paper will be divided into three sections. The first section will examine the debate over the EU as an international actor. The second section will show the Aceh conflict as the background understanding of the peace process. The third section will examine the work of the EU through the AMM and its challenges.

THE EU AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR: THE DEBATE

In contemporary world affairs, the EU presents a puzzling feature. According to McCormick (2005, 208), the EU is more than an international organization but less than a state and this feature often frustrated other international actors, whether they should think of 27 member states or regards as a single entity. The EU member states still maintain their sovereignty in many areas, such as defence and security issues. However, in particular issues, such as trade negotiations, other parties should deal with the EU because of member states willingness in allowing the EU Commission as the representative of their interest (McCormick, 2005, 108).

There are some challenges to assess the role of the EU in global politics. Caporaso et al., (1998, 213) argues that the analytical criteria to determine the status of the EU as an actor are not clear. It is hardly to find consensus about the meaning of the actor where the existing standards mainly discussed about power and influence. Furthermore, he argues that the changing nature of the EU is a challenge. It is an organization made up of 27 member states and several institutions which replicate territorial

and nonterritorial interests. Moreover, EU's involvement in world affairs are varies over time and issues (Caporaso, 1998, 213).

Caporaso, et al (1998, 214), outline three characteristic to analyse the "actorhood" of the EU. First, the EU can be seen as a collection of states with limited set of rules to direct the interactions among member states. The status of the EU as a "collective actor" relates to its convergence of interests at the unit level facilitated by interaction within a communication structure. Second, the EU regards as an evolving polity. Based on this idea, there has been a political transition within the EU from nation-state system into a polity. This approach, however, ignores the process of system transformation itself. Third, the EU view as an evolving entity made up of several issue areas and policy networks with varieties of "actorhood" across time and issues (Caporaso, 1998, 214). In this regards, the third characteristic will be used in later discussion about the EU's actorness in global politics.

According to Caporaso, et al., (1998, 214-220) there are four components of actor capacity in global politics : recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion. First factor, is recognition by other actors, whether de jure or de facto, which accept and allows for presence in global politics. De jure recognition is diplomatic recognition under international law or formal membership in international organizations. Because of the EU is not sovereign, therefore, the EU does not have a full diplomatic recognition from third parties. Although the EU has high-level diplomatic contacts with almost every country in the world, it has not been granted the exact status as sovereign states.

By the same token, in international organizations memberships, the EU often confused third parties due to its unclear position whether it is competent enough to address any given issues and endorse responsibilities as a member of the international organizations. As a consequence, third parties does not grant full recognition to the EU through formal international organization membership. De facto recognition can be seen from the sociality of global politics. The interaction between third

parties and the EU can be regarded as an implicit recognition upon it (Caporaso, 1998, 216).

The second factor is the EU's authority to act externally. Due to the fact that the EU is a creation of the member states, thus the authority derives from these states. In this regard, the authority is assigned to EU institutions by sovereign nation-states. The third factor is autonomy, which suggest independency from other state actors. Independence in this sense means that these institutions should work differently and independently from the basic expectation of a normal states system operating on the basis of power and interests. The fourth factor, is cohesion, to which the ability of actor to formulate and articulate consistent policy preferences. However, the EU can make a difference even without policy cohesion (Caporaso, 1998, 217).

In a slightly different way, Mackenstein et.al, (2005, 261-262) outline four factors to analyse the EU's direction and capabilities as an international actor : legitimacy, the transatlantic context, the enlargement, and the attitudes of member states. The legitimacy discussions include the impact of international law and the relationship between the EU and its citizens. International crises such as in Kosovo, September 11 and Iraq provide challenges to international law and implies recognition that the EU should response effectively to these crises.

Because of the role of the EU is very limited therefore the EU should increase its power to provide greater accountability in the EU external relations. The transatlantic context, in this regard, discuss the conduct of the EU as an international actor. The enlargement of the EU is also crucial factor, which include the pending 2004 round and future obligations, such as those taken on the SAP. New external relations challenges ranging from migration and new environmental threats through to strive for adapting the European security architecture and avoid outlining new dividing lines around EU frontiers (Mackenstein, 2005, 261).

Nevertheless, they argue that the most critical factor of all is the attitudes of its member states. In this regard, the significant factors will

be how good and how bad the leading member states coordinate and cooperate with one another. For example, the Anglo-French rapprochement in the St Malo declaration was the most significant factor for the development of the EU's security ambitions and capabilities from late 1990s. On the contrary, there is a significant loss of momentum in the Iraq crisis due to the aligning of Franco-German against British, Spain, and Italy (Mackenstein, 2005, 261).

Furthermore, they argue that the most important factor of all is political will, especially, the willingness of other international actor to recognize the EU as a legitimate international actor. And more important is the political will of the EU member states. In order to be an effective international actors and to be able to reverse its international presence into operational power, the EU need to have a common will, a common vision and trust. The common vision of the EU is lacking of broad principles and objectives, and there has been a political will deficit and lack of trust. As a consequence, the EU seems to present uncertainty feature as an international actor. It will consistently set apart in economic, politico-strategic and geographic reach. Its international ambitions and credibility will depend on the international events and there seems to be a contradictory in order to meet the rethorical commitments and political will (Mackenstein, 2005, 262).

According to Vogler, et.al. (1999, 5), there are three categories to examine the external roles of the EU : presence, opportunity, and capability. Presence refers to the relationship between internal development of the EU and external expectations. Opportunity refers to factors in external developments that could enable and constrain actorness. Capability refers to the capacity to respond effectively to external expectations and opportunities. Following Allen and Smith rationale, the EU's presence in international affairs has been significance. Presence, in this sense, refers to the ability to influence; to shape the perceptions and expectations of others. Presence was not supposed to be an external action, but rather as

a consequence of internal policies and processes (Vogler, 1999, 6).

By outlining from these point of view, the next section will discuss a case study about the EU's role as an international actor in the Aceh Monitoring Mission.

THE ACEH CONFLICT

The roots of the Aceh conflict date back a long way. In October 1976 a separatist movement was created in the Indonesian province of Aceh on the island of Sumatra. This movement fought by GAM, strive to establish an Acehese independent state. In the Indonesian history, there seems to be a paradox regarding to the fact that unlike the two other territories which created separatist movement, such as East Timor and West Papua, Aceh had contributed to the Indonesian nationalist movement and the creation of the Indonesian Republic. There is a broad consensus in Indonesian society, especially in Acehese society that the Acehese embodied Islamic values in a country which comprised 88% of Muslim population, and widely known as "Serambi Mekah" or "the Veranda of Mecca".

By drawing upon Acehese dissatisfaction toward the government, GAM created a separatist movement. The 1976 GAM operation failed to mobilize Acehese grievances and by 1979 GAM was paralyzed by Indonesian military operations. In 1989, GAM was able to begun its military operations. For about sixteen years, GAM was involved in the insurgency against the Indonesian army. The crucial dissatisfaction lies in the vertical conflict of centre-periphery led to a political, social, and economic grievances. The Acehese grievances related to the unfulfilled promises of autonomy by the central government under Soekarno (1951 – 1959) and under Soeharto (1967 – 1998). The grievances become intensified in 1971 by the discovery of natural gas. Especially, under Soeharto, the revenue of Aceh's natural resources flowed to Jakarta with small amount of wealth return to the province (Schulze, 2007, 2).

Furthermore, the population also felt discontent to the effects of the natural gas

discovery, such as dispossession, dislocation, industrialization, pollution, foreign corporations, urban-rural migration, the arrival of non-Acehnese workers and enclave development in North Aceh. This led to the risen of prices and urban poverty. The harder grievances felt by Acehese was the Indonesian military operation from 1976, particularly in the period from 1989 to 1998 when Aceh known as *Daerah Operasi Militer* (DOM) or military operations area. During this period, the Indonesian army in order to pursue GAM, committed with human rights abuses towards Aceh population (Schulze, 2007, 2).

An opportunity for a peaceful settlement emerged by the changing of power in Indonesian civilian and military power after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. Before that, the Indonesian government was consistent to use military approach in dealing with conflicts within the republic. However, the tsunami disaster on December 2004 contributed to the shifting political approach in dealing with conflict in Aceh, especially under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The involvement of the EU through the Crisis Management Initiative chaired by Martti Ahtisaari contributed much to bringing the peaceful settlement to a successful outcome in July 2005.

THE ACEH MONITORING MISSION (AMM)

As a response to the official invitation by the Indonesian Government and supported by the GAM leadership, and despite initial doubts among some member states, the EU eventually decided to conduct its first mission in Asia. Learning from the past experience in East Timor, the Indonesian Government preferred a regional organization rather than the United Nations' involvement and eventually the EU was a reasonable choice as if no Asian regional organizations capable to conduct such operation. The AMM was deployed on 15 September as an EU mission conducted together with five ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), and with contributions from Norway and Switzerland. It was led by the head of mission,

Pieter Feith, who reported to the European Council and directly to Secretary General Javier Solana (Helly, 2005).

From 15 September to 31 December the AMM had 125 EU and 93 ASEAN monitors on the ground. At the end of the mission there were only 29 EU and 7 ASEAN monitors left. The AMM's objective was to assist GAM and the Indonesian government with the implementation of the MOU and 'to contribute to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh'¹.

The AMM specific tasks were to:

- to monitor the demobilisation of GAM and the decommissioning of its weapons
- to monitor the redeployment of non-organic TNI and police
- to monitor the reintegration of GAM and the human rights situation as well as the legislative change
- to rule on disputed amnesty cases
- and to investigate violations of the MOU

According to Schulze (2007, 4), the key to the success of the AMM were the Commission on Security Arrangements (COSA) meetings, head by Pieter Feith and attended by senior representatives of GAM and the Indonesian government, police and military. In addition, there were also meetings at the district level (DiCOSA). The purpose of these meetings was to provide a forum that could accommodate issues, questions, and complaints and resolve them before they turn to be real problems.

THE EU INVOLVEMENT IN THE AMM

The EU initiative and full support through the CMI is essential for the success of the Helsinki Accord. Its initiative also supported by some EU member states which sent their team in the AMM to show their strong commitment to the implementation of the Accord. Actually, the Helsinki Accord was the third attempt which involve international mediation to solve the conflicts in the region. The first peace

negotiations were facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) that produced the 'Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh' of 12 May 2000.

The second negotiation produced the 'Cessation of Hostilities Agreement' (COHA) of 9 December 2002. Unfortunately, both negotiations were failed to end the conflict. Unlike the previous accords facilitated by the HDC, the Helsinki Accord facilitated by the CMI had full support from the EU in legal and financial basis. The legal basis of the CMI found in the 'Council Regulation No. 381/2001 establishing the Rapid Reaction Mechanism' or RRM. The initiative legal basis found in the EU's 'RRM Policy Advice and Mediation Facility Decision 2002–2004.' It can be argued that the quasi-state was the sole international mediator during the negotiations that end up in the Helsinki Accord (Gunaryadi, 2006, 89).

After five rounds of tough negotiations between January and July 2005, the Indonesian government and GAM eventually agreed on the Helsinki Accord. Aspinall (2005) emphasizes that the possibility for success of this accord is greater than the previous peace accords because it is different in fundamental way. The previous accords, such as The Humanitarian Pause for Aceh and COHA, called for ceasefires and demilitarization which followed by an opened dialogue on the political status of Aceh. Both parties remained in a different stand on the core issue of whether Aceh should become an independent state or remain part of the Indonesian republic.

On this critical circumstances, it was very difficult for both parties to build confidence and trust one another. Especially Indonesian military and government remained suspicious that the peace accords was used by GAM to strengthen its separatist movement. However, the negotiations become possible to be successful after GAM announced in February that they were willing to leave behind its independence goal and agreed to accept a "self-government" solution for Aceh within the Indonesian state (Aspinall, 2005, viii).

¹ Aceh Monitoring Mission leaflet, Banda Aceh, 2006.

Furthermore, Aspinall (2005, viii) notes that compare to the previous accords, the Helsinki Accord outlines a comprehensive peace settlement. It deals not only with security dimension but also with broad terms such as a new political relationship between Aceh and the Indonesian state which is personified in a new Law on the Governing of Aceh. The Helsinki Accord also includes requirements concerning political participation, human rights, the rule of law, and economic matters as well as measures for the disarmament of GAM and its members' reintegration into society. Indeed, with the involvement of the EU in Aceh Monitoring Mission and also supported by participating countries from ASEAN, the Helsinki Accord is more successful than the previous accords. The EU backstage roles in the process is significant in spite of Indonesia's sensitivity to foreign intervention on its domestic affairs. The important thing then begin with the question why the EU took the lead in the process, compare to other organizations. To answer the question, it would be better to analyse the EU motivations.

THE EU MOTIVATIONS

Following Gunaryadi (2006, 92), the EU main motivations to take the lead of the Helsinki Accord are the political; and geopolitical and strategical considerations. From the political motive, there are three points need to be concerns. First, it can be said that the EU has ambition to be a global player where it requires 'to lead, not to be led' (Suryadinata, 1997). This ambition is natural in away of its appearance as an international actor and the pursuit of its global interest. He mentions several factors that endorse the EU as an international actor.

The most important factor is the EU has become a global power in terms of economic, trade and investment. It contributed 51% of world's foreign direct investment outflows. It is the biggest and richest marketplace in the world with more than 454 million consumers, its exports of goods and services constituted 38% of the world market, controlled of 36% of the world's GNP, provided 56% of official development assistance. Furthermore, the EU Member States

build the largest block in the Bretton Wood institutions : 23% of the votes in the World Bank and 29% of the votes in the International Monetary Fund, it possesses the largest collective number of votes as well as a regional grouping in the World Trade Organisation (Van Reisen, 1999, 2). Moreover, the EU will remain influential in the global economy as the euro become established and become powerful competitor to the US dollar and the Japanese Yen.

The EU 'actorness,' is still debatable because it was usually referred to the role of a sovereign state, a level that would be hard to achieved by the EU. Thus, the concept of the 'actorness' should be go along with the notion of its international presence. The notion of 'presence' itself would compensate the EU's inability to exercise it effectively in the pursuit of its global interests (Peterson, 1998, 3). The notion of 'presence' might become a more significant phenomenon that attract the perceptions and expectations of policy-makers in the international politics (Allen & Smith, 1991, 95-120). According to C. Hill (1994, 103-126) there are three capabilities underlining the EU international 'presence' : its ability to agree, its ability to act, and the extent of resources dedicated to support those actions. The capabilities, in this regard, are divided into resources, instruments, and cohesiveness. Gunaryadi (2006, 93) argues that in the Helsinki Accord, the EU preserved all aspects that sustain its capabilities to act and to realize its ambition for global leadership. The EU commitment to support the Helsinki Accord through the Crisis Management Initiatives should be understood in political aspiration framework.

Second, the EU has an ethical obligation to realize its commitment to develop its cooperation with Indonesia which have a legitimate legal source under international law. It can be argued that the EU is consistent with its grand strategy on Indonesia. Although there is no special clause in the major documents regulating its relations with Indonesia to solve internal conflicts in a peaceful way, however, the Helsinki Accord is part of the main agenda, such as the EU's support to good governance, local democracy, and sustainable management of natural resources. The EU often criticised human rights violations in Indonesia,

but it consistently support Indonesian territorial integrity and called for a peaceful and political conflict resolution in the country. Third, through the involvement in the Helsinki Accord, the EU is indirectly try to deliver message to the world, especially to the powerful country, such as the US, that conflicts can be solved peacefully rather than using military force (Gunaryadi, 2006, 93).

From geopolitical and strategic considerations, Gunaryadi (2006, 96) mentions two main motivations : the first motivation of the EU involvement is that the possibility for success is bigger after the tsunami disaster. The warring parties in Aceh were also hit by the devastation. This condition perceived by the EU and the CMI as a good opportunity which could accelerate the peace process in Aceh. Second, by the fact that Acehnese are predominantly Muslim, like the majority Indonesians, it can be said that the EU was willing to portray in sympathy among the Muslims and to reinforce the West-Muslim world's relations and understanding in the context of economy, politics and the measures of combating terrorism. Third, the successful of the Helsinki Accord may improve the EU's image and influence in Indonesia. This can be seen from the statement of Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner on March 2005:

The world must not forget the terrible devastation the Tsunamis brought to South East Asia.... Of the €350 million...available for post-Tsunami reconstruction I intend to devote over €200 million to Indonesia.... Europe and South East Asia are not just major trading partners...two regions can deepen this... important relationship particularly on non-trade issues from the fight against terrorism, to protecting the environment and combating the drug trade...how we can strengthen ties with Indonesia, and support it on its path to democracy, stability and prosperity (European Commission 2005 b, 4 March).

FINANCING THE AMM

Following the tsunami disaster in December 2004, Aceh become a region with many international presence, including the EU. It has taken the lead in relief effort and has given

large contribution to humanitarian assistance and development aid. Since the tsunami, the EU and its member states have contributed up to 1.5 billion euros. On the EU side, particularly, 123 million euros were allocated to immediate humanitarian assistance to all countries affected by disaster and 207 million euros made available under the Asia and Latin America (ALA) program and the RRM to support the long-term reconstruction of Aceh. In the Aceh peace process, the EU had contributed well before the tsunami. In December 2002, it became a co-chair of the Tokyo Preparatory Conference for Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh where it financed the monitoring mission chaired by the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue which failed to end the conflict (Grevi, 2005, 29).

Furthermore, in March 2005, the EU mobilized up to 220,000 euro from the RRM in support of a project in drafting the Master Plan for the recovery of Aceh which involved local stakeholders and civil society. On April 2005, the EU delivered fund under the RRM, with a 270,000 euro ceiling to the CMI to conduct peace talks. On 29 July, the EU provided 30 million euros to support the projects for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the province. This project intended, not only to rebuilding houses, public infrastructures and restart the economy, but also to strengthening the capacity of the new Reconstruction Agency as well as the local government (Grevi, 2005, 29). Although, financial matters are oftenly become tough criticism in Brussels, the EU's efforts and the AMM mandate might be regarded as complementary and mutually reinforcing.

CHALLENGES OF THE AMM

The Helsinki Accord facilitated by the EU through the CMI is one of the successful story in the peace settlement, however, it also suffered some challenges. Schulze (2007, 5) addresses two important points : first, the disparity between the limited time to set up the mission and the lengthier and highly bureaucratic funding process in Brussels. Second, the training and selection of monitors. One of the greatest challenges is the financing of the AMM. When the CMI asked the

EU to involve in monitoring the implementation of the AMM, it came with different reactions. A positive reactions about a Europeandeployment in Aceh came from The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), while The Political and Security Committee (PSC) was halfhearted. In this case, the EU member states were divided. Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and the UK were agreed for an EU involvement while the rest preferred the EU to concentrate on areas which had already the EU presence, such as in Balkans and Africa.

However, the EU Commission's External Relations DirectorateGeneral continued to outline a proposal to finance the mission in July 2005 through a grant to a member state. This proposal attracted an intense debate between the Commission and the Council, not only about the contents but also the political consequences to the Commission for conducting the Aceh mission. As a consequence, the Council Legal Service rejected the proposal on legal, budgetary and political grounds. Thus, from this reaction, it was obvious that the Council felt the Commission had been overboard from the EU chain of command. The process to finance the AMM was slow during the debate due to some member states dubious stance on the Aceh mission. Because of Javier Solana's personal intervention, the debate over financing the AMM swayed in favour of EU deployment and financing it from the CFSP budget (Schulze, 2007, 5).

Nevertheless, out of a total budget of 15 million euro, the CFSP could only cover 9 million euro, the rest had to be provided by member states. Only seven member states contributed to this mission for an overall amount of 5 million euro. For instance, Sweden gave 4 million euro for logistical support. However, in this critical situation, the largest contribution fell upon the UK through the British embassy in Jakarta since the UK held the EU presidency at the time. This financial challenges forced by procedural and time constraints, because the EU are not equipped to release the fund rapidly. In addition, the Aceh mission was operated at very short time, in only 18 days. Therefore, Schulze argues that the institutional struggle of power inBrussels, the lack of consensus among member states,and

the unconventional way of raising the money forthe mission, had consequences not only on the diplomaticlevel but also on the ground. This can be seen from the fact that when the assessment team arrived in Aceh in August2005 they had no money to access and no mobilephones that worked. Unfortunately, the AMM lacked money forsecretaries, offices, computers, and printers (Schulze, 2007, 5).

The training program for the mission was a challenges as well since it was not prepared sufficiently. Since the beginning, it only covered elementary issues in a three-day training program. It included briefs on Acehneseociety and culture, the conflict history, and an overview of the Indonesian military functioned. There was also training provided on emergency preparednessand humanitarian operations. The local languages also posed significant challenges. There were only a small number within the EU team who can speak Indonesian let alone Acehnese language. This become more burden with the fact that a few members of the AMM were not speak English adequately and therefore hindered communication among the monitors (Schulze, 2007, 5).

Despite the challenges along the process, the AMM was success in some ways. Its monitors and expertise contributed to made the implementation process of the Helsinki Accord easier and avoid the collapsed of the Aceh peace process. Due to the impartiality and the confidence inspired by the AMM in both GAM and the Indonesian military, it eventually smooth the way to the implementation of the crucial decommissioning and redeployment. Schulze (2007, 14) summed up five key points of the successful of the peace process: First, full commitment of GAM and the Indonesian government in the peace process. Without the consent of both parties, the peace process will failed since the very beginning of the talks. Second, the leadership and impartiality of its head of mission, Pieter Feith, and the mission as a whole. Third, the support of individual member states, particularly the UK, Finland, and Sweden during the set-up phase of the mission. Fourth, the quick amnesty and the committee on security arrangements (COSA). Fifth, by not too much

focusing on the human rights implementation at the early process, it made possible for the AMM to complete its mission in the light of sensitive context of Indonesian domestic politics.

CONCLUSION

The EU involvement in the AMM was one of the successful story in the peaceful conflict settlement. In this mission, the EU has been able to show the world that it is one of significant actor in international politics. Admittedly, the EU represents uncertain image in international politics as if it can not be seen at the same level of sovereign-states. Nevertheless, by viewing the EU as an evolving entity which engaged in particular issues and by addressing its international presence in the context of its involvement in the AMM, the EU has played significant role as an international actor.

Furthermore, the willingness of third parties in the peace process, particularly the Indonesian government and the GAM leadership, to recognize the EU as a legitimate international actor and the political will of some EU member states to participate and contribute in the AMM also emphasized the EU's role as an international actor. In conclusion, by viewing the EU as an evolving entity which engaged in particular issues and by addressing its international presence, it is argued that the EU has played significant role as an international actor in the context of its involvement in the AMM.

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GERAKAN MASYARAKAT ADAT SAMI DAN KONTESTASI SUMBER DAYA ALAM

SAMI INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE'S CONTESTATION

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Diterima: 06-07-2017

Direvisi: 14-09-2017

Disetujui: 16-10-2017

ABSTRACT

The main agenda of the indigenous movement is fighting for political and cultural rights of ethnic minority communities in accordance with unique historical and cultural practices that they have. As Kymlicka said, minority rights must also be fought because they are on a system that is governed by the majority who pretend to produce injustice. Sami Indigenous Movement in Norway is a form of a long struggle to obtain the right independently to manage natural resources. Currently Sami struggling to maintain the uniqueness of the cultural identity and living practices that have been owned for generations. This paper would like to see the establishment of indigenous peoples' movement Sami in Norway as well as the practice of social movements committed to demanding social change related to self-governance and autonomy of management of natural resources.

Keywords: *Indigenous Movement, Sami people, identity, otonomy, natural resource management*

ABSTRAK

Agenda utama dalam gerakan adat atau *indigenous movement* adalah memperjuangkan hak politik dan budaya komunitas etnis yang menjadi minoritas sesuai dengan keunikan historis serta praktik budaya yang mereka miliki. Seperti yang dikatakan oleh Kymlicka, bahwa hak-hak minoritas juga harus diperjuangkan karena mereka berada pada sistem yang diatur oleh mayoritas yang berpretensi menghasilkan ketidakadilan. Gerakan Masyarakat Adat Sami di Norwegia merupakan bentuk perjuangan panjang untuk memperoleh hak secara mandiri untuk mengelola sumber daya alam. Saat ini masyarakat Sami berjuang untuk mempertahankan keunikan identitas budaya dan praktik hidup yang telah dimiliki secara turun temurun. Tulisan ini ingin melihat pembentukan gerakan masyarakat adat Sami di Norwegia serta praktik gerakan sosial yang dilakukan untuk menuntut perubahan sosial terkait dengan *self-governance* dan otonomi pengelolaan sumber daya alam.

Kata kunci: Gerakan Masyarakat Adat, Sami, identitas, otonomi, pengelolaan sumber daya alam

PENDAHULUAN

Indigenous people sebagai bagian dari warga negara dunia mendapat peluang untuk menyuarakan haknya di kancah dunia. “*Self-determination*” menjadi salah satu tujuan gerakan ini yang melingkupi beragam isu. Beberapa di

antaranya adalah hak untuk mengembangkan dan membangun manifestasi praktek-praktek budaya (Kuokkanen, 2000). Melalui konvensi ILO, masyarakat lokal yang selama ini menjadi pihak yang termarjinalkan memiliki ruang untuk bernegosiasi. Dalam konvensi yang diadakan

oleh ILO dengan tajuk ‘*Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries*’ (ILO No. 169) dihasilkan definisi mengenai masyarakat adat. Dalam pasal satu dinyatakan definisi masyarakat adat sebagai :

indigenous people as people who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. (Nuttal, 1998, 2)

Pengakuan secara internasional ini menjadi angin segar bagi gerakan masyarakat adat di beberapa negara yang sudah berlangsung cukup lama. Etnis Sami di Norwegia, menjadi salah satu aktor dalam proses pengakuan hak adat di negaranya. Perjuangan menghadapi ketidakadilan serta dominasi budaya berawal sejak masyarakat Sami dihadapkan pada kebijakan-kebijakan negara yang merugikan mereka. Gerakan ini diawali dari bentuk perlawanan terhadap proyek pembangunan skala besar dengan dalih kemajuan. Setelah aksi perlawanan tersebut, keterlibatan politik masyarakat Sami mulai meningkat dalam konteks pengakuan hak. Hal ini terlihat dari pembentukan Komisi Hak Asasi Sami, Parlemen Sami, maupun pengajuan serta diimplementasikannya Finnmark Act (Perjanjian Finnmark). *Finnmark Act* adalah upaya pemerintah norwegia sebagai pihak yang meratifikasi konvensi ILO tentang masyarakat adat, untuk memberikan kesempatan kepada orang Sami di kawasan Finnmark untuk mengelola sumber daya secara mandiri (Finnmark Act, 2005).

Dalam artikel ini, penulis ingin melihat bagaimana gerakan masyarakat adat muncul di Norwegia. Apa saja faktor pendorong gerakan tersebut dan dampaknya terhadap masyarakat Sami? Apakah gerakan ini mampu mempengaruhi budaya dominan yang ada? Seberapa jauh masyarakat Sami dapat bernegosiasi untuk mendapatkan pengakuan terhadap hak-hak kewargaannya?

INDIGENOUS PEOPLE DAN ARTIKULASI IDENTITAS DALAM GERAKAN SOSIAL BARU

Secara global, masyarakat adat telah mendapatkan pengakuan dan hal ini memberikan peluang kepada komunitas adat untuk mengkonstruksi ulang identitasnya. Pengertian atau definisi yang fleksibel memungkinkan beberapa kelompok mengidentifikasi etnisitasnya untuk mendapatkan klaim atas hak-hak untuk diakui sebagai populasi masyarakat adat (Nuttal 1998). Seperti yang dikemukakan oleh Plant (1994 dalam Nuttal, 1998, 3) bahwa banyak dari komunitas yang mencoba mengidentifikasi dirinya sebagai masyarakat adat dikarenakan “proteksi kuat yang ditawarkan melalui hukum internasional”.

Perdebatan tentang munculnya identifikasi terhadap “keadatan” diwarnai dengan bermunculannya klaim masyarakat adat terhadap pengelolaan sumber daya. Salah satu kajian yang membahas isu tersebut adalah Kuper (2003). Dia melihat konsep yang diajukan tentang *indigeneousness* sangat terkait dengan pembentukan identitas yang tidak pernah usai. Pandangan tentang *indigenous* terkadang disamakan dengan romantisme terhadap kehidupan masyarakat non-modern yang hidup serasi dengan alam serta berdampingan dengan lingkungan. Disamping itu, Kuper (2003) menjelaskan tentang beberapa kasus tentang masyarakat adat yang akhirnya mendapatkan klaim atas sumber daya alam yang terhubung dengan latar historis mereka.

Namun, dibalik itu ada kegelisahan yang ditunjukkan oleh Kuper tentang klaim-klaim masyarakat adat dengan menunjukkan bahwa tidak ada masyarakat yang terisolir sama sekali dan memiliki relasi dengan kelompok masyarakat lain. Jadi secara historis, sulit menentukan siapa yang memiliki hak atas suatu wilayah, kerana didalamnya ada unsur migrasi ataupun asimilasi. Selanjutnya, klaim-klaim atas sumber daya dianggap mampu mengeksklusi atau menyingkirkan tidak hanya masyarakat yang identitasnya berbeda tetapi juga dari internal masyarakat itu sendiri. Ketidakadilan dan penyingkiran kemungkinan bisa terjadi

jika klaim-klaim tersebut tidak didasarkan pada realita yang terkait dengan realita sosial budaya yang ada. Saling menggunakan sumber-sumber historis yang berdasar pada budaya tutur maupun mitos bisa menghasilkan kontestasi yang tidak akan pernah usai. Seperti yang dipaparkan Kuper (2003):

There are also frequent disputes about who should be chief, and land claims regularly pit native against native, chief against chief... Precisely because myths function as charters, there are inevitably competing stories, and disputes often rage over who owns a particular story and who has the right to use it to back up claims to resources (Kuper, 2003: 391)

Hal tersebut senada dengan apa yang coba ditelusuri oleh Hames (2007) tentang bagaimana pendefinisian serta penggunaan konsep *noble savage*. Dengan melacak Istilah *noble savage* secara historis, Hames menemukan konsep tersebut mengacu pada anggapan dimana masyarakat lokal (adat) yang dianggap ‘primitif’ adalah bentuk masyarakat yang menjunjung nilai-nilai keserasian terhadap alam, atau bisa dinyatakan sebagai konservasionis. Ahli sosial menafsirkan bahwa kehidupan masyarakat tersebut merupakan negasi dari kehidupan masyarakat modern yang memiliki tendensi untuk melakukan eksploitasi terhadap alam secara berlebih.

Menurut Hames (2007), alih-alih mengklarifikasi apakah mitos *noble savage* itu adalah sebuah kebenaran, dia mengusulkan untuk melihat bagaimana konsep ini digunakan untuk kepentingan masyarakat yang mengusungnya. Mitos tentang pola hidup masyarakat yang sinergis dengan alam juga digunakan secara politis oleh masyarakat dengan tujuan tertentu. Konsep tersebut disandingkan oleh masyarakat lokal dengan isu tentang identitas serta *self determination*. Seperti yang dikatakan oleh Hames (2007) “...how this concept is used by native peoples to identify essential characteristics of their culture and world view and how it is deployed politically in their struggles for self determination and equality.” Tidak hanya masyarakat, organisasi non-pemerintah yang bergerak di bidang lingkungan juga menggunakan

konsep tersebut untuk memastikan program-program konservasi mereka berjalan baik dengan bantuan yang diberikan oleh lembaga donor internasional.

Hal yang menarik dilihat adalah bagaimana *indigenusness* ini dianggap sebagai sesuatu yang hadir tidak secara natural tetapi merupakan upaya masyarakat untuk menentukan identitasnya sebagai bagian dari legitimasi. Tania Li (2003) dalam studinya di Indonesia melihat bahwa fenomena identifikasi diri menjadi bagian dari masyarakat tribal atau adat sebagai proses artikulasi identitas. Dia menyatakan bahwa identifikasi tersebut adalah sesuatu yang “*invented, adopted or imposed*”. Bagi Li, tindakan tersebut adalah upaya *positioning* yang berdasar pada praktik-praktik historis, lanskap, yang dilakukan dengan perjuangan. Menjadi *indigenous*, dapat diartikan bahwa masyarakat bisa menuntut atau bahkan mendapatkan hak-hak tertentu terkait kehidupan mereka. Tujuan identifikasi diri sebagai bagian dari masyarakat adat adalah untuk mendapatkan hak yang salah satunya untuk mengelola budaya, sumber daya alam, politik secara mandiri. Istilah *Indigenous* ini bukanlah secara sederhana bisa dipadankan dengan ras, etnisitas atau agama. Menurut Smith (2006), “*Indigenous is a complex concept: as an identity, a relationship to the land and the State, and as a form of legitimation.*”

Identitas merupakan entitas yang selalu mengalami perubahan dan di dalamnya terdapat ketidakstabilan serta selalu dipengaruhi beragam faktor. Seperti yang dijelaskan oleh Hall (1990 dalam Li, 2003, 151) mengenai identitas kultural yang selalu berada dalam proses “menjadi”. Menurut Hall (ibid), identitas tersebut datang dari sesuatu yang bersifat historis. Argumentasinya menekankan bahwa seharusnya identitas tidak dipandang sebagai bentuk yang “*eternally fixed*”, melainkan sebagai subjek yang sangat dipengaruhi oleh sejarah, budaya dan kekuasaan. Bagi Hall, ada ketidakstabilan dalam identifikasi kebudayaan, sehingga menurutnya proses ini akan “*renders any articulation complex, contestable, and subject to rearticulation*”. Identitas bukanlah ruang yang kaku dan mutlak, bahkan merupakan ruang yang dinamis dan selalu berupaya menemukan bentuknya.

Masyarakat adat berupaya memposisikan dirinya dalam tantangan menghadapi perubahan sosial yang terjadi di masyarakat melalui gerakan sosial. Nash (2008) menunjukkan dalam kerangka gerakan sosial, masyarakat adat menjadi agen aktif untuk menjawab tantangan dunia yang terikat erat dengan sistem kapitalis yang mengglobal. Keinginan atas otonomi dan kepengaturan mandiri menjadi isu sentral dalam masyarakat adat saat ini. Pendekatan gerakan sosial saat ini mulai mengalami modifikasi untuk merespon arah baru dari proses-proses global. Pergeseran ini muncul berdasar kajian yang mulai beralih dari spesifik membahas kelas pekerja menjadi kemunculan hak-hak sipil, gerakan feminis, dan juga identitas post-industri.

Gerakan masyarakat adat tersebut bisa dilihat dalam kerangka “new social movement”. Karakter gerakan tersebut memfokuskan pada identitas, otonomi serta “self-realization” (Calhoun 2000 [1993] dalam Smith, 2006, 7). Di dalam gerakan sosial ‘baru’ ini, identitas memainkan peran yang cukup penting sehingga gerakan masyarakat adat pun masuk didalamnya. Seperti yang dipaparkan oleh Nash (2008, 10), “*the resurgence of ethnic identification among populations marginalized in the course of conquest challenged the indigenist ideologist... brought to the fore collective practices and aspirations that had long been buried*”. Seperti yang dijelaskan Dove (2006) bahwa, salah satu bentuk identitas yang sering dimunculkan adalah dengan mengenalkan konsep mengenai *indigenous environmental knowledge*, di mana masyarakat dianggap mampu hidup secara berkesinambungan dengan lingkungan melalui penggunaan pengetahuan lokal mereka

“*Cultural politic*” atau politik budaya mendapatkan perhatian dalam pendekatan gerakan sosial untuk melihat bagaimana munculnya alternatif gerakan yang berdasar pada artikulasi budaya. Menurut Escobar (1998, 64) bahwa *cultural politic* merupakan proses yang terjadi ketika “*sets of social actors shaped by, and embodying, different cultural meanings and practices come into conflict with each other*”. Dalam pengertian ini pemaknaan dan praktik tersebut bisa dikatakan sebagai sumber dari proses yang bisa diterima sebagai sesuatu yang bersifat

politis. Selanjutnya hal ini biasanya terlihat dalam kasus ketika praktek tersebut diteorisasikan sebagai yang marginal, berseberangan, alternatif dan semua itu “dipahami dalam relasinya dengan aturan dari kebudayaan yang dominan”. Budaya dianggap politik karena pemaknaan di dalamnya mengandung proses, baik implisit maupun eksplisit, untuk mendefinisikan kembali ‘sosial power’. Menurut Escobar gerakan alternatif merupakan upaya penegasan bahwa mereka bisa bernegosiasi atau berhadapan dengan budaya dominan. Seperti yang dijelaskannya bahwa :

“When movements deploy alternative conceptions of woman, nature, development, economy, democracy, or citizenship that unsettle dominant cultural meanings, they enact a cultural politics. Cultural politics are the result of discursive articulations originating in existing cultural practices. These processes are never pure and always hybrid yet showing significant contrasts in relation to dominant cultures” (Escobar, 1998, 64).

Dalam konteks kewarganegaraan (citizenship) hak-hak minoritas atau komunitas juga mendapatkan perhatian karena terkait dengan keunikan dan perbedaan yang dimiliki. Holston dan Appadurai (1996) menjelaskan konsep kewarganegaraan yang dianggap bersifat netral selalu menghadapi tantangan dalam konteks masyarakat yang multi-identitas. Kelompok-kelompok yang memiliki latar belakang sejarah dan karakteristik berbeda memaknai ulang hubungan antara hak dan kewajiban sebagai warga negara. Perbedaan ini mendasari bahwa setiap kelompok berupaya untuk mendapatkan ‘perlakuan’ berbeda dan dihargai keberadaannya. Beberapa kelompok identitas termasuk didalamnya adalah kelompok minoritas, kelompok orientasi seksual, ras, keagamaan maupun organisasi berdasarkan etnis. Masing-masing kelompok memiliki klaim dengan tujuan, “*...demand different treatment on the basis of their inalienable right to retain and realize their unique qualities, contributions, and histories...That difference in fact constitutes their authentic and original character; which they have every right to develop to full capacity.*” (Holston dan Appadurai, 1996, 194).

Hak-hak minoritas juga harus mendapat perhatian karena mereka berada pada sistem yang diatur oleh mayoritas yang berpretensi menghasilkan ketidakadilan. Kymlicka (2002[1995]) berpendapat bahwa hak kewarganegaraan sangat mengagungkan hak individu yang didukung dalam sistem liberal dan terkadang melupakan bahwa seharusnya kelompok minoritas juga harus dilindungi dan diakui keberadaannya. Salah satu bentuk pengakuan tersebut adalah dengan memberikan “perlindungan eksternal” (dari negara atau kelompok mayoritas) dengan cara memberikan hak atas pemerintahan sendiri kepada kelompok minoritas yang di dalamnya terkait bagaimana kelompok tersebut mendapatkan otonomi untuk mengatur, diantaranya terkait pengembangan budaya serta akses terhadap sumber daya.

MASYARAKAT SAMI: ANTARA PENGAKUAN DAN DISKRIMINASI

Masyarakat Sami merupakan salah satu etnis yang tinggal di kawasan utara negara-negara Skandinavia. Secara tradisional mereka menempati teritori yang dikenal sebagai Sapmi, yang meliputi kawasan utara Norwegia, Swedia, Finlandia, dan juga Kola Peninsula di Rusia. Meskipun mereka dipisahkan dengan batasan geografis dari empat negara, mereka tetap memiliki kesatuan dan persamaan budaya melebihi batas-batas kenegaraan (Arnadottir, 2014).

Populasi orang Sami di Norwegia berkisar antara 30.000 orang. Di negara lainnya, Sami yang menetap di Swedia berjumlah 15.000 dan di Finlandia berjumlah 5.000 orang. Sedangkan di Russia sekitar 2.000 orang. Di Norwegia sendiri 24.000 dari 30.000 orang Sami tinggal di propinsi paling ujung utara wilayah negara ini. Sekitar 15.000 orang berada di kawasan bernama Finnmark dan 9.000 orang lainnya berada di Tromso (Paine, 1987). Konsep mengenai Sami sering digunakan tanpa definisi yang baku. Menurut orang Sami sendiri, Sami adalah orang yang menganggap dirinya sebagai Sami, yang berbicara bahasa Sami, dan atau memiliki orang tua atau keturunan yang berbahasa Sami (Kitti, 1996, 65).

Hidup berdampingan dengan lingkungan yang keras di Artik membuat masyarakat Sami harus beradaptasi dengan menemukan cara-cara bertahan hidup. Beberapa diantara mereka masih berpindah-pindah, atau nomaden. Mata pencaharian masyarakat Sami diantaranya adalah berburu, nelayan, maupun menggembala rusa kutub. Menjadi penggembala rusa kutub menjadi salah satu ikon budaya masyarakat Sami. Banyak orang Sami yang mempraktikkan gaya hidup semi-nomaden, untuk memindahkan rusanya diantara pegunungan dan pantai sesuai dengan musim (Arnadottir, 2014, 170).

Rusa menjadi salah satu sumber kehidupan bagi orang Sami. Rusa bisa dimanfaatkan untuk transportasi, membuat beragam peralatan dan juga sumber makanan. Bulu rusa bisa dimanfaatkan untuk membuat sepatu musim dingin, sarung tangan, topi, pelindung kaki. Selain itu juga bisa digunakan untuk kasur, dan juga selimut. Sementara itu, dagingnya biasa dikonsumsi dan juga diawetkan untuk memenuhi protein orang Sami. Pentingnya keberadaan rusa pada kehidupan mereka maka negara-negara Nordic mengadopsi perjanjian khusus terkait dengan penggembalaan rusa kutub, seperti yang dijelaskan Zashikhina (2014):

...the Reindeer Grazing Act of 1971 in Sweden and the Reindeer Husbandry Act of 1978 in Norway, which was recently amended. These documents provide the Sami with the exclusive right for their traditional livelihood – reindeer husbandry. The Lapp Codicil was the first official document, which allows to the Sami to practice reindeer husbandry. This document still can be considered as the source of law regarding Sami’s rights for the traditional livelihoods.

Meskipun memiliki keunikan dan dukungan dalam pengelolaan sumber daya, masyarakat Sami sebagai minoritas juga mendapatkan diskriminasi pada masa lalu. Salah satu bentuk diskriminasinya adalah dengan diimplementasikannya kebijakan asimilasi yang memarjinalisasikan orang Sami di Norwegia. Salah satu pemicu kebijakan ini adalah pemberontakan yang terjadi di kawasan Koaukatoni di Utara Norwegia pada tahun 1852. Pemberontakan tersebut terjadi karena respon

orang Sami terhadap diskriminasi dan penjajahan (Muus, 2010).

Setelah itu, muncul kebijakan yang dikenal sebagai “fornorsking” atau “norwegianization” yang terjadi pada era 1879-1940. Kebijakan itu diimplementasikan terjadi pada dua level, yaitu kebijakan tempat tinggal dan *livelihood*, dan kebijakan bahasa dan pendidikan. Salah satu prakteknya yang terjadi sebelum tahun 1970 adalah pelarangan untuk menggunakan bahasa Sami dimanapun dan masyarakat Sami harus menggunakan bahasa Norwegia di ranah publik (Zashikhina, 2014). Menurut Muus (2010) orang Sami yang tidak menguasai bahasa Norwegia baik membaca atau menulis, tidak diperbolehkan memiliki bentuk bisnis atau kepemilikan atas properti. Memiliki nama dengan karakter bahasa Sami juga bisa menjadi masalah terkait hak kepemilikan properti. Dalam proses asimilasi ini pula, ada hukum yang diberlakukan pada tahun 1902 terkait dengan nama Norwegia saja yang bisa dilekatkan pada properti. Proses-proses diskriminasi ini sudah berlangsung cukup lama tidak hanya di Norwegia tetapi juga orang Sami di negara scandinavia lainnya, seperti juga yang dinyatakan oleh Zashikhina (2014):

For the long period of time the Sami people from all these Nordic states were neglected by the governments and it was easier to pretend that they are not a separate ethnic group, but just a group of people with other language and way of life. And it was easier to try to change them, make „them“ similar to „us“, then to cohabit all together. But it was not fault of national governments. All international law that time considered indigenous peoples not like individual ethnic groups, but just like small tribes with no culture.

GERAKAN SOSIAL DAN OTONOMI PENGELOLAAN SUMBER DAYA ALAM

Seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Nuttal (1998, 3) gerakan politik yang terjadi di Artik memiliki tujuan untuk mendapatkan pengakuan diri (self-determination) dan juga klaim terhadap lahan serta sumber daya alam. Upaya yang dilakukan untuk memperoleh itu semua adalah dengan mengkonstruksi identitas etnik serta budaya yang dimiliki serta memfokuskan perhatian

pada *aboriginality* dan keadatan. Penggunaan retorika juga digunakan untuk mengartikulasi, menunjukkan, serta mempertahankan identitas sosial tertentu dan klaim bahwa mereka tergabung dalam group atau lokasi tertentu (Nuttal, 1998). Seperti yang dijelaskan oleh Nuttal (1998) bahwa:

The use of such rhetoric has become essential for Arctic peoples as they argue that their demands for ownership of or title to lands and resources are based on two undisputable claims: that they have a unique and special relationship to the Arctic environment which is essential for social identity and cultural survival; and that they have never given up their rights over lands and resources in the first place—rather, land has been expropriated and resources exploited without due regard to indigenous peoples. Claims to lands and resources are thus based on cultural and historical rights: the Arctic environment not only sustains indigenous peoples in an economic sense, it nourishes them spiritually and provides a fundamental basis for the distinctive cultures and ways of life they are fighting to protect

Pada bagian ini akan dipaparkan bentuk-bentuk gerakan yang pernah dilakukan oleh masyarakat Sami beserta pihak-pihak yang membantunya. Dalam hal ini secara garis besar upaya yang dilakukan oleh orang Sami adalah untuk memperjuangkan hak-hak komunalnya, diantaranya hak atas pengelolaan sumber daya maupun kepemilikan atas tanah. Upaya untuk memperoleh klaim yang berdasar pada keunikan identitas ditempuh melalui jalan dan proses yang panjang. Pada bagian ini, deskripsi momentum di mana masyarakat Sami menjadi aktor dalam perjuangannya menuntut hak hidup serta hak otonomi sumber daya yang berada dalam kaca mata gerakan sosial baru akan dipaparkan lebih mendalam.

Proses perjuangan tersebut diantaranya muncul pada aksi penolakan proyek skala besar pembangkit listrik di Alta serta perjuangan politik terbentuknya parlemen Sami dan pengajuan *Finnmark Act* yang mencoba mengakomodasi kepentingan masyarakat Sami. Secara historis kedua hal ini memiliki keterkaitan dalam gerakan masyarakat Sami. Aksi penolakan ini

menjadi awal masuknya isu-isu diskriminasi serta ketidakberpihakan pemerintah terhadap orang Sami dalam perdebatan publik. Aksi ini pulalah yang mendorong orang Sami secara politik memiliki perwakilan dalam parlemen, yang dibentuknya sendiri, untuk bernegosiasi dengan pemerintah pusat.

Menentang Pembangunan Pembangkit Listrik Alta

Kawasan utara Norwegia sebagai kawasan yang ditinggali oleh masyarakat Sami menjadi lokasi pembangunan skala besar untuk meningkatkan pertumbuhan di Norwegia. Pemerintahan Norwegia memiliki rencana untuk membangun pembangkit listrik tenaga air di daerah Alta-Kautokeino. Hal ini didasari pada disetujuinya perencanaan pendirian pembangkit listrik beserta dam berukuran raksasa pada tahun 1978 oleh parlemen. Proses inisiasi proyek ini ternyata berlangsung cukup panjang. Menurut Andersen, et. al (1985) Kementerian Sumber Daya Air dan Listrik Norwegia meluncurkan rencana pada tahun 1960an untuk mengeksploitasi aliran sungai Alta-Kautokeino untuk digunakan sebagai pembangkit listrik serta menciptakan waduk di desa tempat tinggal etnis Sami. Kasus ini berlangsung cukup lama hampir lebih dari 12 tahun dengan banyak ketidakpastian serta konflik. Namun akhirnya pada tahun 1981 rencana ini diimplementasikan.

Aliran sungai Alta-Kautokeino merupakan salah satu aliran sungai yang memiliki nilai ekologis dan ekonomis bagi kehidupan masyarakat. Hal ini didasari atas pentingnya aliran sungai bagi ekosistem di kawasan utara Norwegia. Parmann (1981) memaparkan bahwa sungai tersebut merupakan salah satu sungai terindah di Norwegia. Panjang aliran sungai ini mencapai 130 km dan menyimpan potensi perikanan air tawar berupa persediaan ikan salmon yang mencapai 30.000kg/tahun. Berkat sumber daya ikan tersebut, Sungai Alta berperan dalam perikanan komersil dan juga sebagai tujuan pariwisata (Andersen, et.al., 1985, 318). Tidak hanya itu, di kedua sisi sungai itu melintasi dataran tinggi bernama Finmarksvidda yang merupakan area terpenting bagi migrasi rusa

kutub. Masyarakat Sami sangat bergantung pada pemanfaatan rusa kutub ini.

Rencana pembangunan pembangkit listrik ini menimbulkan gejolak dan perlawanan di masyarakat, tidak hanya oleh masyarakat Sami yang terekslusi dari tempat tinggalnya tetapi juga banyak pihak. Howell (2010) mengatakan bahwa pembangunan ini merupakan proyek yang paling kontroversial dalam sejarah proyek energi di Norwegia. Tidak hanya karena mampu mengaktifasi gerakan dari populasi Sami, tetapi juga mampu menggerakkan pihak-pihak lain seperti politisi, kelompok radikal, environmentalis, maupun ilmuwan sosial seperti antropolog. Proyek skala besar ini juga menimbulkan perdebatan politik di Norwegia (Broderstad, 2011; Andersen et al., 1985, 318). Kasus ini memberikan peluang untuk mempertanyakan kembali prosedur serta aturan dalam pembuatan kebijakan dalam ranah lingkungan dan manajemen sumber daya. Gerakan perlawanan ini didasari pada hak-hak masyarakat Sami atas tanah, air, serta sumber daya alam.

Tindakan perlawanan dari gerakan ini berlangsung berulang kali dan sempat berhasil menunda sejenak proses pembangunan pembangkit listrik serta waduk. Bentuk resistensi yang muncul beragam (Andersen, et. al., 1985, 320). Pada tahun 1970 penduduk Masi, komunitas kecil Sami yang akan dipaksa pindah dari lingkungan tempat tinggalnya karena pendirian waduk, berhasil mendesak parlemen Norwegia untuk tidak memasukkan proyek pembangunan waduk dalam rencana proyek pembangkit listrik. Hingga delapan tahun setelahnya, pada 1978 keputusan untuk membangun waduk mendapatkan petisi dan juga aksi demonstrasi baik di pusat kota Oslo maupun di Alta. Setelah itu, pada tahun 1979 pembangkangan sipil dilakukan oleh masyarakat setempat dan juga kelompok lingkungan di Norwegia dengan cara menutup pembuatan jalan menuju ke lokasi pusat energi. Pada tahun yang sama demonstrasi damai dengan membuat tenda di depan gedung parlemen dilakukan oleh warga Sami. Aksi ini diliput oleh media massa hingga publik memaksa Pemerintah untuk menghentikan implementasi kebijakan tersebut.

Perlawanan masyarakat adat Sami memuncak pada tahun 1981 ketika pemerintah akan melakukan eksekusi pembangunan proyek. Gerakan mobilisasi massa terjadi di lokasi Alta untuk menolak konstruksi pembangkit listrik dan dam. Tujuan utama aksi ini adalah untuk melindungi kawasan yang memiliki fungsi ekologis di Norwegia serta untuk menegakkan hak-hak masyarakat adat yang tinggal di kawasan tersebut, masyarakat Sami. Estimasi menunjukkan sekitar 600-700 orang berkumpul dengan membawa atribut demonstrasi. Mereka telah berkumpul di lokasi dan menginap di lokasi pendirian konstruksi pembangkit listrik. Untuk menghalau aksi tersebut, Pemerintah mengutus 600 anggota kepolisian untuk berjaga, dan bahkan menangkap semua orang yang ikut dalam aksi ini. Mereka yang tertangkap dikenai denda sebesar 3000 kroner. Denda yang terkumpul dalam aksi tersebut mencapai 1.700.000 kroner atau setara dengan 350.000 dollar (Parmann, 1981, 153). Meskipun aksi massa telah dilakukan, namun gerakan ini belum membuahkan hasil dan proyek pembangkit listrik tetap berjalan yang dimulai pada akhir tahun 1981.

Finnmark Act: Upaya Politik Mendapatkan Otonomi Pengelolaan Sumber Daya

Kemampuan untuk bernegosiasi secara politis diperlukan masyarakat adat untuk mendapatkan *bargaining position* atas hak-hak yang mereka tuntut. Komisi Sami didirikan untuk memperjuangkan hak masyarakat adat di Norwegia. Kemunculan Komisi Hak Asasi Sami (*Sami Rights Commission*) tersebut dapat dikaitkan dengan momen penting perlawanan masyarakat Sami terhadap proyek pembangkit listrik di kawasan Alta. Broderstad (2011) menyatakan, meskipun warga Sami kalah dalam ‘pertempuran’, tetapi mereka memenangkan kasusnya. Tepat setelah kejadian demonstrasi besar-besaran, masih di tahun 1981 komisi hak asasi masyarakat Sami dibentuk. Mandat utama dari pendirian komisi ini adalah mempertanyakan kembali mengenai hak masyarakat Sami terhadap tanah dan air.

Tuntutan komisi ini mengenai hak masyarakat Sami menghasilkan beberapa

luaran. Hasil kerja keras komisi dapat dilihat dari bagaimana *Sami Act* berhasil disusun pada tahun 1987 untuk membela kepentingan orang Sami. Selain itu juga berhasil dilakukannya amandemen konstitusi pada tahun 1988 serta pendirian parlemen Sami di tahun 1989. Pasal yang diajukan dan telah disahkan dalam konstitusi Norwegia tercantum pada pasal 110a yang berisikan ada tanggung jawab pemerintah untuk mempertahankan serta mengizinkan “development of Sami Culture”. Dengan munculnya pasal tersebut, masyarakat Sami dapat bernegosiasi dengan Pemerintah Pusat mengenai otonomi sumber daya dan budayanya. Salah satunya adalah keberhasilan inisiasi penggunaan bahasa Sami (Broderstad, 2011)).

Hak politik menjadi poin utama dalam agenda masyarakat Sami dengan perjuangan pendirian parlemen Sami. Dengan adanya parlemen ini perwakilan masyarakat bisa menegaskan representasinya dalam perpolitikan di Norwegia. Melalui politik, negosiasi bisa terus dilakukan untuk kepentingan masyarakat Sami. Menjadi entitas warga negara yang memiliki kemampuan mengatur dirinya sendiri terkait sumber daya dan juga budaya merupakan tujuan utama dari keterlibatan dalam ranah politik ini. Seperti yang dipaparkan oleh Broderstad (2011) bahwa, “*As is the case across the Arctic, where a number of legal and political arrangements have been established to promote a greater degree of autonomy, certain Sami rights gradually became entrenched, and political arrangements were established to promote a greater degree of Sami autonomy*”.

Salah satu bentuk produk perjuangan adalah munculnya *Finnmark Act* (atau perjanjian Finnmark). Finnmark merupakan daerah paling terujung bagian selatan dari Norwegia yang ditinggali sekitar 74.000 penduduk. Daerah tersebut juga merupakan kawasan tempat tinggal masyarakat Sami dan juga masyarakat non-Sami. Gagasan reformasi lahan di Finnmark tersebut diperjuangkan oleh Komisi Hak Asasi Sami (Riseth, 2007, 180) setelah hampir 20 tahun berdiri. Awalnya Komisi Hak Asasi Sami memberikan rekomendasi agar ada pengakuan hak masyarakat untuk bisa mengakses tanah dan air. Tujuan digagasnya perjanjian ini untuk

meminta pengakuan kepada pemerintah pusat untuk memberikan hak otonomi kepada orang Sami.

Pada awalnya, bagian paling utara Norwegia yaitu Finnmark adalah kawasan yang menjadi bagian dari yurisdiksi Pemerintah Norwegia dan negara memiliki kuasa penuh sebagai pemilik tanah. Seperti yang dinyatakan Ravna (2011), kepemilikan oleh negara ini berdasar pada persepsi “*terra nullius*” atau “*the state land doctrine*”. Negara mampu mengajukan tanah yang dianggap tidak berpemilik menjadi kekuasaan Norwegia, tanpa harus ada perjanjian atau kesepakatan dari penduduk yang sebelumnya telah mendiami dan memanfaatkan area tersebut. Cara pandang ini hampir sama dengan konsep ‘*frontierisme*’ (Tsing, 2003) yang merupakan gagasan atau ide yang menganggap sebuah ‘zona’ dianggap kosong, tidak ada yang mengatur dan oleh karena itu harus diatur.

Seperti yang diketahui, Norwegia menjadi salah satu negara awal yang meratifikasi konvensi No.169 terkait masyarakat adat dan tribal. Sebagai bentuk ratifikasi, Pemerintah Norwegia dihadapkan pada kesepakatan-kesepakatan yang dibangun serta melakukan implementasi kebijakan terkait hak-hak masyarakat adat, salah satunya dengan mengidentifikasi dan mengakui tanah adat yang dimiliki oleh masyarakat adat.

Perdebatan dan perjuangan untuk menginisiasi perjanjian Finnmark mengalami proses yang cukup panjang. Lembaga-lembaga seperti Komisi Hak Asasi Sami dan juga Parlemen Sami serta menjadi tulang punggung dalam proses legal formal. Negosiasi-negosiasi juga dilakukan untuk mendapatkan peluang memperoleh pengakuan atas sumber daya atas nama masyarakat Sami di Finnmark. Pada awalnya pengajuan atau cikal bakal perjanjian Finnmark adalah tuntutan dari Komisi Hak Asasi Sami terhadap status kepemilikan adat masyarakat Sami terkait tanah dan air di kawasan tersebut (ibid). Komisi tersebut mengajukan perjanjian untuk pengelolaan tanah di Finnmark di mana kepemilikannya dialihkan dari ‘*State Forest Company*’ kepada badan kepemilikan independen yang bernama ‘*Finnmark Estate Management*’ yang diatur oleh dewan yang

dipilih oleh Sami Parlemen. Kemudian draft tersebut berkembang menjadi bagaimana masyarakat adat dapat mengelola sumber dayanya secara otonom di sana.

Setelah enam tahun rekomendasi ini diberikan, Pemerintah akhirnya mengeluarkan deklarasi (*bill*). Draft tersebut berkali-kali diujikan untuk mendapatkan kesepakatan bersama antara komite, parlemen Sami dan Pemerintah Norwegia. Namun draft yang diajukan oleh pemerintah beberapa poin didalamnya tidak mengakomodasi kepentingan masyarakat Sami. Salah satunya adalah terkait tidak adanya lembaga khusus yang memiliki tugas untuk mengklarifikasi di lapangan apakah ada kepemilikan hak lahan oleh masyarakat Sami di Finnmark. Padahal, proses identifikasi hak menjadi salah satu poin utama yang diajukan oleh komisi hak asasi untuk memperkuat informasi mengenai aksesibilitas terhadap sumber daya. Hal ini dikritik oleh Parlemen Sami dan dibentuklah lembaga independen bernama “Parliamentary Standing Committee of Justice” untuk melakukan *assessment* terhadap draft yang telah disusun Pemerintah. Komite Keadilan tersebut menyimpulkan bahwa apa yang diajukan oleh Pemerintah belum memenuhi persyaratan dalam Konvensi ILO No. 169,

“Should the Finnmark Act meet ILO Convention requirements for recognition of land rights, the decision rules must be changed so that the Sámi are secured the control according to an ownership position. If this is not relevant for the entire county, the special Sámi areas need to be identified with a view to ensuring the Sámi the control and rights to these areas” (Ravna, 2011, 434)

Untuk mengakomodasi kepentingan pengidentifikasian hak kepemilikan maka dibentuklah Komisi Finnmark sesuai dengan *Finnmark Act*. Komisi ini memiliki mandat untuk melakukan investigasi terhadap hak kepemilikan dan penggunaan lahan di area tersebut yang nantinya akan diambil alih dari negara kepada ‘*Finnmark Estate*’. Komisi tersebut awalnya tidak muncul dalam rancangan yang diusulkan oleh pemerintah. Pentingnya badan tersebut justru dikemukakan dan diajukan ketika konsultasi

dengan Komisi Hak Asasi dan Komite Keadilan. Komisi Finnmark ini adalah upaya untuk mengakomodasi kesepakatan yang dibangun dalam Konvensi ILO yaitu diperlukannya lembaga legal formal yang memiliki wewenang untuk mendukung pengakuan hak masyarakat adat. Seperti yang ditegaskan oleh Ravna (2011), bahwa:

“...under Article 6, paragraph 1 (a), to take steps as necessary to identify land traditionally occupied by indigenous people, and to establish adequate pro-cedures within the national legal system to settle land claim of indigenous peo-ples under Article 14 (2) and 14 (3).The latters aim to facilitate the clarification process in relation to the Sámi, who for the most part are locals living in villages and reindeer-herders. This holds not only for the formal process, but also for the application of substantive law, including the use of legal sources.”

Dalam praktiknya badan-badan yang dibentuk untuk mendukung *Finnmark Act* masih terdapat permasalahan. Meskipun dianggap perangkat yang ideal, tetapi Komisi Finnmark yang memiliki tugas melakukan pemetaan tentang hak pemilikan lahan, berasal dari kalangan elite pengacara dan sangat sedikit melibatkan masyarakat Sami. Broderstad (2015) bahkan mengatakan bahwa “*the Finnmark Estate is ethnically blind*”. Dia memaparkan bahwa dalam proses pengakuan hak, ternyata hak masyarakat Sami dan masyarakat lain yang mengakses kawasan Finnmark diperlakukan sama. Lebih lanjut, ia menjelaskan bahwa jika memang diperuntukkan bagi orang Sami, maka harus ada perbedaan atas pemilikan lahan atau penggunaan lahan.

Munculnya bentuk pengaturan lingkungan dan sumber daya melalui *Finnmark Act* memunculkan berbagai respon tidak hanya dari penduduk etnis sami, tetapi juga non-Sami yang tinggal di daerah Finnmark. Ween dan Lien (2012) melihat bahwa penerapan kebijakan ini ternyata juga mendatangkan rasa takut bagi penduduk di sana dalam hal akses terhadap sumber daya. Mereka melihat bahwa sudah sejak lama masyarakat Sami dan non-Sami hidup berdampingan di Finnmark. Masyarakat tersebut

memandang bahwa sumber daya alam yang ada di kawasan tersebut sebagai “*common resources*” atau sumber daya bersama. Di Finnmark baik Sami atau non-Sami, memiliki hak untuk mengakses sumber daya, seperti memancing, memetik buah *berries* atau berburu hewan (ibid). Dengan adanya *Finnmark Act* memunculkan permasalahan di tingkat mikro terkait dengan kekhawatiran penduduk Finnmark bahwa apakah ada kemungkinan di masa depan hanya penduduk Sami saja yang bisa mengakses sumber daya dan menyingkirkan penduduk lain yang dari dulu juga memiliki akses yang sama di area tersebut.

PENUTUP

Masyarakat Sami menjadi aktor dalam gerakan sosial baru yang mendasarkan perjuangannya pada identitas maupun otonomi. Perjuangan ini dimulai pada perlawanan mereka atas ketidakadilan yang dimunculkan oleh proyek pembangunan. Proyek skala besar yang diselenggarakan oleh pemerintah Norwegia dianggap mampu memberikan dampak terhadap kehidupan masyarakat Sami di kawasan tersebut. Dengan adanya kasus perlawanan ini, publik Norwegia akhirnya sadar tentang diskriminasi yang terjadi kepada minoritas etnis Sami. Dengan adanya kasus ini, dipertanyakan kembali bagaimana seharusnya proses pembangunan dilakukan dan apa dampaknya bagi masyarakat. Meskipun kalah melawan intervensi pembangunan, tetapi gerakan ini justru menginisiasi peran masyarakat Sami di ranah politik.

Secara politis, baik komisi hak asasi maupun parlemen Sami menjadi corong kepentingan orang Sami. Usulan-usulan serta inisiasi orang Sami untuk mempengaruhi kebijakan pemerintah, telah memberikan ruang negosiasi agar hak kewarganegaraan etnis minoritas untuk mendapatkan pengakuan. Salah satu bentuk negosiasi tersebut adalah perjanjian Finnmark yang berisi tentang gambaran ideal pengakuan hak masyarakat terhadap sumber daya, terutama tanah dan air. Perjanjian ini dianggap sebagai pengejawantahan yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah Norwegia terhadap Konvensi ILO No. 169. Sebagai pihak yang

meratifikasi, maka Norwegia memiliki tanggung jawab untuk memperlihatkan komitmennya untuk mengakui hak masyarakat adat.

Meskipun perjuangan untuk mendapatkan pengakuan hak-hak terhadap sumber daya telah dilakukan tetapi masyarakat Sami tetap harus menunggu proses identifikasi yang dilakukan oleh negara. Dalam proses ini masih banyak persoalan-persoalan yang harus diselesaikan terkait dengan sudut pandang negara mengenai sistem pengelolaannya. Pada perjanjian tersebut, tidak dimunculkan kekhususan hak yang dimiliki oleh orang Sami ketika disandingkan dengan orang non-sami terkait akses dan kepemilikan lahan di Finnmark. Penerapan pengelolaan sumber daya melalui *Finnmark Act* juga memunculkan kegelisahan dalam tataran lokal. Penduduk di Finnmark realitanya tidak hanya masyarakat Sami, tetapi juga masyarakat non-Sami. Sejak lama kawasan Finnmark dianggap sebagai sumber daya milik bersama atau *commons* oleh penduduknya sehingga siapa saja memiliki akses untuk memanfaatkan sumber daya tersebut untuk kebutuhan hidup. Ketika *Finnmark Act* dirancang untuk memberikan otonomi pengelolaan sumber daya kepada etnis Sami, maka kemungkinan akan muncul persoalan di masa depan tentang eksklusi kepada pihak lain, terutama masyarakat non-Sami yang juga merupakan penduduk Finnmark.

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AGAMA KHONGHUCU DAN BUDDHA DALAM LINTASAN SEJARAH KOREA

KONFUCIANISM AND BUDDHISM IN THE HISTORY OF KOREA

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Diterima: 21-08-2017

Direvisi: 14-09-2017

Disetujui: 30-10-2017

ABSTRACT

South Korean society has a plural society with its different religious background. Khonghucu (Confucianism) and Buddhism have grown in the country for the last several centuries. Khonghucu teaches philosophy and thinking about politics and culture which form identity and ethic of Korean society. Likewise, Buddhism has a role in establishing basic identity and culture of Korean society. Other religions such as Catholic, Islam, Protestant, and shamanism are also followed by Korean. This article tries to respond the question about religious environment among Korean society, especially the question for the ground of Confucianism and Buddhism in Korean history. This article is resulted from a desk literature research which also aims at describing the current development of Confucianism and Buddhism and their role in forming culture as well as identity of Korean people.

Keywords: *Confucianism, Buddhism, shamanism, Xu she scripture, and mass culture.*

ABSTRAK

Masyarakat Korea Selatan merupakan masyarakat yang heterogen dari sisi agama. Agama Khonghucu dan Agama Buddha telah berkembang di Korea sejak berabad lampau. Agama Khonghucu sangat mengandung unsur-unsur filsafat pemikiran, politik, dan kebudayaan yang berakar dan berpengaruh ke dalam pembentukan etika dan identitas bangsa Korea. Agama Buddha juga berperan dalam pembentukan dasar-dasar identitas dan kebudayaan Korea. Selain Agama Kristen, Islam dan Katholik, agama setempat atau shamanisme juga tetap dipeluk sebagian masyarakat Korea Selatan. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjawab pertanyaan bagaimanakah situasi kehidupan beragama di Korea Selatan dan bagaimanakah kedudukan Agama Khonghucu dan Buddha dalam sejarah perjalanan bangsa Korea. Tulisan yang dihasilkan dari penelitian literatur ini juga dimaksudkan untuk mendeskripsikan bagaimanakah kondisi Agama Khonghucu dan Buddha di Korea pada masa kini dan bagaimana perannya dalam membentuk kebudayaan dan identitas nasional Bangsa Korea.

Kata kunci: Agama Khonghucu, Agama Buddha, shamanisme, teks-teks Xu she, dan budaya massa.


PENDAHULUAN

Korea Selatan adalah sebuah negara yang plural dari sisi agama, yang terdiri dari Kristen, Buddha, Khonghucu, dan Islam. Pada tingkatan tertentu, shamanisme, suatu sistem kepercayaan

lokal, dimasukkan sebagai salah satu kategori agama. Pemerintah Korea Selatan berdasarkan Undang-Undang Dasarnya melindungi perbedaan dalam agama di antara penduduknya. Setiap orang bebas memeluk agamanya sesuai dengan

pilihan dan keyakinannya sendiri. Peran agama dalam pembangunan sosial kebudayaan Korea Selatan merupakan hal yang unik, karena beberapa tradisi keagamaan dipahami oleh orang Korea sebagai kekayaan kebudayaan sebab tidak menganjurkan ritual ibadah.

Menurut statistik tahun 2005, 53 persen penduduk Korea Selatan memiliki agama dan pada tahun 2008 terdapat 510 organisasi keagamaan di negara ini. Di antara empat agama tersebut, Agama Buddha dan Agama Khonghucu merupakan agama yang lebih berpengaruh daripada agama-agama yang lain dalam kehidupan sehari-hari orang Korea. Hal ini sejalan dengan warisan budaya yang separuhnya di Korea Selatan terkait dengan dua agama ini.



Bagan 2.1 *Pemeluk agama di Korea¹*

Uniknya, secara ringkas dapat digambarkan bahwa Khonghucu lebih dipahami oleh sebagian masyarakat Korea sebagai sebuah ajaran etika daripada sebuah agama. Ajarannya menekankan pada pentingnya loyalitas, kesalehan, dan berbagai kebajikan lainnya. Padahal, pemeluk agama ini memiliki dan sangat menghargai suatu kepercayaan bahwa ruh nenek moyang dapat mempengaruhi kehidupan anak cucunya. Karenanya mereka membangun kuburan nenek moyang seindah mungkin di tempat yang paling tinggi seperti perbukitan.

Agama Katholik diajarkan di Korea dari China melalui utusan-utusan Kerajaan Jaseon yang mengunjungi Beijing dan para misionaris Barat mengikuti mereka ke Korea. Pemeluk agama Katholik pada masa dinas Jaseon mengalami banyak represi, namun agama ini

¹ <http://www.korea.net/AboutKorea/Korean-Life/Religion> (Diakses 5 Juni 2015).

terus menerus berkembang menyebar di kalangan penduduk kelas menengah ke bawah di seluruh pelosok Korea. Sementara, Protestantisme dibawa ke Korea pada akhir abad ke-19 oleh zending dari Amerika Serikat dan menyebar dengan cepat melalui penyediaan sekolah dan rumah sakit. Bahkan, sekarang ini Protestan di Korea memiliki dan mengelola banyak sekolah mulai dari sekolah dasar sampai dengan perguruan tinggi dan rumah-rumah sakit.

Agama-agama orang Korea, Cheondogyo, Won Buddhisme dan Daejonggyo meskipun terdesak oleh agama-agama Abrahamik, masih dianut oleh sebagian orang Korea. Cheondogyo mendasarkan pada ajaran belajar dari Timut di abad ke-19, yakni mempertahankan bahwa manusia adalah surga, berpengaruh terhadap proses modernisasi di Korea. Daejonggyo muncul pada awal abad ke-20 untuk menyembah Dangun, pendiri negara Korea pertama, juga berpengaruh terhadap orang Korea dan mendorong pembentukan nasionalisme Korea. Pada tahun 1955, muncul masyarakat Islam Korea dan imam pertama yang diikuti oleh pembentukan Federasi Muslim Korea pada tahun 1967. Sekarang ini, telah ada sekitar 60 masjid dan 100.000 orang Korea yang memeluk agama Islam. Shamanisme masih berpengaruh dalam kehidupan sehari-hari orang Korea yang menghubungkan dunia spiritual dengan kehidupan yang akan datang, misalnya meramal nasib dan keberuntungan.

Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menjawab pertanyaan bagaimanakah situasi kehidupan beragama di Korea Selatan dan bagaimanakah kedudukan Agama Khonghucu dan Buddha dalam sejarah perjalanan bangsa Korea. Tulisan ini juga dimaksudkan untuk mendeskripsikan bagaimanakah kondisi Agama Khonghucu dan Buddha di Korea pada masa kini dan bagaimana perannya dalam membentuk kebudayaan dan identitas nasional Bangsa Korea.

AJARAN AGAMA KHONGHUCU SEJARAHNYA DI KOREA

Menurut ajaran Agama Khonghucu, orang tua adalah superior, oleh sebab itu penghormatan seara mutlak harus diberikan kepada mereka. Namun sebaliknya, orang tua

diharapkan untuk memperlakukan generasi muda dengan kasih sayang. Mereka diijinkan untuk bertindak keras kepada anak-anak, tetapi tidak diijinkan untuk bertindak kasar. Suami atau ayah memiliki kedudukan yang utama dalam sebuah keluarga. Dalam lingkup yang lebih besar, suami atau ayah haruslah tunduk pada orang yang mempekerjakannya atau dalam sistem politik adalah pemimpin nasionalnya seperti raja atau kaisar. Semua anggota masyarakat diharuskan untuk menghormati dan mematuhi penguasa yang memerintah mereka. Sebaliknya, penguasa juga memiliki kewajiban untuk bertanggung jawab terhadap rakyatnya, melindungi mereka dan menjamin kesejahteraan mereka. Penguasa juga harus menjadi suri tauladan dalam perilaku atau perbuatan bagi rakyat yang dipimpinnya, sehingga jika seorang penguasa memerintah dengan bijaksana, rakyatnya akan mematuhi. Raja atau penguasa juga harus mematuhi hukum Tuhan, jika raja gagal melaksanakan kewajiban-kewajibannya, kekacauan alamiah dan ekonomi akan muncul hingga rakyat akan menggulingkan penguasa tersebut.

Agama Khonghucu menekankan pada beberapa konsep dasar seperti *benevolence*, *righteousness*, *propriety*, *wisdom* dan *sincerity*. Menurut Nabi Khongtzu, usia membawa kebijaksanaan, semakin tua usia seseorang semakin terhormat tempatnya dalam ibadah penghormatan terhadap nenek moyang. Orang-orang seharusnya selalu melihat masa lalu dan jalan nenek moyangnya sebagai contoh untuk memecahkan persoalan-persoalan yang muncul pada masa sekarang. Pendapat Nabi Khongtzu adalah “dengan melihat kembali yang lampau, kita dapat mempelajari hal yang baru.”

Agama Khonghucu menyediakan kode perilaku antarindividu secara detail dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Namun, dalam kebudayaan, ajaran ini dapat dilihat sebagai doktrin praktis sosial dan politik. Jika ditelusuri lebih jauh Kung Fu Tse (Nabi Khongtzu) berasal dari China pada masa 500 BC, seorang guru yang mengajarkan murid-muridnya sistem keteraturan selama periode China mengalami perang saudara. Satu dari ajaran Kong Fu Tse yang paling penting adalah adanya tata keteraturan semua benda di alam semesta termasuk masyarakat manusia.

Nabi Khongtzu berpendapat bahwa di dalam dan melalui tata kehidupan bermasyarakat, perdamaian dan harmoni dapat dicapai jika setiap orang mengetahui tempatnya yang sesuai dalam masyarakat dan melaksanakan tugas-tugasnya sesuai dengan kedudukannya sebagaimana dalam semboyan” biarkan penguasa menjadi penguasa, kawula menjadi kawula, ayah menjadi ayah, dan anak menjadi anak.” Berikut adalah lima ajaran moral kedisiplinan untuk mengatur hubungan antarmanusia sebagai berikut: (i) keadilan dan kebenaran seharusnya mendasari relasi antara pemerintah dan rakyat, (ii) seharusnya ada hubungan yang baik antara anak dan bapak, (iii) pemisahan fungsi antara suami dan istri, (iv) orang muda seharusnya menghormati yang lebih tua, (v) ketulusan dan kepercayaan seharusnya ada dalam hubungan antarteman.²

Agama Khonghucu merupakan sistem kepercayaan paling penting di Korea karena telah memberi landasan etika bagi orang Korea pada umumnya. Studi Helgesen, Arben, dan Chen mengenai kehidupan orang Korea menunjukkan bahwa etika Agama Khonghucu sangat berpengaruh. Geir Helgesen (1998) mengatakan bahwa dalam perkembangan individu di Korea, teman-teman sekolah dan keluarga berperan lebih besar, lebih bersifat personal dan kurang pengaruh struktural. Hal ini sesuai dengan pemikiran Nabi Khongtzu yang mengajarkan ikatan antarindividu sebagai alat mengembangkan emosi individu. Pemikiran ini dapat dilihat dalam isu-isu kontemporer seperti pemisahan peran pemerintah dari masalah-masalah privat yang dihadapi oleh masyarakat. Perilaku komunalisme dalam setiap aspek diatur oleh aturan-aturan ethno-linguistik tradisional yang secara langsung dikaitkan dengan istilah semua perilaku yang membawa kebaikan (*virtue*). Russel Arben (1997) menyebutkan bahwa salah satu warisan Agama Khonghucu di Korea adalah masyarakat seharusnya diperintah oleh kontrol moral yang bersifat interpersonal dan rasa malu setiap individual (*sense of shame in every individual*), daripada seperangkat hukum formal. Meskipun Korea masih memberlakukan hukuman mati, tingkat pembunuhan dan kriminalitas relatif

² <http://www.asia-pacific-connections.com/confucianism.html> (Diakses 5 Juni 2015)

rendah karena sistem kehidupan masyarakat berakar pada sistem kontrol komunitarian, bukan pada ketakutan terhadap tindakan hukum.

Joseph Chen (2002) mengamati masyarakat Korea menyangkut posisi individu dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat dan persyaratan yang harus dimiliki oleh seseorang untuk sadar terhadap lingkungan disekitarnya. Hasil pengamatannya adalah bahwa masyarakat Korea memiliki ciri khas komunalisme secara alamiah yang tidak berarti anti-individual. Meskipun setiap orang memiliki kebebasan untuk bertindak dalam kehidupan sehari-hari, ada beberapa otoritas yang harus dihormati untuk mempertahankan harmoni antara personal dan masyarakat. Struktur asal dari masyarakat Korea adalah institusi keluarga, yang mensosialisasikan dan menginternalisasikan nilai-nilai dan aturan kedudukan seseorang dalam keluarga dan masyarakat, terutama penghormatan terhadap orang yang lebih tua dan rasa berintegritas. Pendidikan diajarkan sebagai instrumen untuk membuktikan kemampuan seseorang terhadap keluarga dan seluruh bangsa. Perilaku yang membawa manfaat sangat diajarkan di Korea dan diwujudkan dalam kewajiban seseorang terhadap keluarga dan masyarakat, yang nampak jelas dalam perilaku masyarakat pedesaan.

Levi (2013) mengatakan dewasa ini kebanyakan orang Korea merasa kecewa dengan nilai-nilai Barat, terutama individualisme dan liberalisme, dan kembali ke akar kebudayaan mereka yakni Agama Khonghucu. Relasi antara Agama Khonghucu dan modernitas di Korea bersifat rumit karena Agama Khonghucu lebih memusatkan perhatiannya pada elemen-elemen sejarah masa lalu daripada masa depan. Oleh karena itu, untuk memahami masyarakat Korea kontemporer, kita harus memahami prinsip-prinsip dasar atau filsafat yang digunakan dalam kehidupan sehari-hari orang Korea, yang tidak lain adalah Agama Khonghucu. Kebanyakan unsur-unsur ajaran neo-Agama Khonghucu masih eksis dalam kehidupan sehari-hari dan urusan pemerintahan seperti kesetiaan terhadap organisasi dan kontrak kerja jangka panjang. Namun, ajaran ini sudah tidak nampak dalam kurikulum sekolah di Korea Selatan setelah Perang Dunia II. Baru pada tahun 2000, muncul

minat dan perhatian yang lebih besar dari masyarakat terhadap simbol-simbol Agama Khonghucu, seperti merehab kembali kuburan-kuburan dan batu-batu penanda ingatan. Pada masa kini upacara pemakaman di Korea Selatan adalah perpaduan antara Agama Khonghucu dan Kristen. Contoh lainnya adalah penghormatan terhadap guru dan orang yang lebih tua juga merupakan bagian dari ajaran Nabi Khongtzu.

Ada sedikit perbedaan antara Agama Khonghucu Jepang dengan Agama Khonghucu Korea. Moralitas dalam Agama Khonghucu Korea yang diajarkan terkait dengan struktur keluarga dan semua klan yang memiliki hubungan darah. Sedangkan moralitas Agama Khonghucu Jepang meletakkan keluarga sebagai seluruh warga dan klan meskipun tidak ada hubungan darah. Selain itu, nilai-nilai fundamental Agama Khonghucu Korea lebih mengakui heterogenitas dan toleransi terhadap perbedaan. Sebaliknya Agama Khonghucu Jepang lebih cenderung pada entitas yang homogen dan kurang terbuka terhadap bangsa lain. Korea Selatan lebih terbuka karena situasi geografisnya sebagai daerah semenanjung yang memungkinkan untuk berinteraksi dengan bangsa lain dari China, Rusia, maupun dunia Barat.

Namun begitu, nilai-nilai Agama Khonghucu Jepang dan Korea memiliki beberapa persamaan karena baik masyarakat Jepang maupun Korea dibentuk oleh falsafah dan ajaran Agama Khonghucu. Misalnya semua bentuk konflik terbuka sebaiknya dihindari. Menurut Torbjorn Loden, harmoni, yang ditekankan dalam Agama Khonghucu, dapat dijadikan sebagai falsafah yang memandu peradaban Jepang dan Korea dalam keluarga dan relasi-relasi bisnis. Anak-anak di Jepang dan Korea juga diajarkan untuk bertindak dalam harmoni dengan lingkungan di sekitarnya. Kedua bangsa menekankan pada kesopanan dan bekerja bersama untuk tujuan universal daripada individual. Konsep pendidikan dalam peradaban Korea dan Jepang didominasi oleh prinsip-prinsip fundamental pendidikan Agama Khonghucu dan kebanyakan teks Agama Khonghucu merujuk pada bidang pendidikan. Pendidik misalnya tidak hanya hadir sebagai guru, tetapi juga mewakili masyarakat dan pemerintah. Oleh karena itu,

gelar pendidik/guru kepala menjadi sangat umum di Korea maupun Jepang.

Selanjutnya menurut Albert Pilot, baik masyarakat Korea dan Jepang memiliki tingkat kolektivitas yang relatif tinggi. Dalam kedua masyarakat ini, setiap orang yang lahir terserap dalam sebuah entitas kolektif baik keluarga ataupun kelompok, sehingga loyalitas dan orientasi terhadap kelompok atau keluarga mendapatkan tempat yang utama karena kelompok atau keluarga memberikan suatu identitas sosial. Hal ini dapat dilihat bahwa belakangan kebanyakan orang Korea Selatan berafiliasi terhadap gereja yang memberikan mereka identitas dan sebuah jalan menuju spiritualitas. Pada konteks Jepang, keterikatan lebih pada perusahaan atau tempat-tempat kerja. Kepala perusahaan ditempatkan kedudukannya seperti seorang ayah. Terkait dengan persoalan ekonomi, nilai-nilai Agama Khonghucu mengenai kepentingan umum dan kerja keras hampir sama baik di Korea dan Jepang. Pada saat menghadapi krisis ekonomi, baik Jepang maupun Korea cepat pulih karena kepemimpinan yang ditandai dengan kolaborasi antara elit politik dan bisnis mampu memobilisasi dukungan dari masyarakat untuk mengatasi persoalan.

Selama berabad-abad di Korea, Agama Khonghucu lebih dimaknai sebagai sistem pendidikan, upacara, dan tata cara pemerintahan sipil. Konsep mengenai keharmonisan sosial dan pesan-pesan moral memungkinkan kehidupan intelektual di Asia Timur pada masa lampau dan memainkan peranan yang menentukan dalam pembentukan budaya Korea pada masa kini. Di Korea, Agama Khonghucu diterima dengan hangat dan sangat ketat, sehingga orang China memandang bahwa pemeluk Agama Khonghucu Korea lebih saleh dibandingkan orang China sendiri. Korea dijuluki sebagai negara etika dari timur yang mengacu pada pelaksanaan ritual Agama Khonghucu yang dilaksanakan secara detail. Ajaran-ajaran Agama Khonghucu di Korea Selatan, dikenal sebagai neo-Khonghucu, menjadi lebih ketat karena digunakan dalam lembaga-lembaga pemerintah.

Penyebaran Agama Khonghucu ke Korea tidak bisa dilepaskan dari sejarah kerajaan

besar di Korea yakni Silla, Koryo dan Yi (Yang dan Henderson 1959).³ Pada masa Dinasti Yi (1392-1910), berdiri sekolah-sekolah Agama Khonghucu oleh organisasi-organisasi penganut Agama Khonghucu di Korea. Sistem pemikiran, masyarakat, dan politik Agama Khonghucu telah berada dalam lintasan sejarah Korea dan pengaruhnya masih dapat dilihat hingga pada masa sekarang (Yang, 1958).

Agama Khonghucu yang tumbuh di China menyebar ke negara lain setelah ajaran-ajaran Nabi Khongtzu ditulis oleh murid-murid Kong Fu Tse (Nabi Khongtzu) seperti Mencius dan Sunzi. Masyarakat Korea selalu sensitif terhadap perkembangan Agama Khonghucu China dan pada saat yang sama mereka mengembangkan pandangan mereka sendiri yang jarang diteliti seperti di China dan Jepang. Agama Khonghucu Korea mengikuti siklus lahir, berkembang, konflik, penuaan dan lahir kembali selama kurang lebih 2000 tahun. Oleh karena itu, pemahaman terhadap konteks sejarah Korea penting untuk memahami perkembangan Agama Khonghucu dalam lintasan sejarah negara ini.

Agama Khonghucu diterima di Korea pada saat yang sama dengan perkembangan Buddhisme. Orang Korea berusaha untuk mempelajari huruf-huruf China dan sekaligus lima buku klasik Agama Khonghucu: Buku Perubahan, Buku Ritual, Buku Nyanyian, Buku Dokumen dan Kronikel Musim Semi dan Gugur. Pada masa Raja Sosurim, di Koguryo (371-384) memeluk agama Buddha, beliau juga pada saat yang sama mendirikan sebuah universitas yang berhaluan Agama Khonghucu pada tahun 372. Raja sesudahnya, Kwanggaet (391-413) yang memperluas wilayah Kerajaan Koguryo, mulai mengabadikan tulisan-tulisan dalam huruf China yang menunjukkan pengaruh Agama Khonghucu terhadap kepemimpinan dan etika.

Pada masa Kerajaan Silla, tiga pemikiran agama: Agama Khonghucu, Buddhisme, dan Taoisme berkembang dengan lambat. Penguasa-penguasa Kerajaan Silla yang pertama sampai abad ke-5 memeluk shamanisme dan menolak

³ <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7113844> (Diakses 5 Juni 2015)

pemikiran baru seperti Buddha yang kemudian ditindas, namun kemudian berkembang sangat cepat dan menjadi kekuatan yang menyatukan Korea oleh Dinasti Silla pada tahun 668. Pada tahun 682, Raja Silla mendirikan Akademi Khonghucu Kerajaan dengan ujian negara yang pertama diselenggarakan pada tahun 788. Untuk mendapatkan teks Khonghucu dalam Bahasa China, para sarjana Agama Khonghucu melakukan perjalanan ke China untuk belajar dan kembali ke Korea untuk mengajarkan agama ini. Masa antara 668 dan 998 disebut sebagai Kerajaan Silla bersatu yang ditandai dengan perkembangan Agama Khonghucu, Buddha, dan Taoisme. Sekolah dari ketiga agama tersebut saling terbuka satu sama lain dan tidak dipengaruhi oleh ortodoksi keagamaan.

Salah satu contoh pertukaran pemikiran tersebut adalah “gerakan bunga-bunga muda” sebuah organisasi di Kerajaan Silla yang mempersiapkan elit untuk melaksanakan tugas-tugas kenegaraan. Karakteristik dari pendidikan elit tersebut adalah mengajarkan ketiga agama dan membawanya ke dalam keharmonisan. Pada masa itu diceritakan adanya seorang rohaniwan Agama Khonghucu yang bernama Choe yang dikenal sebagai seorang Buddha yang cerdas dan pendeta Tao yang menyendiri. Pendeta ini juga menunjukkan pentingnya teks dan pendekatan Zen Buddhisme yang menjaga jarak dari teks dalam mencari spiritualitas, sehingga mampu menjembatani dialog antara Buddha, Tao, dan Khonghucu.

Masa selanjutnya adalah pada masa Kerajaan Koryo, didirikan oleh T’aejo (918-943) berlangsung sampai tahun 1392. Figur-figur simbolik pada masa ini adalah rohaniwan yang tidak menikah. Saat itu pula, *lithang* maupun tempat suci menyebar ke seluruh pelosok Korea yang dibangun sebagai tempat upacara maupun mempelajari teks-teks suci Agama Khonghucu. Saat itu pula, seni-seni berlatar belakang Buddhisme dalam bentuk lukisan dan naskah yang dicetak seperti Kitab Tripitaka, sehingga seakan-akan Agama Khonghucu Korea tidak nampak lagi keberadaannya. Namun demikian, pada masa tersebut berkembanglah Agama Khonghucu baru (neo Konfusianisme) yang

merupakan kelanjutan dari perkembangan Agama Khonghucu pada masa sebelumnya.

Jika Buddhisme menekankan pada pelatihan spiritual dan pencerahan, berkeinginan untuk menolak semua keinginan dan hal-hal yang terkait dengannya, sebaliknya Agama Khonghucu memusatkan pada dunia dengan kehendak untuk memiliki dan berdampak terhadap masyarakat luas. Para rohaniwan Khonghucu mempelajari bagaimana untuk bertanggung jawab dalam pemerintahan dan masalah-masalah sosial. Pada masa ini, rohaniwan Agama Khonghucu mulai terganggu dengan penetrasi biksu-biksu Agama Buddha dalam kekuasaan dan kehidupan yang korup. Para rohaniwan Agama Khonghucu tidak hanya menginginkan menjadi penasihat politik, tetapi juga mendesain masyarakat dengan cara yang mendasar.

Perkembangan gagasan Agama Khonghucu pada masa Dinasti Koryo dapat dibagi ke dalam dua periode, yakni 918-1046 berkaitan dengan kerja Ch’oe Sung-no dan Ch’oe Chung, dan 1047-1259 yang berhubungan dengan perkembangan Neo-Khonghucu. Rohaniwan CH’oe Chung dikenal sebagai tokoh Agama Khonghucu Korea yang mengorganisasi sistem model akademik untuk memperluas pendidikan dan meningkatkan pembelajaran yang ekselen. Pada periode yang kedua muncul beberapa rohaniwan Agama Khonghucu yang mempublikasikan buku-buku penting ajaran ini sehingga menjadikan Agama Khonghucu semakin tertanam dalam lembaga-lembaga politik di Korea. Misalnya Rohaniwan Kim Pu-Sik menerbitkan kronikel Tiga Kerajaan yang menginspirasi para sarjana untuk membangun kesadaran nasional sebagai Bangsa Korea. Rohaniwan U Tak menerbitkan buku Perubahan sebagai sumber refleksi teologis orang Korea. Rohaniwan yang lain Yi Kyu-bo (1168-1241) mengarang buku Puisi yang mampu menjelaskan pemikiran-pemikiran rohaniwan Cg’oe Ch’i-Won dan buku ini membantu orang Korea untuk merefleksikan identitas mereka di tengah invasi Kerajaan Mongol.

Semua aktivitas sarjana-sarjana ini membantu masyarakat Korea untuk mengalami perkembangan negara mereka baik secara

internal dan internasional. Penderitaan petani dan masyarakat kelas bawah lainnya, korupsi agamawan Buddha yang lari dari tanggung jawab sosial dan mengeksploitasi perbudakan, bencana politik serangan Mongol membuat orang Korea memikirkan kembali model masyarakat mereka. Ketika gagasan Neo-Khonghucu mencapai Korea pada abad ke-13, orang Korea sudah siap untuk menerima nilai-nilai dalam keluarga, etika, komitmen sosial, reformasi drastis, dan transformasi lembaga dan ekonomi. Akibat kekalahan Korea dari Bangsa Mongol pada 1267, Raja Ch'ungyol memperbaiki hubungan dengan pemimpin-pemimpin China yang baru. Dalam perjalanan ke China pada tahun 1289, raja membawa rohaniwan Agama Khonghucu An Hyang, yang dikenal sebagai orang Korea pertama yang menemukan teks terkenal China Neo-Khonghucu karangan Zhu Xi. Pengganti Raja Ch'ungyol, Ch'ungson (1308-1312) membentuk pusat penelitian Manwondang di Ibu Kota China dan membawa serta menerjemahkan 4.000 volume buku ke Korea. Gagasan-gagasan Agama Khonghucu pada masa tersebut telah melahirkan sebuah dinamisme baru, suatu akademi kerajaan yang dibentuk pada akhir abad ke-14. Beberapa rohaniwan Neo-Khonghucu melangkah lebih jauh tidak hanya mengkritik perilaku koruptif dan manipulatif para biksu Buddha tetapi juga mempelajari doktrin-doktrin agama Buddha, sehingga mereka dapat menjaga hubungan baik dengan pemeluk Buddha.

Pada tahun 1388, sebuah kudeta dilakukan Jenderal Yi Song-gye, menggulingkan Dinasti Koryo dan membentuk dinasti baru Yi dengan bantuan beberapa rohaniwan Neo-Khonghucu seperti Chong To-jon dan Kwon-kun. Rohaniwan Chong mengambil posisi yang sangat kritis melawan doktrin Buddha dan menginginkan untuk membentuk model lembaga-lembaga Agama Khonghucu dan menolak monarki yang terlalu sentralistis. Sedangkan Rohaniwan Kwong-Kun lebih intelektual dan lebih moderat terhadap Buddhisme. Untuk melawan pengaruh doktrin Buddhisme, rohaniwan Kwon mendirikan Metafisik Agama Khonghucu, misalnya surga dan manusia, dan kombinasi antara jiwa dan alam semesta. Beberapa rohaniwan Neo-Khonghucu yang masih loyal kepada Raja Koryo seperti

Chong Mong-ju tidak digunakan oleh Raja dari dinasti baru. Perkembangan Neo-Khonghucu Korea terutama dalam domain pemikiran dimungkinkan oleh pematangan gagasan ini pada abad ke 13 dan 14 dan didukung oleh kreativitas pengembangan ajaran ini pada abad ke-15 di bawah Raja Sejong (1418-1450). Pada masa permulaan Dinasti Yi ditandai dengan pembentukan lembaga-lembaga keagamaan Agama Khonghucu, implementasi ritual-ritual baru untuk memandu kehidupan sehari-hari, ritual keluarga menurut Zhu Xi, ritual kematian dan pendirian sekolah-sekolah Agama Khonghucu. Pada masa tersebut, pemeluk Buddha mengalami penyiksaan dan melarikan diri ke pegunungan, pemeluk shamanisme juga mengalami nasib yang sama. Perkembangan Agama Khonghucu di China maupun Jepang tidak pernah mencapai tahap ini, dilembagakan secara politik dengan nama Agama Khonghucu.

Masa Pemerintahan Raja Sejong (1418-1450) adalah masa yang paling produktif dalam kesusastraan dan ilmu pengetahuan karena raja dikelilingi oleh para intelektual dan penasihat keagamaan yang cakap, disebut sebagai balai kebajikan (*hall of worthies*). Raja juga mendukung penelitian dalam bidang astronomi, kesehatan, dan teknologi seperti penemuan logam metal pada tahun 1420 untuk kerja-kerja pencetakan. Raja ini dikenang karena telah memberikan orang Korea alfabet baru, *the hangul*, dan mengizinkan semua warga untuk dididik. Sayangnya pada akhir abad ke-15 di Korea dan awal abad ke-16, ditandai oleh persaingan politik karena ambisi yang jauh dari nilai-nilai ideal Agama Khonghucu. Pada masa ini Raja Yonsan'gun melakukan penahanan terhadap para rohaniwan Khonghucu dengan alasan politik yang menyebabkan instabilitas politik. Baru pada tahun 1519, seorang rohaniwan Khonghucu Cho Kwang-jo mencoba membawa kembali etika dalam politik di Korea.

Dinasti Choson yang muncul menggantikan Dinasti Yi pada abad ke 16, membawa babak baru dalam perkembangan Neo-Khonghucu. Pada masa tersebut muncul rohaniwan Khonghucu yang dikenal di luar Korea, yakni Yi Hwang T'oegye (1501-1570) and Yi I Yulgok (1536-1584). T'Oegye adalah rohaniwan Korea

pertama yang menguasai literatur China klasik dan juga keseluruhan tradisi Neo-Khonghucu terutama teks-teks Zhu Xi. Meskipun dia memegang posisi resmi dalam pemerintahan, dia menganggap pekerjaannya sebagai waktu yang sia-sia dan mengalami trauma perjuangan politik terutama kehilangan saudaranya yang berada dalam pengasingan. Selama tinggal di China, rohaniwan T'oegye kembali ke Korea pada tahun 1549 dan membentuk akademi baru Tosansowon di Andong. Salah satu mahakaryanya adalah menulis kembali isu metafisik dan etika untuk menanamkan dan mengkoreksi jiwa dan hati dan aspek-aspek praktis kehidupan sehari-hari. Sementara, Rohaniwan Yulgok yang menempati posisi menteri dalam negeri, ekonomi, pendidikan dan militer, adalah seorang rohaniwan sederhana dan bekerja dalam jabatan-jabatan publik. Pada masa mudanya, setelah kematian ibunya, ia sempat mempelajari dan hidup sebagai biksu Buddha selama setahun. Kemudian kembali ke ajaran Agama Khonghucu namun terbuka dengan pemikiran Taoisme dan Buddha serta Wang Yang-ming. Warisan rohaniwan ini adalah mengharmoniskan nilai-nilai ideal dalam satu tangan yakni kebenaran, keikhlasan, dan etika dan pada tangan lain adalah kehendak untuk melakukan reformasi dan transformasi baik pada level individu dan masyarakat. Rohaniwan Yulgok juga melakukan reformasi terhadap pendidikan, penyelesaian masalah sosial seperti perbudakan dan adopsi, reformasi kehidupan masyarakat dan militer.

Pada masa Dinasti Choson tahap kedua, sebagian sarjana Khonghucu Korea mengikuti langkah-langkah T'oegye dan Yulgok tetapi tidak selalu mengadopsi visi dan pengetahuan yang sama. Mereka membangun sekolah-sekolah yang memusatkan studinya pada aspek filosofis. Berbeda dengan Neo-Khonghucu Jepang yang mengkritik beberapa pandangan Khonghucu China dan kembali kepada pemikiran orisinal asli, Neo-Khonghucu Korea bersandar pada Ortodoksi. Teks-teks Zhu Xi dipuji oleh Rohaniwan T'Oegye dan menjadi referensi utama. Bahkan Rohaniwan Song Si-yol (1607-1689) hampir menyembah Zhu Xi dan berkelahi dengan rohaniwan Yu Hyu (1717-180) yang melarang pandangan Ortodoksi dalam Agama Khonghucu.

Jatuhnya Dinasti Ming di China pada tahun 1644 memiliki konsekuensi yang buruk terhadap bangsa Korea. Kebanyakan orang Korea tidak mengakui Kaisar Qing karena mereka masih memuji Dinasti Ming. Namun demikian, mengisolasi diri membuat mereka merindukan untuk menyaksikan pencapaian China dalam periode ini dan juga penemuan ilmu pengetahuan, teknologi, dan gagasan yang muncul dari dunia Barat. Namun, sebelum jatuhnya Dinasti Ming, beberapa rohaniwan Korea seperti Yi Su-gwang (1563-1627) telah membuat kontak dengan orang asing dan Rohaniwan lainnya, Chong Tu-won, kembali dari China dengan mengenalkan teleskop dan sebuah peta dunia pada tahun 1631. Pada masa itu muncul ketegangan di antara pemeluk Agama Khonghucu Korea yaitu mereka yang menginginkan pada tradisi Agama Khonghucu Ortodoks dan mereka yang menginginkan penafsiran baru terutama pertimbangan perubahan dan kehidupan praktis. Ketegangan kedua kelompok ini berkembang menjadi persoalan yang tidak dapat diselesaikan pada abad ke-19 dan permulaan abad ke-20. Sementara, pada saat yang sama Korea, dihadapkan pada tekanan politik dan militer dari utara, imperialisme Rusia, dan dari timur, imperialisme Jepang.

Pada masa Dinasti Choson, muncul gerakan pembaharuan dalam masyarakat Korea, yang dilhami oleh gagasan pencerahan di Barat. Rohaniwan Yu Hyong-won (1622-1673) dan Yi Ik (1682-1764) memasukan gagasan mengenai perlunya reformasi sosial dan politik untuk mendukung pencerahan dan modernisasi di Korea. Kemudian Rohaniwan Tasan (1762-1836) mengkombinasikan kedalaman ajaran Agama Khonghucu Klasik, penggunaan ilmu pengetahuan Barat dan pemikiran agama Katholik. Gerakan ini disebut dengan gerakan Sirhak, yang mencakup banyak bidang, ditujukan untuk merubah masyarakat terutama dari kalangan bawah.

Gerakan tersebut menandai masa paling gemilang dari sejarah Agama Khonghucu Korea, sehingga banyak dipublikasikan oleh sarjana Khonghucu China dan Jepang. Kajian-kajian mengenai Agama Khonghucu di Korea masih membicarakan kunjungan para rohaniwan

Khonghucu Korea seperti Park Che-ga dan Park Chi-won pada abad ke-18 ke China dimana mereka menulis catatan harian untuk orang Korea mengenai penemuan-penemuan teknologi baru orang China. Mereka juga masih mengenang Kim Chong-hui (1786-1856) yang berteman baik dengan para ahli analisis teks, epigraphy dan seni serta surat menyurat dengan para sarjana China setelah dia kembali ke Korea. Pada abad ke-19, Raja Chongjo dari Dinasti Choson yang sudah mulai terbuka terhadap pemikiran-pemikiran baru dan reformasi sosial tiba-tiba ditemukan meninggal dunia pada tahun 1800. Pihak-pihak yang menentang reformasi pemikiran keagamaan kemudian melakukan balas dendam dengan melakukan persekusi terhadap penganut agama Katholik dan pendukung ide-ide reformasi, sampai akhir abad ke-19. Sarjana Khonghucu seperti Tasan melarikan diri ke China selama 18 tahun pada masa penumpasan gerakan reformasi karena dianggap sebagai musuh negara.

Kedatangan ide-ide Barat dan agama Katholik, meskipun menginspirasi elit, telah mendatangkan perlawanan dan permusuhan dari para penguasa Neo-Khonghucu. Hal ini berbeda dengan Restorasi Meiji yang terjadi di Jepang dimana Kaisar Meiji didukung oleh para penguasa agama. Penyerangan terhadap penganut Katholik dan perang sporadis dengan tentara Amerika dan Perancis yang mencapai Korea menimbulkan suasana ketakutan dan kecurigaan. Bahkan, beberapa sarjana Khonghucu seperti Yi Hang-no (1792-1868) bereaksi dengan penolakan terhadap orang-orang Barat yang barbarian dan memuji kebudayaan China yang adi-luhung. Rohaniwan Yi juga menolak menggunakan barang-barang dari Barat dan mengembangkan kekuatan perlawanan terhadap penetrasi Barat.

Namun demikian, respon terhadap penetrasi pemikiran dan agama dari Eropa ditanggapi secara berbeda. Sebagian orang Korea memeluk agama Katholik dan menjadi martir. Sebagian yang lain menolak agama orang asing yang merusak peradaban Korea. Para intelektual seperti Tasan Ch'oe Che-u (1824-1864), yang dapat membaca teks Khonghucu Klasik dan memiliki pengetahuan terhadap agama Katholik mengembangkan pendekatannya sendiri dalam hubungan antara Khonghucu dan Katholik,

namun mereka dituduh gila oleh Pemerintah. Pada akhir abad ke-19, jarang ditemukan sarjana Khonghucu seperti Tasan yang matang dalam menghadapi ide-ide Barat dan berhasil dalam dialog serta berkontribusi terhadap modernisasi Korea. Demikian juga, para misionaris Katholik Perancis yang datang pertama kali ke Korea tidak mempelajari kebudayaan Khonghucu dan tidak bertukar gagasan dengan sarjana Khonghucu sehingga menimbulkan banyak kesalahpahaman.

Runtuhnya Dinasti Choson yang ditandai dengan aneksasi Korea oleh Jepang pada tahun 1910 merupakan masa yang paling kelam dalam Sejarah Korea. Pemerintah kolonial Jepang berusaha untuk menghilangkan Bahasa Korea, memaksa orang Korea menggunakan Bahasa Jepang dan melakukan praktik Shintoisme. Seorang profesor Jepang, Takahashi Ko, di Keijo Imperial University Seoul pada tahun 1926 mempresentasikan filosofi orang Korea secara negatif dan membuat orang Korea menganggap tradisi mereka sendiri sebagai barbarian, tidak ilmiah, dan tidak rasional. Imajinasi negatif yang dikonstruksi Jepang masih tertanamkan di hati orang Korea dan menganggap mereka inferior terhadap Filosofi Barat. Dalam linguistik dan literatur, para ahli Korea selama pendudukan Jepang sampai sesudah kemerdekaan tahun 1945 melakukan kerja yang luar biasa untuk melakukan penelitian dan mencari jalan untuk melindungi terhadap apa yang disebut sebagai orang dan budaya Korea. Kerja-kerja seperti demikian menjadi sangat sulit bagi sarjana Khonghucu maupun Buddha karena filsafat Barat menjadi semakin berpengaruh dalam dunia intelektual. Trend ini belum dapat dibalik kembali seperti sebelum tahun 1910. Departemen-departemen filsafat di universitas di Korea mengajarkan filsafat Barat secara mendasar dan mempublikasikan pemikiran-pemikiran filosof Barat seperti Heidegger, Habermas, Foucault, atau Derrida.

Pasca Perang Dunia II, nasib Agama Khonghucu di Korea lebih baik daripada yang terjadi di China. Rejim Komunis di China, Mao Tse Tung, menolak sepenuhnya ajaran Agama Khonghucu karena dianggap sebagai warisan dari kaum feodal yang harus dihilangkan dari China. Namun, Korea memilih untuk mempertahankan

ajaran-ajaran Khonghucu. Penelitian-penelitian ilmiah terhadap agama ini baru dimulai pada akhir tahun 1960. Generasi muda sarjana Khonghucu Korea merupakan lulusan dari Songgyun' gwan dan mempublikasikan serta mengajar nilai-nilai Khonghucu.

Pada masa kini, ajaran-ajaran Agama Khonghucu Korea perlu untuk devaluasi kembali dalam konteks global. Agama Khonghucu pada masa lalu tidak membangun suatu agama yang hirarkis dan tidak mengembangkan sebuah teologi, namun menjaga nilai-nilai dan spiritualitas tinggi. Hal ini menarik kebanyakan orang Korea yang tidak menyukai lembaga-lembaga agama yang ketat dan konflik antarpemeluk agama. Agama Khonghucu selalu menekankan pada harmoni, perdamaian, dan menjaga relasi dengan orang lain. Sikap yang demikian memungkinkan Tasan untuk berdiskusi dengan biksu Buddha, berbagi filsafat dan puisi.

Agama Khonghucu memiliki *sense* yang mendalam terhadap alam dan lingkungan, serta melihat manusia sebagai bagian yang menyatu dengan keseluruhan alam semesta. Juga muncul kesadaran di kalangan Filosof Korea untuk memiliki ajaran pragmatisme Korea dan mengembalikan kembali *a philosophical turn* seperti yang terjadi pada munculnya gerakan shirak, reformasi. Sekarang ini, meskipun orang Korea kelihatan terbaratkan dalam pengertian ter-Amerika-nisasi dalam banyak hal, orang Korea secara internal mencari jati diri mereka sendiri sebagaimana diilustrasikan oleh tema konferensi akademik Seoul, "Identitas Korea pada milenium baru." Di bawah permukaan, jiwa sebagai orang Asia tetap tersembunyi. Dalam merespon modernisasi, sejumlah studi dilakukan oleh pemikir Korea, misalnya evaluasi terhadap pendidikan diri, pengendalian emosi, kemuliaan kebenaran, kebersihan hari, kekuatan dan ketulusan kehendak. Hasilnya nilai-nilai tersebut akan berkontribusi sebagai kekuatan penyeimbang terhadap modernisasi yang berlangsung sangat cepat, kecenderungan terhadap materialisme dan berkembangnya kebudayaan yang superfisial.⁴

⁴ http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Korean_Confucianism (Diakses 6 Juni 2015)

Leland Ackerson (1997) memberi kritikan atas pengaruh Agama Khonghucu terhadap kebudayaan Korea. *Pertama*, ajaran ini menjadi basis dari seksisme. Dalam konteks masyarakat China, perempuan tidak diberikan kekuasaan politik dan hal ini berpengaruh terhadap status perempuan sampai saat ini. Akan tetapi seksisme yang terjadi di Korea berakar dari masa Dinasti Chosun yang berlangsung hampir selama 500 tahun. Dinasti ini mengambil Agama Khonghucu secara ekstrim melebihi dari ajaran aslinya. Misalnya perempuan bahkan tidak diijinkan meninggalkan rumah mereka. Selanjutnya, pada masa dinasti Chosun, kebanyakan orang tidak memperhatikan prinsip-prinsip Khonghucu yakni hormat dan bertanggung jawab. Berkaitan dengan otoritarianisme, benar bahwa penguasa Asia seringkali menggunakan ajaran Nabi Kongtzu sebagai alat untuk melegitimasi kekuasaannya. Ajaran Agama Khonghucu menyebutkan secara berulang-ulang bahwa jika seorang penguasa melupakan kebutuhan rakyatnya dan hanya mengejar keuntungan pribadinya, maka dia tidak dapat lagi memiliki hak untuk berkuasa.

Masalah utama dari sistem pendidikan di Korea berasal dari tingkat mengingat yang berlebihan dimana para pelajar dipaksa untuk melakukannya dan sistem pengujian yang menekankan bahwa kebanyakan orang Barat dianggap kasar dan tidak produktif. Sistem ingatan memang berasal dari ajaran Nabi Khongtzu, terutama mengingat syair yang dinyanyikan (ode) yang terdiri dari 200 sampai dengan 300 puisi di masa itu. Namun, Nabi Khongtzu berpandangan bahwa kemampuan untuk menafsirkan apa yang telah dipelajari dan menciptakan gagasan-gagasan baru lebih penting daripada ingatan. Gagasannya tidak seharusnya dihubungkan dengan sistem pendidikan yang dibangun dalam negara industri yang berkembang dengan cepat dimana tujuan sistem pendidikan untuk memberikan kesempatan pada pelajar untuk bersekolah setinggi mungkin. Demikian juga sistem pengujian yang distandarisasikan dianggap progresif pada masa Nabi Khongtzu karena sistem tersebut menjauhkan kekuasaan elit dan mendistribusikannya kepada orang-orang atas dasar kemampuannya. Oleh karena itu, dalam teori, paling tidak, setiap orang dapat memperoleh

kekuasaan tanpa mempertimbangkan status sosialnya, dengan syarat lulus dari ujian tersebut. Beberapa aspek dari ajaran Nabi Khongtzu masih berpengaruh terhadap budaya orang Korea pada masa kini. Misalnya nilai-nilai Agama Khonghucu dalam bekerja keras, semangat mengejar pendidikan, serta mendorong pertumbuhan ekonomi setelah Perang Dunia II.⁵

Doud (2012) menjelaskan bahwa Agama Khonghucu mengalami banyak tantangan seperti halnya dengan Bangsa Korea yang melampaui sejarah modernisasi, kolonialisasi Jepang, Perang Dunia II, dan lain-lain. Namun, ajaran ini tetap berakar secara mendalam dalam budaya orang Korea, melintasi perbedaan agama. Baik orang Korea beragama Kristen atau Buddha selalu merujuk pada ajaran Khonghucu. Tradisi perkawinan dan pemakaman juga masih mengikuti ajaran-ajaran ini. Upacara-upacara Khonghucu juga masih diselenggarakan selama acara-acara publik pada momen-momen tertentu.

Masih menurut Doud (2012), seperti halnya dengan China dan Jepang pada masa lalu, Agama Buddha pernah menjadi agama negara. Namun, sebagaimana telah disebutkan oleh Prof Yao dalam bukunya *An Introduction to Confucianism*, para biksu Buddha menjadi koruptif karena mereka semakin terlibat ke dalam politik. Sementara, Agama Khonghucu di Korea, China, dan Jepang mengalami kebangkitan dengan gerakan Neo-Khonghucu yang menyerap beberapa elemen dari agama Buddha, misalnya yang menekankan pada praktis, pentingnya jiwa, dan eksplorasi kosmologi, dan mendapatkan dukungan dari Pemerintah. Hal ini terjadi di Korea pada akhir Dinasti Koryo, bahkan semakin mendalam di bawah Dinasti Jaseon. Sebagai akibatnya, agama Buddha menjadi agama yang kedua dan mengalami tekanan selama beberapa abad yang sekarang belum sepenuhnya kembali.

Pada masa Dinasti Jaseon, tepatnya abad ke-17 salah seorang sarjana Khonghucu, Gang Han, ditahan sebagai tahanan perang ketika Pasukan Jepang di bawah Jenderal Toyotomi Hideyoshi menyerang Korea. Gang Han dibawa ke Jepang dan dijadikan guru Agama Khonghucu

di sana oleh Fujiwara Seika, yang merupakan tokoh penting pada masa Tokugawa. Pada masa dinasti ini, seperti halnya dengan agama Buddha, para sarjana Khonghucu juga terlibat dalam politik praktis dan pada akhirnya mengalami pembersihan. Pada masa akhir Dinasti Jaseon, pembersihan berhenti tetapi Agama Khonghucu sudah sepenuhnya menyebar dan bergeser dari gerakan reformasi menjadi ortodoksi. Hal ini dapat dipahami mengingat pada waktu Korea menghadapi tekanan politik dan militer dari negara-negara Barat dan Jepang, kelas intelektual mereka menolak reformasi dan mencoba untuk lebih menggunakan ajaran yang ortodoks.

Pada periode ini, sejumlah sarjana menjadi frustrasi dan mencoba untuk menghidupkan kembali etika Khonghucu dan mempelajari dari luar. Hal ini disebut sebagai gerakan *silhak* atau mempelajari sambil berpraktek. Gerakan ini mencoba untuk kembali ke prinsip-prinsip dasar Agama Khonghucu dan bertujuan memperbaiki kondisi sosial dan politik. Salah satu nama sarjana yang terkenal adalah Tasan, yang menolak seluruh ajaran guru-guru Khonghucu sesudah Nabi Khongtzu meninggal. Karena Dinasti Jaseon, Agama Khonghucu menjadi semakin konservatif dan ortodoks, hal ini sebagai reaksi dari tekanan dari negara-negara Barat yang semakin meningkat. Sebagai respon terhadap tekanan politik, sebagian sarjana Agama Khonghucu membentuk gerakan *donghak* yang berarti pelajaran dari timur, dimulai oleh Choe Je-u, yang menyebutkan bahwa tujuan Agama Khonghucu adalah penanaman diri sendiri dan jalan ke surga tidak jauh dari manusia, dengan cara memperbaiki sifat dasar seseorang, maka mereka menjadi dekat dengan surga. Choe mencoba untuk memperbaiki masyarakat dan mengembalikan stabilitas dan mengambil ajaran-ajaran Nabi Khongtzu ke dalam musik, sehingga para petani yang buta huruf dapat mempelajari Agama Khonghucu dengan mudah.

Namun, pada masa Donghak dipimpin oleh Son Byeong-hui (1861-1922), gerakan ini menjadi gerakan agama baru yang dikenal dengan Cheondogyo atau Cheondoism yang masih dipraktikkan sampai sekarang baik di Korea Utara maupun Selatan. Pada realitasnya, pengikut gerakan ini terbatas sekali karena

⁵ <http://pusanweb.com/Exit/Jun97/CONFUSED.htm> (Diakses 6 Juni 2015)

ajaran-ajaran Nabi Khongtzu diterjemahkan dalam konteks Kekristenan, misalnya surga di Agama Khonghucu diterjemahkan surga dalam istilah Kristen. Sekarang ini, aliran Cheondogyoo menolak ide hidup sesudah kematian dan memusatkan pada pembangunan dunia yang ideal melalui penanaman diri, kode etik, dan saling menghormati. Pada masa kini Cheondogyo menjadi agama minoritas di Korea Selatan dan seringkali diidentifikasi sebagai agama asli orang Korea. Ajaran Cheondogyo sebenarnya hampir sama dengan Shinto dalam kebudayaan Jepang, namun kedua agama tersebut tidak memiliki hal yang sama, akan tetapi keduanya berakar mendalam dalam budaya tertentu.⁶

SEJARAH BUDHA DI KOREA

Berbeda dengan Agama Khonghucu, agama Buddha telah berkembang di China pada tahun 372 M. Buddhisme datang ke Korea ketika ketiga kerajaan Silla, Bakjae, dan Goguryo saling memperebutkan kontrol terhadap semenanjung Korea. Buddhisme merupakan agama resmi pada masa dinasti Goguryeo, Silla dan Bakjae selama periode tiga kerajaan (57 SM – 668 M) dan Kerajaan Silla (668-935) menggunakan agama Buddha sebagai kekuatan psikologis untuk menyatukan semenanjung Korea. Se-Woong Koo⁷ menyebutkan bahwa pada saat Buddhisme datang ke Korea, Taoisme dan Agama Khonghucu klasik sudah dianut oleh sebagian masyarakat Korea tetapi pengaruh kedua sistem kepercayaan tersebut terhadap kehidupan politik masih sangat terbatas. Agama Buddha kemudian digunakan oleh penguasa karena memiliki fungsi politik menyatukan semua kelompok-kelompok suku dan memasukkan kelompok-kelompok kepercayaan yang sudah ada sebelumnya ke dalam kekuasaan bangsawan.

Agama Buddha berkaitan erat dengan peradaban dan penggunaan teknologi dari China. Ketiga kerajaan tersebut mengadopsi Agama Buddha untuk menjadikan negara mereka lebih modern baik dalam peradaban maupun

penggunaan teknologi serta menyediakan ideologi untuk menjaga kelangsungan kerajaan. Selama periode Kerajaan Silla, agama Buddha memainkan peran utama dalam pembangunan budaya yang salah satunya menghasilkan pendirian situs sejarah Candi Ulguksa dan Sokguran Grotto. Kemajuan lainnya adalah penemuan percetakan dengan menggunakan kayu untuk membuat yang kemudian diikuti dengan penggunaan logam untuk mencetak sutra Buddha.

Tujuh puluh delapan tahun sebelum ditemukannya mesin cetak di Eropa oleh Guettenberg, teks (kertas) telah dicetak pada tahun 1377 M. Sutra Buddha adalah ajaran-ajaran Buddha Gaotama untuk pembangunan spiritual sebagaimana petunjuk-petunjuk untuk mencapai Dharma, termasuk lagu-lagu, mantra, ukiran, dan tulisan. Pada masa Kerajaan Silla bersatu, ajaran Seon (Zen di Jepang, Chen di China) dikenalkan dari China dan para pemeluknya mendirikan Sangha Seon yang memberikan kontribusi pada pengembangan Filsafat Buddha yang pada akhirnya memberikan landasan psikologis Agama Buddha pada masa dinasti Goryo (918-1392).

Menurut buku karangan Buswell, *Tracing Back The Radiance*, Buddhisme di Korea dipusatkan pada aspek-aspek ritual seperti penyembahan Maitreya Bodhisattva dan studi Mahayana klasik dari India. Kerajaan Goguryo yang paling dekat dengan China, mengadopsinya menjadi agama negara pada tahun 372 ketika Kaisar Fu Jian dari Dinasti Qin mengirinkan seorang biksu, Shundao untuk bertemu Raja Sosurim. Kerajaan Bakjae mengadopsinya pada tahun 384 M ketika biksu Buddha Marananta dari China diterima Raja Asin Bakjae. Baru Kerajaan Silla menggunakan agama Buddha pada abad ke-6 M karena pelawanan oleh kelompok bangsawan dan politik isolasi terhadap China.

Buddhisme menyebar dan memiliki pengaruh terhadap masyarakat Korea yang terbelah menjadi tiga kerajaan, karena biksu-biksu Buddha Korea memiliki hubungan yang erat dengan China dan para biksu tersebut membantu mempercepat berkembangnya ketiga kerajaan tersebut di semenanjung Korea baik

⁶ <http://jklr.net/2012/06/28/a-brief-history-of-confucianism-in-korea/> (Diakses 6 Juni 2015)

⁷ http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/introduction_of_buddhism_to_korea_an_overview (Diakses 6 Juni 2015).

secara politik, budaya, dan ekonomi. Misalnya Buku Sutra *Benevolent Kings* sangat dihargai. Begitu pula, tatanan monarki kerajaan-kerajaan di Korea diorganisasi dan dikendalikan oleh negara dengan peran penting para biksu Buddha untuk melindungi negara.

Ketika kerajaan Silla menyatukan semenanjung Korea pada abad ke-7, Agama Buddha berkembang lebih pesat dan tidak hanya menjadi instrumen politik negara. Buddhisme telah diterima pada saat itu oleh seluruh lapisan masyarakat dan para biksu Korea banyak melakukan perjalanan menghadap Dinasti Tang di China. Pada masa itu terapat dua sekolah yang menyebarkan Agama Buddha. *Pertama* sekolah *Flower Garland* yang didasarkan atas Sekolah China Hua-Yan dengan *Flower Garland Sutra* sebagai teks utama. Prinsip ajarannya adalah ketergantungan antarbenda di dunia, satu mengandung semua dan semua mengandung satu. *Kedua*, sekolah *Pure Land* yang dipusatkan pada *Pure Land of Amitabha Buddha*. Sekolah ini banyak mendapatkan pengikut di kalangan masyarakat biasa.

Ketika Kerajaan Silla bersatu jatuh pada abad ke-10, Dinasti Kerajaan Goryeo secara politik lebih cenderung mengadopsi Agama Khonghucu sebagaimana dilakukan oleh Dinasti Sung di China. Agama ini berkembang pesat dan menjadi agama resmi negara pada masa Dinasti Goryeo (918-1392). Namun demikian, pada masa tersebut, para pemeluk Agama Khonghucu dan Buddha hampir mencapai keseimbangan dalam jumlah. Agama Khonghucu mengajarkan kebudayaan dan politik pemerintahan di Korea, sedangkan Buddhisme mengajarkan kedamaian jiwa dan hari kemudian (*after life*). Pada abad ke-11 dalam Dinasti Goryeo, kitab-kitab suci Agama Buddha sudah terukir dalam blok-blok kayu yang kemudian dihancurkan pada saat Kerajaan Mongol menyerang Goryeo. Pada masa Goryeo, Buddhisme dilanda perpecahan antara sekolah-sekolah Buddha yang berlandaskan teks saja dengan sekolah-sekolah pemikiran. Ada juga Sekolah Tian-tai dari China yang berakar di Korea, *Cheontae*, yakni mencoba menyediakan kerangka kerja Buddhisme yang mencakup baik sekolah teks maupun pemikiran dengan Buku Lotus Sutra sebagai sentral pemikiran.

Berlandaskan ajaran *Cheontae* ini muncul sekolah Seon yang memunculkan sangha terbesar di Korea yakni Jogye, dilahirkan oleh biksu Jinul pada abad ke-11 M.

Kerajaan Goryeo, seperti dengan Kerajaan Silla Bersatu juga mengadopsi Agama Buddha sebagai agama resmi negara dan menggunakannya sebagai faktor pemersatu bangsa Korea, sekaligus memberikan landasan bagi pembangunan identitas nasional dan kebudayaan ke depan. Penguasa Goryeo mengikuti ajaran-ajaran biksu Buddha Doseon (827-989) dan membangun vihara-vihara Buddha serta menyebarkan Dharma. Pada masa Goryeo, Kitab Tripitaka dalam Bahasa Korea diukir ke dalam lebih dari 80,000 *woodblocks* sebagai perlindungan dari invasi dan kekuatan-kekuatan asing. Agama Buddha melahirkan festival nasional seperti *P'algwanhoe* dan *Yeondeunghoe* (Lotus Lentera Festival).

Pada masa tersebut, jumlah sangha-sangha dalam agama Buddha berkembang pesat. Akan tetapi, peningkatan pengaruh ekonomi dan politik para biksu Buddha menyebabkan ketidaksukaan dari masyarakat umum yang tidak dipedulikan oleh penguasa Goryeo. Sebagai akibatnya, pada masa dinasti politik Jaseon, agama Buddha memasuki periode represi politik (1392-1910). Meskipun para biksu Buddha termarjinalkan pada masa Jaseon, namun beberapa bangsawan tetap memeluk agama Buddha secara privat. Para rohaniwan Agama Khonghucu berperan dalam mengelola pemerintahan. Segala bentuk represi terhadap agama Buddha berakibat positif, yakni mendekatkan agama Buddha kepada masyarakat umum, sehingga memiliki ikatan yang kuat dan menjadikan vihara sebagai pusat-pusat berkembangnya praktek-praktek Seon. Baru sesudah Perang Dunia II, Buddhisme Korea berkembang dalam bentuk Seon Korea dimana Sangha Jogye menjadi dominan.⁸

Jatuhnya Kerajaan Goryeo pada tahun 1392 dan munculnya Dinasti Jaseon menandakan pudarnya pengaruh Agama Buddha. Pada asalnya, Agama Khonghucu memusatkan ajarannya pada hal-hal yang bersifat sekuler, politik dan sosial,

⁸ http://www.koreanbuddhism.net/bbs/content.php?co_id=110 (Diakses 7 Juni 2015).

namun ajaran Neo-Khonghucu yang berkembang di China lebih filosofis dan menjadi pesaing bagi ajaran Buddha. Ketika Dinasti Jaseon menjadi semakin represif terhadap biksu dan pemeluk agama Buddha, Buddhisme dilihat sebagai kepercayaan milik perempuan (*woman faith*) dan inferior dibandingkan dengan ajaran-ajaran Agama Khonghucu.

Dinasti Chosun (1392-1910) yang mengganti agama resmi negara menjadi Agama Khonghucu, banyak menyingkirkan biksu Buddha pada masa tersebut dari kekuasaan. Gerakan pembersihan bermula pada tahun 1388 ketika Jenderal Yi Seongye (1380-1400) dengan dukungan gerakan Neo-Khonghucu melakukan kudeta militer dan mendirikan Dinasti Choson. Pada masa awal dinasti ini, jumlah vihara Buddha dikurangi, keanggotaan dalam organisasi biksu Buddha, sangha, mulai dikurangi, para biksu dipaksa tinggal di pegunungan dan dilarang bercampur dengan masyarakat dan memasuki kota. Tindakan represif terhadap para biksu Buddha ini berhenti pada abad ke-16 ketika para biksu Buddha berpartisipasi dalam melawan serangan Jepang pada tahun 1592-1598. Pemimpin umat Buddha pada waktu itu, Seosan hyujeong (1520-1604) mengorganisir para biksu menjadi unit gerilya melawan Jepang dan berhasil, sehingga represi terhadap agama Buddha dihentikan. Namun demikian, para biksu Buddha tetap menahan diri untuk mengembangkan ajarannya sampai Dinasti Choson berakhir pada tahun 1910.

Kolonialisasi Jepang terhadap Korea berbeda dengan kolonialisasi terhadap negara Asia lainnya, karena Korea adalah tetangga paling dekat Jepang, Korea telah mengalami modernisasinya sendiri dan memiliki pengalaman untuk mengusir penjajah. Kontrol Jepang terhadap Korea lebih berat daripada terhadap negara Asia lainnya. Pemerintah Jepang pada dasarnya tidak menyukai Buddhisme Jepang sejak 1800 dan melakukan represi terhadap ajaran Buddha dengan Hukum *Nikujiku Saitai* yang memaksa biksu Buddha untuk menikah dan makan daging. Hal ini melanggar tradisi selibat dan diet di kalangan biksu. Kebijakan serupa juga diterapkan di Korea.

Namun demikian, agama-agama di Korea dan sebagian Buddhisme Korea secara umum memiliki rasa nasionalis yang tinggi dan ikut berpartisipasi melawan penjajahan Jepang. Jepang menggunakan simbol *naisen ittai* yakni *the interior* (Jepang) dan Korea adalah satu tubuh. Sekolah-sekolah dipaksa untuk menggunakan Bahasa Jepang sebagai pengantar dan organisasi-organisasi keagamaan diorganisir seperti Shinto. Pada tahun 1935, Jenderal Ugaki, Gubernur militer Jepang di Korea memaksa semua pelajar dan pejabat pemerintah Korea menghadiri upacara Shinto sehingga mengakibatkan protes yang keras dari kelompok-kelompok Kristiani dan Buddhisme.⁹

Kolonialisasi Jepang juga berdampak terhadap perkembangan agama Buddha di Korea. Pada masa pendudukan Jepang (1910-1945), semua larangan terhadap aktivitas para biksu Buddha dicabut oleh Pemerintah. Bahkan, biksu Buddha Jepang meminta pemerintahnya, agar para biksu Buddha Korea diijinkan untuk mengajarkan agamanya di kota-kota, yang sebelumnya telah dilarang selama hampir 500 tahun. Pada masa ini, Buddhisme Korea memiliki pesaing dalam melakukan pembabaran dharma, yaitu dari Won Buddhisme dan misionaris Kristen yang telah berkembang pesat pada masa pendudukan Jepang. Para biksu Buddha Jepang menyebarkan ajarannya terkait dengan diijinkannya perkawinan antara biksu dan biksuni.

Sesudah Perang Dunia II, konflik kekerasan muncul antara para biksu Buddha yang telah menikah, disebut Buddha Jepang, dengan para biksu yang mempertahankan selibat, Buddha Korea. Seiring dengan kuatnya sentimen anti-Jepang, biksu Buddha Korea lebih mendapatkan dukungan, yang pada akhirnya dapat menguasai vihara-vihara Buddha di seluruh Korea. Namun cara-cara yang digunakan para biksu Buddha Korea menimbulkan kerusuhan dan perkelahian hampir di setiap vihara. Hal ini menjadikan masyarakat umum lebih banyak bersimpati terhadap pengajaran agama Kristiani

⁹ <http://jklr.net/2011/10/26/a-brief-history-of-korean-buddhism/> (Diakses 7 Juni 2015)

daripada ajaran Agama Buddha. Pada tahun 1950-an, Presiden Syngman Rhee mendukung kampanye pembersihan para biksu Buddha Jepang karena dianggap sebagai kolaborator Pemerintah Kolonial Jepang di Korea. Namun, presiden sesudahnya, Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) mencoba untuk memediasi konflik di antara dua kelompok Buddha dengan membentuk organisasi nasional pan-Buddhisme. Seangkan pada tahun 1980an, Presiden Chun Doo-Hwan mengirim pasukan tentara untuk menyerang vihara-vihara dan menangkap serta menyiksa ratusan biksu yang diduga melakukan kritik terhadap Pemerintah Korea.

Pada saat yang sama, Kristen semakin berkembang di Korea sehingga banyak memunculkan ketegangan dengan pemeluk Agama Buddha, misalnya dalam bentuk pembakaran vihara dan serangan terhadap karya-karya seni Buddha. Mahasiswa pada universitas-universitas Buddha seringkali dibujuk untuk memeluk agama Kristen. Umat Buddha yang menghadiri perayaan Waisak kadang-kadang diganggu oleh oknum-oknum umat Kristen di luar arena perayaan. Ketegangan-ketegangan antara kedua kelompok umat beragama ini menurun pada akhir 1990-an dan pada awal 2000. Namun muncul kembali dengan terpilihnya Presiden Lee Myong-bak, seorang Kristen yang taat yang dikelilingi oleh para menteri dan penasihat dari kalangan Kristen yang taat juga. Isu yang sering dilaporkan oleh media pada tahun 2008 adalah Pemerintah Lee sering menutup atau memindahkan vihara tanpa meminta konsultasi dengan para biksu Buddha.

Sekarang ini, jumlah pemeluk agama Buddha secara statistik mencapai 40 persen dan merupakan yang terbesar di Korea Selatan. Sebagian besar menetap di provinsi-provinsi Selatan Korea.¹⁰ Hogart (1998) mengatakan bahwa untuk merespon perkembangan agama Kristen yang cukup pesat di Korea, para biksu Buddha mulai berusaha untuk memodernkan praktik-praktik keagamaannya dengan publikasi media, penggunaan perlengkapan modern di vihara-vihara Buddha dan mendorong partisipasi

massa yang lebih luas untuk membangun vihara-vihara Buddha yang baru.

Pada periode antara 1950 dan 1960, biksu-biksu dari sekolah Seon mengorganisasi kembali lembaga-lembaga tradisional Buddha yang direpresi selama penjajahan Jepang. Proses ini mengarah pada pembentukan Sangha Jogye yang berasal dari aliran Jogye kuno dari Kerajaan Goryeo. Sangha ini sekarang paling banyak mengelola vihara-vihara di seluruh Korea Selatan. Kelompok lain, Sangha Taego, terbentuk pada tahun 1970 yang merupakan cabang dari Sangha Jogye dan sangha terbesar nomor dua di Korea Selatan. Perbedaan dari kedua sangha ini adalah pernikahan biksu Buddha diijinkan di Sangha Taego, tetapi tidak diperbolehkan di Sangha Jogye. Sangha yang lain adalah *Chongtae* dan gerakan-gerakan aliran Vajrayana namun lebih kecil dari Sangha Jogye dan Taego. Kedua sangha Buddha ini muncul sebagaimana pada umumnya orang Korea menemukan kembali masa lalunya.

Hubungan antara Buddhisme dan agama-agama lokal di Korea seingkali menjadi perhatian para pengkaji studi agama. Buddhisme tidak dapat sepenuhnya menghapus agama-agama lokal yang sudah ada sebelumnya, akan tetapi hanya memasukkan elemen-elemen ketuhanan dalam agama lokal ke dalam sistem dan memberikan legitimasi sebagai pelindung dan penyembah Buddha. Agama lokal juga tidak memusuhi agama Buddha, mereka mengundang Buddha (*the enlightened one*) ke dalam ritual-ritual dan memperlakukannya seperti entitas transendental yang memiliki kekuasaan untuk kebaikan umat manusia. Koeksistensi yang harmonis antara Agama Buddha dan agama lokal ini disebut sebagai Shamanisme. Dengan demikian, kita dapat menyaksikan di Korea, ketika berkunjung ke sebuah vihara Buddha dapat dijumpai beberapa dewa dalam agama lokal (dewa pegunungan dan bintang-bintang). Sebaliknya, ketika berkunjung ke rumah Shaman, di dalamnya terdapat lukisan dan patung Buddha dan Bodhisattva.¹¹

Charles Muller (1996) menyebutkan bahwa Buddhisme Korea pada masa kini

¹⁰ <http://www.korea4expats.com/article-Korean-buddhism.html> (Diakses 7 Juni 2015).

¹¹ http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/introduction_of_buddhism_to_korea_an_overview (Diakses 6 Juni 2015).

merupakan agama yang penganutnya cukup besar yakni sekitar 40% dan berperan dalam mengajarkan etika kepada bangsa Korea. Praktik-praktik tradisional Seon dilakukan oleh sejumlah besar vihara-vihara di pegunungan di Korea Selatan. Hal ini dalam beberapa dekade terakhir menarik para praktisioner dari negara-negara Barat untuk belajar Seon-Buisme di Korea.¹²

Sebelum Buddhisme datang ke Korea, praktik keagamaan penduduk di semenanjung Korea pada umumnya adalah shamanisme, yang berpengaruh terhadap kehidupan masyarakat Korea sampai pada masa sekarang. Inti dari ajaran shamanisme adalah menganggap bahwa semua makhluk hidup dan kekuatan-kekuatan alam serta objek-objek yang tidak hidup semuanya memiliki spirit yang harus ditenangkan. Bahkan, orang-orang Buddha Korea yang berpendidikan tinggi dan saleh tetap memiliki kepercayaan yang kuat terhadap ruh dan secara teratur mengunjungi rumah-rumah shaman untuk ritual perlindungan. Sejak Shamanisme tidak dilihat secara moral berlawanan dengan Buddhisme, dua agama tersebut cenderung bercampur memproduksi sebuah bentuk agama Buddha yang khas Korea. Ketika seorang biksu Buddha, dari China, datang ke semenanjung Korea pada tahun 372 M mengenalkan teks-teks dan rupa-rupa Buddha, mereka mengenalkan ajaran karma dan pencarian kebahagiaan. Ajaran-ajaran tersebut kemudian diasimilasikan dengan ajaran-ajaran Shamanisme.¹³

Shamanisme Korea terdiri atas ritual-ritual gaib yang dilakukan baik secara komunal maupun individual. Dalam ritual-ritual tersebut, fokusnya adalah pengalaman individu pemeluk Shaman (*mudang*) dan kemampuan Shaman untuk memanggil dunia roh yang ditempati oleh berbagai tuhan-tuhan dalam agama Shaman. Selama lima ribu tahun, Shamanisme di Korea telah berlangsung. Kebanyakan orang Korea berpendapat bahwa tradisi Shamanisme berakar dari Asia Tengah dan terkait dengan sabuk Shamanisme Utara yang menghubungkan Korea

dengan Asia Tengah, Siberia, dan Skandinavia Utara.

Oleh karena Shamanisme termasuk dalam budaya massa kebanyakan, ia tidak pernah sepenuhnya hilang dari Semenanjung Korea. Sesudah masa evaluasi kembali identitas budaya Korea pada pertengahan abad ke-20, disepakati oleh para budayawan Korea bahwa Shamanisme membentuk *stratum* paling awal dalam kebudayaan Korea. Dewasa ini, ritual-ritual Shamanisme merupakan bagian dari kehidupan sehari-hari baik pada masyarakat pedesaan maupun perkotaan. Misalnya, kerja-kerja konstruksi gedung pencakar langit diresmikan dengan ritual-ritual shamanisme. Demikian juga kebanyakan artis-artis kontemporer berasal dari keluarga pemeluk Shamanisme.¹⁴

PENUTUP

Berdasarkan paparan di muka dapat disimpulkan beberapa hal sebagai berikut. *Pertama*, masyarakat Korea merupakan masyarakat yang heterogen dari sisi agama, terdiri atas Kristen, Katholik, Buddha, Agama Khonghucu, dan agama-agama lokal. *Kedua*, Agama Khonghucu merupakan sistem kepercayaan yang mengandung unsur-unsur filsafat pemikiran, politik, dan kebudayaan yang berakar dalam sejarah Korea dan berpengaruh ke dalam pembentukan etika dan identitas bangsa Korea. *Ketiga*, Buddhisme juga berperan dalam pembentukan dasar-dasar identitas dan kebudayaan Korea serta berakar dalam sejarah sebagaimana Agama Khonghucu. Di samping agama-agama tersebut, juga berkembang Shamanisme.

Agama-agama tersebut tumbuh dan berkembang sejalan dengan pembangunan ekonomi yang ditandai dengan industrialisasi. Berkembangnya kebudayaan Barat dan meningkatnya pemeluk Kekristenan tidak menjadikan kepercayaan mereka terhadap Agama Khonghucu menjadi menurun karena Agama Khonghucu juga telah mengakar dalam budaya massa. Konflik dan ketegangan antara Buddha dan Kristiani yang muncul sesudah tahun 2000

¹² <http://www.acmuller.net/kor-bud/koreanbuddhism-overview.html> (Diakses 7 Juni 2015).

¹³ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/buddhism/subdivisions/koreanzen.shtml> (Diakses 8 Juni 2015)

¹⁴ <http://www.xip.fi/atd/korea/korean-shamanism-the-origins-of-indigenous-culture.html> (Diakses 8 Juni 2015).

dilihat sebagai ketakutan terhadap hilangnya identitas kebudayaan orang Korea.

Agama dalam pengertian Barat dan Timur sering dikatakan berbeda. Misalnya Agama di Barat dimaknai sebagai seperangkat nilai yang melekat pada komunitas tertentu dengan sejumlah ritual dan simbol-simbol. Sedangkan di dunia Timur, agama lebih dipahami sebagai kekayaan spiritualitas yang melekat pada masyarakat secara kultural. Dari pengalaman Korea, sejarah Konfusianisme dan Budha menunjukkan bahwa agama dimaknai sebagai spiritualitas yang mampu memberikan perlindungan dan menjawab tantangan pada masa krisis. Melebihi makna spiritualitas atau ritual, agama akan dipatuhi jika memberikan solusi kepada umatnya melalui praksis-praksis sosial untuk membebaskan diri dari krisis sosial.

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RESEARCH SUMMARY

CRISIS, GROWTH AND CHANGES IN SUB SAHARA AFRICA: EVIDENCE FROM KENYA

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Diterima: 08-07-2017

Direvisi: 20-09-2017

Disetujui: 17-10-2017

ABSTRAK

Sejak 2008, perekonomian dunia telah dibayangi oleh tekanan krisis keuangan global. Dengan hubungan global yang relatif kuat, sulit bagi Kenya untuk sepenuhnya keluar dari krisis tersebut. Kenya juga mengalami krisis pangan, krisis politik pasca pemilu dan krisis keamanan. Namun, ekonomi Kenya, sejak awal tahun 2000an, terus bertumbuh tanpa banyak terpengaruh oleh krisis. Dengan pendekatan sejarah dan ekonomi, penelitian ini berangkat dari keingintahuan yang sederhana tentang bagaimana perkembangan ekonomi Kenya selama krisis. Studi ini meneliti tiga sektor yang bertahan hidup dan berkembang selama masa krisis, yaitu sektor pertanian (teh, kopi dan bunga potong), infrastruktur, dan teknologi keuangan. Selain itu, studi ini juga menggambarkan peningkatan peran China dalam perekonomian Kenya, ketika negara-negara donor lainnya berada dalam krisis.

Kata kunci: *Krisis, sektor pertanian, pembangunan infrastruktur, teknologi keuangan, China*

ABSTRACT

Since 2008, the world economy has been overshadowed by a heavy pressure from the global financial crisis. With a relatively strong global relationship, it is difficult for Kenya to fully escape the global financial crisis. Kenya has also gone through a food crisis, the post-election political crisis and the security crisis. In fact, the Kenyan economy, since the early 2000s, continues to grow without much affected by the crises. With history and economics approach, this study departs from a simple curiosity, to know how Kenya's economic development is during the crises. This study examines three sectors that survive and thrive during times of crisis, namely agricultural sector (tea, coffee and cut flowers), infrastructure, and financial technology. In addition, this study also describes the increasing role of China in the Kenyan economy, when other donor countries are in crisis.

Keywords: Crisis, agricultural sector, infrastructure development, financial technology, China

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, Kenya has gone through serious crises. First, the country experienced a political crisis following the 2007 presidential elections. There was huge unrest in Kenya after the incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki, was declared the winner in the presidential election on

December 27, 2007. Violence broke out in coastal areas such as in Mombasa, Nairobi, and extended in some other regions, particularly in the Rift Valley. Around 1400 people were reported killed and more than 600 thousand people have been displaced (Brownsell, 2013).

Second, after the political crisis decreased economic growth rate in 2008, Kenya had to face global financial crisis that began to hit the United States (US) and Europe. With a very close relationship between European countries and African countries in several ways such as trade flows, foreign aid, and flow of people (migration), it is difficult to ignore the impacts of global financial crisis on the dynamics of society in the Sub-Saharan Africa. For Kenya that have a fairly open economy (international trade and financial depth level is relatively high in Sub-Sahara Africa), and their dependence on remittances from diaspora abroad, the global financial crisis is quite alarming.

Third, Kenya experienced a severe drought in 2011, which resulted in food shortages (McKenzie & Kermeliotis, 2011). As a country that relies heavily on agriculture with very low irrigation systems, Kenya depends on the intensity of rainfall in their agricultural activity. This is especially true in the main areas that are dry and have limited infrastructure development. Drought is a potential to decrease Kenyan economy, which is 40 percent comes from agricultural sector.

Fourth, terror attacks launched by Al-Shabaab militants in the West-Gate Shopping Mall in 2013 showed that there is a security crisis in Kenya. The attack that killed more than 60 people is one terror incident among several others in the country that borders with Somalia, which is the base of Al-Shabaab group (see New York City Police Department, 2013). The terrorist incident badly hit the tourism sector which is an important backbone for the economy. Kenya is famous for the great wildebeest migration in July each year. Security conditions had led many countries to issue travel warning, which decrease the number of foreign tourists to Kenya.

Interestingly, even though the country had to face several crises, Kenya's economy continues to grow confidently. The country's economy is still growing an average of 5 to 6 percent annually since 2003. The gross domestic product (GDP) of the country has only decreased in 2008 when the political crisis is sweeping the country. After that, the Kenyan economy

grew quite high compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa region.

Despite these crises, interestingly, the Kenyan economy continues to grow without much affected by the crises since the early 2000s. With historical and economic approach, this study departs from a simple curiosity, to know how Kenya's economic development is during the crises. This study examines three sectors that survive and thrive during times of crisis, namely agricultural sector (tea, coffee and cut flowers), infrastructure, and financial technology. In addition, this study also describes the increasing role of China in the Kenyan economy, when other donor countries are in crisis.

Analysis in this paper is based on primary and secondary data. It uses secondary data obtained from the official documents of the Kenyan government, such as development planning, budget and debt documents. We also use statistics and periodical publications and online publications of international organizations such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations and International Monetary Fund, which heavily involved in the economic and development in Kenya. In addition, articles from newspapers, magazines, and academic journals that analyze and or related to the crisis in the countries of the eastern region of Sub-Saharan Africa are important sources for this study. The collection of primary data through observations and interviews were conducted in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, in April 2017. Interviews were conducted with lecturers from the University of Nairobi, the World Bank, the IMF, the African Development Bank, British Embassy, local communities, and also with Indonesian diplomats and embassy staffs in Nairobi.

KENYA: BRIEF OVERVIEW

After independence in 1963, Kenya was led by Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, who became president after the former British colony became a republic in 1964. In the early independence period, many assets such as land controlled by the European were taken over. Unfortunately, some of the assets were




Figure 1.1. GDP per capita (Constant 2010USD)

Source: World Bank (2017)

transferred to Kenyatta's own group, particularly ethnic Kikuyu, even though the assets were belong to other ethnic groups before the colonial era. As a result, many other ethnic groups were not satisfied, such as those living in the area around the beach. The country, that officially uses English language and Swahili, is a country with many ethnic groups, such as Kikuyu (20%), Luo (14%), Luhya (13%), Kalenjing (11%), Kamba (11%), Kisii (6%), Mijikenda (5%), Somali (2%), Turkana (2%), Maasai (1%), and others (14%), including Indian and Arabic (Mynott, 2008). Since the beginning of independence, Kikuyu has a benefited position, by controlling assets and positions in government, as well as the target of government programs. Favoritism by the government at the time have resulted in inequality between ethnic groups, which is one of the roots of political problems recurring from time to time, especially when general elections (Miguel, 2004).

Figure 1.1 shows that Kenya's economy can be divided into three periods, namely post-independence boom (1963-1978), stagnation (1978-2002), and economic revival (2002-2016). Kenya's economy grew significantly in post-independence period, when Jomo Kenyatta led the country (1963-1978). In that period,

the average economic (GDP) growth in Kenya reached 6.9 percent annually, except in 1970 and 1975 when the country suffered a severe drought. Unfortunately, the economic growth did not continue since Daniel Arap Moi became president, because Jomo Kenyatta died in 1978. Figure 1.1 shows that per capita GDP was stagnated, and even decreasing during Daniel Arap Moi time in power (1978-2002). During this period, the GDP only grew by an average of 3 percent per year, and GDP per capita fell from USD898 in 1980 to USD823 in 2002. During the reign of Moi, favoritism continued but shifted to Moi's support base, especially in the Rift Valley (Miguel, 2004, 337). This has caused ongoing ethnic tensions in the country.

Kenya's economic revival occurred after the elections in 2002, which declared Mwai Kibaki as the winner, beating Uhurru Kenyatta, the son of former president Jomo Kenyatta that was supported by Daniel Moi. From 2003 to 2015, GDP grew by more than 5 percent annually. Only in 2008 the economy stagnated with a growth rate reached only 0.2 percent because of the post-election political crisis. The high growth rate is mainly due to the rise of agricultural

commodities prices, such as tea and coffee that are major contributors to Kenya's exports.

Despite a relatively high economic growth, unemployment rate is increasing in the period. The unemployment rate rose from 8.1 percent in 1999 to around 12 percent in 2009, although it decreased again to 10 percent in 2016 (World Bank, 2017). The unemployment rate for youth (15-24 years) indicates a more severe situation. Since 2005, the youth unemployment rate reaches more than 20 percent, and continued to increase, up to 23.8 percent in 2009 (World Bank, 2017). This indicates that the economic revival since 2002 has not been supported by a strong production base, but because of changes in international prices.

The service and agricultural sectors continued to be main contributors to Kenya's economy from independence until the beginning of 2016. According to the World Bank (2017), in 2016, the agricultural sector accounted for more than 35 percent of Kenya's GDP, while the service sector accounts for more than 45 percent. The contribution of the agricultural sector is not too surprising (World Bank, 2017). Approximately, from 45 million Kenya's population in 2016, about 74 percent live in rural areas with the main occupation as a farmer. The great contribution of agricultural sector is mainly supported by the three main export commodities, namely tea, coffee and cut flowers. Meanwhile, with limited agricultural infrastructure, particularly irrigation, food commodities are still highly dependent on weather conditions, and drought is main threat.

The large contribution of service sectors was mainly supported by tourism, especially safari business, which is a primary sector in Kenya to earn foreign currencies. Kenya is very popular with its Kilimanjaro mountain and safari, especially with the big five animals, namely the lion, rhino, leopard, elephants and buffalo, as well as giraffe, hippo and zebra. In times of great wildebeest migration, every hotel and inn definitely full with tourists who want to see attractions, such as how a herd of buffalos had to cross a river with crocodiles waiting in the water. Although a primary sector, the tourism sector is highly vulnerable to the global economy and

security conditions. Kenya is a country located in the Eastern Africa region and directly borders with Tanzania, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia, and the Indian Ocean. With more than half of Somalia is now controlled by Al-Shabaab group, and a number of refugees from that country entered Kenya, security in the country is now become vulnerable. Kenya has been hit by terrorism, and one biggest casualty is the one at the West Gate Shopping mall.

GROWING IN CRISIS

This section presents main findings about three sectors that survive and thrive during times of crisis, namely agricultural sector (tea, coffee and cut flowers), infrastructure, and financial technology. It also describes the increasing role of China in the Kenyan economy.

Coffee, tea and CutFlowers

The development of Kenya's three export commodities, coffee, tea and cut flowers proved to have mainly contributed to Kenya's economy. The three commodities have their own trajectories, starting from coffee, then tea and cut flowers. The decline in Kenya coffee exports in the late 1980s had been replaced by the export of black tea and cut flower. These three commodities have become a source of revenue for Kenya. These three export commodities are cultivated mostly by small farmers (60%), and 40% by large and medium enterprises.

In light of the internal and external crises that occurred during the 1930-2013 period, coffee commodities appear to be more sensitive to international market price and climate crisis than the global crisis, except during the 1930s economic depression and the 1980s world economic recession. A very long drought in 2001/2002 has had an impact on the drastic drop in commodity exports. However, compared to coffee and tea commodities under the period of study, coffee exports fluctuated sharply compared to tea and cut flowers. Even these latter two commodities have dominated the world market.

The global financial crisis in 2008 in the United States and its impact on the export

of Kenya's leading commodities is not so significant. In addition to exporting these three commodities to European countries, the Kenyan government has been looking for new consumer countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan, Middle East countries, even Korea and Japan.

Financial Technology

The global financial crisis has changed the landscape of how financial system works. While foreign banks scaled back their activities in some Sub-Sahara African countries, it's should be opportunities for local banks to increase their presence. But, at the same time, non-bank institution also sees the opportunity to expand financial services to rural poor which majority still unbanked. In Kenya, mobile phones-based technology, M-Pesa which launched in March 2007 by local giant mobile operator, Safaricom, started a revolution in the payment system. The cash payment system evolved from commodity money to fiat money, while cashless payment system changed from paper based to electronic based (electronic money, electronic wallet, mobile money). With these developments, the role of the payment system is becoming increasingly important in the economy.

Kenya offers successful story of expanding financial inclusion through digital financial services based on mobile phones for emerging market and developing countries. The demand of financial services was high due to the lack of other competitive money transfer services and the need to reduce dependency on cash for security reasons. Several factors help explain the success of mobile money payment in Kenya. The four main factors are development of adequate ICT infrastructure, the need for access to financial services, the regulatory approach to mobile money services in Kenya and strong brand image of mobile phone operators (in this case is Safaricom).

Infrastructure Development

After a period of stagnation from 1980 to 2000, the economy of Kenya is now reviving. The economy grew consistently more than 5 percent annually since 2004, even during the 2009 global

financial crisis. After the 2007 post-election crisis, the government of Kenya launched the Vision 2030 aspires to be a middle income countries. To achieve the vision, the government of Kenya is prioritizing infrastructures as an enabler factor for development. It is believed that infrastructure development could reduce infrastructure deficits, strengthen growth, increase quality of life, reduce regional inequality, and provide legitimacy for a government performance.

Since 2009, the ability of government to build infrastructure across the country is noticeable, particularly in energy and transportation sectors. In the global financial crisis, the infrastructure development is considered as a key factor to maintain economic growth as suggested by Keynesian economists. An active government spending on infrastructure is expected to increase aggregate demand in the economy. While there was a limited source of finance from domestic resources and traditional donors, increasing role of China in global economy has significantly helped Kenya to close the financial needs. The shifting global economic power from the Western countries to Asian countries provides alternative sources of finances.

However, there are challenges ahead for Kenya to develop its infrastructure projects. The government of Kenya needs to be careful with the rapid increase of external finance. Total public and publicly guaranteed debt is now close to 50 percent of GDP, which is dangerous for the economy. The experience of Spain shows that uncalculated massive infrastructure development has led to a serious economic crisis.

The Rise of China

As also in other parts of Africa, the role of China is prominent in the increasing infrastructure development since 2009. In 2005, China's bilateral aid to Kenya was only Ksh2.4 bn, or only about 1.58 percent of total bilateral aid received by Kenya. According to The National Treasury RoK (2013, 2016), in 2009, China contributed more than Ksh 11.8 bn (6.36 percent of total bilateral aid). Since then, contribution of bilateral aid from China to Kenya increased

significantly, to 15.05 percent (Ksh 36.6 bn) in 2012 and 56.63 percent (Ksh 252 bn) in 2015.

China has shifted the position of traditional bilateral creditor for Kenya such as Japan, France and Germany. From 2005 to 2010, Japan, France and Germany were three main bilateral creditors for Kenya. Moreover, in 2015, bilateral aid from China only second to multilateral aid from International Development Association (IDA). It already bypassed all other multilateral donors, such as African Development Bank/Fund (ADB/ADF), European Economic Commission/European Investment Bank (EEC/EIB) and International Monetary Bank (IMF). The increasing role of China in Kenya confirms our finding in 2016 that the global financial crisis has shifted geographical economic power, from the US, the EU and Japan.

Data from Debt Management Department RoK (2015) shows that along with the Standard Gauge Railways projects that costs more than USD 3.6bn, the Nairobi-Thika superhighway projects is among the largest bilateral finance from China (USD 100m). Other infrastructure projects listed financed by China are rural telecommunication projects, geothermal production wells drilling, and power distribution system modernization.

CONCLUSION

If crisis is interpreted as a critical period or a difficult time, then the crisis is not strange to the Kenyan population. The country in eastern Africa has experienced various crises since its independence in 1963, in terms of economic, political, social and security crises. Interestingly, as Kenya faces an ongoing crisis since the post-election crisis of 2007, the food crisis, terrorism and the global financial crisis, the country's economic growth continues to grow, although it has not been able to significantly reduce poverty and unemployment.

The ability to sustain this high rate of economic growth is fueled by an increase in agricultural commodity exports, which is a major contributor to Kenya's economy. Looking at the trajectory of three major agricultural commodities, tea, cut flowers and coffee, this study shows how the effect of increasing

agricultural commodity prices has helped in maintaining the value of Kenyan exports. From its trajectories, the development of Kenya's three main export commodities proved to be an important contribution to Kenya's economy. The development of one commodity with another commodity changed, evidenced by the decrease in the quantity and trade of coffee replaced by tea. At the time of export tea prices fall, cut flowers become an alternative economic population.

Viewed from the internal and external crises that occurred during the period studied (1930-2013), the trajectory of the development of the three export commodities show that the world economic crisis, such as the depression, the oil crisis and the global financial crisis did not affect commodity prices, thus not directly affecting the export value of Kenya. Even the crisis of one commodity was overcome by the development of other commodities such as between coffee and tea in the 1930s, and tea and cut flowers in 2012.

Along with the global financial crisis, Kenya is developing M-Pesa, a mobile-based electronic money. The rapid development of M-Pesa in the country is supported by an increase in ICT infrastructure, built heavily in the country. In addition to demonstrating the transformation of financial technology, the widespread use of M-Pesa has also increased financial inclusion in the country. It also supports the creative destruction that occurred during the crisis.

Another interesting point from Kenya is massive infrastructure development since 2009, when many donor countries are experiencing an economic crisis. In addition to domestic demand for long-lasting infrastructure deficits, Kenyan policy makers believe that infrastructure development will help to boost economic growth, to improve living standards and to reduce inequality across regions, and to legitimize government performance.

In addition, China's increasing role in the global economy has helped to boost infrastructure development in Kenya. Foreign aid from China is very helpful in realizing infrastructure development, such as in the transportation and energy sector, in Kenya. However, China's rapidly growing aid since 2009, which became

the largest bilateral aid since 2015, has also raised concerns, both in its paying ability and the accompanying social issues.

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TINJAUAN BUKU

CHINA BELT ROAD INITIATIVE: PEMBANGUNAN INFRASTRUKTUR DAN PERLUASAN HEGEMONI EKONOMI TIONGKOK DI DUNIA

Wang Yiwei. 2016. *The Belt and Road Initiative: What Will China Offer The World In Its Rise*. New World Press: Beijing. 214 Page.

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Diterima: 04-07-2017

Direvisi: 18-08-2017

Disetujui: 15-09-2017

“If you want to get rich, build roads; if you want to get rich quickly, build highways, if you want to get rich immediately, build internet networks.” Wang Yiwei (2017, Global Times).

Buku ini mengulas perkembangan *China Belt Road Initiative* (China BRI, *Inisiatif Sabuk Jalan Tiongkok*) sejak digulirkan pada tahun 2013 sekaligus merespon beragam diskusi dan permasalahan yang muncul dari inisiatif tersebut. Misalnya saja tentang dialog ekonomi politik manfaat pembangunan infrastruktur Tiongkok di sepanjang pesisir Laut Cina Selatan, dampaknya bagi perdagangan di ASEAN, problematika hubungan internasional antara negara, dan lain-lain. Selain itu, buku ini juga sedikit mengulas praktik implementasi *China Belt Road Initiative* tentang pertukaran ide/gagasan, barang, modal, dan kesempatan pasar yang cukup kompleks di kawasan yang dilalui. Pergerakan pembangunan infrastruktur, logistik, dan investasi Tiongkok dalam program *Belt and Road Initiative* disampaikan dalam buku ini yang mendorong terciptanya hubungan-hubungan (persinggungan) baik aktor maupun institusi antar negara. Jejaring kerjasama (maupun konflik) dari *China Belt Road Initiative* ini terbentuk dari hubungan-hubungan sosial-ekonomi-politik antar pemerintah/masyarakat Tiongkok dengan negara lain. Buku ini ditulis oleh Wang Yiwei, seorang profesor dari School of International Studies, Direktur Institut Urusan Internasional

dan Direktur Pusat Studi Eropa di Universitas Renmin Beijing, dan salah satu pakar dalam bidang hubungan internasional Eropa-China di Tiongkok.

Secara umum buku ini terbagi menjadi empat gagasan utama yang mengintisarikan suatu abstraksi tentang China BRI. Pertama, memperkenalkan sejarah kemunculan inisiatif China BRI—yang sebelumnya menggunakan istilah *One Belt One Road*, dan sejauh mana dorongan ekonomi dan politik nasional maupun internasional mendasari pembentukan inisiatif ini. Bagian pertama ini menyoroti lima jenis hubungan persatuan antara Tiongkok dengan Eurasia yang baru, yaitu: pengembangan infrastruktur fisik baru; perdagangan dan investasi; standarisasi sistem moneter; dan membangun kesadaran umum tentang kesatuan politik dengan meningkatkan intensitas hubungan antar warga (bisnis, program pertukaran, pariwisata). Penulis buku ini tampaknya hendak menempatkan Inisiatif Sabuk Jalan Tiongkok tersebut ke dalam perspektif sejarah yang lebih modern agar tampak lebih menarik, tidak hanya menggambarkan pentingnya sejarah Jalan Sutra yang lama, namun juga merinci hubungannya dengan fase pengembangan ekonomi Tiongkok

saat ini—yang lebih mengedepankan proses reformasi ekonomi terbuka dan juga mengglobal. Penjelasan bagian ini juga menyoroti signifikansi historis-geopolitik dari pembentukan *One Belt One Road*, terutama di bidang atau masalah pembangunan kekuatan maritim bersanding/berhadapan dengan pembangunan infrastruktur antar benua (kontinen), menggambarkan paralel gagasan antara *China Belt Road Initiative* dan *America Marshall Plan* yang berbeda namun bertujuan sama serta respon negara-negara lain tentang pengembangan Sabuk Jalan Tiongkok baru.

Di Bagian Dua, buku ini menyajikan penjelasan mengenai manfaat China BRI yang memberi peluang bagi negara-negara di kawasan Asia, Eropa dan negara di dunia lainnya atas implementasi dari pembangunan yang digagas dalam China BRI. Bagian dua buku ini memberikan masukan kepada pembaca terhadap fakta bahwa bila negara-negara bangsa lainnya bersatu dengan China, mereka bisa mendapatkan kembali peran globalnya, misalnya Eropa dapat kembali muncul sebagai kekuatan baru yang hilang setelah Perang Dunia II. Negara-negara Asia Selatan juga dapat terkoneksi global dengan Tiongkok daratan maupun dengan kawasan lain.

Pada bagian konseptual ketiga, penulis mengungkapkan tentang bahaya yang dihadapi dari penerapan China BRI. Penulis memberikan contoh gambaran tentang isu keamanan terorisme dan bencana alam, bencana ekonomi (misalnya terjadinya risiko inflasi keuangan dunia), risiko munculnya hukum internasional tentang hubungan antar berbagai kawasan akibat China BRI. Pada bab ini penulis menganggap besarnya tantangan geopolitik yang diajukan oleh China BRI adalah yang terbesar. Keberadaan China BRI bisa juga mempertajam teori “ancaman China” bagi negara-negara yang berkompetensi dengan Tiongkok, misalnya, Rusia di Asia Tengah, India di Samudra Hindia, Amerika Serikat di Laut Cina Selatan, serta sejumlah negara Eropa yang tidak nyaman dengan perluasan pengaruh Tiongkok di Eropa. Namun, penulis optimis: menurutnya masalah bisa diatasi dengan kolaborasi negara.

Pada bagian terakhir, penulis mengembangkan suatu teori, yaitu teori

integrasi global dan konsep bagaimana cara melakukan kerja sama praktis menjadi dasar China BRI. Untuk mewujudkan program China BRI, pemerintah Tiongkok akan membantu membangun infrastruktur dan jaringan politik-ekonominya di negara-negara Asia Tengah dan Asia Tenggara melalui para aktor maupun institusi lokal yang saling bekerja sama agar semakin terintegrasi ke arah politik dan ekonomi dengan Tiongkok. Dalam konteks pendekatan pragmatik, penulis buku ini membuat saran bagaimana penerapan China BRI ini dapat diukur (misalnya implementasi infrastruktur, pengurangan bea masuk, peningkatan bantuan dan investasi, kerjasama ilmiah, dan lain-lain). Sebagai penutup, penulis menyimpulkan bahwa China BRI adalah gagasan yang boleh dimiliki oleh publik yang menguntungkan bagi semua negara dan warga dunia. Selanjutnya, prakarsa tersebut merupakan dasar yang baik sebagai kebangkitan kawasan Eurasia, yang menurut penulis, dapat menghubungkan berbagai kepentingan Tiongkok, negara-negara Asia dan juga Eropa.

Apa yang membuat buku Wang Yiwei ini menarik, pertama, bahwa informasi dan saran yang dikemukakan sangat mencerminkan pendapat dan gagasan kepemimpinan Komite Partai Komunis Tiongkok. Dalam buku ini posisi pemerintah Tiongkok ditunjukkan dengan melampirkan dokumen resmi pemerintah yang berjudul Visi dan Usulan Tindakan yang Digariskan pada Jalan Sabuk Ekonomi Jalan Bersama dan Jalan Raya Maritim Abad 21. Dokumen ini dikeluarkan bersama oleh Komite Pembangunan dan Reformasi Nasional China, Kementerian Luar Negeri dan Kementerian Perdagangan. Sehingga dapat dikatakan bahwa buku ini adalah representasi gagasan pemerintah Tiongkok terkait dengan China BRI. Pemerintah Tiongkok dalam China BRI hendak menunjukkan dan mewujudkan semangat keterbukaan Tiongkok, keinginan untuk masuk dalam pusaran perkembangan globalisasi yang inklusif sekaligus menandai transformasi sosial-ekonomi-politik Tiongkok dan menjadi partisipan bagi promotor globalisasi.

Terlibat dalam pusaran globalisasi modern dikarenakan tren kekuatan sosial, ekonomi, dan politik mulai kurang didominasi oleh Amerika Serikat. Perkembangan dunia saat ini telah bergerak menuju model desa global namun masih menyisakan persoalan dunia yang terdikotomi antara negara maju dan negara berkembang, antara pusat dan pinggiran kota. Membaca fenomena ini penulis buku hendak menghubungkan kebijakan pemerintah Tiongkok untuk melanjutkan hubungan yang kini terhenti karena menurunnya dominasi Amerika dengan membangun hubungan baru antara Tiongkok dengan Eropa, Afrika dan Asia. Prakarsa China BRI akan membantu menjembatani kesenjangan ini dengan membantu negara-negara berkembang melepaskan kemiskinan, sambil mempromosikan kemunculan negara-negara berkembang yang terus berlanjut dan berhasil dengan cara yang akan memperbaiki kekurangan dengan logika globalisasi tradisional.

Penulis berpendapat bahwa ketidakberlanjutan globalisasi yang didominasi AS dan kemunculan inisiatif “Belt and Road” yang diajukan oleh Tiongkok adalah sebuah solusi untuk mempersempit kesenjangan antara kawasan miskin dan kaya, negara miskin dan kaya. Tiongkok dengan cerdas telah memulai arah globalisasi sejati dan inklusif yang akan menjadi tema utama abad ke-21 mendatang. Penulis mengklaim bahwa buku ini sebagai karya pertama di Tiongkok yang menganalisa inisiatif “Belt and Road” dari perspektif hubungan internasional. Penulis buku menjelaskan buku ini memberikan perspektif hubungan internasional tentang inisiatif membangun jalur sabuk ekonomi dan alur maritim serta pengaruhnya terhadap hubungan Tiongkok dengan kondisi global. kekuatan. Secara konseptual dan praktik, China BRI telah membuka sebuah babak baru dalam sejarah keterbukaan Tiongkok secara keseluruhan. Berfokus pada konektivitas di bidang komunikasi kebijakan, konektivitas infrastruktur, perdagangan tanpa hambatan, peredaran keuangan dan pemahaman antar masyarakat, inisiatif tersebut menandai transformasi fundamental China dari sekedar menjadi pembentuk globalisasi, dan situasinya berubah dari satu tempat dimana China membuka

diri ke dunia luar, ke tempat di mana dunia terbuka bagi China. Selain itu, melalui konektivitas di antara Eropa, Afrika, dan Asia, prakarsa ini akan menghidupkan kembali peradaban pedalaman dan laut, membantu negara-negara berkembang melepaskan kemiskinan, dan meningkatkan kemunculan negara-negara berkembang yang terus berlanjut dan berhasil, sehingga dapat memperbaiki logika tradisional globalisasi. Inilah gagasan dari pemerintah Tiongkok yang dianalisis melalui kaca mata hubungan internasional yang cukup menarik.

Hal menarik kedua adalah, buku ini cukup komprehensif, dan mencakup berbagai isu. Kemunculan gagasan China BRI berusaha menjembatani sejarah masa lalu tentang kemasyuran Jalur Sutra Cina dengan menempatkan konteksnya melihat ke masa depan, yaitu tantangan perdagangan global dan konektivitas manusia antar kawasan dan bangsa. Pada bagian pendahuluan penulis berusaha menjawab pertanyaan mendasar seperti: mengapa diberi nama ini? Apa kesamaan antara Jalan Sutra yang baru dan yang lama? Apa tujuan yang telah dilakukan pemerintah China? Kapan China akan menyelesaikan inisiatif ini? Pertanyaan ini di jelaskan secara filosofis, Orang Cina sering mengatakan: “Jika Anda ingin menjadi kaya, bangunlah jalan; Jika Anda ingin cepat kaya, bangun jalan raya, jika Anda ingin cepat kaya, bangun jaringan internet”. Di Cina, Jalan tidak umum dipahami sebagai jalan fisik, tapi itu lebih berarti “cara”. Dalam karakter Cina “Daolu”, yang berarti “arah atau jalan”, “Lu” adalah metode untuk mewujudkan “Dao”. Apa arti sebenarnya dari “Dao”? Menurut bab 42 dari “Tao Te Ching” yang merupakan ajaran klasik kuno di Tiongkok, “Dao” menghasilkan satu, satu menghasilkan dua, dua menghasilkan tiga, dan kemudian tiga menghasilkan dunia kita. Pada saat ini, masyarakat menghadapi nasib yang sama, perlu “jalan” untuk perbaikan nasib. Oleh karena itu, China BRI adalah upaya membangun jalan (jaringan) yang terbuka untuk semua pemain dan merangkul semua orang, tidak hanya bersifat eksklusif.

Buku ini sangat menarik untuk membantu memberikan penjelasan China BRI ke khalayak Barat (Eropa) khususnya, misalnya banyak dari pelaku ekonomi mulai tertarik menggeser perhatian pada keuntungan yang ditawarkan dari gagasan China BRI ini, namun di sisi yang berbeda masyarakat Eropa pada umumnya belum begitu menyadari akan apa yang ditawarkan dan implikasi yang akan terjadi. Buku ini hendak menunjukkan kontribusi China BRI terhadap jenis koeksistensi dan pembangunan berkelanjutan yang baru, dan merupakan alternatif dari globalisasi gaya lama Barat. Inisiatif ini beroperasi di sektor ekonomi, politik, budaya, sosial dan ekologi, yang berbasis pada pembangunan infrastruktur fisik maupun komunikasi yang kuat. Buku ini ingin melawan prasangka Barat tentang Tiongkok sebagai negara komunis tertutup sekaligus menawarkan prakarsa pembangunan dunia masa depan yang saling menguntungkan. Sebagai contoh, penulis mencontohkan kepada bangsa Eropa yang skeptis bahwa jalan sutra baru dapat mendamaikan Eropa dengan Rusia dan menjadikannya sebagai kekuatan Eurasia dan Atlantik. Pada saat yang sama, penulis juga memberikan contoh Amerika Serikat bahwa negara tersebut akan tetap menjadi kekuatan maritim terbesar di dunia melalui pengembangan infrastruktur laut di kawasan Asia Tenggara dengan penguasaan wilayah dan teknologi yang telah dikembangkan sejak perang dunia 2 selesai.

Selain dua hal menarik di atas, ada kritik penting yang tampaknya perlu untuk ditambahkan dalam memahami China BRI yang tidak sempat dibahas dalam buku karangan Wang Yiwei, pertama, kiranya perlu penjelasan dan pemahaman berbeda diluar perspektif Tiongkok atau dari peneliti lain. Ini fungsinya sebagai perbandingan. Misalnya, sejauh mana dan seperti apakah gagasan konektivitas dari China BRI ini muncul sebagai permasalahan global dan dengan siapa akan dikaitkan? Kedua, sejauh mana dampak yang ditimbulkan dari pembangunan infrastruktur yang menjadi andalan dalam pelaksanaan China BRI di wilayah lain (semisal di Eropa dan Asia Tenggara)? Ketiga, persoalan-persoalan apa saja yang tercipta dan berkaitan dengan isu-isu sosial-ekonomi-politik yang

berkorelasi dengan negara-negara di kawasan (terutama kawasan Asia Timur dan Asia Tenggara)? Keempat, sejauh ini belum banyak diketahui seperti apakah jejaring kerjasama negara/masyarakat dalam kebijakan China Belt Road Initiative yang membentuk relasi-relasi aktor dan institusi antar negara. Beberapa point pertanyaan penting ini kurang banyak ditelaah dan dijelaskan oleh penulis dalam penjelasan buku ini.

Dapat dipahami kekurangan buku ini karena ditulis 3 tahun berselang sejak digulirkan Presiden Xi Jinping tahun 2013 di Kazakthan dan Indonesia. Dalam kurun waktu tersebut tentu saja menyisakan berbagai sudut pandang yang kurang banyak di bahas dalam buku ini. Buku ini sangat ber-perspektif Beijing dan mewakili suara pemerintah Tiongkok tentang China BRI. Selain itu, buku ini minim 'intepretatif' dari segi pembacaan terhadap isu-isu (kasus) yang terkait dengan inisiatif jalur sutra baru diluar Tiongkok. Padahal buku ini ditulis oleh professor ahli dalam kajian wilayah, khususnya Tiongkok dengan Eropa.

Sebagai suatu contoh perbandingan, ada buku lain yang di tulis oleh Lim Tai Wei dan kawan-kawan berjudul *China's One Belt One Road Initiative* yang diterbitkan oleh Imperial College Press tahun 2016. Buku ini memberikan penafsiran berbeda tentang narasi China BRI tidak melulu soal manfaat, relasi sosial, atau integrasi global. Misalnya membahas China BRI dilihat dari kacamata pemberitaan media kontemporer. Bagian ini mengulas berbagai isu positif dan negatif dari prakarsa China BRI di media masa (mengambil contoh di Singapura). Selain itu, buku perbandingan ini mengulas bagaimana peneliti dari luar Tiongkok daratan menceritakan narasi tentang peristiwa sejarah yang berkaitan dengan Jalan Sutra kuno dan pembukaan jalur maritim baru. Beberapa penulis dalam buku ini memberikan penafsiran tentang agenda kebijakan Tiongkok saat ini dan bagaimana pemerintah Tiongkok berusaha melegitimasi kegiatan ekonomi ini melalui jalur pertukaran politik (diplomasi) dan ekonomi. Dalam hal studi kelembagaan, buku ini juga mengulas peran Asian Infrastructure Investment

Bank (AIIB) yang berusaha terlibat secara lebih intens dalam China BRI, mengulas isu-isu yang dihadapi AIIB dalam upayanya membentuk *platform* investasi perbankan untuk pembiayaan pembangunan yang bersifat multilateral.

Bagian lain dari buku karangan Lim dan kawan-kawan juga mengulas kasus empiris dan kritis, misalnya program Euro-China High Speed Rail (HSR) dan HSR Central Asia-China yang tidak berjalan mulus pada saat ini dikarenakan volume penumpang tidak cukup banyak memberikan keuntungan sejak dibukanya jalur kereta api cepat tersebut. Bagian ini membahas rute darat dari China BRI dan melihat sejarah perkembangan HSR di Tiongkok hingga saat ini beserta perkembangan teknologi rel kereta api berkecepatan tinggi yang mereka punyai. Salah satu bentuk kritik terhadap HSR ini adalah masih adanya persoalan perhitungan teknis kurang tepat dan material yang ekonomis yang menurunkan kadar kemampuan teknologi kereta cepat yang menjadi tidak tepat guna. Selain persoalan itu, beberapa bagian di buku perbandingan ini juga menganalisis soal relasi sosial dan ekonomi terkait China BRI, misalnya menyoroti tantangan ekonomi, birokrasi dan persoalan geo-politik yang mungkin dihadapi atau diproyeksikan oleh proyek ini akan sangat menentukan keberhasilan dari proyek dalam China BRI.

Inisiatif “Belt and Road” merupakan inisiatif yang sangat penting dari sudut pandang yang positif, yaitu untuk membawa dunia bersama memfasilitasi ke arah globalisasi yang adil. Artinya membuka konektivitas (baik sosial, ekonomi, maupun politik) di area di mana pembangunan infrastruktur, khususnya jalan, saling terbangun. Hal ini senada dengan argumentasi yang dikemukakan oleh Parag Khanna penulis buku “*Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization*,” yang menyatakan bahwa konektivitas dan pembangunan infrastruktur akan mampu membuat dunia lebih damai, makmur, dan berkelanjutan. Khanna lebih lanjut menyatakan bahwa infrastruktur yang akan dibangun oleh penduduk dunia dalam 40 tahun ke depan akan melebihi total infrastruktur yang telah dibangun dalam 400 tahun terakhir. “Revolusi Interkonektivitas Global” katanya sudah mulai,

dan Tiongkok menciptakan program Belt Road (silk road dan maritime road) adalah sebuah contoh sejauh mana pembangunan infrastruktur berskala terbesar akan tercipta dalam periode sejarah global.

Buku yang ditulis Wang Yiwei tidak menyoroti dampak lebih lanjut atau analisis lebih dalam dari inisiatif sabuk jalan ini. Walaupun dalam bagian akhir bukunya menyebutkan tentang teori integrasi global, namun hanya sebatas dalam perspektif hubungan internasional. Ketidadaan analisis semacam ini, membuat buku Wang secara sekilas akan dilihat sebagai propaganda atau akan menjadi buku saku tentang China BRI. Padahal bila penulis cukup cerdas memberikan penjelasan teoritis/analitis secara umum dari praktik China BRI akan jauh lebih menarik. Sebagaimana dikatakan oleh Khanna inisiatif sabuk jalan yang banyak membangun infrastruktur akan membentuk suatu *connectography*. Sebuah gambaran tentang keterhubungan antar wilayah. Tidak ada lagi perbedaan ideologi dan politik dalam berhubungan, yang ada hanyalah konektivitas ekonomi yang makin mengglobal melalui kota-kota besar dan federasi atau kumpulan-kumpulan kepentingan ekonomi melalui pembangunan jaringan-jaringan fisik seperti kabel, pipa, rel kereta api, serta jaringan rantai suplai bisnis dan industri.

Jaringan dan infrastruktur yang terbangun tersebut menjadi jalan baru yang oleh Khanna disebut sebagai ‘*Global Renaissance*’ (dunia baru) yang mengikuti tiga pola, yaitu *Connectivity*, *Devolution*, dan *Tug of War*, yang singkatnya adalah sebagai berikut: 1) Konektivitas merangsek ke kota-kota besar sebagai zona ekonomi khusus (special economic zones – SEZs) di seluruh dunia yang terkoneksi melalui jalan kereta api, pipa, kabel internet, dan simbol-simbol lain dari jaringan global peradaban; 2) Devolusi negara menuju agregasi propinsi bahkan kota, serta kompetisi segala sesuatu berbasis global supply chain yang mengarah pada aktivitas ekonomi-bisnis-industri lintas batas negara; 3) Kompetisi geopolitis berevolusi dari perang berdasar teritori menjadi konektivitas, berbasis rantai suplay global, pasar energi, produksi industrial, keuangan, teknologi, knowledge,

dan talenta. Ketiganya, kemudian berorientasi pada Megacities yang akan melahirkan *The New Economic Geography* dan SEZs di dunia sebagai *The New Nodes* (Mulawarman, 2017).

Dari abstraksi yang di sampaikan dalam buku Wang dan dua buku perbandingan di atas, setidaknya dapat di petik suatu kesimpulan bahwa urgensi pembangunan infrastruktur adalah untuk mendukung daya saing sektor riil, memberikan penguatan pada iklim investasi dan dunia usaha. Penguatan daya saing sektor riil, perlu dukungan kelancaran distribusi produk domestik dari/ke berbagai wilayah. Kelancaran jaringan distribusi dan lalu lintas antarwilayah akan mengurangi tekanan disparitas harga, mendukung tercapainya skala ekonomi, dan meningkatkan efisiensi produksi. Dalam kerangka ini, percepatan penyelesaian konektivitas internasional adalah gagasan cemerlang yang muncul dari ide China BRI. Secara garis besar, berbagai program dalam China BRI menerapkan dua paradigma utama yaitu percepatan pertumbuhan ekonomi suatu negara (kawasan) dengan pengembangan infrastruktur melalui pendanaan bersama antara sumber negara dan swasta, dan perluasan pertumbuhan ekonomi dengan mengacu pada integrasi pasar secara internasional dan produksi yang masih terfragmentasi akibat rendahnya konektivitas inter-koridor, intra-koridor dan antar koridor di dalam wilayah ekonomi Tiongkok dengan sistem ekonomi di wilayah internasional. China BRI dengan usulan programnya hendak melakukan upaya pembangunan infrastruktur dalam program perluasan ekonomi Tiongkok (dan pengaruh sosial-politik yang akan juga mereka bawa) dengan menfokuskan pada perluasan area yang nantinya akan menghubungkan pusat-pusat ekonomi dunia. Sebuah program yang sangat ambisius dari pemerintah Tiongkok, namun sangat menjanjikan beragam keuntungan yang dapat diraih.

Selanjutnya dalam konteks hubungan antara negara/bangsa akibat pembangunan dalam China BRI menyisakan berbagai kesempatan untuk pembahasan lebih lanjut. Salah satunya, dalam hubungan antar negara, bisa memberikan penjelasan tentang potensi China BRI akan

memberikan peluang kerjasama potensi investasi Tiongkok berupa sumber pendanaan sumber dana asing (FDI), pembiayaan infrastruktur, produksi barang secara global, rantai pasar yang lebih efisien, dan transfer teknologi. Untuk itu, dari hasil kerjasama negara-negara yang berhubungan dengan China BRI dapat dilihat sejauh mana reformulasi kerjasama ekonomi dan politik mampu meningkatkan pola perdagangan, investasi, dan hubungan sosial yang lebih berkualitas. Di sektor pembangunan infrastruktur maritim, maka diperlukan pula kajian holistik terkait konektivitas maritim di Asia Tenggara dalam konteks *one belt one road* mulai dari kelembagaan/tata kelola, logistik *performance*, potensi bisnis, sumber energi, SDM, dampak sosial ekonomi hingga keragaman hayati. Kajian ini semua pada akhirnya mengekerucut pada bagaimana ide tentang konektivitas melalui pembangunan infrastruktur ini dapat menjelaskan hal lain, semisal, pola jejaring sosial-ekonomi-politik Eurasia-Tiongkok dan membangkitkan daya saing suatu negara terhadap negara lain.

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