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DDC: 303.6**Ridwan****MENGENAL MASJID RAYA PATTANI DALAM KONFLIK THAILAND SELATAN**

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 101-109

ABSTRAK

Berbicara secara umum, masjid-masjid dan pondok-pondok pesantren di Thailand Selatan dipandang sebagai tempat melahirkan militan Muslim Thailand. Secara khusus, di wilayah Pattani kebanyakan masjid diasumsikan sebagai tempat merekrut militan Muslim guna melawan Pemerintah Thailand. Dalam hal ini, insiden Masjid Kru-Ze 2004 telah menumbuhkan Muslim militan untuk melawan pemerintah Thailand. Dalam hal ini, saya percaya bahwa Masjid Central Pattani di Thailand Selatan memiliki elemen-elemen non-kekerasan yang bisa diaktivasi sebagai tempat untuk mencegah kekerasan yang tidak adil. Oleh karena itu, artikel ini akan menilai kualitas nyata dari Masjid Raya Pattani di Thailand Selatan dengan dasar profil deskriptif dari masjid tersebut. Dengan demikian, pembaca akan mendapatkan gambaran yang lebih utuh tentang permasalahan tersebut. Selanjutnya, dengan menganalisa praktik-praktik keagamaan di masjid tersebut, penulis berkesimpulan bahwa Masjid Raya Pattani nampak sebagai campuran yang setara antara Muslim moderat dengan jemaah yang lebih konservatif daripada radikal dan ekstrem.

***Kata kunci:** Masjid, Praktik Pendidikan Islam, Salafy-Wahaby*

DDC: 302.4**Akhmad Siddiq****PANEN PERDAMAIAN: HUBUNGAN ISLAM DAN KRISTEN DI DESA KAKAI RENABOR, FILIPINA**

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 111-120

ABSTRAK

Barangay Kakai Renabor adalah sebuah distrik kecil yang terletak di Lanao Del Norte, Filipina. Kawasan ini dikenal sebagai salah satu titik rawan dan arena konflik di Mindanao. Di kawasan ini masyarakat Kristen dan masyarakat Muslim memiliki sejarah yang kurang menyenangkan. Hal ini terkait dengan ketegangan emosional yang menyebabkan mereka saling bentrok dan saling melakukan tindak kekerasan. Hubungan tidak harmonis ini terjadi karena setiap kelompok bersikeras untuk hidup sendiri-sendiri, saling menafikan kelompok lain. Hanya ada dua pilihan: masyarakat Kristen tanpa Muslim atau masyarakat Muslim tanpa Kristen. Namun, pada saat ini kedua kelompok dapat hidup berdampingan

dalam harmoni. Mereka saling bekerja sama menanam dan memanen tanaman dalam satu lahan, dan melupakan kenangan pahit serta sejarah luka masa lalu. Mereka mampu untuk hidup saling menghargai dan saling menghormati. Artikel ini hendak mengurai proses transformasi konflik yang dilakukan dalam proses penyelesaian konflik, bagaimana mereka mengatasi ketegangan, dan apa yang mereka butuhkan untuk membangun masa depan yang lebih baik.

Kata Kunci: Hubungan Kristen-Muslim, Kekerasan, Perdamaian, dan Transformasi Konflik.

DDC: 333.7

Lengga Pradipta

KOMUNITAS ASEAN: MENGELOLA SUMBERDAYA ALAM UNTUK PEMBANGUNAN BERKELANJUTAN

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 121-129

ABSTRAK

Artikel ini membahas tentang komunitas ASEAN dan bagaimana mereka berkoneksi dengan masalah pengelolaan sumber daya alam, terutama dalam memanfaatkan sumber daya alam agar tercipta ekonomi yang berkelanjutan. Artikel ini tidak hanya menitikberatkan pada permasalahan pembangunan dalam arti luas, tapi lebih spesifik tentang pengelolaan sumber daya alam untuk kesejahteraan komunitas ASEAN. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk memperkenalkan standar baru dalam pengelolaan sumber daya alam, dan menghubungkan semua bidang, baik politik, institusional, pengelolaan sumber daya alam, hak asasi manusia, ekonomi dan juga pemerintahan. Standar ini kemudian dapat diaplikasikan kepada permasalahan sumber daya alam serta strategi penyelesaiannya. Pada saat ini, dunia menaruh perhatian khusus kepada Negara ASEAN karena dianggap sebagai kawasan yang sangat menjanjikan bagi perkembangan ekonomi dunia, dan untuk itu ASEAN harus memastikan keberlanjutan lingkungan dan sumber daya alamnya, bukan hanya untuk mencapai ekonomi yang stabil, akan tetapi juga untuk melindungi sumber daya alam. Mengelola sumber daya alam bukan hanya tanggung jawab dari komunitas ASEAN tetapi juga membutuhkan keterlibatan aktif dari pemerintah dan para pembuat kebijakan di ASEAN.

Kata Kunci: Masyarakat ASEAN, Manajemen Sumber Daya Alam, Pembangunan Berkelanjutan

DDC: 382

Indriana Kartini

KEBIJAKAN JALUR SUTRA BARU CINA DAN IMPLIKASINYA BAGI AMERIKA SERIKAT

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 131-147

ABSTRAK

Kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina merupakan salah satu kebijakan luar negeri dari negara “middle power” yang kekuatan militer dan ekonominya tengah meningkat dan diprediksi dapat mengancam tatanan internasional yang didominasi AS. Jalur Sutra Baru Cina yang mencakup dua aspek, yakni daratan (*new Silk Road Economic Belt*) dan lautan (*21st Century Maritime Silk Road*) merupakan perpaduan kekuatan geopolitik dan geoekonomi untuk menghubungkan wilayah Eurasia dengan Cina sebagai pusatnya. Artikel ini menganalisis faktor-faktor internal dan eksternal yang mendorong pemerintah Cina mengeluarkan kebijakan tersebut. Selanjutnya, artikel ini menganalisis implementasi kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina dan implikasinya terhadap hegemoni Amerika Serikat di dunia. Kajian ini menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut dengan menggunakan konsep geopolitik dan geoekonomi, dimensi kebijakan luar negeri, dan

konsep *hegemonic stability*.

Kata Kunci: Jalur Sutra Baru, Cina, Amerika Serikat, Kebijakan Luar Negeri

DDC: 307.1

Devi Riskianingrum

TINJAUAN HISTORIS KEBIJAKAN PENGELOLAAN GEMPA DI CINA: DARI TANGSHAN, SICHUAN SAMPAI YUNAN

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 149-160

ABSTRAK

Gempa bumi merupakan bencana alam yang kerap memakan banyak korban jiwa dan memperlambat laju perekonomian di Tiongkok. Dua bencana gempa terbesar yang menimpa Tiongkok di abad ke-20 adalah Tangshan di tahun 1976 dan Sichuan di tahun 2008. Namun demikian, paling tidak terdapat empat gempa besar yang menimpa Tiongkok dalam lima tahun terakhir. Terkait dengan hal tersebut, manajemen penanganan bencana menjadi hal terpenting yang harus dikelola secara profesional oleh Pemerintah Tiongkok dalam rangka meminimalisir dampak dari bencana yang terjadi. Fokus dalam penelitian ini ialah berbagai kebijakan yang dikeluarkan oleh Pemerintah Tiongkok terkait dengan penanganan bencana gempa bumi dan efektifitas pelaksanaannya di lapangan. Beberapa penelitian mengenai manajemen bencana di Tiongkok telah dilakukan oleh Divisi Asia Pasifik, Pusat Penelitian Sumberdaya Regional LIPI sejak tahun 2010 sampai dengan tahun 2015. Beberapa hasil penelitian mengenai kebencanaan di Tiongkok di antaranya adalah *Disaster Management in China: History and Institutional Networks* pada tahun 2010 dan *the Representation of Sichuan Earthquake: State Control, Museum, and The Role of the Army* pada tahun 2011. Selanjutnya, melalui wawancara mendalam dan studi literatur, artikel ini mendiskusikan dua pertanyaan utama, yaitu bagaimana sejarah pembentukan kebijakan terkait penanganan gempa di Tiongkok, dan bagaimana efektifitas pelaksanaan kebijakan tersebut pada empat gempa yang terjadi di Tiongkok, yaitu Tangshan (1976), Sichuan (2008), Qinghai (2010) dan Yunnan (2014). Tulisan ini mengklaim bahwa kebijakan dan aturan yang dikeluarkan pemerintah terkait dengan manajemen bencana di Tiongkok tergolong efektif dan sukses, namun demikian masih terdapat *gap* informasi dan minimnya koordinasi antar-institusi yang terkait di dalamnya.

Kata Kunci: Gempa Tangshan, Gempa Sichuan, Manajemen Bencana, Tiongkok.

DDC: 305.8

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo

ORANG JAWA DI LAMPUNG: ASING ATAU LOKAL? MERUJUK PADA PENGALAMAN CINA

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 161-172

ABSTRAK

Orang Jawa merupakan mayoritas dari penduduk Indonesia. Secara geografis mereka tinggal di Jawa Tengah, DIY dan Jawa Timur. Namun sejak awal abad ke-20 pemerintah kolonial Belanda mulai memindahkan mereka ke Lampung di Sumatera bagian selatan dan kemudian ke berbagai tempat lain. Selama seabad Lampung menjadi daerah tujuan utama migrasi Orang Jawa, menjadikan Lampung “provinsi Jawa” setelah Jawa Tengah, DIY dan Jawa Timur. Berbeda dengan Orang Cina yang berhasil membangun bangsa dan negara Cina, Orang Jawa gagal dalam membangun bangsa Jawa; bahkan mendukung dibangunnya bangsa dan negara Indonesia. Dalam tulisan ini, Orang Jawa di Lampung dilihat

sebagai kasus bagaimana kejawaan sebagai sebuah identitas ditempatkan dalam konteks perubahan politik pasca-Suharto, ketika desentralisasi dan otonomi daerah mulai diimplementasikan. Dari pengamatan yang dilakukan terlihat bahwa Orang Jawa meskipun tetap mempertahankan sebagian besar identitas kebudayaannya namun terbukti tidak menggunakan identitas tersebut untuk melakukan mobilitas politik, misalnya pada saat pemilihan kepala daerah. Orang Jawa sudah merasa aman, dan tidak merasa sebagai Orang Asing, karena merupakan mayoritas meskipun berada di wilayah yang sejatinya milik Orang Lampung.

Kata kunci: *Migrasi, Identitas Etnik, Penduduk Lokal, Mobilitas Politik*

RINGKASAN HASIL PENELITIAN

DDC: 363.7

Muzar Kresna

REFORMASI PAJAK LINGKUNGAN DAN *DOUBLE DIVIDEND* DI REPUBLIK CEKO

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 173-177

ABSTRAK

Untuk meminimalisasi dampak perubahan iklim serta pola konsumsi dan produksi yang tidak berkelanjutan dapat dicapai dengan cara mengimplementasikan sebuah reformasi pajak lingkungan. Mekanisme reformasi pajak lingkungan dilakukan melalui penurunan tingkat pajak yang tinggi terhadap tenaga kerja dan dunia usaha dengan diimbangi penerapan pajak terhadap tindakan pencemaran lingkungan serta pada kegiatan ekstraksi sumber daya alam yang tidak dapat diperbarui. Tujuan dari studi ini adalah untuk menentukan hubungan kausalitas antara reformasi pajak lingkungan dan indikator ekonomi untuk pembangunan berkelanjutan di negara Republik Ceko. Selanjutnya, studi ini juga menganalisis interaksi antara kebijakan lingkungan dan kebijakan fiskal dalam mempengaruhi prospek terjadinya kejadian keuntungan ganda (*double dividend*). Keuntungan ganda adalah kondisi dimana penerapan pajak lingkungan dapat menghasilkan dua manfaat utama, yaitu: perbaikan kualitas lingkungan dan penurunan biaya di dalam sistem perpajakan. Hasil dari studi ini menunjukkan bahwa dalam kondisi yang relatif netral dan sederhana, kondisi keuntungan ganda tidak ditemukan pada studi kasus di negara Republik Ceko. Hal ini mengindikasikan bahwa pajak lingkungan yang diterapkan masih lebih rendah dibanding jenis pajak lain yang digantikan.

Kata Kunci: *Pembangunan Berkelanjutan, Reformasi Pajak Lingkungan, Double Dividend, Kausalitas.*

TINJAUAN BUKU

Firman Budianto

ANIME, COOL JAPAN, DAN GLOBALISASI BUDAYA POPULER JEPANG

JAPANESE ANIMATION: EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES

Masao Yokota dan Tze-yue G. Hu (ed). Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2013

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 179-185

DDC: 303.6

Ridwan

EXAMINING THE PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE AMID THE SOUTHERN THAILAND CONFLICT

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 101-109

ABSTRACT

Generally speaking, mosques and pondok (Islamic boarding schools) in Southern Thailand are regarded as place for fostering Muslim militants. In Pattani, many mosques are taken for granted as places to recruit Muslim militants against the Thai Government. For instance, Kru-Ze Mosque incident in 2004 had raised various militant, Islamist activities against the central government. In this regard, Pattani Central Mosque has non-violence elements that could be activated as a sanctuary to hinder the unjust violence. Therefore, this article will examine the real quality of Pattani Central Mosque in southern Thailand on the basis of its profile. Consequently, readers would grasp a general picture about those matters. Thus, by analyzing the religious practices within the mosque, I conclude that Pattani Central Mosque seems to be composed of a fairly equal mixture of moderate and more conservative Muslims instead of those with radical and extreme tendencies.

Keywords: Mosque, Islamic teaching practices, Salafy-Wahaby

DDC: 302.4

Akhmad Siddiq

HARVESTING PEACE: CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONSHIP IN BARANGAY KAKAI RENABOR, THE PHILIPPINES

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 111-120

ABSTRACT

Barangay Kakai Renabor is a small district in Lanao Del Norte, Philippine. It is renowned as the area of conflict. Christians and Muslims used to fought one another, and living in emotional tension that guided them to commit various violences. Disharmonious relationship was exist because every group insists to live exclusively in Barangay, and striving to eliminate the existence of others. There were only two choices: Christians without Muslims or Muslims without Christians. So did their previous story. Recently, they live conjointly harmoniously. They work cooperatively both in planting and harvesting. Indeed, they do it in one similar terrain. Christians and Muslims bury their bad memories and wounds. They live side by side with the spirit of mutual respect and mutual understanding in the Barangay community. This

paper aims to discuss the conflict transformational process which has accomplished in order to reconcile Christians and Muslims, how they overcame tensions, and what they required to develop a better future. In doing so, this article will describe how they solved the conflict, what sort of tools they used, and what the expected-future they need.

Keywords: Christians-Muslims relationship, violence, peace, and conflict transformation

DDC: 333.7

Lengga Pradipta

ASEAN COMMUNITY: MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 121-129

ABSTRACT

This article briefly reviews the ASEAN community and how they associated with the natural resources management issues especially in utilizing the resources to enhance the sustainable economic development. It does not address fundamental questions about development in a broad sense, but be more specific on managing the natural resources for the people's welfare. This article strives to develop a new standard for managing natural resources, which addressed the significant inter-related and inter-connected in all areas such as political, institutional, natural resources management, human rights, economic and governance. The standard therefore considers how problems are defined and how strategy is formulated to deal with the natural resources problems. Furthermore, since the world pays attention to ASEAN as a promising model of economic development, the latter has to ensure the sustainability of environmental and natural resources in the region, because it is not only about achieving the economic milestone, but also to protect natural resources. Overall, managing natural resources is not merely the responsibility of ASEAN community, but it also needs the active involvement of various governments and policy-makers.

Keywords: ASEAN Community, Natural Resources Management, Sustainable Development

DDC: 382

Indriana Kartini

NEW SILK ROAD POLICY OF CHINA AND ITS IMPLICATION TO THE UNITED STATES

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 131-147

ABSTRACT

The China's New Silk Road Policy is one of foreign policies from a middle power" country with its rising on economic and military power that in the future could challenge international order dominated by the US. The China's New Silk Road Policy which consist of two aspects of land (new Silk Road Economic Belt) and maritime (21st Century Maritime Silk Road) is a combination of geopolitics and geoeconomic power to connect Eurasia region with China as the center. This article analyses internal and external factors that drive the China's government to conduct the policy. Moreover, this article analyses the implementation of the China's New Silk Road policy and its implications to American hegemony in the world. This article uses concepts such as geopolitic, geoeconomy, foreign policy, and hegemonic stability theory to answer the questions.

Keywords: New Silk Road, China, United States of America, foreign policy

DDC: 307.1

Devi Riskianingrum

NEW SILK ROAD POLICY OF CHINA AND ITS IMPLICATION TO THE UNITED STATES

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 149-160

ABSTRACT

The earthquake is one of the deadliest natural disasters that hinder economic progress in China. The two biggest 20th century catastrophic quakes occurred in China are Tangshan in 1976 and Sichuan in 2008. Additionally, there are at least four massive earthquakes that struck China in the last five years. Hence, the disaster management is one of the main factor to be seriously administered by the Chinese government, both in the central level as well as to the regional and local level. Therefore, this article aims to examine some policies issued by the Chinese government in the context of earthquake management and its effectiveness. The discussions on disaster management in China have been deeply explored by Asia Pacific Research Team at The Research Center for Regional Resources LIPI and published under the title of Disaster Management in China: History and Institutional Networks in 2010. Furthermore, the research team also conducted a research on the Sichuan earthquake and published a monograph entitled The Representation of Sichuan Earthquake: State Control, Museum, and The Role of the Army. We conduct both some in-depth interview and literature review concerning the historical process of initiating some earthquake policies, and its practical effectiveness. This article discusses the disaster management based on various policies and responses of two contemporary deadliest quake in Tangshan (1976) and Sichuan (2008), and two recent earthquakes occurred in Qinghai (2010) and Yunnan (2014). The article claims that policies and regulations issued by the government in disaster management in China are successful to some extent though there is a lack of coordination, and some informational gaps in the existing institutions.

Keywords: Tangshan earthquake, Sichuan earthquake, disaster management, China

DDC: 305.8

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo

THE JAVANESE IN LAMPUNG, STRANGER OR LOCALS? WITH THE REFERENCE OF CHINESE EXPERIENCE

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 161-172

ABSTRACT

Javanese is the majority of the Indonesian population. Geographically they are resided in the provinces of Central Java, DIY and East Java. However, since the beginning of the 20th century the Dutch colonial government began to relocate them to Lampung in the sothern part of Sumatra and then to other places. Within a century Lampung become the main destination of Javanese migration, making Lampung the “Javanese province” after Central Java, DIY and East Java. Unlike the Chinese that is able to construct Chinese nation and state, the Javanese failed in constructing the Javanese nation, instead supporting the construction of Indonesian nation and state. In this article the Javanese in Lampung is exposed as the showcase of how Javanese as an identity is located within the post-Suharto’s political development contexts, when decentralization and regional autonomy began to be implemented. Based on a fieldwork in Lampung, it shows that the Javanese while continue preserving the cultural identities yet reluctantly using their identities for political mobilization, for instance during the election of head of local government. The Javanese seems secure to be the majority, and not perceived themselves as strangers, although the resided in the land of the Lampungers.

Key word: Migration, Ethnic Identity, Local People, Political Mobility

RINGKASAN HASIL PENELITIAN

DDC: 363.7

Muzzar Kresna

CAUSALITY RELATION BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL TAX REFORM AND DOUBLE DIVIDEND IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 173-177

ABSTRACT

Minimizing the impact of climate change and unsustainable practices of consumption-production could be achieved by environmental tax reform. Environmental tax reform applied by reducing the high tax burden on human labor and the business sector and raised taxes on pollution and the exhaustion on non-renewable natural resources. The aim of this study is to determine the direction of causality between environmental tax reform and economic indicator for sustainable development in the Czech Republic. Furthermore, this study attempts to analyze the interaction between environmental and fiscal policies that influence the prospects for a double dividend. Double dividend is condition where the environmental tax can produce two main benefits that are an environmental improvement and a decrease in the costs of the tax system. The result in this study shows that under relatively simple and neutral conditions, the double dividend in the case of Czech Republic does not arise. That condition indicates the environmental tax is narrower than the other tax it replaces.

Keywords: *Sustainable Development, Environmental Tax Reform, Double Dividend, Causality.*

BOOK REVIEW

Firman Budianto

ANIME, COOL JAPAN AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF JAPANESE POPULAR CULTURE

JAPANESE ANIMATION: EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES

Masao Yokota dan Tze-yue G. Hu (ed). Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2013

Jurnal Kajian Wilayah, Vol. 6 (2) Desember 2015: 179-185

EXAMINING THE PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE AMID THE SOUTHERN THAILAND CONFLICT¹

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ABSTRAK

Berbicara secara umum, masjid-masjid dan pondok-pondok pesantren di Thailand Selatan dipandang sebagai tempat melahirkan militan Muslim Thailand. Secara khusus, di wilayah Pattani kebanyakan masjid diasumsikan sebagai tempat merekrut militan Muslim guna melawan Pemerintah Thailand. Dalam hal ini, insiden Masjid Kru-Ze 2004 telah menumbuhkan Muslim militan untuk melawan pemerintah Thailand. Dalam hal ini, saya percaya bahwa Masjid Central Pattani di Thailand Selatan memiliki elemen-elemen non-kekerasan yang bisa diaktivasi sebagai tempat untuk mencegah kekerasan yang tidak adil. Oleh karena itu, artikel ini akan menilai kualitas nyata dari Masjid Raya Pattani di Thailand Selatan dengan dasar profil deskriptif dari masjid tersebut. Dengan demikian, pembaca akan mendapatkan gambaran yang lebih utuh tentang permasalahan tersebut. Selanjutnya, dengan menganalisa praktik-praktik keagamaan di masjid tersebut, penulis berkesimpulan bahwa Masjid Raya Pattani nampak sebagai campuran yang setara antara Muslim moderat dengan jemaah yang lebih konservatif daripada radikal dan ekstrem.

Kata kunci: Masjid, praktik pendidikan Islam, Salafy-Wahaby

ABSTRACT

Generally speaking, mosques and pondok (Islamic boarding schools) in Southern Thailand are regarded as place for fostering Muslim militants. In Pattani, many mosques are taken for granted as places to recruit Muslim militants against the Thai Government. For instance, Kru-Ze Mosque incident in 2004 had raised various militant, Islamist activities against the central government. In this regard, I believe that Pattani Central Mosque has non-violence elements that could be activated as a sanctuary to hinder the unjust violence. Therefore, this article will examine the real quality of Pattani Central Mosque in southern Thailand on the basis of its profile. Consequently, readers would grasp a general picture about those matters. Thus, by analyzing the religious practices within the mosque, I conclude that Pattani Central Mosque seems to be composed of a fairly equal mixture of moderate and more conservative Muslims instead of those with radical and extreme tendencies.

Keywords: Mosque, Islamic teaching practices, Salafy-Wahaby

INTRODUCTION

This article aims to depict the general picture of Pattani Central Mosque in terms of its profile, Islamic teaching practices, and its management. In other words, this study is important to carefully look at another function of the place for worship in which case is not only for religious activities but could also be activated as a sanctuary from the unjust violence. Compared

with the Indonesian context, this paper gives a general portray about the dynamics of religious practices and the mosque management with the latent conflict between the Southern Thai Muslims against the Thailand central government. This article describes the profile of Pattani Central Mosque and discussanalyze the research findings viz., this mosque represents both the moderate and conservative believers rather than the radical ones.

¹ This article is modified of my thesis research "Examining Pattani Central Mosque: Islamic Teaching Practices and Views of Good Governance, Human Rights and Anticipation for Radicalism" for Master of Human Rights and Democratisation of Sydney University, Australia, and Mahidol University, Thailand..

A BRIEF PROFILE OF *MASJID JAMI'* PATTANI (PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE)

Entering the Pattani land from Hat Yai airport, people can easily read the name of *Masjid Jami'* Pattani in the advertisement on the street. Another popular mosque is the *Kru-ze* Mosque. Both mosques are well-known, not only to the Thai people but also to foreign people such as Malaysians and Indonesians. In addition, a number of tourism websites have put both mosques as the tourist destinations.

In 1964 *Masjid Jami'* is built and located in Yarang, the Pattani Municipality. According to an informant, there was a rumor behind the establishment of the mosque. It is said that the King of Thailand wanted to do a good deed for the Pattani people by building a mosque as a compensation because there was a mass murder at that time, and as a consequence, there were discontent of Muslim people.

If this is the case, those who know the story are reluctant to pray in the mosque because the idea of developing the mosque is not fully sincere. In addition, before the King ordered to establish the mosque, he and his companions spent a month in India to study the architectures of existing buildings there to choose the most suitable style for the mosque in Pattani.

According to my informant, it was merely a small *masjid* that is used only for praying at first. Then, it is enlarged until its current form gradually, and it took nine years to complete its construction. The mosque thus is not dedicated only to prayer but also to other activities. To date, its surrounding are business places such as a travel agent, a furniture store, banks, etc. There is also a second hand market nearby the mosque. Its strategic location makes the mosque is easily reached by a car, a motorbike and on foot.

Basically, the mosque's architecture adopted *Taj Mahal* in India. There is a big dome in the center which is surrounded by four small minarets. A big pond is located in front of the mosque, and there is a large hall and two sided corridors inside

the mosque. Small trees and various beautiful flowers make the mosque appear beautifully and bring peaceful tranquility either for the congregations or tourists especially in summer. Hence, there is no exaggeration to claim that this is one of the most beautiful and largest mosques in Thailand.

There are three entrances in the mosque. The main entrance is in the middle, and it leads directly to the pond. The second entrance leads to the parking area and the last one is located behind the mosque. This entrance is rarely used by tourists, and only a small number of Muslims come and go through this way.

This mosque is the most important center for Islamic religious activities in the Southern Thailand. In addition, the mosque has many activities, ranged from five prayers in a day and *tadika* (a kindergarten) to organizing various rallies against the Thai government.

ISLAMIC TEACHING PRACTICES

Generally speaking, Islamic teaching practices in this mosque follow the tradition of *Shafi'i* school of *Sunni* tradition. It is obviously reflected in the practice of the five day prayers (*rawatib*), such as reciting *zikir* after praying, reading *qunut* in the *shubuh* praying, the two consecutive calls to prayers (*azan*), the practice of raising a stick during Friday prayers, reading *Yasin* verses collectively, reading *Barazanji* in the celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH, etc. These *Shafi'i* traditions are found in the mosque. A similar Islamic practices could be found in many other mosques in Pattani as well as many mosques in Indonesia due to the fact that the majority of Muslims are *Shafi'i* followers.

Fortunately, there are no hints of Islamist neo-fundamentalism in the mosque. Furthermore, the mosque does not unify some fragmentations within the diverse Islamic group in Pattani region, but it finally represents itself as the fortress of *khana kao*. In this regard, *khana kao* means Muslim's conservative groups, that represent old generations.

THE RELUCTANCE OF OTHER ISLAMIC GROUP TOWARD THE EXISTENCE OF THE MOSQUE

There are no clues provided in the mosque, through its Islamic teaching practices, promulgates ideas on struggling for the Islamist main goal such as the idea of forming an Islamic state or, at least, teaching about the application of Shari'a on the state level. In addition, there is no striking evidence of *Salafy-Wahaby* followers, as part of *dakwah* movement in Pattani, who practice religious activities, here. Although there are few constituents of *Jemaah Tabligh* who pray five times a day in this mosque, their presence here is no more than some individuals who practice its tenets rather than an organized movement.

This argument is supported by the informant perceptions and my own observations. I did not observe any of them attending this mosque. My informant told me that followers of *Salafy-Wahaby* prefer to pray in their own mosque, not in this mosque. To some extent, they do pray in the mosque of the Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus.

The reluctance of these groups could be considered as the religious tension among the mosque stakeholders (*khana kao*), *Jemaah Tabligh*, and *Salafy-Wahaby* followers (*khana mai*). Here, this study uses a sociological, theoretical framework that is Weber's and Troeltsch's conception of tension (cited in Bagby 2009). Basically, the concept is related to the Catholic tradition, that is, a tension between a 'sect' and a 'church'. The concept explains a type of religious dominant group that maintain and sometime accommodate the social cultural norms of the society. But, at the same time there is another religious group challenges the existing norms.

The congregation of the mosque could be put as the religious dominant group (*khana kao*) in Pattani region. Meanwhile, the *Salafy-Wahaby* and the *Tabligh* could be considered as the *khana mai* (the new school) some of which challenging the religious practices of the mosque that are presumably against the pristine Islam.

Consequently, their rejection to attend prayers in the mosque implies the development of some new mosques, and eventually have made a polarization among various Muslim communities in Pattani. The phenomenon is portrayed (McCargo, 2008) as tensions and competitions between the 'new school' (*khana mai*) and the 'old school' (*khana kao*) in taking place in some mosques in Pattani region.

Furthermore, Stark and Bainbridge (cited in Bagby 2009) discuss that 'Church-set typology as a continuum, and the operational variable is the degree of tension between the religious group and the dominant culture—i.e. tension caused by acceptance or rejection on the part of both entities'. In the case of Pattani mosques, tensions occurred due to the rejection of some Islamic teaching practices from different Islamic groups.

Beside both groups, there are a few Muslims that not related to the both groups do not pray in the mosque as well due to two main reasons: firstly, they believe that non-Muslims should not enter the mosque whatever the reasons are; secondly, they have seen the mosque is dominated by symbols of the Thai monarchy because it is built and funded by the King.

PREACHERS AS AFFIRMATION OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY

From a theoretical perspective, Gaffney (1994, 194-250) categorized three types of preachers according to its sermons in Egypt mosques: firstly, preachers as the affirmation of traditional authority; secondly, preachers as the advocate of religiously inspired modernity; and thirdly, preachers of apologist for the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism.

To put it simply, the first character emphasizes preaching that mostly talks about religious matters. As Gaffney (1994, 194) mentioned that:

"The central theme of the sermon, including the main Qur'an verse which it is built, is quite familiar; in fact the verse is among the commonplace of citations in all of contemporary Muslim religious rhetoric...In short the sermon in the first category reflects the classical standard."

The second character, according to Gaffney (1994, 208), reflects ‘a considerable measure of innovation and adaptation. Hence, the preaching, combined with other ritual expression, offers elements that tend to be less predicable, seemingly experimental, and sometimes idiosyncratic’. The kind of preaching that is aimed ‘to carry Islam from the pulpit to the streets’ allow a greater flexibility and a more dialectical interaction with the everyday occurrence of the world outside the mosque. The third character asserts the ‘preacher who legitimates his function by assuming the culturally constituted duty of “struggle” or jihad’ (Gaffney, 1994, 238).

I argue that the majority of Pattani Central mosques preachers could be categorized as the affirmations of traditional authority. The reason lies in the content of their *khutbahs* many of which discussing the religious matters. In practice, preachers here recite common verses from Qur’an that can be easily found in many mosques in the Muslim world. Their *khutbahs* do not venture beyond these verses.

In practice, no preachers have talked outside this perimeter. I saw that they are reluctant to go beyond the religious matters because the mosque does not allow preachers to talk about *ikhtilaf* (deviation/differences) and armed *jihad*, etc. To sum up, no preachers in this mosque could be put into either the second or the third types of Gaffney’s classification.

As a central mosque in conflict situation, the emergence of preachers who campaign for peace, good governance and values such as pluralism and multiculturalism is required to maintain the mindset of congregation to internalize, to adopt and to act in accordance with those values. However, it is unlikely we could find preachers stemming from the threat of militant groups. At the same time, if they talk about *jihad* or criticize the Thai government or monarchy, they would face the cruelty of State officials. Interestingly, my informant told me that generally *uztad* share similar concerns with militants, for example, in

terms of grievances. The difference lies in the militants who follow the violence path while most *uztads* are silent in responding to situations. In short, many *uztad* who preach in the mosque strive to avoid sensitive issues. To conclude, most preachers in the mosque could be categorized as the second type of Gaffney’s category.

THE ABSENCE OF LITERATURE THAT SUPPORT VIOLENT JIHAD

The other important clue that this mosque is not infiltrated by radicalism is the absence of literature that support the violent *jihad*. This study presume that many mosques in Pattani do not provide literatures with which justifying the violent *jihad*. Once, I performed my *Jum’at* prayers at a mosque in Bangkok in 2012. Soon after, the mosque officials distributed a leaflet about Muslim massacres or genocide in Syria while at the same time calling Muslims to help their Muslim brothers and sisters in Syria through donations of money, and via a *jihad* against the Assad administration.

There was no clue as to whom the authors of this leaflet are, or whether it was the work of an individual or a group. In the light of this particular event, leaflets and bulletins that support *jihad* may have developed in such a way in many mosques in Thailand. In this regard, further research about this is needed. It is important to note that in the case of *Kru-ze* Mosque there was a booklet that justifying the violent *jihad* which is found on the body of victim. Its title is *Berjihad di Patani*, as described in the previous chapter.

The phenomenon of literature that supporting the violent *jihad* could be found in both American and Indonesia mosques. Kedar and Yerushalmi (2009) claim there are a number of American mosques providing literature that endorsing the violent *jihad*. Indeed, some invited preachers promulgate and encourage the violent *jihad* in their preaching.

In Indonesia, many mosques and office's mosques (mosques be attached to offices) provide

literatures containing contents some of which calling for the violent *jihad* in the forms of leaflets and bulletins. Such literatures could easily be found there especially in relation to calamities in some countries such as Palestine, Bosnia and Afghanistan many of which Muslims are the victims. Apart from these literature, it does not include bulletins from Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), to wit *Al-Islam*, by which it could easily be found in every mosque every Friday pray. In this light, Fealy (2004, 105-106) argues that HTI is one of the radical Islamist groups.

To date, the *Al-Islam* of HTI bulletin has been seen as an alternative critique against injustices of the Indonesian governmental system. In general, the idea of global Islamic caliphate for majority of Muslims in Indonesia seems peculiar due to who should be the legitimate caliph. In addition, some moderate Islam groups, such as NU and *Muhammadiyah*, are worried with the penetration of Caliphate ideas toward the ummah.

Furthermore, it seems that more students in Indonesia or abroad, some of which in Australia, become sympathizers of HTI. I know it whenever I was studying in Sydney, Australia, for my MHRD in 2011. For instance, in the mailing list of the Indonesian students in the University of Sydney, I often received various propaganda concerning HTI's ideology, including its electronic bulletin, *Al-Islam*. In addition, I also met some HTI sympathizers during an Indonesian student conference in the Indonesian Consulate in Sydney.

Questioning Mosque Management: Some Observations

Generally speaking, the mosque management in Pattani has functioned well in running religious activities. The Imam gives opportunities to all Muslims to conduct religious activities regardless their own affiliations to one of which four Islamic schools (*mazhab*). Furthermore, the management team has applied the idea of *shura* in determining policies that are related to mosque matters. Additionally, they practice transparency in using funds related to mosque expenses as well.

Mosque management in the Pattani central mosque, to some extent, shares some similarities with the mosque management team in Indonesia. The management in Indonesia is called Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid (DKM/the mosque prosperity council). Its operation is based on a policy that is enacted by the Indonesian government (Al-Makassary, 2011, 288).

In DKM, there are three divisions which serve as indicators to examine the effectiveness of a mosque. Firstly, the division of organization (*idaroh*). Secondly, the division of welfare (*imaroh*). Thirdly, the division of maintenance and development (*ria'yah*). Moreover, *idaroh* does some planning, organizing, administering, financing and supervising all activities within the Indonesian mosques. Meanwhile, *imaroh* serves the education activities, be the center of *dakwah* (proselytization), improving the welfare of ummah, youths, library, etc. The services of *ri'ayah* includes architectures and the design of a mosque, maintaining facilities, park and the environment.

Regardless the operation management of this mosque, I have some suggestions that are important to be considered in managing mosques everywhere.

The Involvement in Civic Engagements

It seems that civic engagements, such as empowering the community, cleaning up the environment, and peace initiatives, are not sufficiently noticed by this mosque. It functions no more than a place for praying and other religious activities. Therefore, the mosque management should enlarge their functions beyond serving as a place of prayer and devotion.

In comparison, according to McLoughlin (2005, 1408), some mosques in Britain have functioned as places of prayer, devotion, and serving as 'advice centers for the unemployed, Members of Parliament's surgeries, homework clubs, youth centers, elderly day-care centers, and spaces to prepare food for communal gatherings such as weddings' since the 1980s.

In a similar way, Bagby (2009, 481) claims that the political and community involvement is manifest in American mosques. Furthermore, he adds that The Mosque Life Survey (MLS) found that 20 percent of participants took part in 'community service, social justice or advocacy activities of their mosque'.

Another example is a mosque in Sierra Leone. Drewer (2010, 57) argues that a primary key of conflict resolution or peacekeeping is to maintain houses of God, namely via churches and mosques through the Inter-religious Council of Sierra Leone. At this point, I regard that mosques could play a pivotal role in the civic engagements in their congregations.

The Influence of Salafy- and Wahaby-based Donor

As showed above, The Pattani Central Mosque could be categorized as a *khana kao* home base by carefully examining its Islamic teaching practices. I presume that many mosques in Pattani belong to the *khana kao*. However, the recent trend shows that several new mosques are built by the generosity of *Salafy and Wahaby*-based funds from Saudi Arabia.

McCargo (2008) discusses the tensions between 'new school' (*khana mai*) and 'old school' (*khana kao*) that taking place in some Pattani mosques due to a different approach in Islam. Basically, the 'new school' are alumni from abroad universities and follow progressive interpretation about Islamic teaching that differ from the old school that represent conservative group.

The extent to which some mosques in Pattani have been infiltrated by *Salafy and Wahaby*-based funds require further investigations because a probable mission behind of the funds is the promotion of *Wahabysm*.

It is not surprising that Saudi Arabia is striving to promulgate *Wahabysm* in the Muslim world. Wahid (2009) reveals that the *Wahaby* movements in Indonesia strives to promulgate their ideas through Islamic institutions and organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI),

and the education and government institutions and mosques.

Recently, the Islamic radical movement has implanted its ideology in mosques that are commonly under the auspices of the two biggest Islamic organisations viz., Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. In this light, the former general chairman of NU, Hasyim Muzadi, has warned all Muslim communities to be fully vigilant in regard to the emergence of what has been called the transnational ideology. To him, such an ideology is at odds with the Indonesian mainstream Islam which has been renowned for its tolerant and moderate character. Hence, this ideology must be rejected (Muzadi, 2009).

Moreover, the Central Committee of NU thinks it is necessary to protect NU's mosques from the infiltration of radical movement. In October 2007, at Pondok Pesantren Zainul Hasan Genggong (an Islamic boarding school), Probolinggo, Jawa Timur, the NU central committee held a *Bahtsul Masa'il* (a discussion on contemporary issues) which issued an edict on the certification of NU's mosques in order to keep them away from the influence of and the probable takeover done by this movement. Similarly, the Central Chair of Muhammadiyah issued the decree No.149/December 2006 that aims to protect Muhammadiyah's properties, such as mosques, schools, orphanages, hospitals, and universities from the influence and takeover by such radical group whose world-view is very much different from Muhammadiyah.

America faces a similar situation of which *Wahabysm* is promoted through financial assistance. As Keller (cited in Haddad, 1994, 144) explains how a mosque could be easily influenced by the donors' ideology. For instance, a mosque in Los Angeles had received funds from a company or some individuals from Saudi Arabia. This could either directly or indirectly influence a mosque status and its congregation.

In southern Thailand, *Salafy-Wahaby* or *khana mai* has been largely commanded by a *Salafist-Wahabist* scholar named Dr. Ismail Lutfi

Chapakia. He has institutions such as the Yala Islamic College and the College of Islamic Studies at Prince of Songkla University.

Although previous research (Liow, 2006, 47-48; Yusuf, 2007, 18) considers Dr. Lutfi and his followers as the moderate *Wahaby*, and do not have relationships with other militant groups, I guess other radical *Salafy-Wahaby* movements strive to nurture influence, and promulgate ideas secretly through their financial assistance to mosques and *pondok* (Islamic boarding schools). Yet, Liow recognizes that the orthodox *Wahaby* is still a small and periphery group in southern Thailand.

The Weak Control toward Religious Study Groups

To date, the Pattani Central mosque has a good management in running their own religious study groups. Preachers of these study groups are *uztads* who have moderate views, such as *Uztad* Ismail Sepanjang. Theoretically speaking, mosques with a weak management could be easily infiltrated by the radical Islamic ideas. I think the weak control of religious study groups pave the way to radical preachers in promoting the radical Islamist concepts. This situation, in fact, allows the infiltration of radical ideas which occurs in mosques.

The history of Dani Dwi Permana, who became a suicide bomber at the *JW Marriot* Hotel, provides a valuable lesson. Dani was a religious study group member recruited by *Uztad* Saefuddin Jaelani at the *As-Surur* mosque in the *Telaga Kahuripan* housing in Bogor, Jawa Barat, Indonesia. Furthermore, a mosque study group could potentially transform into an ‘incubator of *Jihadism*’ to some extent (Ward, 2008, 216).

In the light of above, I argue that to some extent *Kru-ze* Mosque tragedy on 28 April 2004 is caused by the weak control over the religious study group in Pattani.

The Yawi Language as Social Resistance

During my fieldwork, one of my first encounters concerning Malay Pattani is, on the one hand, the Pattani language. On the other

hand, Pattani food, especially *nasi kerapu* suits my taste. Concerning the language, Pattani people could speak with others by using Bahasa Indonesia though we cannot fully grasp every single word. Yet, they still understand the substance of conversation. In contrast to such thing, I was surprised by the fact that preacher, delivered his sermon in the standard Malay so that I understood the sermons perfectly.

I asked myself then why do the preachers address their sermons in the ‘standard Malay’ while in the daily life, including my interviews, the Mosque congregation speaks with a dialect of Pattani language. Could the congregation then comprehend the sermons delivered in the standard Malay?

Several explanations pop up in my mind. Firstly, the preachers are educated people many of which have pursued their studies abroad such as in various *pondoks* and universities in Indonesia and Malaysia. In other words, they might want to show their own educational level. That explains some suspicions toward all Indonesians or Malaysians especially those from traditional *pondok* and certain Islamic universities in Java Island, Indonesia. Secondly, I think the sermons could not be fully understood by the Thai intelligence operatives especially during the crises in the region. Thirdly, that is tradition since the outset, and they just keep the tradition. Fourthly, they wish to preserve Bahasa Melayu in the midst of the domination of Thai language.

Recently, I know that majority of Pattani people, especially the old generation, speak Yawi language in a daily life. According to Gilquin (2002, 53), Yawi is ‘linked to religion, and is traditionally written with characters used in Arabic’. This is the difference from other languages (Bahasa Malaysia, Bahasa Indonesia and the Languages of Mindanao) that use the Roman alphabet.

However, the Arabic character of Yawi writing is sharply declining because the Thai alphabet is massively taught in the school. This phenomenon raised some concerns amongst

certain well educated groups in Pattani. Firstly, a foundation such as the Bungaraya Foundation tries to maintain the existence of *Yawi* language through publishing some books for students. In this sense, the foundation manager told me that the main idea to publish books in *Yawi* language is to preserve the language in the midst of the Thai language supremacy. Secondly, *Yawi* language is more than a mean to communicate among the freedom fighters that I have met in a prison in southern Thailand. To them, *Yawi* language is the national identity of Pattani. If Pattani loses its *Yawi* language, Pattani will lose its identity as well. Similarly, Nilsen (2011, 148) claims that 'in the Patani region, the local Malay dialect indicates Muslim identity'.

Based on my observation and interview, I think that the Pattani young generation and children accustom to speak the Thai language than the Malay language. One interesting fact that I saw during my fieldwork was the temporary *tadika* that using the Thai language as the language of instruction.

Furthermore, I argue that the rise of Thai language is caused by the job and career requirements either in Pattani region or in Thailand. Therefore, the decline of Malay language is inevitably triggered by the lost of economic interest on it. Thereby, mastering the Malay language means strengthening their identity as one Pattani nation, and establishing the local Muslim language.

THE CONTESTING VIEWS TOWARD *MASJID JAMI'* PATTANI

As a central mosque, *Masjid Jami'* Pattani, is the center of Islamic activities in Pattani. However, the perceptions of Pattani people toward this mosque are quite different primarily since 2004. There are two main views occurred during my interviews:

Firstly, most Muslims in Pattani regard this mosque as the symbol of Muslim existence in the area. Moreover, this mosque plays a pivotal role

in teaching Islamic community through many activities. Secondly, *Masjid Jami'* is considered as a symbolic power of the Thai Kingdom in Pattani. They view this mosque as the King's mosque because it is built and funded by the King. It is clearly shown by the Thai flag on the top of the mosque, and the presence of representative of Thai Monarchy in some occasions such as giving prizes for the winners of Qur'an reciting competitions. In addition, some people in Pattani hold the view that non-Muslims (including the King) should not enter a mosque. Practically speaking, the mosque manager allows non-Muslims to enter this mosque, which is regarded as a bad thing by these people. Finally, they have seen that *Masjid Kru-ze* turned out to be a brutal, slaughtering spot against 106 Muslims on 28 April 2004. Consequently, the mosque be the symbol of the struggle for freedom in Pattani.

CONCLUSION

Pattani Central Mosque is one entry point to look at the dynamic of Islam and conflict in southern Thailand through the sociological lens and the narrative description of the real inherent quality of the mosque (its Islamic teaching practices) Many things are available there to endorse a view that the mosque plays more roles than a mere worshiping place. Thus, it zigzags across time ranged from the site for some peaceful rallies in 1975 and 2007 by Malay Muslim Pattani against the Thai Government; the place for resisting the triumph of Thai language by exercising the standard Malay language in the Friday sermons; until it is regarded as the representation of predominant symbol of the Thai Kingdom.

To conclude, a groundless suspicion that the mosque is the place to recruit and teach Thailand Muslim militants; is not proven on this mosque. In addition, the mosque could not represent itself as a common house for all Islamic groups due to the tensions amongst certain Islamic groups that resist the existence of the mosque itself, and they prefer to run their own Islamic teaching and

developing their views on good governance and human rights within their own mosques.

Furthermore, a different depiction and qualities of a mosque could probably occur in the Pattani sub-urban areas and villages, especially mosques with which enjoy financial assistance from certain donors such as the *Salafy-Wahaby*. In particular, the radical Islamic ideas, teachings, and the practice to recruit young Muslims are not proven. Once again I want to emphasize that the real quality of the mosque is unique and distinct. Hence, it could not be generalized in studying other mosques in the Pattani villages.

All in all, the Pattani Central Mosque appears to be composed of a fair, equal mixture of moderate and conservative Islamic point of views instead of the radical and extreme ones.

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HARVESTING PEACE: CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONSHIP IN BARANGAY KAKAI RENABOR, THE PHILIPPINES

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ABSTRAK

Barangay Kakai Renabor adalah sebuah distrik kecil yang terletak di Lanao Del Norte, Filipina. Kawasan ini dikenal sebagai salah satu titik rawan dan arena konflik di Mindanao. Di kawasan ini masyarakat Kristen dan masyarakat Muslim memiliki sejarah yang kurang menyenangkan. Hal ini terkait dengan ketegangan emosional yang menyebabkan mereka saling bentrok dan saling melakukan tindak kekerasan. Hubungan tidak harmonis ini terjadi karena setiap kelompok bersikeras untuk hidup sendiri-sendiri, saling menafikan kelompok lain. Hanya ada dua pilihan: masyarakat Kristen tanpa Muslim atau masyarakat Muslim tanpa Kristen. Namun pada, saat ini kedua kelompok dapat hidup berdampingan dalam harmoni. Mereka saling bekerja sama menanam dan memanen tanaman dalam satu lahan, dan melupakan kenangan pahit serta sejarah luka masa lalu. Mereka mampu untuk hidup saling menghargai dan saling menghormati. Artikel ini hendak mengurai proses transformasi konflik yang dilakukan dalam proses penyelesaian konflik, bagaimana mereka mengatasi ketegangan, dan apa yang mereka butuhkan untuk membangun masa depan yang lebih baik.

Kata Kunci: hubungan Kristen-Muslim, kekerasan, perdamaian, dan transformasi konflik.

ABSTRACT

Barangay Kakai Renabor is a small district in Lanao Del Norte, Philippine. It is renowned as the area of conflict. Christians and Muslims used to fought one another, and living in emotional tension that guided them to commit various violences. Disharmonious relationship was exist because every group insists to live exclusively in Barangay, and striving to eliminate the existence of others. There were only two choices: Christians without Muslims or Muslims without Christians. So did their previous story. Recently, they live conjointly harmoniously. They work cooperatively both in planting and harvesting. Indeed, they do it in one similar terrain. Christians and Muslims bury their bad memories and wounds. They live side by side with the spirit of mutual respect and mutual understanding in the Barangay community. This paper aims to discuss the conflict transformational process which has accomplished in order to reconcile Christians and Muslims, how they overcomed tensions, and what they required to develop a better future. In doing so, this paper will describe how they solved the conflict, what sort of tools they used, and what the expected-future they need.

Keywords: Christians-Muslims relationship, violence, peace, and conflict transformation.

INTRODUCTION

The story began from my first visit to Davao City, Philippine, on May-June 2013. I was involved in the Peace-building Training sponsored by MPI (Mindanao Peace-building Institute). The program explored both theoretical and practical activities to enrich participants' and facilitators'

perspectives concerning the peace-building process. We recognized that it is indispensable to share various peaceful experiences with people from different countries such as the United States, Germany, Vietnam, Japan, Kenya, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, and Indonesia. The program conducted within three consecutive

weeks. We discussed and learned the theoretical framework of peace-building, peacemaking, peacekeeping, conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation in the first week. Next, we explored the “scope of conflict” to enhance our experiential and empirical studies of peace-building in the second and three weeks.

I am blessed having the chance to join the field trip to the Province Lanao Del Norte with other ten participants from various countries. It was one-day trip from Davao City to Lanao Del Norte by a mini-van. We visited universities, NGOs, religious leaders, and Mindanao people in order to learn and experience their peaceful attempts to transform the conflicts. One of our destination in Lanao Del Norte was the Barangay Kakai Renabor, Tubod. This district represents an ideal harmony between Muslim and Christian people who live in the same place peacefully, while in the past they had a dreadful history of religious disharmony, not to mention they perplexed tensions as well.

Basically, the harmonious life in Kakai Renabor suffices the very basic theory of interfaith dialogue. Referring to Kung (2007), we should understand that religion has become one of the most important elements in the process of peace-building. In his well-known book, *Islam: Past Present and Future*, Kung asserts that “No peace among the nations without peace among the religions. No peace among the religions without dialogue between the religions. No dialogue between the religions without investigation of the foundations of the religions.” (Kung, 2007, xxiii). This statement arguably reflects that religion could be the unifying factor in which case it might resolve and reconcile the social and political conflicts within society. The so-called religious violence seems to be ingrained in the religion’s role.

Along with Kung’s point of view (2007), Knitter (2002), calls us to improve our strategy on developing a new perspective of interfaith dialogue. Based on theological perspective of Christianity, he conceives at least four approaches

in this particular context. The first is *replacement model* which represents only one true religion. The second is fulfillment *model* which conveys that the one could fulfill the many. The third is *mutuality model* which suggests that many true religions could be called to dialogues, and the last is *acceptance model* that attempts to put many religions on its own positions: *so be it* (Knitter, 2002). In this context, Christians and Muslims of Barangay Kakai Renabor appear to practice the Knitter’s last approach.

Previously, Swidler (1983) conceives *the dialogue Decalogue* to create an ideal approach of inter-religious dialogues. The main points are: (i) the primary purpose of dialogue is to learn, that is, to change and to grow some understanding of reality, and then to act consistently based upon such reality; (ii) inter-religious or inter-ideological dialogues should be a two-sided project—within each religious or ideological community and between religious or ideological communities; (iii) each participant should join the dialogue with a complete honesty and sincerity; (iv) in the inter-religious dialogue we should not compare our ideals with our partner’s practices, but rather our ideals with our partner’s ideals, our practices with our partner’s practices; (v) each participant should define himself or herself; (vi) each participant should come to the dialogue with no hard-and-fast assumptions against the direction of where the points of disagreement go to; (vii) dialogue could proceed merely between equal participants; (viii) dialogue could take place only on the basis of mutual trust; (ix) Persons who join the inter-religious dialogue should be at least self-critical against both themselves and their own religious or ideological traditions; (x) each participant should eventually attempt to experience their partner’s religions or ideologies from the inside (Swidler, 1984).

To strengthen and to develop the theological perspective on interfaith dialogue, Hick (1980). (Hick, 1980). Persuasively elucidates many perspectives on religious pluralism by which is considered as a tool to reconstruct some peaceful

thoughts on the interfaith dialogue. Hick insists that religious differences should not be put as a blocking factor to build peace among people.

However, some people assume that religions have two opposite sides, to wit, both determining violence and peace. Unlike Kung, Girard (1977) conceives religions as a dominant factor that both triggering the social violence and establishing the social cohesion. Through religious sacrifice, he claims that violence which threatens community is ritually dismissed: turned outwards rather than inwards on to the members of the community. According to Girard (1977) there is an inevitable relationship between violence and religion. He supposes that religions do not function properly in keeping violence off the community. In addition, Girard (1977) argues that violence is mimetic, and people committing violence tend to be bound with the historical expulsions, and be eventually drawn into the mimetic frenzy. Mimesis commands people to do violence in various unimaginable ways. The only way to stop the unjustified violence, and keeping societies from total calamities is by conducting a sacrifice. Here, religions appear as a part of violence (Girard, 1986).

In contrast to the aforementioned perspective where religions trigger violence, Appleby has interestingly elucidated the logical connection between religions and violence into three levels of understanding: strong religions, weak religions, and pathological religions. The first level means there is a closed and inseparable relation which binds the notion of violence with religious convictions. It is appealing that Appleby starts his point of view by naming religions. It shows that he actually concerns with religious values and implicitly considers violence as an outside influence or effect in understanding religions. Here, people believe that religious teachings are deliberately constructed and imaginatively created without any relevance to reality (Appleby, 2012, 3-11). Referring to Mircea Eliade, people suppose religions as “the sacred” which order and regulate some circumstances, including violence.

Religions have been fundamentally convicted as a basis of cruelty and violence (Eliade, 1987).

The second level holds that religions are likely seen as the subordinate reason to other factors such as politics, economy, culture, prestige, etc. This perspective excludes religions as the main source in explaining conflicts. In contrast to the first level, people in this level perceive religions as instrumental factor that could be simply and easily excluded as a trigger of social conflict. The objective measure on determining the root causes of violence is not always religions. Nevertheless, religions cannot be totally excluded from the reasoning process and justifications of violence because it clearly is a part of human experiences (Appleby, 2012, 11-15). Moreover, the third level is ambiguous. Appleby calls this level as pathological religions.

Beside the spirit of interfaith dialogue and the curiosity of religion's roles in creating violence, the process of conflict transformation is seen as one of essential factors to develop peace-building. In his book, *Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis*, Ho Won Jeong (2008) classifies several stages to understand the root of conflict, to analyze its situation and behavior, to feel its dynamics and escalation, and finally to solve the conflict (Jeong, 2008). Putting this perspective as a framework, this paper aims to, firstly, elucidate the root of inter-religious conflict between Muslims and Christians in Barangay Kakai Renabor. Secondly, to analyze the past and the current situations of the conflict in order to understand its dynamics and escalation. Thirdly, to portray some solutions to be made in the conflict.

KAKAI RENABOR AND THE CONFLICT OF MINDANAO

Kakai Renabor is a beautiful small district which has abundant coconut trees. There is a small main path to enter the district. It is not easy to reach this venue because Kakai Renabor is a remote area which is not accessible to the ordinary vehicles. I arrived to the area together

with other persons on the field trip arranged by Pakigdait¹ to make a dialogue with the chairman and the people of Barangay Kakai Renabor. We are interested to observe the harmonious inter-religious relationship between Christians and Muslims.

Geographically, Barangay Kakai Renabor is one of twenty-four districts (Barakanas, Baris (Lumangculob), Bualan, Bulod, Camp V, Candis, Caniogan, Dalama, Kalilangan, Licapao, Malingao, Palao, Patudan, Pigcarangan, Pinpin, Poblacion, Pualas, San Antonio, Santo Niño, Taden, Taguranao, Tanguguiron, Tubaran) under the municipality of Tubod. It is located in the outlying area of Tubod. The municipality Tubod, inhabited by approximately 44,095 people, belongs to the Province of Lanao Del Norte, Philippines.

Lanao del Norte is part of Northern Mindanao. This province is a fertile land that connects Western Mindanao to Central and Eastern Mindanao. The nearby cities for this province are Pagadian, Ozamis, Tangub, Marawi, and Iligan. To visit Lanao del Norte, people can drive through Cagayan de Oro or from Ozamis Airport.

Five of its municipalities (Linamon, Kauswagan, Bacolod, Maigo, and Kolabugan) are within the Iligan-Cagayan Industrial Corridor. Ten of its municipalities are coastal towns blessed with rich fishing grounds: the Illana Bay, Panguil Bay, and Iligan Bay. Twelve municipalities are upland towns adorned by vast agricultural and forest based crops and products. Muslim communities are generally found in the highland; whereas, Christian communities dwell the coast. The province is proud to be a major contributor to the overall development in Mindanao. It hosts three out of seven Agus Hydropower Plants, which generates 80% of Mindanao power grid. There are more than 70,000 hectares of coconut

land located in Lanao del Norte, and it is the second largest producer of copra in the region. Other major products are rice, fruits, corn, and aquaculture products.

The province of Lanao is divided into Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur on July 4, 1959 based on the passage of Republic Act 2228. Iligan City formerly served as the capital of Lanao del Norte until June 24, 1982. Then, the capital of the province is moved to the municipality of Tubod close to Batas Pambansa 181.²

It is important to comprehensively portray the location of Kakai Renabor, just to notice that this district is situated within the “area of conflict” in Mindanao Island. We know that the southern Philippines has a long history of conflict, with armed groups including the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf group, the communists, the clan militias and criminal groups. They actively operate in the area. Obviously, religious conflict between Muslims and Christians in Barangay Kakai Renabor has no direct implication to the major armed conflict in Mindanao though the religious conflicts there should be considered as a “common and local issue” in the region.

Conflict between Muslims and Christians in Mindanao had its historical background from the unjust Spanish occupation, which occurred from the mid 16th century up to the 19th century. The Moros and the indigenous groups inflamed the resistance in Mindanao region against the Spanish, and as a result the latter is distressed in colonizing the region. After 1898, when the United States controlled the Philippines territory, the previous encouraged the Catholics from the north to settle down to the south, and it caused a rapid shift of population there: the Muslims and indigenous people switch over from being the majority to the minority. Along with the 1996 treaty of the Autonomous Region of Muslim

1 Pakigdait Inc. is Non-Governmental organization which concerns on interfaith dialogue and peace building. It contains Moslem and Christian member who regulate and manage inter-faith activities and peace bulding process. The office of Pakigdait is located in Lanao del Norte.

2 The information of Lanao Del Norte is quoted from the official website: <http://lanaodelnorte.gov.ph/Profile/profile-tabs-and-info.html>

Mindanao (ARMM), the region includes other provinces such as Maguidanao, Lanao del Sur, while the island Provinces are Sulu-Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Basilan (Guerra, 2010).

THE ROOT OF CONFLICT AND ITS SOLUTION

Like any other conflicts, the tension between Muslims and Christians in Kakai Renabor was naturally growing and escalating from a trivial case. Tots Pasandan (Interview, 20/9/2013) said that the conflict in the region began when the families had a fight. It started when the horse of one family was tied near the house of another family. The horse somehow destroyed the plants of other family. It was a problem of neighborhood but unfortunately the friction grew bigger and wider when the male head of one family said some nasty words to the female head of other family. Among Meranaos (and Philipinos) it is forbidden and taboo for a man to say nasty words to a woman since such thing is disrespectful. Culture, ethics, and religions should have penetrated into the area of conflict. It happened at the end of 2008.

The conflict escalated and grew up worse when there was some bloodshed. There were already unjustified killings happened in Kakai Renabor and other places. Chaos was happened everywhere. The Barangay (villages), the municipal, and the provincial government work hand in hand to seek the resolution of conflict. Considering the destruction in Kakai Renabor, the local officials also stepped in to resolve the conflict. Both conflicting parties tried the traditional *Rido* (clan feuds) settlement and the legal settlement but it was failed as well. These failures led to retaliatory killings which affected the whole community. The Kakai Renabor *Rido* was a complex conflict taking resources and identities. In short, it seems to be a resource-based conflict as well as an identity-based conflict.

It is interesting to note that prior to the conflict, the population of Kakai Renabor was 70% Muslims and 30% Christians. Yet, when

the conflict started the Muslims sold their lands and moved out from Kakai due to extreme fear of their security. Thus, it rapidly reversed into 30% Muslims and 70% Christians (Interview, 23/9/2013).

There were at least three principal elements working and complementing one another to solve the conflict: NGOs, government, and religious leaders. These three elements had worked painstakingly to stop the conflict escalation, and attained the reconciliation. They used some supporting factors that could enduringly stop the conflict, such as (i) the cooperation and the willingness from the community to work together to attain peace in the community, and (ii) the collaboration from different stakeholders such as the provincial government of Lanao del Norte, the Municipal Government of Tubod, the Barangay Council of Kakai Renabor, the military, the Philippine National Police, NGO's and other relevant organizations that contributed a lot and gave their support and time in helping the community.

To activate networking among several elements in the peace-building process, the Government the Philippines has formally established The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), which is called by Peace Office. This institute is authorized to supervise, coordinate, and integrate the implementation of comprehensive peace process. It is built by the Aquino administration's National Security Policy. It focuses on basic services, economic reconstruction, sustainable development, and the security reform. OPAPP also promotes the mainstreaming of peace process in order to gain the support of general public to force both the government and the armed groups to remain at the negotiating tables and achieving peace agreements immediately. This effort is a combined communication and social mobilization campaign along with peace partners from various sectors, promoting projects and activities that intend to bring the peace process into the public consciousness.

Peace office manages all process of peace-building, not to mention supporting the peace process and reconciliation of Kakai Renabor conflict. Along with Pakigdait (an interfaith group/ NGO), the government facilitates to empower the people, giving hope, providing linkages among different stakeholders. They provide a space and create a venue wherein Christians and Muslims of Kakai Renabor could talk and express their feelings, opinions and thoughts, and work together as one cohesive community.

Interestingly, a significant means to the process of reconciliation and helping the conflicting community; is to give them ranches and work together. The peace-builders (especially from Pakigdait, Inc.) supported Muslims and Christians of Kakai Renabor to live in harmony and forget the past, the wounds of conflict. They gave approximately two hectares of farm to Christians and Muslims in Kakai Renabor, Tubod, to be a medium for co-operation. It is necessary to deepen understanding and to respect each other.

Both Muslims and Christians in the Barangay has been working together and developing the farm. They planted coconuts, onions, cucumbers, tubers, and other vegetables in the area given by the government. The Barangay people succeed to deal with their protracted conflict by forgiving and not remembering what had happened towards among different religious groups in the society. When the team of Pakigdait took me to the farm, talking with the farmers, seeing what they have been doing to the land; I could feel the nuance of harmonious relationship between two groups. The peasant leader told to me that the process of farming means the process of healing as well. The more they focus on farming, the more they dismiss the past especially the conflict. It shows us the effectiveness of storytelling in mediation.

As a part of conflict reconciliation process, Pakigdait Inc., always gives financial, conceptual, psychological supports to the people. This process worked on the right track because every single basic element involved in this process is always supporting and communicating one another. The

government played its authority to strengthen the process, NGOs such as Pakigdait performed its roles to run and deepen an understanding of mutual respect, and the conflicted parties learned to solve the problem by thinking rationally. Moreover, the role of religious leaders in the area played a significant role to solve the problem. Analogously, we could draw the process of conflict reconciliation as following:



Scheme 1. The process of conflict reconciliation

The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) was a formal institution which officially supervised the process of conflict reconciliation in the Barangay. To do several supporting activities, the office has been cooperating with the army and the NGOs, especially for keeping and developing mutual trust among the people. Besides farming, these institutions made several activities such as trauma healing and practical training to increase their skills.

The government thinks that poverty could trigger society to commit violence. Geneva Declaration on Armed violence and Development (2010), *More Violence, Less Development Examining the relationship between armed violence and MDG*, elaborates the connectivity between development, poverty, and violence. In doing so, the Mindanao State University established a center called IPDM (Institute for Peace and Development in Mindanao). This

institution is also indirectly engaged in the process of conflict transformation between Muslims and Christians in Barangay Kakai Renabor.

Poverty is widely considered as one of the most significant cause of violence. It links to the violence in a number of ways. In this particular context, poverty may include poor housing, distressed neighborhood, or disrupted families. Indeed, cultural condition has also connected to a high level of violence among poor people. Poverty leads people to be bound with social pathology. In his book, *The Locus Effect: Why the End of Poverty Requires the End of Violence*, Haugen (2014) explains “a number of massive topics of tremendous complexity: levels and categories of criminal violence against the poor; the impact of violence on economic development, poverty alleviation, and the modern human rights struggle; the legacy of colonial justice systems in the developing world; the privatization of justice systems; the story of justice systems in aid programs; the political economy of criminal justice systems in the developing world; the history of law enforcement development; current experiments in justice system reform; and more.” The author of this book emphasizes that “each of these topics touches on a vast field of intellectual endeavor that features diverse experts, scholarly literature, treatises, and the latest academic article just posted to the Internet. What follows, therefore, is not exhaustive in any area but is hopefully a coherent and provocative weaving of credible arguments that makes the case for urgent and energetic engagement with the woefully neglected global crisis of violence against the poor” (Haugen and Boutros, 2014, xvi).

Referring to the theory of Conflict Tree, the process of conflict reconciliation begins with uncovering artificial and symbolic violence, the basic reason, and finally to find the root of conflict. It also explores the needs, the interests, and the position of conflicting groups. The theory of conflict tree also deals with some differences between the structural and dynamic factors, and explaining how conflict issues link these two

aspects. Moreover, it explores three elements of conflict: effects, core problems, and main causes (Ramsbotham et al., 2011). Some people arbitrarily argued that the conflict could be easily solved and reconciled because it is only a small conflict which engage several persons among two groups. This argument is not appropriate because in many cases, we see that a big-scale conflict sometimes is easier to solve compared to a small-scale conflict.³

THE ROLE OF PAKIGDAIT, INC.

Before explaining the role of Pakigdait, Inc., in the peace process of Kakai Renabor conflict, I will briefly explore its commencement and its initial hopes. It began from a war policy of Estrada administration. On March 17th, 2000, two thousands guerrillas of the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) occupied the municipal hall and the town of Kauswagan, but the day after, the government troops confiscated the town. This war revived the old feelings of hostilities between Christians and Muslims in the city.

In the midst of conflict, Christian and Muslim religious leaders attempted to build peace and harmony. On March 17th, 2001, they launched the first declaration of the Pilgrimage of Peace. This launching is arranged by various religious leaders such as Muslims, Roman Catholics, Philippine Independent Church, United Church of Christ of the Philippines, Seventh Day Adventists, and the Assembly of God. They concurred to form an inter-religious council to build peace-building in the region. They understand that peace process would bring hope and wisdom though it is painful.

It is written in the brief history of Pakigdait drafted by. Antiquesa that Pakigdait’s work for peace is anchored in the framework of reconciliation. Reconciliation is to be seen here as both a process and a goal. It is a process of building and rebuilding relationship between individuals,

³ For instance, compare the big-scale conflict between Moslem and Christian in Ambon, Maluku which is finally reconciled and rightly solved with the small-scale Sunni-Shiite conflict in Sampang that is not reconciled yet until today.

groups, and communities. It is a process of building relationship between antagonists. It is a goal that everyone in Kauswagan must strive and work for. This relational dimension involves the emotional and psychological aspects of conflict and the need to recognize past grievances and explore future independence. In the process, reconciliation could create a space for encounter of parties, a place where the diverse but connected energies and concerns driving the conflict can meet, including the paradoxes of truth, mercy, justice and peace. From this framework, Pakigdait hope to work with various families, groups, communities, institutions and churches who dream for a just and lasting peace (MPI, 2013).

In the context of Kakai Renabor's conflict, Pakigdait has been involved to facilitate, to empower the people, to give hope, to provide linkages among various stakeholders, and to encourage the participation of the community. The activists of Pakigdait believe that the community must be active participants in their journey towards healing. Pakigdait believes that the interest and willingness must come from them. They are now in the process of elevating the economic conditions of the community and, at the same time, strengthening the gains of peace-building initiatives in Kakai Renabor, Tubod, (Interview Sheila Olenas, 23/9/2013).

Pakigdait had a community consultation who talks to both conflicting parties. They made a conflict mapping sessions with the community to know who the violent actors are, and who could assist in developing the conflict resolution. Based on the conflict mapping session, strategies are also formulated by themselves. Such strategies would function as the direction or steps for the conflict resolution. The participation of all stakeholders is very important.

In addition, Pakigdait conducted some following interventions and supports in Kakai Renabor: (i) making a socio-economic conflict analysis and the culture of peace to the community, (ii) conducting a conflict mapping session with the community, (iii) striving a peace process,

anchored by the Barangay Development Planning Session, especially on the formulation of their vision, mission and goals, (iv) developing a Bayanihan Peace Center to serves as a venue for dialogues, and the conflict resolution. The Bayanihan Peace center is a product of collaboration of diverse stakeholders such as the provincial government, the municipal government and the military, (v) provision the Learning Farm for the Farmers Association and the Sustainable Agriculture Training for the Farmers. The learning farm somehow raised the economic status of the farmers. It equipped farmers with some additional knowledge on the sustainable agriculture and to actually plan on their learning farm. Beside these economic development, the learning farm also served as a venue for them to interact and to work as one solid team, (vi) provision the Rice Trading project for the Farmers, and (vii) conducting a Play Therapy Session for children of the Kakai Renabor, Tubod.

Pakigdait supposes that the entire project at Kakai Renabor would give the residents a certain hope that they would regain their past glory, and to diminish the stigma that their village is an "awful village". Pakigdait always provides a new hope and a better future even though it is very challenging. Discussing the conflict means to reopen emotions and reopen old wounds but as time goes by it could potentially juxtapose two conflicting parties.

CONCLUSION

Recently, Christians and Muslims of Kakai Renabor live harmoniously and work effectively to improve their life. They succeed to block all bad-memories of conflicts and seeking for a better future. The provision of farming and rice trading initiated by Pakigdait command them to construct the communal life and creating collective understanding. They suppose that new life would not be achieved only by blocking the past but also by preparing the future. This conflict transformation is accomplished by developing and maintaining the good inter-

religious relations. As the third party, Pakigdait has completed their function to intercede and to reconcile the tensions between the two conflicting parties and creating a glimmer of hope toward harmony. Pakigdait believes that the process of elevating the economic conditions of Kakai Renabor people, and strengthening the gains of peace-building initiatives are two indispensable factors. They implemented what Walton (1969) and Fisher (1972) argued on the essence of third party, that is, to facilitate problem solving through improving communication and analyzing the basic relationship between the parties, rather than by encouraging or imposing specific settlements on substantive issues. The unique identity of the approach has been captured by the term, third party consultation (Fisher, 1983, 302).

In his book, *The Resolving Conflict*, Max A Eggert and Wendy Falzon explain four basic steps in the mediation process: (i) to open, (ii) to discover, (iii) to unite, and (iv) to close. *To open* means that mediator's roles and the way the mediator would like to move forward in the process of resolution set out the whole process. The rules of engagement are agreed upon, along with how the parties would behave one another, how there should be a mutual respect, and ensuring the absence of blaming. *To discover* means to know the needs of each party, aspirations and concerns; mis-perceptions should be clarified at this stage. Every effort is made to help the parties in understanding both their own and other stakeholders' positions. *To unite* means to encourage, to generate and to evaluate options for seeking the best win-win solutions. Possible concessions and bargains could be suggested and reviewed here. Tentative agreements and bargains could be held and time frames could be agreed upon. *To close* is to capture the mutual agreements, ensuring that all parties are satisfied and the resolution is acceptable, pragmatic and perceived by two parties as fair (Eggert & Falzon, 2014, 73-74).

When the people of Kakai Renabor decided to live in harmony and healing all historical wounds, they actually decided to reopen injuries by the process of reconciliation and accomplishing such thing by a mutual agreement. They stepped further on a fair resolution which is acceptable and applicable. Kakai Renabor is an imperative lesson that we could learn how to solve conflicts fairly.[]

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ASEAN COMMUNITY: MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRAK

Artikel ini membahas tentang komunitas ASEAN dan bagaimana mereka berkoneksi dengan masalah pengelolaan sumber daya alam, terutama dalam memanfaatkan sumber daya alam agar tercipta ekonomi yang berkelanjutan. Artikel ini tidak hanya menitikberatkan pada permasalahan pembangunan dalam arti luas, tapi lebih spesifik tentang pengelolaan sumber daya alam untuk kesejahteraan komunitas ASEAN. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk memperkenalkan standar baru dalam pengelolaan sumber daya alam, dan menghubungkan semua bidang, baik politik, institusional, pengelolaan sumber daya alam, hak asasi manusia, ekonomi dan juga pemerintahan. Standar ini kemudian dapat diaplikasikan kepada permasalahan sumber daya alam serta strategi penyelesaiannya. Pada saat ini dunia menaruh perhatian khusus kepada Negara ASEAN karena dianggap sebagai kawasan yang sangat menjanjikan bagi perkembangan ekonomi dunia, dan untuk itu ASEAN harus memastikan keberlanjutan lingkungan dan sumber daya alamnya, bukan hanya untuk mencapai ekonomi yang stabil, akan tetapi juga untuk melindungi sumber daya alam. Mengelola sumber daya alam bukan hanya tanggung jawab dari komunitas ASEAN tetapi juga membutuhkan keterlibatan aktif dari pemerintah dan para pembuat kebijakan di ASEAN.

Kata Kunci: Masyarakat ASEAN, Manajemen Sumber Daya Alam, Pembangunan Berkelanjutan

ABSTRACT

This article briefly reviews the ASEAN community and how they associated with the natural resources management issues especially in utilizing the resources to enhance the sustainable economic development. It does not address fundamental questions about development in a broad sense, but be more specific on managing the natural resources for the people's welfare. This article strives to develop a new standard for managing natural resources, which addressed the significant inter-related and inter-connected in all areas such as political, institutional, natural resources management, human rights, economic and governance. The standard therefore considers how problems are defined and how strategy is formulated to deal with the natural resources problems. Furthermore, since the world pays attention to ASEAN as a promising model of economic development, the latter has to ensure the sustainability of environmental and natural resources in the region, because it is not only about achieving the economic milestone, but also to protect natural resources. Overall, managing natural resources is not merely the responsibility of ASEAN community, but it also needs the active involvement of various governments and policy-makers.

Keywords: ASEAN Community, Natural Resources Management, Sustainable Development

INTRODUCTION

More than half of the total world population lives in Asia, and this region plays some very crucial roles in the global economy, security and human development. The flexible system in Asian economies contributes significantly to the international economic recovery; some of which alleviates people from poverty. Over the years, this region has been shaped by a

rapid economic growth and some demographic changes. In Asia, especially in Southeast Asia, the regional economic integration would foster development in all aspects but obviously it would degrade the environmental conditions while the scarcity of natural resources would be a major obstacle as well. ASEAN region is endowed with various natural resources, such as forests, water, coastal resources and biodiversity, many

of which need to be protected and conserved for the sake of boosting the economic growth. To protect the environment and natural resources, we have to adjust the human growth rate with the environmental standards in managing the natural resources (Natural Resources Commission, 2015). It should be implemented in order to create a better quality of life towards the ASEAN vision in 2030; resilient, inclusive, competitive and harmonious¹.

This article conceives the standard of natural resources management with which supporting the flexibility and innovation in the consistent, rigorous, accountable regional planning, investment and decision-making processes among ASEAN countries. Moreover, it pays attention to the actions of ASEAN community because they hold double positions. Firstly, the main actor of economic growth in the region and secondly, the manager of natural resources in Southeast Asia. By these roles, they have to achieve a deep understanding about the nuances of natural resources management for the sake of sustainable development. The aim of this article is exploring the action plans with which connecting the countries, community and industrial groups in Southeast Asia.

The rest of the article proceeds as following. Section 2 will discuss some previous research on how ASEAN community manages their environment and resources. Section 3 highlight the standards for the quality natural resources management. Section 4 will explain the methodology which is exercised here. Furthermore, section 5 will discuss some investigations and findings concerning the natural resources management and sustainable development. Last but not least, last section will summarize this article.

1 ASEAN aspires to become Resilient, Inclusive, Competitive, and Harmonious in 2030, and four major challenges: (1) managing the macroeconomic and financial stability (2) promoting the economic convergence and equitable growth (3) forging a competitive and innovative region (4) nurturing natural resources and sustaining the environment. <http://www.adbi.org/asean.2030/> accessed on March 21, 2015.

ASEAN COMMUNITY AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

The Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) was established in Bangkok, Thailand on August 8, 1967. At that time, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand signed the ASEAN Declaration. Due to the rapid development in Southeast Asia region, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Cambodia are also attracted to join the ASEAN. Currently, there are ten member states which actively involves in this association. At the 12th ASEAN Summit, in January 2007, the ASEAN leaders have agreed to establish the ASEAN Community 2015 which comprises three fundamental pillars; (i) ASEAN Political – Security Community, (ii) ASEAN Economic Community and (iii) ASEAN Socio – Cultural Community².

This region is covered by an approximately 4.5 million square kilometer mainland, be equal to nearly 3 percent of the world's total land mass. The region has a population more than 605 million some of which live in urban areas (45%). It has 60 percent of the peat-land areas of the world (25 million hectares). The region's natural resources of water, forests, oceans, and soil provide sustenance to its inhabitants and economic activities. Most countries in the ASEAN region are served by some river systems such as the Mekong River basin and the Toba Lake. The region has a long coastline no less than 173,000 kilometers and has abundant freshwater resources, particularly Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, and Malaysia. These countries enjoy the largest water resources per capita in the region. Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are rich in biodiversity, and they are homes for approximately 80 percent of global biological diversity, while 65 percent of the world's coral species are located in the 'coral triangle' by which encompassing some parts of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. About 45 percent of the ASEAN region is covered by

2 <http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview>. Accessed on March 23, 2015.

forests, which provides a suitable natural milieu, for some 40 percent of all animal species on Earth. Among the ASEAN countries, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Lao PDR are agriculture-based countries. Brunei Darussalam and Singapore are two most urbanized countries in the region, and the contribution of the agriculture sector to GDP in these countries is less than 5 percent. The GDP here aims to measure the output of economic activities within the economic territory of a country. In contrast to these two countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam have some different stages of transformation. Overall, the ASEAN region has consistently shown a positive economic growth in the last few decades. As an example, prior to the global financial crisis, during 2000–2007, the real GDP of ASEAN countries' economies are increased by 6 percent, and be expected to grow on average by more than 5 percent during 2014–2018, according to a projection provided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The real GDP of some countries in the region, such as Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Indonesia, are projected to increase beyond the ASEAN average. Indonesia, The Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam are now part of the middle-income countries, as defined by the World Bank, while Malaysia approaches the upper end of such range.

Some ideas about ASEAN and its natural resources management are available in the ASEAN Socio – Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint 2009 - 2015, section D about 'Ensuring Environmental Sustainability' which says

“ASEAN shall work towards achieving sustainable development as well as promoting clean and green environment by protecting the natural resource base for economic and social development including the sustainable management and conservation of soil, water, mineral, energy, biodiversity, forest, coastal and marine resources as well as the improvement in water and air quality for ASEAN region. ASEAN will actively participate in global efforts towards addressing global environmental challenges, including climate change and the ozone layer protection, as well as developing

and adapting environmentally-sound technology for development needs and environmental sustainability.”

Such statement is the main concern of ASEAN Community, since the environment and natural resources are the keys for economic and social development. Subsequently, this condition also led many ASEAN leaders to have some serious efforts in minimizing some issues concerning natural resources such as; forest depletion, land degradation and water crisis with which implying unbearable damage to biodiversity.

This condition is captured by many scholars; one of them is Huong, (1999, 217-225), who pays attention to the environmental protection and community welfare. He has a high-curiosity about the natural resources management in various Southeast Asia countries, and he argues that ASEAN countries have some tremendous obstacles in managing the resources. Thus, the involvement of people and leaders is very crucial to manage the resources as it is said. Furthermore, Huong said that *“people do not understand the serious consequences of environmental and resources degradation because they are not well informed about environmental problems and their causes”*.

Discussing the environment and natural resources management implies a consideration on the sustainable development. The latter could be perceived as a development that meets the current needs and considering the ability of future generations (World Commission on Environment and Development's, 1987). Most people who pay attention on the issue of sustainable development agreed that we need to set the equilibrium among social, economic and environmental situations.

Many literatures provide abundant discussion about the sustainable development, and how to balance between the industrial growth and the preservation of natural resources. Stakeholders, environmentalists, economists and policymakers sometimes comprehend the idea of sustainable development as a dilemma because so many burdens should be accomplished by the ASEAN Community.

STANDARDS FOR MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES TO ENHANCE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Given that most parties strive to show their concern on sustainable development due to the degradation of the available natural resources, the Southeast Asia countries boosted its reforestation by 30 million hectares to many of which would be enjoyed by industry. There is estimation that this region would use roughly 45 percent wood out of the forest plantations by 2020. It's a vivid situation that Southeast Asia region would be an important player in the world level though the natural forest resources continue to be depleted³.

Subsequently, there are pros and contras in Southeast Asia about the forest products industry. The rapid population growth vastly implies an increasing demand of timber. Though many hectares of forest are now being conserved, the incomplete regulations may provide a gap to proceed the illegal logging and timber smuggling. It is a tremendous challenger to the ASEAN Community. Therefore, we need to formulate a system or standard that would balance the social, economic and environmental objectives in the decision making related to the sustainable development.

Achieving sustainable development requires much effort, specifically in the structural changes and new working patterns in all areas of economic, social and political life. In the long run, Southeast Asia region should ensure the availability of both their natural resources and man-made and human capitals for the sake of its common prosperity. Despite of this situation, ASEAN as a regional association should encourage the standards for managing the natural resources in order to proceed the sustainable development, (Clayton & Bass, 2002). It has some important governing implications in the local, national and regional levels. Hence, it also requires a cross-sectoral and integrating mechanism of which could bring forth

governments, society and private stakeholders. If it works, such collaboration could make a standard in managing resources. The main purpose of such standard is to give confidence to the public, government, other interested parties and the natural resource managers that the investment in natural resource management is cost-effective. Moreover, it could protect and improve the high value of natural resource assets, and maximizing benefits. The standards contain the good quality processes to deliver the best practice of natural resource management.

The crucial research problem of which igniting this article is how the establishment of natural resources management could give advantages to the society, and how the standard of natural resources management could affect the sustainable development. Thereby, addressing these following questions would be necessary: (i) What are the benefits of natural resource management for ASEAN Community? (ii) Do the standards for managing natural resources support the sustainable development in Southeast Asia?

Aiming to answer these two questions this article uses primary data from interviews with some prominent figures in the ASEAN Community, mostly in Indonesia and Malaysia. These two countries are selected on the basis that their sectors are governed by a challenging phase in the sustainable development. Moreover, these countries provide some interesting facts to who is attracted to the application of SMNR (Standards for Managing Natural Resources). Interviews were conducted since it is particularly indispensable for assessing various individuals' perceptions directly.

Indonesia and Malaysia are selected due to a large number of land conversions from the community forestry into the palm plantation. Indeed, such conversion excessively reaches the annihilation of natural forests which supposed to be million hectares of the environmentally unfriendly palm plantation. In other words, such business activity does not contribute any positive impact to the sustainable development.

³ http://education.nationalgeographic.com/education/encyclopedia/asia-resources/?ar_a=1. Accessed on March 30, 2015

Consequently, Indonesia and Malaysia are categorized as the most-degraded countries annually (UNEP Report, 2007).

Hence, the literature and document reviews also done in this research as the secondary data. Unfortunately, there are only few documents discussing natural resources management standards and the sustainable development issues. Thus, it is obviously crucial to be analyzed.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This article starts by explaining the benefits of natural resources management for ASEAN Community which would lead to a demand that they need a standard in managing their resources. Here, my analysis firstly evaluates the framework of standard of natural resources management (SNRM) in Indonesia and Malaysia, and mainly focuses on the management of forest resources. ASEAN faces enormous challenges here. There is a need to tackle some environmental problems such as air and noise pollutions, sewage disposals and management, traffic congestion, land degradation and deforestation, the depletion of natural resources and biodiversity, damages to marine and coastal ecosystems, depletion of the ozone layer, and excessive emissions of greenhouse gases. Managing environmental resources are not easy. Markets normally do a good job of dealing with scarcity. As things start to be scarce, their prices increase in such a way following the supply and demand law, people consume commodities less than before and producers invest more money and raw materials in producing them. In contrast to such cycle, it does not work if the case is environmental goods as the goods turn out to be scarce. Many people are the subject of misguided government policies many of which trigger the environmental destruction by, for example, subsidizing energy consumption, over-fishing and deforestation (Pomeroy, 2007).

Finally, the findings and discussion will be summarized by outlining some sustainable development implications, and some suggestions to further research in natural resources management in Southeast Asia.

The Benefits of Natural Resources Management for ASEAN Community

Natural resources management (NRM) encompasses not only the land-use planning, water and soil management, maintaining air quality, biodiversity conservation, and ecology. Contemporary environment economists also incorporate issues such as ensuring the future sustainability of industries including agriculture, mining, tourism, fisheries, and forestry. Natural resource availability, in general, is one function of the demand and supply of resources. The demand side effect shows an ever-growing trend as a result of the countries' continual efforts to achieve a higher economic growth and improve the living standards, whereas the supply side is more or less unpredictable. The result could be a scarcity of natural resources, which contains a point of no return in terms of environmental degradation in the course of time. This would not only generate a depleted ecosystem, but it could also result in an excessive exploration of new resource stocks that would damage the environment's sustainability. The growing concern over the complex dimensions of natural resource dynamics has induced a paradigm shift to global policies focusing more on a sustainable environment in recent times. Hence, efficient and effective natural resources management has become crucial in ensuring a sustained development and a better future for the region (Persoon, 2003).

Moreover, ASEAN Community would bear many challenges and opportunities after 2015. ASEAN has an ambitious target by 2030, which is called RICH; Resilient, Inclusive, Competitive and Harmonious. This target requires 4 (four) key development challenges as following: enhancing the macroeconomic and financial stability; supporting the equitable growth; promoting some competitiveness and innovations; and protecting the environment as its most challenging obstacle.

In case of protecting the environment and natural resources in Southeast Asia, we have to make sure the proper environmental improvement. Natural resources are mostly industry and the

growing populations. Actually, there are some abundant benefits to the extent we could manage and maintain its stockpile considerably. Here are some of those benefits:

Benefits in Managing Natural Resources in Southeast Asia
• Boosting economic activities, growth and GDP per capita
• Increasing employments
• Maintaining the revenue stream
• Accelerating and narrowing the development gaps
• Increasing the supply of public goods and services in order to alleviate the level of local poverty
• Securing funds for the national and regional development
• Promoting the intergenerational equity
• Supporting an integrated and prosperous ASEAN Economic Community by 2030
• Enabling the ASEAN's political and bureaucratic structures to work hand in hand on various fundamental issues with the member states
• Reducing the resources curse. Promoting a stable and sustainable economic development.

Source: Adopted from landcarensw.org

More than a decade ago, the financial crises hit the ASEAN economic development. Those policies were failed to make a concession between the natural resources and capitalist perspective⁴. If ASEAN had willingness to manage the resources wisely, they could have gained lots benefits as mentioned in the above table. In addition, managing natural resources is not only a matter of earning the advantages of it, but also conserving and protecting the resources themselves, so that our next generations would have chances to access and enjoy it.

The Standard for Managing Natural Resources and Sustainable Development

Definitions of sustainable development are not in themselves interesting, although there is an intense on how 'development' could be measured in terms other than per capita gross national product (GNP). Hence, although the debate regarding what is to be sustained has some merits, what does matter is what has to be done to secure it.

Furthermore, sustainable development is a set of concepts that attempts to harmonize a number of competing goals. These include providing better conditions of life and more opportunity for people, especially the poor, and ensuring both production and consumption do not go beyond the limits that ecosystems could tolerate in the long run. The idea of sustainable development is an optimistic response to a disturbing and gloomy vision of human future: the notion that we could not have both a better quality of human life and a healthy environment. This pessimistic view holds that there is necessarily a trade-off between; on the other hand, a better environment means keeping the poor in poverty, or we could say, more economic opportunity always leads to the environmental destruction.

A fundamental assumption of sustainable development is there are some policies that could simultaneously achieve both sets of objectives that we do not have to choose, for example, between the adequate nourishment and the pollution control. There is an increasing evidence that this is not just a wishful thinking, but such solutions are with the right combination of understanding and political will within reach. Indeed, one very fundamental insight is that the problems of poverty and the problems of environmental degradation could not be solved separately. Only by overcoming poverty we could have a greater chance for a stable and productive ecosystem. Only through maintaining environmental quality we could create the material conditions for people to be better off. The more research we do to understand the problem, the more obvious that a distinction between the economic hope and the environmental quality is absolutely wrong. Moreover, such issue is intensively discussed by the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The poor would not pay attention any kind of politics that they should hold their consumption activities, and consequently they would not be able to overcome their poverty. Such reality reflects recognition that

⁴ Asian Development Bank Institute. *ASEAN 2030; Toward a Borderless Economic Community*. 2014

the environmental quality is crucial to improving the well-being of all of us.

In Asia, especially in Southeast Asia, the standard for managing natural resources has not established until today. On the contrary, having a good standard in natural resources management could be the solution to enhance the sustainable development. The standard for managing natural resources management is indispensable in giving confidence to the public, government, and other interested parties and to natural resource managers themselves that investment in natural resource management is cost effective, protecting and improving high value natural resource assets, and maximizing benefits through actions of which integrating outcomes at all scales. The standard does this by establishing quality processes to deliver the best practice natural resource management (Thanh, 2008).

Its goal is to support the dynamic and innovative regional planning, investment and a decision-making while ensuring consistency, rigor and accountability in the natural resource management. The standard should be used as a

tool to improve the natural resource management, and be designed to get focus on the outcome.

This standard is very adaptive and applicable to ASEAN's vision all of which planning to develop and implement some natural resources management strategies efficiently, effectively and transparently. Thus, it also addresses the commitment and comparability with other parties, so that all member states could exercise the standard properly.

On that figure, we can see that the standard for resources management pays full attention to the community and the institutional systems. Nowadays, it appears as a system that highlight all major variables and people have to keep in mind that they should manage comprehensively. Subsequently, we may imply that this system is characterized by various human and institutional inputs, processes and outputs.

The standard framework for natural resources management (SNRM) obviously supports the ASEAN Community in managing their resources. If this framework is applied, the resources loss would be decreased because the




Figure 1. The standard for managing natural resources

management of any resources should balance the interests of various stakeholders.

This study provides an insight to scholars and practitioners interested in ASEAN and natural resources management, illuminating how the sustainable development should be considered. Therefore, some findings from this article could arguably be examined into other natural resources management settings in order to measure its relevance.

CONCLUSION

The upshot of this article is both developing some understanding concerning how natural resources affect sustainable development, and more specifically, to explore the standard in managing natural resources in ASEAN Community.

Moreover, it contributes to a theoretical understanding of the relationship between the natural resources management and the sustainable development in two distinctive ways. Firstly, this study elucidates the benefits of natural resources management. Secondly, results from this study illustrate the complex frameworks of standard in natural resources management. It shows that an integrative or inter-disciplinary solution could be the extraordinary formula to sustainable development. The findings from this study should be put as a reminder that natural resources generally need to be addressed with a renewed standard. To sum up, we need experienced stakeholders in sustainable development fields to share and to evaluate various ideas and techniques about the natural resources management.

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KEBIJAKAN JALUR SUTRA BARU CINA DAN IMPLIKASINYA BAGI AMERIKA SERIKAT

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ABSTRACT

The China's New Silk Road Policy is one of foreign policies from a middle power" country with its rising on economic and military power that in the future could challenge international order dominated by the US. The China's New Silk Road Policy which consist of two aspects of land (new Silk Road Economic Belt) and maritime (21st Century Maritime Silk Road) is a combination of geopolitics and geoeconomic power to connect Eurasia region with China as the center. This article analyses internal and external factors that drive the China's government to conduct the policy. Moreover, this article analyses the implementation of the China's New Silk Road policy and its implications to American hegemony in the world. This article uses concepts such as geopolitic, geoeconomy, foreign policy, and hegemonic stability theory to answer the questions.

Keywords: *New Silk Road, China, United States of America, foreign policy*

ABSTRAK

Kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina merupakan salah satu kebijakan luar negeri dari negara "middle power" yang kekuatan militer dan ekonominya tengah meningkat dan diprediksi dapat mengancam tatanan internasional yang didominasi AS. Jalur Sutra Baru Cina yang mencakup dua aspek, yakni daratan (*new Silk Road Economic Belt*) dan lautan (*21st Century Maritime Silk Road*) merupakan perpaduan kekuatan geopolitik dan geoekonomi untuk menghubungkan wilayah Eurasia dengan Cina sebagai pusatnya. Artikel ini menganalisis faktor-faktor internal dan eksternal yang mendorong pemerintah Cina mengeluarkan kebijakan tersebut. Selanjutnya artikel ini menganalisis implementasi kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina dan implikasinya terhadap hegemoni Amerika Serikat di dunia. Artikel ini menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut dengan menggunakan konsep geopolitik dan geoekonomi, dimensi kebijakan luar negeri, dan konsep *hegemonic stability*.

Kata Kunci: Jalur Sutra Baru, Cina, Amerika Serikat, kebijakan luar negeri

PENDAHULUAN

Pemerintah Cina di bawah Xi Jinping berupaya menghidupkan kembali konsep "Jalur Sutra" dalam agenda kebijakan luar negerinya. Jalur Sutra kemudian dipromosikan menjadi slogan baru Cina di berbagai forum internasional. Konsep Jalur Sutra ini bukanlah hal baru, melainkan sebuah konsep lama di masa lampau untuk menamakan jalur perdagangan dan budaya antara Cina dengan Asia Tengah dan Asia Selatan, serta dengan Eropa dan Timur Tengah yang dibangun pada masa Dinasti Han, sekitar tahun 200 SM. Dalam pandangan pemimpin Cina saat ini, konsep Jalan Sutra Baru yang dikenal juga

dengan nama "One Belt, One Road" terdiri dari "Sabuk Ekonomi Jalur Sutra Baru" (*new Silk Road economic belt*) yang mengindikasikan hubungan ekonomi yang lebih kuat dengan Asia Tengah dengan fokus pada perdagangan. Kemudian, para pemimpin Cina menambahkan satu konsep lagi yakni "Jalur Sutra Maritim Abad ke-21" (*21st Century Maritime Silk Road*) yang dipandang sebagai upaya untuk mempererat hubungan dengan Asia Selatan dan Asia Tenggara yang difokuskan pada keamanan perdagangan maritim.

Pentingnya kedua slogan baru itu dapat dilihat dari fakta bahwa kedua konsep itu disebutkan dalam dokumen terbuka setelah

sidang pleno ke-3 dari Komite Sentral ke-18 Partai Komunis Cina yang dilaksanakan pada pertengahan November 2013 di Beijing. Dalam waktu kurang dari 18 bulan, Cina mengeluarkan rencana aksi komprehensif yang didukung hampir 60 negara Eurasia dan non Eurasia. Jaringan ekonomi yang diajukan tersebut mencakup wilayah geografis yang sangat luas. Sabuk daratan akan melalui benua Asia, Eropa, dan Afrika, menghubungkan Cina, Asia Tengah, Rusia dan Eropa di utara, dan menghubungkan Cina dengan Teluk Persia dan Laut Mediterania melalui Asia Tengah dan Lautan Hindia di selatan. Satu rute jalur maritim diawali dari pantai Cina ke Eropa melalui Laut Cina Selatan dan Lautan Hindia, rute lainnya dari Cina ke Pasifik Selatan. Jalur ini diperkirakan mencakup 4,4 milyar orang dan US \$2,1 trilyun produksi bruto, atau 63% dari populasi dunia dan 29% dari PDB dunia (Cheng, 2015).

Langkah Cina tersebut tentunya mengundang perhatian masyarakat internasional, termasuk negara superpower seperti Amerika Serikat yang tidak masuk dalam kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina. Meskipun pemerintahan Obama belum mengeluarkan tanggapan resmi terkait dengan kebijakan Cina tersebut, namun jaringan ekonomi dunia tersebut tentunya menawarkan tantangan sekaligus peluang bagi Amerika Serikat dalam menyikapi kebijakan Cina dengan cara konstruktif. Mengamati keseriusan pemerintah Cina untuk mengimplementasikan kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru tersebut memunculkan beberapa pertanyaan seperti faktor-faktor apa yang mendorong pemerintah Cina mengeluarkan kebijakan tersebut, dilihat dari faktor internal dan eksternal? Sejauh mana implementasi kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina tersebut? kemudian bagaimana implikasinya terhadap hegemoni Amerika Serikat di dunia? Artikel ini akan menjawab pertanyaan tersebut dengan menggunakan konsep geopolitik dan geoekonomi, dimensi kebijakan luar negeri, dan konsep *hegemonic stability*.

GEOPOLITIK DAN KEBIJAKAN LUAR NEGERI

Teori dalam ilmu hubungan internasional menawarkan kerangka konseptual untuk menjawab tiga tugas dasar yakni : untuk menganalisis dampak dari peraturan dan keputusan dari perilaku negara; untuk memahami perubahan dimensi dan batas struktur kekuatan (power), institusi dan tatanan (order), termasuk peran dari transparansi yang lebih luas (akses informasi) dan akuntabilitas; dan untuk mempromosikan keadilan, inklusi sosial yang lebih luas serta kesetaraan. Dengan kata lain, teori digunakan untuk menggambarkan realita dan memaparkan pengetahuan historis dan praktis untuk memecahkan masalah dan mempromosikan idealisme yang telah disebutkan sebelumnya (Griffith, O'Callaghan & Roach, 2008, vii). Berdasarkan pemikiran tersebut, tulisan ini akan menjawab permasalahan dengan menggunakan beberapa konsep dalam hubungan internasional seperti geopolitik dan geoekonomi, kebijakan luar negeri dan *hegemonic stability theory*.

Konsep Geopolitik dan Geoekonomi

Geografi selalu memainkan peranan penting dalam kehidupan manusia. Geografi membentuk identitas, karakter, dan sejarah negara-bangsa (*nation-states*); geografi juga membantu sekaligus menghalangi kemajuan ekonomis, sosial, dan politik; geografi juga berperan penting dalam hubungan internasional. Sementara geopolitik merupakan studi mengenai pengaruh faktor geografis terhadap perilaku negara, yakni bagaimana lokasi, iklim, sumber daya alam, populasi, dan kondisi fisik menentukan pilihan kebijakan luar negeri suatu negara dan menentukan posisinya dalam hierarki negara (Griffith, O'Callaghan & Roach, 2008, 122-123).

Sebagai sebuah bidang studi, geopolitik terinspirasi oleh karya dua akademisi abad ke-19, yakni Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) dan Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947).

Mahan mengemukakan bahwa kekuatan laut adalah kunci bagi kekuatan nasional. Negara yang menguasai lautan (seperti yang dilakukan Inggris di abad ke-19) dapat mendominasi hubungan internasional. Kemampuan untuk meraih kontrol tersebut tergantung pada kekuatan angkatan laut yang besar dan canggih, wilayah pantai yang panjang, dan fasilitas pelabuhan yang memadai. Pada 1919, Sir Halford Mackinder melengkapi tesis teritorial Mahan dengan mengajukan “teori Heartland”. Mackinder berpendapat bahwa negara yang mengontrol teritori antara Jerman dan Siberia dapat mengontrol dunia. Seperti diungkapkan dalam frase terkenal Mackinder : *“Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland.. Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island..Who rules the World Island commands the World”* (Griffith, O’Callaghan & Roach, 2008, 123).

Dalam perkembangannya, konsep geopolitik mengalami perubahan menjadi geoekonomi dengan fokus yang berubah dari gagasan militer menjadi fenomena ekonomi. Konsep ini berupaya menunjukkan bagaimana meraih dan mempertahankan keuntungan kompetitif nasional melalui alat atau cara ekonomi. Peperangan itu sendiri, tidak lebih merupakan alat utama untuk meraih tujuan yang sama. Jika satu negara memilih jalan perang, negara itu harus yakin bahwa jalan yang ditempuhnya akan mengarah pada peningkatan posisi ekonomi. Tidak seperti geopolitik, konsep geoekonomi lebih memfokuskan pada perkembangan sosial, yakni lebih berkaitan dengan pertumbuhan ekonomi dan fenomena globalisasi (Soilen, 2012, 23). Konsep geopolitik dan geoekonomi ini digunakan untuk menjelaskan konsep Jalur Sutra Baru Cina yang melingkupi wilayah Cina hingga ke beberapa wilayah lintas benua Asia dan Eropa yang juga didorong oleh motif pembangunan ekonomi baik domestik maupun internasional.

Analisis Kebijakan Luar Negeri

Analisis kebijakan luar negeri merupakan studi pengelolaan hubungan eksternal dan aktivitas negara-bangsa, yang membedakannya

dari kebijakan domestik. Kebijakan luar negeri melibatkan tujuan, strategi, kekuatan, metode, petunjuk, arah, pemahaman, yang dalam hal ini pemerintah nasional melakukan hubungan internasional satu sama lain dan dengan organisasi internasional serta aktor non-negara. Kebijakan luar negeri terdiri dari tujuan dan kekuatan (*measures*) yang ditujukan untuk mengarahkan keputusan dan tindakan pemerintah berkaitan dengan hubungan eksternal, khususnya hubungan dengan negara asing (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, 252). Dengan kata lain, kebijakan luar negeri merupakan kumpulan kebijakan yang memberikan efek terhadap hubungan pemerintah nasional suatu negara dengan pemerintah nasional lainnya (Millar dalam Rosenau 1969). Para pejabat pemerintah seperti presiden, perdana menteri, menteri luar negeri, menteri pertahanan, menteri keuangan, dan lainnya bersama dengan para penasehatnya, merupakan para pembuat kebijakan utama.

Dalam merumuskan kebijakan, para pembuat kebijakan luar negeri dipengaruhi oleh faktor internal dan eksternal, atau pengaruh domestik dan faktor internasional (Rosenau, 2006, Mintz & DeRouen Jr., 2010). Faktor internal yang dimaksud antara lain perkembangan ekonomi, sejarah dan budaya, struktur sosial, opini publik, akuntabilitas politik, dan struktur pemerintahan. Sementara yang dimaksud faktor eksternal antara lain luas wilayah negara (*size*), kondisi geografis, *great power structure*, aliansi, dan teknologi (Rosenau, 1974, 6). Konsep kebijakan luar negeri ini digunakan untuk menganalisis kebijakan luar negeri Cina yang dipandang sebagai produk dari tekanan internal dan eksternal. Secara spesifik, konsep ini digunakan untuk menganalisis Kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru yang dibuat pemerintah Cina dan memberikan efek bagi pemerintah nasional lainnya.

Hegemonic Stability Theory

Teori ini mengindikasikan bahwa sistem internasional akan lebih stabil tatkala suatu negara-bangsa menjadi kekuatan dunia yang dominan atau sebagai hegemon (Goldstein,

2005, 107). Hegemon yang dimaksud dalam hubungan internasional adalah ‘pemimpin’ atau “negara yang memimpin” suatu kelompok negara. Berbicara tentang hegemoni, maka kita akan berpikir tentang sistem antar negara. Hegemoni tidak terjadi dengan sendirinya, namun merupakan fenomena politik yang unik yang ada dalam sistem antar negara sekaligus produk dari kondisi sejarah dan politik (Griffith, O’Callaghan & Roach, 2008, 139).

Dalam konteks ini, jatuhnya hegemon yang telah ada atau kondisi dimana tidak ada satupun hegemon akan menyebabkan hilangnya stabilitas sistem internasional. Jika hegemon menerapkan kepemimpinan, baik melalui diplomasi, koersi, atau persuasi, berarti ia mengaktualisasikan kekuatan dalam jumlah besar (*preponderance of power*). Hegemoni mengacu pada kemampuan suatu negara mendominasi penerapan aturan dan perjanjian dalam politik internasional dan hubungan ekonomi (Goldstein, 2005, 83).

Hegemonic stability theory dapat membantu menganalisis kebangkitan “great power” hingga peran pemimpin dunia atau hegemon yang telah berlangsung sejak abad ke-15. Konsep ini juga dapat digunakan untuk memahami dan mengkalkulasi politik internasional ke depan melalui analisis hubungan simbolik antara hegemon yang *power*-nya tengah menurun dan munculnya hegemon baru (Herrington, 2011).

KEBIJAKAN JALUR SUTRA BARU CINA

Konsep Jalur Sutra Baru Cina diumumkan pertamakali dalam pidato Presiden Xi Jinping di dalam kunjungannya ke Kazakhstan dan ditegaskan kembali dalam KTT Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) pada tahun 2013. Hal ini merupakan momen pertama kalinya seorang pemimpin Cina menjelaskan visi strategisnya. Xi Jinping mempresentasikan proposal yang terdiri dari 5 poin utama untuk membangun bersama “Sabuk Ekonomi Jalur Sutra Baru” (*the New Silk Road Economic Belt*). Proposal ini ditujukan untuk memperkuat

hubungan antara Cina, Asia Tengah dan Eropa. Kelima poin tersebut antara lain (Tatar, 2013): (i) memperkuat komunikasi kebijakan yang dapat membantu ‘memberikan lampu hijau’ bagi kerjasama ekonomi; (ii) memperkuat koneksi jalan atau infrastruktur, dengan gagasan membentuk koridor transportasi yang besat dari Pasifik ke Laut Baltik, dan dari Asia Tengah ke Lautan Hindia, kemudian secara bertahap membangun jaringan koneksi transportasi antara Asia Timur, Asia Barat, dan Asia Selatan; (iii) memperkuat fasilitas perdagangan, dengan fokus pada penghapusan halangan dagang (*trade barriers*) dan mengambil langkah mengurangi biaya perdagangan dan investasi; (iv) memperkuat kerjasama keuangan, dengan perhatian khusus pada penyelesaian mata uang yang dapat mengurangi biaya transaksi dan mengurangi risiko finansial sambil meningkatkan ekonomi yang kompetitif; dan (v) memperkuat hubungan *people-to-people*.

Dalam rangka memperkuat visi strategis Cina tersebut, pada Oktober 2013, Presiden Xi Jinping juga mengajukan proposal pembentukan hubungan dekat antara Cina dengan komunitas ASEAN dan menawarkan gagasan pembentukan Jalur Sutra Maritim Abad ke-21 (*21st Century Maritime Silk Road*) untuk mempromosikan kerja sama maritim. Dalam pidatonya di hadapan parlemen Indonesia, Xi juga mengajukan pembentukan Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) untuk mendanai pembangunan infrastruktur dan mempromosikan interkoneksi regional dan integrasi ekonomi.

Jalur Sutra Maritim ini bertujuan untuk memperkuat hubungan dengan Asia Selatan dan Asia Tenggara, dengan penekanan pada keamanan perdagangan maritim. Rencana tersebut bertujuan untuk merealisasikan Jalur Sutra kuno dengan jaringan modern jalur kereta cepat, jalur kendaraan darat, pelabuhan dan pipa yang membentang di kawasan Asia. Tol ekonomi Beijing ini terdiri dari tiga rute: rute pertama membentang dari Cina ke Asia Tengah dan Timur Tengah; rute kedua, yakni rute maritim membentang dari pantai selatan; dan rute ketiga membentang dari Yunnan dan

Guang Xi ke Asia Tenggara (Hong, 2015, 1) (lihat Gambar 1).

Gagasan Jalur Sutra Baru dimunculkan berdasarkan fakta bahwa ekonomi domestik Cina mengalami perubahan struktural yang merefleksikan “keadaan normal baru” dari pelambatan ekonomi, yang membawa dampak ekonomi signifikan bagi kawasan Asia. Lebih penting lagi, hal ini merupakan sinyal perubahan dalam strategi dan kebijakan luar negeri Cina dengan prioritas utama pada hubungan dengan negara-negara tetangga. Selain itu, gagasan ini juga cocok dengan Master Plan Konektivitas ASEAN dan visi baru Poros Maritim Dunia yang diajukan pemerintah Indonesia di bawah Presiden Joko Widodo dengan penekanan pada kekuatan maritim (Hong 2015, 1). Persamaan kepentingan antara Cina dengan Indonesia dalam konteks *21st Century Maritime Silk Road* dan Poros Maritim Dunia, memberikan peluang bagi kedua negara untuk merealisasikan kebijakan yang menekankan pada pengembangan kekuatan maritim. Salah

satu aspek kerjasama yang memungkinkan dilakukan antara Cina dengan Indonesia adalah dalam hal pembangunan infrastruktur yang sangat dibutuhkan Indonesia untuk meningkatkan konektivitas antar pulau dan meningkatkan kualitas infrastruktur pelabuhan.

Bagi pemerintah Cina, *Master Plan* Jalur Sutra Maritim dimulai di Quanzhou di provinsi Fujian, melalui Guangzhou, Behai dan Haikou sebelum ke arah Selat Malaka. Dari Kuala Lumpur, Jalur Sutra Maritim mengarah ke Kalkuta, India dan menyeberangi Lautan Hindia hingga Nairobi, Kenya. Dari Nairobi, Jalur Maritim mengarah ke utara mengelilingi Benua Afrika dan bergerak melalui Laut Mati ke Laut Mediterania, berhenti di Athena, sebelum bertemu dengan Jalur Sutra Darat di Venesia. Proposal “Sabuk Ekonomi Jalur Sutra” dan “Jalur Sutra Maritim Abad ke-21” kemudian menjadi bagian kunci dari diplomasi infrastruktur baru Cina di bawah pemerintahan Xi Jinping. Tujuan dari proposal ini adalah memperkuat hubungan

Gambar 1. Peta Jalur Sutra Baru Cina



Sumber: “The Untold War”, dalam <http://warmonitor.net/news/2015/06/08/the-untold-war/>, Juni 2015, diunduh pada 31 Agustus 2015.

dengan negara tetangga melalui investasi di bidang infrastruktur (Hong, 2015, 2).

Dalam konektivitas daratan antara Cina dan Asia Tenggara, pemerintah lokal Cina memainkan peranan penting, seperti Provinsi Yunnan dan Daerah Otonom Guangxi, yang berbatasan dengan Vietnam, Laos dan Myanmar. Sejak awal tahun 2000, Yunnan dan Guangxi memprioritaskan konektivitas transportasi fisik antar-kawasan dengan negara-negara ASEAN dan menginisiasi Strategi Gateway dan Zona Ekonomi Teluk Pan-Beibu. Proposal kedua pemerintah lokal tersebut bertujuan untuk memperkuat konektivitas wilayah daratan mereka dengan ASEAN melalui kerja sama jalur kereta dan jalur cepat, dan membangun konektivitas bilateral di maritim dan udara melalui kerja sama pelabuhan dan bandar udara (Hong, 2015, 2-3).

Konektivitas antara Yunnan dan Asia Tenggara telah tercapai. Terpisah dari rangkaian jalur kereta (jalur timur ke Vietnam, jalur tengah ke Vientiane di Laos dan jalur barat ke Myanmar), jalur pipa gas dan minyak saat ini telah berjalan antara pelabuhan Kyaukphyu di Myanmar dan Kunming. Dalam kasus Guangxi, proposal Zona Ekonomi Teluk Pan-Beibu (khususnya di barat daya Cina, termasuk wilayah Yunnan, Guizhou, Chongqing, dan Sichuan; serta bagian utara Semenanjung Indochina, meliputi wilayah utara Vietnam, Laos, dan Thailand) dan “Koridor Ekonomi Nanning-Singapura” telah memainkan peranan sangat aktif dalam mempromosikan konektivitas lintas-perbatasan di wilayah pesisir Teluk Beibu (Hong, 2015, 3).

Presiden Xi Jinping juga menegaskan dalam pidatonya di hadapan parlemen Indonesia pada Oktober 2013 bahwa “Cina akan memperkuat kerja sama maritim dengan ASEAN dan memajukan *partnership* maritim dengan ASEAN dalam rangka membangun Jalur Maritim Abad ke-21” (http://www.aseanchina-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm). Penekanan utama terletak pada kerja sama ekonomi yang lebih kuat, termasuk aspek finansial, kerjasama yang erat dalam proyek

patungan infrastruktur (pembangunan jalan raya dan jalur kereta) dan kerjasama teknis dan ilmiah dalam isu lingkungan. Proyek ini akan melibatkan konstruksi pelabuhan, *upgrading* pelabuhan, pembangunan pelayanan logistik dan pembentukan zona perdagangan bebas untuk meningkatkan perdagangan dan konektivitas antara pelabuhan internasional dan jalur perairan dalam. Oleh karena itu, beberapa kalangan ada yang menyebut proposal ini sebagai “Marshall Plan versi Cina” (Tiezzl, 2014). Namun, Marshall Plan diajukan oleh AS pada 1948 untuk membantu rekonstruksi ekonomi di Eropa, sedangkan Jalur Sutra Baru dimaksudkan untuk mempromosikan pembangunan ekonomi di wilayah-wilayah yang tertinggal secara ekonomi melalui kerjasama dan akan melibatkan lebih dari 60 negara. Terlebih lagi, proposal Cina ini lebih sulit diimplementasikan ketimbang Marshall Plan (Hong, 2015, 3).

Dalam pertemuan APEC di Bali pada Oktober 2013, Xi Jinping mengumumkan rencana pembentukan the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) yang akan mendanai mega proyek tersebut dan memfasilitasi pembangunan infrastruktur regional bersama dengan inisiasi Cina dalam kerangka dana kerja sama maritim Cina-ASEAN yang dibentuk pada tahun 2010. Kemudian, pada pertemuan APEC setahun kemudian, pada Oktober 2014, Xi Jinping mengumumkan dana Jalur Sutra sebesar US\$ 40 milyar yang akan digunakan untuk investasi di bidang infrastruktur dan pembangunan sumber daya alam bagi negara-negara tetangga Cina. AIIB akan memfokuskan pada “upgrading” infrastruktur pelabuhan dan pembangunan infrastruktur baru di wilayah untuk mengakomodasi meningkatnya permintaan yang berasal dari kerjasama perdagangan maritim. AIIB juga menargetkan infrastruktur maritim lainnya termasuk manufaktur perlengkapan produk laut. AIIB akan melengkapi peningkatan pembiayaan pembangunan bilateral Cina dan menghubungkan lebih banyak sumber daya dari negara-negara berkembang serta mengurangi batasan birokratis dan meningkatkan fleksibilitas (Jone-Wha, 2014).

DASAR PEMIKIRAN KEBIJAKAN JALUR SUTRA BARU CINA

Kebijakan luar negeri Cina dipandang sebagai produk dari tekanan internal dan eksternal. Begitupula dengan kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru yang dikeluarkan pemerintah Cina didasari oleh faktor domestik dan internasional. Meminjam pemikiran Rosenau (1974), faktor domestik yang dianalisis dalam tulisan ini difokuskan pada pembangunan ekonomi dan stabilitas politik. Sementara faktor internasional difokuskan pada kebijakan *Pivot to Asia*-nya Amerika Serikat yang mendorong pemerintah Cina mengeluarkan kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru.

Faktor Domestik


Kebijakan luar negeri Cina pasca wafatnya Mao Zedong banyak dipengaruhi oleh faktor domestik, tidak terkecuali kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina. Salah satu faktor pendorong dikeluarkannya kebijakan tersebut adalah situasi ekonomi yang dapat membahayakan Cina. Krisis ekonomi global dan permasalahan sosial domestik telah mengakibatkan model ekonomi yang bergantung pada ekspor dan *Foreign Direct Investment* (FDI) menjadi kurang efektif. Untuk mengatasi hal ini, Cina harus menemukan pasar ekspor baru atau menjaga pasar yang ada, serta mempersempit kesenjangan pembangunan antara wilayah pesisir yang kaya dengan wilayah daratan yang miskin serta menjaga stabilitas baik di dalam maupun di luar negeri. Hal ini merupakan dasar utama yang mendorong para pemimpin Cina mempromosikan gagasan Jalur Sutra Baru (Tatar, 2013, 2). Salah satu kawasan yang didekati oleh Cina untuk mempromosikan kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru adalah Asia Tengah dengan prioritas utama pada upaya menjamin pembangunan ekonomi dan stabilitas politik. Negara-negara Asia Tengah seperti Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan dan Tajikistan berbatasan dengan provinsi otonom Xinjiang (yang sering mengalami gejolak politik), dimana Xinjiang menempati ranking ke-25 provinsi termiskin dari 29 provinsi di Cina menurut data statistik tahun 2012 (Brugier, 2014, 2).

Mayoritas penduduk Xinjiang adalah Muslim Uyghur yang merupakan kelompok minoritas yang telah lama menuntut kemerdekaan teritorial. Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, terjadi peningkatan serangan teroris di wilayah itu dimana pemerintah Cina menyematkan atribut teroris kepada kelompok minoritas Uyghur. Termasuk aksi terorisme di stasiun Kunming pada Maret 2013 yang mengakibatkan tewasnya 29 jiwa dan sekitar 130 orang luka-luka. Dalam rangka mempertahankan integritas teritorialnya, pemerintah Cina telah melakukan perlawanan terhadap serangkaian aksi separatisme dan terorisme di wilayah Xinjiang. Untuk mengurangi gejolak domestik tersebut, Beijing mulai meninggalkan kebijakan “stabilitas politik di atas segalanya” yang diterapkan di provinsi Xinjiang hingga 2010, menjadi strategi pembangunan ekonomi regional (Brugier, 2014, 2).

Salah satu bagian dari strategi ini mencakup ekspor produk dari Xinjiang ke negara-negara tetangga Cina di Asia Tengah. Dengan pertimbangan bahwa 78% ekspor Xinjiang ditujukan ke negara-negara Asia Tengah, maka pembentukan “Sabuk Ekonomi Jalur Sutra” akan memungkinkan terjadinya konsolidasi jangka panjang dalam pusat ekspor di Asia Tengah khusus barang-barang Xinjiang, sehingga diharapkan dapat memberikan jaminan bagi pembangunan ekonomi di wilayah tersebut. Sebagai bagian dari pembangunan ekonomi tersebut, pemerintah Cina mengumumkan pembuatan kereta cepat dari Lanzhou ke Urumqi, ibukota Xinjiang. Diharapkan ke depannya, kereta tersebut dapat menjangkau wilayah regional seperti Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran dan Turki, serta wilayah Eropa Timur, yakni Bulgaria (Yousaf, 2014). (Lihat Gambar 2).

Untuk meningkatkan arus perdagangan antara Xinjiang dan negara-negara Asia Tengah, Beijing telah berinvestasi lebih dari US \$91 milyar dalam pembangunan infrastruktur di provinsi Barat Cina, termasuk jalan raya, tenaga *hydropower*, dan fasilitas industri utama. Investasi pemerintah

Gambar 2. Rencana Koridor Kereta Api yang Melewati Xinjiang



Sumber: "China Tables Railway Project Linking to Pakistan", dalam <http://www.dawn.com/news/1116104>, 30 Juni 2014, diunduh pada 31 Agustus 2015.


Cina dalam bidang infrastruktur negara-negara Asia Tengah, termasuk pembangunan kota-kota perbatasan, dirancang untuk menciptakan stabilitas di wilayah yang lebih luas baik secara ekonomi maupun politik. Sebagai upaya untuk meningkatkan keuntungan domestik bagi Xinjiang, perdagangan dan investasi merupakan alat utama dan realistis bagi Cina untuk mencapai tujuannya tanpa harus dipandang sebagai ancaman oleh pemerintah negara-negara Asia Tengah (Brugier, 2014, 3).

Faktor domestik lainnya yang mendorong kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina adalah keamanan energi. Antara tahun 1989 dan 2011, Cina menikmati rata-rata pertumbuhan ekonomi 10%, dan kebutuhan energinya juga meningkat. Beijing telah meninggalkan kemandirian energi pada tahun 1980an menjadi negara yang bergantung pada sumber eksternal untuk memenuhi setengah dari konsumsi domestiknya. Pada awal 2000an, Cina meningkatkan impor energinya dari Rusia

tiga kali lipat (lihat Tabel 1) dalam upaya untuk mengurangi ketergantungannya terhadap negara-negara Timur Tengah dan Afrika sub-Sahara. Hal ini dilakukan karena dua hal :*pertama*, transportasi energi dari kedua kawasan itu bergantung pada jalur maritim dimana acapkali menjadi target serangan bajak laut atau keterlambatan administratif dalam pengiriman suplai energi. *Kedua*, dua kawasan itu mengalami instabilitas politik yang dapat mengarah pada kekurangan suplai energy (Brugier, 2014, 3-4).

Namun perkembangan saat ini, Cina mulai khawatir akan ketergantungan energinya terhadap Rusia, dan mulai mencari sumber alternatif suplai energinya. Mengingat negara-negara Asia Tengah kaya akan sumber energi, Cina kemudian meningkatkan impor energinya ke negara-negara Asia Tengah, khususnya Kazakhstan dan Turkmenistan. Oleh karena itu, proyek Jalur Sutra Baru akan memberikan kesempatan bagi Cina untuk mengunci suplai energi dari partner barunya

Tabel 1. Impor Energi Cina dari Rusia 2000-2012



Source: United Nation COMtrade database

Sumber: Camille Brugier, "China's Way: The New Silk Road", *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, Mei 2014, hlm. 2.

di Asia Tengah. Hal ini juga memungkinkan Cina mengamankan dan meningkatkan jalur suplai untuk impor energi dari negara-negara Asia Tengah dan untuk mengurangi efek potensial dari pemutusan suplai dari Timur Tengah, Afrika atau Rusia (Brugier, 2014, 4).

Selain faktor keamanan energi, isu domestik yang mendorong implementasi kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina adalah keinginan Beijing untuk menjamin pasar ekspor dan diversifikasi jaringan transportasinya. Isu ini telah dikemukakan Xi Jinping dalam lawatannya ke Asia Tengah, khususnya mengenai instabilitas di jalur perairan Asia Selatan dan Asia Tenggara. Salah satu persoalan pelik yang dihadapi Cina adalah Selat Malaka, dimana terjadi peningkatan serangan perompak, peredaran ilegal dan persoalan maritim yang belum terselesaikan. Hampir 85% impor Cina dikirimkan melalui jalur ini, termasuk 80% impor energi Cina (Umana, 2012, 3, 5, 14).

Selat Malaka merupakan salah satu pesisir laut tersibuk menuju Malaysia, Indonesia, dan Singapura. Cina tidak hanya berupaya menjaga jalur laut tersebut namun juga berupaya memajukan transportasi darat atau menemukan jalanlain untuk mencapai akses ke Teluk Bengal

dan Lautan Hindia dengan memotong jalur Malaka. Hal ini menjadi alasan bagi Cina untuk mengikat hubungan dengan Myanmar, yang dipandang sebagai gerbang menuju Teluk Bengal dan Lautan Hindia. Begitupula dengan hubungan Cina dengan Pakistan. Kerja sama erat dengan Pakistan dalam proyek infrastruktur seperti jalan raya, jalur kereta api, dan pipa gas, serta keputusan Pakistan memberikan kontrol dan manajemen operasional pelabuhan Gwadar di lautan Arabia kepada perusahaan Cina, menawarkan akses ke Teluk Persia dan seluruh kawasan Timur Tengah. Gwadar merupakan bagian dari Koridor Ekonomi Cina-Pakistan, dimana Cina telah menandatangani perjanjian investasi pada April 2015 sebesar US\$48 milyar, atau seperlima dari GDP pertahun Pakistan dan 10 kali lipat dari investasi AS di Pakistan (Guidetti, 2015, 6).

Pemerintah Cina juga akan berinvestasi di kanal Thailand (Kanal Kra), memotong jalur melalui Thailand selatan untuk menghemat 48 jam waktu pengapalan melewati jalur transit antara Asia dan Eropa, yang juga digunakan sebagai rute untuk menghindari Selat Malaka. Melalui peningkatan kerjasama dengan negara-negara tersebut, Cina tidak hanya berupaya menghindari

Malaka dan mengurangi ketergantungan pada transportasi laut, namun juga membangun jaringan transportasi darat (jalan raya, jalur kereta api, dan pipa gas) untuk menjamin suplai energi dan bahan mentah yang stabil dari Asia Tengah dan Timur Tengah (Tatar, 2013, 5).

Faktor Internasional

Dalam tulisan ini, kebijakan Amerika Serikat merupakan faktor dominan yang mempengaruhi kebijakan Cina mengingat rivalitas kedua negara tersebut dalam bidang ekonomi dan militer. Faktor Amerika Serikat dipandang lebih signifikan bila dibandingkan dengan negara-negara lain yang berada di kawasan Asia Timur maupun negara-negara di kawasan Asia Tenggara.

Bagi Amerika Serikat, kehadiran Cina yang semakin intensif di kawasan Asia mengindikasikan obsesi kekuasaan global Beijing. Namun demikian, jika dianalisis sebenarnya pengaruh Cina yang semakin kuat di Asia merupakan respons terhadap kebijakan “pivot to Asia-Pacific”-nya Amerika Serikat. Presiden Barack Obama mengumumkan kebijakan tersebut pada tahun 2011 yang juga dikenal sebagai kebijakan “*rebalance toward Asia*”. Kebijakan *pivot* tersebut mencakup keamanan dan ekonomi, dengan mengatur kembali 60% kekuatan udara dan laut AS ke Asia hingga 2020, mengepung Cina, dan melakukan negosiasi dengan negara-negara sekutu perihal perjanjian *Trans-Pacific Partnership*, tanpa melibatkan Cina. Efek dari kebijakan *containment* ini adalah mencegah Cina memperluas pengaruhnya ke wilayah Timur dan Selatan Cina (Cheng, 2015).

Meski AS melakukan kebijakan *pivot to Asia*, hal ini tidak menghentikan upaya diplomatik Cina ke wilayah barat. Upaya diplomatik ini dapat dipandang sebagai perluasan pengaruh politik Cina di tingkat internasional. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari rangkaian kunjungan luar negeri pemimpin Cina dalam forum internasional seperti APEC, ASEAN, dan *East Asia Summit* (EAS) di Indonesia dan Brunei pada September 2013. Absennya Presiden Barack Obama dalam forum internasional

tersebut karena alasan persoalan anggaran dengan Kongres AS dimanfaatkan dengan baik oleh Cina untuk meningkatkan pengaruhnya di kawasan Asia Pasifik. Upaya pemimpin Cina menarik dukungan negara-negara lain untuk menyelesaikan negosiasi pada tahun 2015, terkait *Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership* (RCEP) yang diprakarsai Cina - sebuah perjanjian yang dipandang sebagai *counter-balance* terhadap Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) yang diprakarsai AS - merupakan contoh meningkatnya pengaruh dan posisi regional Cina. Di luar batas wilayah baratnya, Beijing juga tertarik untuk membendung (*hedging*) upaya Rusia untuk memperluas kembali pengaruhnya di negara-negara *post-Soviet* melalui pembentukan Customs Union yang diprakarsai Moskow (Tatar, 2013, 4).

Selain itu, Cina juga berupaya memperbaiki hubungannya dengan negara-negara tetangganya di Asia Timur, seperti Jepang. Hal ini ditegaskan oleh Menteri Luar Negeri Cina Wang Yi dalam pidato tahunannya pada 11 Desember 2014 yang menekankan pada meningkatnya peran Cina dalam ekonomi global, capaian ekonomi Cina melalui institusi multilateral baru, diplomasi ke negara-negara tetangga dan langkah Cina di tahun 2015. Dibanding pidatonya pada tahun 2013, Wang mengemukakan pernyataan yang lebih halus dengan retorika nasionalistik Cina dan memberikan sinyal bahwa Cina secara perlahan-lahan namun pasti akan memperbaiki hubungan dengan Jepang dan negara tetangga lainnya, seraya tetap berupaya menekan pengaruh AS di Asia (Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2014).

Wang juga menegaskan bahwa Cina telah membentuk kemitraan dengan 67 negara dan 5 organisasi regional dengan “membentuk kemitraandan bukan aliansi”. Perbedaan kemitraan dan aliansi ini muncul ketika Cina mengkritisi sistem aliansi AS di Asia sebagai sebuah “pemikiran Perang Dingin” dan bertujuan membendung Cina (Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2014). Para pemimpin Cina akan terus mengkritisi aliansi AS pada tahun 2015 mengingat meningkatnya ketegangan maritim

dengan sekutu AS. Dasar pemikiran inilah yang mendorong pemerintah Cina di bawah Xi Jinping secara serius berupaya mengimplementasikan kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru dengan penekanan pada kemitraan dan bukan aliansi. Para pemimpin Cina melihat pertumbuhan ekonomi sebagai aset besar politik luar negeri dengan meningkatkan hubungan dengan negara mitra di seluruh dunia melalui kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru.

IMPLIKASI TERHADAP HEGEMONI AMERIKA SERIKAT

Selama 25 tahun, kebijakan AS terhadap Cina merupakan kombinasi antara pendekatan “*engaging*” dan “*hedging*”. Pendekatan ini menyeimbangkan antara kerjasama dan ketegangan yang bertujuan untuk mengontrol kebangkitan Cina. Menurut Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick pada 2005, tujuan “*engaging*” adalah untuk membuat Cina menjadi “*responsible stake holder*” serta mau mematuhi aturan main yang ditetapkan oleh tatanan dunia Barat yang berlaku pasca Perang Dunia II. Secara bersamaan, AS mengembangkan kebijakan “*hedging*” yang bertujuan mengkonsolidasi posisi AS di Pasifik Barat melalui jaringan aliansi dan kemitraan, dengan ekspektasi bahwa kebangkitan Cina yang dideklarasikan berjalan damai, akan menimbulkan tantangan terhadap dominasi AS di Asia Timur. Perubahan kebijakan AS terhadap Cina bukan fenomena baru. Hal ini dimulai tatkala kekuatan ekonomi dan politik Cina mulai melampaui batas wilayah Cina dan negara-negara tetangganya. Pasca Perang Dingin, pemeliharaan jaringan aliansi militer AS di Pasifik Utara merupakan indikasi pertama bahwa perhatian AS akan kembali ke Asia timur dan setelah peristiwa Tiananmen 1989, politik luar negeri AS difokuskan pada Cina ketimbang ke negara-negara bekas Uni Soviet (Guidetti, 2015, 3).

Perjanjian nuklir AS-India pada tahun 2006 sebagai kemitraan baru antara dua negara dipandang sebagai sinyal penyesuaian posisi AS di Indo-Asia-Pasifik. Pasca krisis finansial 2008, di saat Cina mencapai kedudukan sebagai ekonomi

terbesar kedua dunia pada 2010, pemerintahan Obama mendeklarasikan kebijakan “*pivot*” atau “*rebalancing*” to Asia” pada tahun 2011. Meskipun kebijakan “*pivot to Asia*” memberikan penekanan pada kawasan Asia-Pasifik dan menekankan pentingnya mendekatkan Cina, namun tujuan utamanya adalah mengurangi pengaruh ekonomi dan politik Cina dan membendung perluasan militernya. Salah satu dari dua pilar kebijakan “*rebalancing*” AS adalah the *Trans-Pacific Partnership* (TPP). TPP merupakan proyek ambisius yang menetapkan standar tinggi bagi perdagangan Asia Pasifik tanpa melibatkan Cina, yang bertujuan menciptakan blok perdagangan baru di kawasan itu. Pilar kedua adalah reposisi AS sebagai aktor militer utama dan pusat jaringan perluasan aliansi militer dan kemitraan di kawasan Asia Pasifik. Dengan kata lain, strategi AS tersebut menunjukkan peningkatan perhatian AS terhadap kebangkitan Cina dan keinginan AS untuk membalasnya (Guidetti, 2015, 3).

Sejak saat itu, AS mempersepsikan bahwa kebangkitan Cina tidak sedamai dan sehalus yang dideklarasikan Cina. Indikasi ini terlihat dalam sengketa di Laut Cina Selatan, dimana diawali perbedaan batas maritim lama meningkat menjadi sengketa teritorial antara Cina dan Jepang (sengketa pulau Senkaku/Diaoyutai di Laut Cina Timur), Vietnam, Filipina dan negara Asia Tenggara lainnya (di Laut Cina Selatan). Sengketa teritorial ini menggambarkan peningkatan ketegangan regional akibat klaim kedaulatan maritim. Jika dianalisis lebih dalam, isu ini bukan hanya sekedar sengketa kepemilikan pulau, bebatuan dengan kekayaan alam di bawahnya dan pulau buatan yang dibangun oleh Cina, Vietnam, dan Filipina di Laut Cina Selatan, bersamaan dengan instalasi militer dan sipil. Namun lebih dari itu, isu ini merupakan upaya dominasi Cina atas wilayah laut terdekatnya, maritim Asia Timur dan Pasifik Barat (Guidetti, 2015, 3).

Dalam kontes *zero-sum* atas dominasi regional, AS ingin menjaga status quo “*Pax Americana*” bersama dengan supremasi atas

kawasan Asia Pasifik. Namun, meningkatnya kapabilitas militer Cina menguji ekspektasi AS di kawasan tersebut. Beijing telah meningkatkan perlengkapan laut non-militer untuk mendukung klaim teritorialnya di Laut Cina. Lebih jauh, Cina telah mengembangkan kapabilitas *anti-ship ballistic missiles*, yang mengakibatkan intervensi AS di kawasan (khususnya Taiwan) menjadi berbahaya dan memakan biaya. Dalam pandangan analis militer AS, langkah Cina ini mengakibatkan “Pax Americana” menjadi berkurang di Asia Timur. Anggaran militer Cina (US\$ 146 milyar di 2015) masih seperempat dari anggaran militer AS, namun hal ini sudah menjadikan Cina menjadi superior dibandingkan gabungan anggaran militer Jepang, India, dan Korea Selatan (Guidetti, 2015, 3) (Lihat Gambar 3).

Kekhawatiran Washington akan kebangkitan Cina ini cukup beralasan. Hal ini dapat ditelusuri melalui Buku Putih Pertahanan Cina 2015, yang dalam hal ini untuk pertama kalinya, Cina mengakui ambisinya atas lautan terbuka. Menurut pejabat militer Cina, hal ini mencerminkan fakta bahwa *“China has made it a strategic goal to become a maritime power; therefore, we need to build a strong navy (...) Offshore-waters defense alone can no longer provide effective defense of the country’s maritime*

interests.” (Denyer, 2015). Buku Putih tersebut dapat dikatakan sebagai “blueprint” untuk meraih hegemoni regional secara perlahan. Hal ini menegaskan rasa percaya diri Cina atas meningkatnya kapabilitas militernya di daratan dan lautan.

Langkah Cina mengkonsolidasi klaim teritorialnya di “lautan terdekatnya” dan mengabaikan tuntutan AS untuk menghentikan aktivitas konstruksinya merupakan sinyal bahwa supremasi AS sudah tidak sekuat dahulu. Namun, dalam kunjungannya ke Asia Timur, Menteri Pertahanan AS, Ashton Carter, memberi peringatan kepada Beijing dan menjamin negara-negara sekutu dan mitranya bahwa AS tidak akan melepaskan supremasinya:


“There should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, as we do all around the world (...) The US will remain the principal security power in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come.” (Whitlock, 2015).

Peta di atas menunjukkan kekuatan AS di negara-negara sekutu dan mitra yang mengelilingi wilayah Cina. Peta tersebut biasa dilihat di kantor-kantor pemerintahan dan lembaga think-tanks Cina. Seorang analis AS, James Fallows saat berkunjung ke Cina mendapat pertanyaan: “How

Gambar 3. Anggaran Militer Cina 2006-2015

Chinese defense budgets since 2006

In billions of U.S. dollars



Sumber: Simon Denyer, “Chinese Military Sets Course to Expand Global Reach”, *The Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinese-military-sets-course-to-expand-global-reach-as-national-interests-grow/2015/05/26/395fff14-3fb1-4056-aed0-264ffcbdb4_story.html, 26 Mei 2015, diunduh pada 3 September 2015.

would you Americans feel if China had forces staged in Canada and Mexico? [By which they mean the encampments in Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere.] How would you react if we sold attack aircraft to a regime committed to your destruction? [By which they mean Taiwan.]". Yang ditekankan dari pertanyaan ini adalah bukan pada seberapa akurat dan seimbang pandangan dunia Cina. Melainkan, pertanyaan tersebut dilontarkan untuk mengingatkan pihak Amerika bahwa hal berbeda akan muncul dalam perspektif Cina, dan mengapa mereka menyatakan bahwa "*American rules*" tidak adil bagi Cina (Fallows, 2015).

Apabila dianalisis, meningkatnya kapabilitas militer Cina menimbulkan persepsi di Washington bahwa Cina bermaksud mendorong militer AS keluar dari wilayah maritim Asia Timur. Persepsi ini semakin berkembang dengan adanya publikasi buku karya mantan perwira militer Cina, Kolonel Liu Mingfu, tahun 2010 berjudul

"The China Dream". Liu mengungkapkan impian negaranya, "*It has been China's dream for a century to become the world's leading nation*". Karya Liu Mingfu kemungkinan besar menginspirasi visi "China Dream" Presiden Xi Jinping yang diimplementasikan ke dalam kebijakan Jalan Sutra Baru (Guidetti, 2015, 3).

Terdapat pandangan bahwa Jalan Sutra Baru merupakan pertarungan pertama dalam kompetisi dominasi di Eurasia antara Washington dan Beijing. Bahkan lebih jauh lagi, George Soros memperingatkan akan munculnya perang nuklir antara kedua negara besar tersebut (Berke 2015). Jika Cina berhasil menghubungkan industrinya yang tengah meningkat dengan sumber daya alam yang besar di jantung kota (*heartland*) Eurasia, maka bisa saja terjadi seperti yang diprediksikan oleh ahli geopolitik Sir Halford Mackinder, pada 1904, "*Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island..Who rules the World Island commands the World*". Kemungkinan ini tentu saja tidak diinginkan oleh Washington.

Gambar 4. Peta Kekuatan AS di Negara-negara Sekutu dan Mitra



Sumber : James Fallows, "Just How Great a Threat is China?", dalam <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/about-the-china-threat-on-the-35th-of-may/394988/>, 4 Juni 2015, diunduh pada 3 September 2015.

Washington melihat bahwa kebijakan Jalan Sutra Baru, termasuk institusi keuangannya (AIIB) sebagai ancaman potensial bagi tatanan internasional, berdasarkan tiga alasan : *pertama*, institusi tersebut akan menduplikasi jaringan institusi keuangan yang telah ada, yakni the World Bank dan the Asian Development Bank, serta melemahkan institusi-institusi tersebut dengan menurunkan standar tata kelola internasional. *Kedua*, institusi ini dapat melemahkan sistem internasional berbasis mata uang dollar, dengan memperkuat mata uang Cina, Renminbi, sebagai aset perdagangan global. *Ketiga*, institusi ini akan menciptakan sistem keuangan tandingan yang dapat meminggirkan tatanan internasional dari tata kelola global (Guidetti, 2015).

Oleh karena itu, tidak mengherankan bila Washington tidak nyaman dengan adanya kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru dan keberadaan AIIB yang diprediksi dapat memajukan sentralitas ekonomi dan politik Cina dari Asia Timur hingga ke Timur Tengah dan Eropa. Bagi Washington, meningkatnya ketegangan di Laut Cina (Selatan dan Timur) dan meningkatnya ekonomi Cina, termasuk kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina dipandang sebagai tantangan terhadap supremasi AS di Asia Timur.

Hal ini menyebabkan munculnya seruan terhadap Washington untuk mengubah kebijakan AS terhadap Cina. Seruan ini muncul dalam laporan *the US Council on Foreign Relations* (CFR) yang menyerukan “grand strategy” baru terhadap Cina yang difokuskan pada upaya mengimbangi kebangkitan Cina ketimbang membantu memperbesar kekuatannya. Strategi tersebut didesain untuk membatasi bahaya dari kekuatan geoekonomi dan militer Cina terhadap kepentingan nasional AS di Asia dan global, meski AS dan sekutunya mempertahankan interaksi ekonomi dan diplomatik dengan Cina. Laporan tersebut juga merekomendasikan beberapa langkah : (i) Revitalisasi ekonomi AS, (ii) Memperkuat militer AS, (iii) Memperluas jaringan perdagangan Asia (melalui TPP), (iv) Menciptakan rezim kontrol-teknologi, (v)

Mengimplementasikan kebijakan-kebijakan Siber (*Cyber*), 6) Mendorong kemitraan Indo-Pasifik, dan 7) memperkuat diplomasi tingkat tinggi dengan Beijing. Secara spesifik, untuk poin kedua, laporan ini merekomendasikan peningkatan anggaran militer AS dan mendorong kuat kehadiran angkatan laut dan udara AS di Laut Cina Selatan dan Laut Cina Timur, serta mempertahankan keseimbangan nuklir antara AS dan Cina, terutama ketika Cina meningkatkan kapabilitasnya (Blackwill & Tellis, 2015).

Meskipun terdapat seruan untuk merevisi “grand strategy” AS menjadi lebih konfrontatif terhadap Cina, namun terdapat pula seruan yang menginginkan AS lebih mengedepankan “engagement” dengan Cina. Dalam kaitan dengan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina, inisiatif ini tidak hanya memberikan tantangan namun juga peluang bagi Washington. Bagi para pendukung kebijakan “engagement”, kebijakan “containment” yang dijalankan Washington tidak akan bekerja dengan baik. Hal ini mengingat kapasitas manufaktur, pasar domestik, dan cadangan devisa Cina cukup besar untuk menciptakan pusat kekuatannya sendiri. Beberapa negara kemungkinan akan menolak untuk mendukung kebijakan “containment”, seperti terlihat adanya beberapa negara yang mengabaikan masukan AS untuk menolak keanggotaan AIIB. Meski terdapat penentangan AS atas terbentuknya AIIB, banyak kekuatan ekonomi lainnya, yakni sekitar 57 negara yang mendaftarkan diri sebagai anggota pendiri. Namun, ada pula negara sekutu AS, yakni Australia dan Korea Selatan, yang menolak bergabung dengan AIIB, setelah dilakukan lobi oleh Washington. Oleh karena itu, bagi para pendukung kebijakan “engagement”, tidak bijak bagi politisi AS untuk terus membendung meningkatnya kekuatan Cina (Cheng, 2015).

Kebangkitan Cina, juga kebangkitan kekuatan dunia lainnya seperti India dan Brazil tidak dapat dihentikan. Pidato Obama dalam *State of the Union Address* 2015 dan perdebatan di kongres dalam hal perdagangan, menunjukkan kurang mampunya Washington menawarkan visi

global dengan menyatakan bahwa para pembuat kebijakan AS harus menjamin AS, bukan Cina, untuk membuat aturan ekonomi global. Dalam kepemimpinan global, sebaiknya AS memberi kesempatan bagi Cina untuk berpartisipasi lebih setara dalam memperbarui aturan dan mengakui bahwa meningkatnya pengaruh Cina memberikan kebaikan bagi Washington.

Jika kebijakan “Sabuk Ekonomi Jalur Sutra Baru Cina” berhasil diimplementasikan, akan membantu “*capital gap*” di seluruh negara Eurasia yang membutuhkan infrastruktur, kemajuan ekonomi dan institusi politik. Wilayah yang lebih maju akan mampu menciptakan peluang ekonomi kepada setiap orang, termasuk pebisnis dan pekerja AS. Keberhasilan kebijakan tersebut juga diprediksi akan mampu meredakan terorisme dan radikalisme. Meskipun muncul keraguan bahwa kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina akan mengurangi nilai-nilai universal utama dan standar internasional dalam hal lingkungan dan tenaga kerja, hal ini harusnya menjadi peluang bagi AS untuk menunjukkan kepemimpinannya dan tetap menjadi aktor utama arsitektur ekonomi global di Abad ke-21. Namun yang perlu ditekankan bahwa “aktor utama” ini harus bekerja dengan “aktor” lainnya ketimbang bekerja sendiri. Seperti yang diungkapkan oleh wakil Menteri Luar Negeri Cina, Fu Ying:

“The United States...has mixed feelings toward China’s rising international status. It remains ambivalent concerning China-proposed initiatives such as the land and maritime Silk Road Initiatives and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. ...however, ... there is a wide belief among the American think tanks that no convincing reasons exist for the United States not to support or participate in these initiatives.” (Berke, 2015).

PENUTUP

Kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina yang juga dikenal sebagai kebijakan “*One Belt, One Road*” ini merupakan kebijakan luar negeri dari negara “*middle power*” yang kekuatan militer dan ekonominya meningkat dan diprediksikan dapat mengancam tatanan internasional yang didominasi

AS. Jalur Sutra Baru yang mencakup dua aspek, yakni daratan (*new Silk Road Economic Belt*) dan lautan (*Maritime Silk Road*) merupakan perpaduan kekuatan geopolitik dan geoekonomi yang diluncurkan Cina untuk menghubungkan wilayah Eurasia dengan Cina sebagai pusatnya.

Meskipun dalam beberapa forum internasional para pemimpin Cina menjamin bahwa kebijakan luar negeri Cina akan berjalan damai tanpa menimbulkan konflik, namun jika melihat sikap agresif Cina di Laut Cina Selatan dan Laut Cina Timur, justru menimbulkan kekhawatiran masyarakat internasional akan kehadiran Cina sebagai ancaman di kawasan Asia Pasifik. Oleh karena itu, kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina ini juga merupakan langkah untuk mengurangi kekhawatiran masyarakat internasional akan kebangkitan kekuatan militer dan ekonomi Cina.

Sebagai sebuah kebijakan luar negeri, Jalur Sutra Baru Cina dipengaruhi oleh faktor domestik dan internasional. Faktor-faktor domestik seperti pembangunan ekonomi (domestik dan regional) dan stabilitas politik, keamanan energi, pasar ekspor dan diversifikasi transportasi, turut mendorong Beijing untuk segera mengimplementasikan kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina. Selain itu, faktor internasional, yakni kebijakan “*pivot to Asia*” yang dilancarkan pemerintahan Obama untuk membendung (*contain*) kekuatan Cina di Asia juga berpengaruh signifikan dalam proses pembuatan kebijakan luar negeri Cina. Sebagai respons atas kebijakan Washington tersebut, kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru akhirnya diluncurkan oleh Cina sebagai langkah untuk mengimbangi kekuatan AS di Asia Pasifik.

Implikasi dari kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina terhadap AS terlihat melalui respons para pejabat Washington yang memandang kebijakan tersebut sebagai ancaman sekaligus peluang. Bagi mereka yang memandang sebagai sebuah ancaman, manuver-manuver dilakukan Washington untuk membendung Cina dengan melobi beberapa negara, termasuk Australia dan Korea Selatan untuk membatalkan dan

menolak kerja sama dengan Cina. Bagi mereka yang memandang sebagai peluang, memberikan tanggapan positif dengan memandang bahwa Washington dapat meraih keuntungan ekonomi dari kebijakan Jalur Sutra Baru Cina. Mengingat implementasi Jalur Sutra Baru Cina melibatkan banyak negara-negara di kawasan Eurasia, tentunya hal ini merupakan pekerjaan rumah yang besar dan berisiko bagi Beijing untuk merealisasikan “*the China dream*” tersebut. Apabila kebijakan “*One Belt, One Road*” ini berhasil diimplementasikan, bukan mustahil Cina akan mampu menjadi kekuatan dunia, seperti halnya Inggris dan Amerika Serikat sebelumnya.

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THE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF QUAKE MANAGEMENT POLICY IN CHINA: FROM TANGSHAN, SICHUAN, TO YUNNAN

Sejarah Kebijakan Penanganan Gempa di Cina: Studi Tangshan Sichuan dan Yunnan

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ABSTRAK

*Gempa bumi merupakan bencana alam yang kerap memakan banyak korban jiwa dan memperlambat laju perekonomian di Tiongkok. Dua bencana gempa terbesar yang menimpa Tiongkok di abad ke-20 adalah Tangshan di tahun 1976 dan Sichuan di tahun 2008. Namun demikian, paling tidak terdapat empat gempa besar yang menimpa Tiongkok dalam lima tahun terakhir. Terkait dengan hal tersebut, manajemen penanganan bencana menjadi hal terpenting yang harus dikelola secara profesional oleh Pemerintah Tiongkok dalam rangka meminimalisir dampak dari bencana yang terjadi. Fokus dalam penelitian ini ialah berbagai kebijakan yang dikeluarkan oleh Pemerintah Tiongkok terkait dengan penanganan bencana gempa bumi dan efektifitas pelaksanaannya di lapangan. Beberapa penelitian mengenai manajemen bencana di Tiongkok telah dilakukan oleh Divisi Asia Pasifik, Pusat Penelitian Sumberdaya Regional LIPI sejak tahun 2010 sampai dengan tahun 2015. Beberapa hasil penelitian mengenai kebencanaan di Tiongkok di antaranya adalah *Disaster Management in China: History and Institutional Networks* pada tahun 2010 dan *The Representation of Sichuan Earthquake: State Control, Museum, and The Role of the Army* pada tahun 2011. Selanjutnya, melalui wawancara mendalam dan studi literatur, artikel ini mendiskusikan dua pertanyaan utama, yaitu bagaimana sejarah pembentukan kebijakan terkait penanganan gempa di Tiongkok, dan bagaimana efektifitas pelaksanaan kebijakan tersebut pada empat gempa yang terjadi di Tiongkok, yaitu Tangshan (1976), Sichuan (2008), Qinghai (2010) dan Yunnan (2014). Tulisan ini mengklaim bahwa kebijakan dan aturan yang dikeluarkan pemerintah terkait dengan manajemen bencana di Tiongkok tergolong efektif dan sukses, namun demikian masih terdapat gap informasi dan minimnya koordinasi antar-institusi yang terkait di dalamnya.*

Kata Kunci: gempa Tangshan, gempa Sichuan, manajemen bencana, Tiongkok

ABSTRACT

The earthquake is one of the deadliest natural disasters that hinder economic progress in China. The two biggest 20th century catastrophic quakes occurred in China are Tangshan in 1976 and Sichuan in 2008. Additionally, there are at least four massive earthquakes that struck China in the last five years. Hence, the disaster management is one of the main factor to be seriously administered by the Chinese government, both in the central level as well as to the regional and local level. Therefore, this paper aims to examine some policies issued by the Chinese government in the context of earthquake management and its effectiveness. The discussions on disaster management in China have been deeply explored by Asia Pacific Research Team at The Research Center for Regional Resources LIPI and published under the title of *Disaster Management in China: History and Institutional Networks* in 2010. Furthermore, the research team also conducted a research on the Sichuan earthquake and published a monograph entitled *The Representation of Sichuan Earthquake: State Control, Museum, and The Role of the Army*. We conduct both some in-depth interview and literature review concerning the historical process of initiating some earthquake policies, and its practical effectiveness. This paper discusses the disaster management based on various policies and responses of two contemporary deadliest quake in Tangshan (1976) and Sichuan (2008), and two recent earthquakes occurred in Qinghai (2010) and Yunnan (2014). The paper claims that policies and regulations issued by the government in disaster management in China are successful to some extent though there is a lack of coordination, and some informational gaps in the existing institutions.

Keywords: Tangshan earthquake, Sichuan earthquake, disaster management, China.

INTRODUCTION

China suffers from various types of a high frequency's natural disasters. In particular, since the 1990s, the impact of material losses from natural disasters are increasing, and indeed it turns into one major factor that hinder economic progress in China (UNISDR 2005). The earthquake is one among those various factors. Since 1949, the earthquake has claimed more than 300,000 lives, caused 1 million injured and physical disabilities, and destroyed 10 million homes, government buildings and public facilities. The two deadliest China's catastrophic quakes in the 20th century are Tangshan in 1976 and Sichuan in 2008. The magnitude of Tangshan earthquake was 7.8 on the Richter scale, where 242,000 people are killed and 164,000 people are wounded. Meanwhile, the Sichuan earthquake, which occurred three months prior to the Olympic Games in 2008, caused a deep sorrow to most Chinese. The disaster killed approximately 69,197 people, injured nearly 374,176 persons, and causing 18,263 people are missing (Zhang, 2008, 6). Additionally, more than 15 million homes destroyed, implying 10 million homeless citizens, 1.5 million individuals are displaced, and entailing more than US\$ 20 billion material loss. It is the worst natural disaster striking China since the Tangshan earthquake in 1976.

Furthermore, the world has been witnessed five massive earthquakes that struck China in the last five years. Firstly, it was on August 30, 2008 in which case the southwestern region of Sichuan are struck off by the 6.1 Richter scale earthquake, and killing 38 people. In 2010, the earthquake shook the area of Yushu, Qinghai, with the magnitude of 7.1 on the Richter scales. 1,944 people are killed as a consequence of the disaster. On September 7, 2012, an earthquake hit the region of southwest China, mainly in the border between Yunnan and Guizho provinces. Although the victims are not as many as in 2010, namely around 43 people are death, but more than 100,000 people homeless and economic losses are quite serious. Subsequently, on April 20,

2013, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale jolted Sichuan, mainly in the city of Ya'an, southwest of Beijing. The death toll was nearly 200 people and 2,600 people are injured. In 2014, Ludian region, in Yunnan province, rocked once again by the 6.1 magnitude quake. The quake took 410 life and harmed 2,373 people (Tempo, 2013).

THE FORMATION OF MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING EARTHQUAKE POLICIES IN CHINA: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Actually, the earthquakes that arise, either as a result of the movement of tectonic plates, as well as due to volcanic influence, do not harm humans. However, the earthquake ignites further damages, either in terms of infrastructural destruction or tsunami waves by which triggering many casualties. Stallings (2005, 263) as cited by Perry (2005, 8) conceives a disaster as a "social situation" caused by the destruction of non-routine due to the forces of nature. Therefore, the natural forces that caused the disaster eventually ruining normal activities, and furthermore, collapsing the social order that has been established. Therefore, some destructive earthquakes challenge the social system of affected society. This is as happened on Tangshan earthquake. Due to the hit, the city was falling apart and all social activities were collapsed. The city requires more than five years to restores its social order. As well as Tangshan, the Beichuan city, as a center of the quake epicenter, also faced a similar situation in which case all of its social activities are ruinous. The government decided to replace the city into a new area and left behind the previous spot. It took three years for the government to relocate and to re-establish the social order in a new Beichuan city. As a means of lesson learned and memorial site, the ruined city is then transformed by the central government into a living museum (Carbonneau, 2011; Liangen, 2010). Since the earthquake hits China repeatedly, an alert system to cope with the quake itself should be constructed and well prepared. As Jan Smith says "they are part of

nature, have happened in the past and will happen again...” (Smith, 2003).

An academic explanation of the fragile China is the intra-plate tectonic energy which could be understood as an after-effect of the collision between the Eurasian plate and the Indo-Australian plate in the Himalayas (Ross, 1984, 774). Therefore, the disaster management is the main factor to be administered comprehensively by the Chinese government.

The discussions on disaster management in China have been explored by the Asia Pacific Research Team at the Research Center for Regional Resources LIPI in the project of *Disaster Management in China: History and Institutional Networks* in 2010. Furthermore, the research team also conducted a research on the Sichuan earthquake in the project of *the Representation of Sichuan Earthquake: State Control, Museum, and The Role of the Army*. Riskianingrum (2011) explains, that as a response of the tragedy, the Chinese government and the private entrepreneurs initiated the earthquake museum Anren and Beichuan in order to commemorating the catastrophe as well as for the lesson learns to the whole country. Therefore, this paper pays attention to the historical development of policies made by the Chinese government in the context of earthquake management and its effectiveness in coping them. The questions are: what is the historical process of initiating policies concerning earthquakes in China? Did those policies apply effectively? This paper discusses two deadliest quakes in modern time, namely Tangshan (1976) and Sichuan (2008) and examines two latest earthquakes occurred in China, Qinghai (2010) and Yunnan (2014) based on some literature reviews, several in-depth interviews, and an on-site visit to Sichuan.

Col (2007) explains that in 1976, prior to the Tangshan earthquake occurred, the government has set up an office for the earthquake monitoring, in charge of designing the proper procedures for rescuing people, training government officials, as

well as simulating the earthquake mitigation to the local community. Furthermore, two weeks prior to the Tangshan earthquake, the local seismologists detect an abnormal signal in the Beijing-Tianjin-Bohai-Zhangjiakou regions that they thought as a possible earthquake. Accordingly, on July 24, 1976, the Qinglong party officials responded to the presentation of the seismologists, and held a preparatory meeting. Furthermore, the party officials strengthened the coordination system, information, and leadership among relevant agencies in order to monitor the situation. They also disseminated information to the public in the area of Qinglong about the probability of an earthquake, and placing medical devices in some spots. On 25 and 26 July, with the assistance from volunteers, the local government held an emergency meeting involving the local communities in the region to teach them how to escape if an earthquake occurs, including encouraging people not to close and lock their doors at night so that they could easily save themselves whenever they felt the tremor. As a result, when the earthquake struck Tangshan on July 28, 1976 at 3:42 AM, there was only one victim died in this region due to a heart attack despite 180,000 flattened buildings although the area was quite close to the epicenter of the quake (Col, 2007; Lo, 2014, xiii-xv).

This condition shows the responsive action of Qinglong’s government, as they are aware with the potential earthquake, has saved many lives. Beside providing counseling and education on how to deal with earthquakes, the Qinglong’s government actions ranged from conducting the geological data collection to predict the strength of earthquake, establishing some seismology offices in the region in order to monitor the movement of the earth, and publishing some regulations on the rescue and evacuation activities during the earthquake. Moreover, the existence of public awareness about the earthquake, in which case they followed the instructions given by the local government, has saved them from deathly earthquake (Lo, 2014). Therefore, it could be concluded that the positive cooperation between

the local government, society and geologists is effective in coping the locals with the earthquake, and reducing the number of victims.

At the beginning of its establishment in 1949, the Chinese government mostly focused on the welfare of its people. Under the reign of Mao, the Chinese government tried to align themselves with other developed countries through various economic policies, such as land reform, Anti-Movement Three (San Fan) and Anti-Movement Five (Wu Fan). Those policies are essentially against corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency, and suppressing the five kinds of crimes, namely bribery, not paying taxes, stealing the state funds, deceiving contracts with the government, and misusing the economic information of state property. Furthermore, Mao also focused on developing heavy industry in order to generate the Chinese economy through massive industrialization and exploiting the cheap labor. This is well known by the people as the Great Leap Forward (Meisner, 1998 p. 80-90). Despite the success of these programs, the economic and political issues still be the main purpose of Mao's administration. Unfortunately, research and disaster management are put as the subordinate subjects compared to those two previous issues. Such thing is obviously shown by the small effort to study natural disasters, particularly earthquakes, in Mao's administration (Ross, 1984).

At the early decades of the PRC establishment, the Chinese government paid attention to the disastrous policy mainly focusing on prevention and protection. The issue of post-disaster relief and reconstruction are neglected by the government at the time. On the one hand, as a token of protective and preventing policies, the Chinese government relied on its military forces, in which case they are much more prepared to tackle the political and economic problems instead of natural disasters. On the other hand, as a token of post-disaster management, the central government provided tax incentives and increased

the food supply from the central to the affected area (Ross, 1984, 776).

The central government did not provide sufficient support to the study and research on earthquake including its disaster management. A token of their effort was founding some seismological observation stations in some earthquake-prone areas. Indeed, Mao's administration rapidly developed such stations from two stations in 1949 up to 24 stations in 1958 (Ross, 1984). Furthermore, the government also developed a measurement method based on the Chinese traditional calculation. This is well known by the people as the scale of twelve degrees. This calculation applies in the architecture and engineering as well. Twelve degrees scale is a way of measuring the intensity of the shock at some certain points. This causes the shock scale of the earthquake varies from one region to another, depending on the distance and other factors. By contrast, the international community uses the Richter scale for the earthquakes measurement. For example, the Tangshan earthquake in 1976 showed 7.8 on the Richter scale, while according to the twelve degree scale of Chinese, the earthquake in Tangshan is XI and it is VIII in Beijing. Different figures of the same earthquake are caused by the distance between Tangshan and Beijing. Both cities are far enough so that the shaking is smaller in Beijing (Ross, 1984).

The application of twelve degree scale in architecture and industry shows the development of research and observational activities of the government in adjusting with their own natural condition. Unfortunately, this effort did not work smoothly due to inadequate financial support and the strong political control in China. Consequently, no significant improvement of awareness to anticipate the threats of earthquake in China. It is obviously shown by the lack of seismological data and its classification in both planning and developing buildings. This is proven by a total destruction of some buildings in Tangshan right after the earthquake (Ross, 1984).

In the period of 1966 to 1976, China

is rocked by 14 times earthquakes where the averages were above 7.0 on the Richter scale. These particular facts attracted the central government's attention about the necessity to take preventive measures by establishing institutions that work on how to anticipate earthquakes.

The first earthquake observation institution in China is established under the auspices of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Then, following the earthquake in Xingtai in 1966, Mao's government established the seismic maintenance agency under the supervision of the National Commission on Science and Technology and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The new task force established and named as the Central Task Force of Earthquake of the Chinese Communist Party, right after China is rocked by a 7.4 magnitude earthquake hitting Bohai Bay region on July 18, 1969. Based on the earthquake coming in a row, the central government decided to establish a national specialized agency on earthquake management namely the National Earthquake Bureau. The agency was officially under the coordination of central government in 1975. At that time, China is the only country that established the administrative institutions of seismicity under a central coordination. This bureau is renamed in 1998 as the China Earthquake Administration (Bai, 2010).

In addition, the government's attention to the earthquake is also shown by their effort in making seismic intensity maps or the *Seismic Intensity Zoning Map* at the end of the 1950s. Thus, the second and the third edition of the maps were published in 1977 and 1992 with some improvements in various aspects. While the Chinese seismology department was developing the scientific method of earthquake prediction, community members are encouraged by the government to predict earthquakes based on their experiences. Through this method, the Chinese managed to conduct a precise prediction of several earthquakes, such as the Haicheng earthquake in 1975, Longlin earthquake in 1976, and Songpan earthquake in 1976 (Yi, et.al. 2012, p. 297).

Actually the Tangshan earthquake has predicted though the Chinese government was wrong in measuring its strength. It is estimated to be only V of twelve degrees scale but it reached the value VIII-XI (Lo, xv).

Currently, all Chinese local governments as well as all earthquake-prone areas have their own local offices of Earthquake Administration. The expansion of tasks is carried out by the agency in order to strengthen the local government readiness against earthquakes. There are 11 main tasks of the bureau, namely (i) to formulate and to implement national strategies, guidelines, regulations, and laws which are relevant to the earthquake disaster readiness and mitigation; (ii) to organize and to plan a national program for disaster preparation and the earthquake mitigation, and making the emergency response plan against some destructive earthquakes, as well as setting up a registration system and guidelines related to the readiness and earthquake prediction; (iii) formulating a national seismic intensity zone map as well as a map of the strong ground motion zone parameters, running the seismic safety evaluation, and determining the level of seismic fortification (seismic fortification levels); (iv) providing supervisions and doing inspections of the tasks related to the earthquake disaster preparedness in accordance with the regulation in the *Law of the People's Republic of China on Protecting Against and mitigating Earthquake Disasters*; (v) implementing a dual-government system, be centered on the CEA, in the provincial and municipal earthquake and building management systems and financial plans, and guiding staff in the city and local level; (vi) monitoring nationally and periodically, and regulating various activities concerning earthquake predictions, and capturing and reporting the tendency of seismic conditions, proposing some necessary actions to the central government, and in return, applying those actions insofar as they are approved by the central government; (vii) serving as the command center of the earthquake disaster relief, and reporting the actual condition to the central government;

(viii) to conduct research and collaboration with various national and international institutions associated with the earthquake; (ix) providing guidance for educating the locals and publishing all information about earthquakes ranged from the locals readiness to face earthquakes and mitigation; (x) to control and to administer the use of the earthquake disaster relief funds, both infrastructure and other projects; (xi) carry out all tasks ordered by the central government. (English1, 2005).

Furthermore, each CEA office is equipped with a monitoring system and earthquake prediction. The system consists of digital seismic observation networks, which ranged from 48 seismic stations, 23 digital seismic telematics at the provincial level, and 25 sustained observations, as well as more than 400 observation stations at the local level (Yi, et.al., 2012). In order to socialize the new requirements of seismic fortification, in 2001, China released the fourth edition of the *Seismic Ground Motion Parameter Zoning Map* with the scale of 1: 4 million. This edition adopts a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and prefers the risk probability level exceeding 10% in the 50 years as a criterion to the seismic zoning fortification map. The fourth edition of seismic zoning map, which is prone to be more academic and advanced, shows that the theory and application of seismic zoning in China has been conformed to the international standards (Yi, et.al., 2012).

In 2011, the office of China Earthquake Administration (CEA) issued a guideline to cope the earthquake with its basic principle, to wit, to reduce casualties and property losses caused by the earthquake at maximum level. The purpose of these guidelines is to improve the ability of the country to predict earthquakes and mitigate its effects through some fancy technology and innovation, as well as comprehensive training for rescuing workers and the improvement of social management. The government through all CEA calls for increasing professionalism in the rescue efforts, and promoting the scientific

and technical innovations to improve their abilities in prognosticating earthquakes and the response management (Ma, 2013). Associated with the policy, the Chinese government since 1949 to 2010 have issued at least 100 laws and decrees related to the prevention and mitigation of disasters, including earthquakes. One aspect of those regulations is the law and regulations of geological disasters. These laws ranged from the *Law of the PRC on Protecting Against and mitigating Earthquake Disasters*; *Rapid Report Regulation of the Situation of the Earthquake*; *Work Rules of Seismic Losses Assessment*; *Work System of Earthquake Emergency Inspections*; *Emergency Ordinance of Destructive Earthquake*; *Management Regulation of Earthquake Predictions*; *Protection Ordinance of Facilities for Earthquake Monitoring and Environment for Seismicity Observations*; and *Management Methods of Geological Disaster Prevention* (Yi et. al., 302).

The implementation of earthquake risk reduction and prevention is officially governed by a regulation adopted by the Chinese government in 1988. Later in 1994, the government issued some regulations supporting the improvement of seismic monitoring facilities by issuing specific a regulation called the *Act for Facilities of Earthquake Monitoring and Environmental Conditions of Earthquake Observation*. The step is taken in order to comprehensively and continuously conduct the seismic observation activities as a benchmark for the prevention and mitigation activities. Upon the occurrence of a large earthquake in Kobe, Japan in 1995, the Chinese government responded by issuing a regulation called as the *Emergency Response Act for Destructive Earthquake*. The action is based on the alertness that a similar earthquake could occur in China. Moreover, the government made a regulation named as the *Law of the People's Republic of China on Earthquake Prevention and Disaster Reduction* where it officially came into effect on December 29, 1997 and be applied

in March 1998. This regulation provides a legal certainty for protecting the CEA from various interventions that may interrupt the earthquake disaster management tasks (www.earthquake.tier.org.tw/document/sedmess/s11.pdf).

Entering a new millennium, China reformed once again the rules related to the management of the earthquake by which the government issued *Regulations on the Prevention and Control of Geological Disasters* in 2003. This is followed by another rule called *Regulations on the Handling of Destructive Earthquake Emergencies* in 2005. However, during the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, the government re-issued a new regulation for handling of the impacts of such particular earthquake, namely the *Regulations on Post-Wenchuan Earthquake Restoration and Reconstruction*. In particular, this regulation is issued by the government in order to accelerate the recovery of communities and infrastructure right after the Wenchuan earthquake (Pandey, 2012, 47-48).

SEVERAL CASES ON EARTHQUAKE MANAGEMENT RESCUE: FROM TANGSHAN TO LUDIAN

Related to disaster management in China, in November 2003, the Chinese government endorsed the “Emergency Law” but it has not been widely publicized. Then, these rules are amended in March 2004 by shifting the terminology of ‘martial law’ to ‘emergency law.’ Next, in December 2005, China established the *Emergency Management Office* (EMO) and start developing a new EM system. Subsequently, the central government issued a *Master State Plan for Rapid Response to Public Emergencies* in January 2006. The law was finally passed into *The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Emergency Responses* on August 30, 2007, and came into effect on November 1, 2007. This law is a major milestone in China’s systemic emergency management. Along with this regulation, the emergency management in China enjoys a legal support from all levels of authority, from

the central government to the local level. Ever since then, the Chinese government began to establish various forms of emergency plans based on this framework. In March 2009, there are approximately 51 national-level emergency plans have been developed. In addition, both 138 nationally owned companies and all mining and chemical related companies have developed emergency plans (Bai, 2010).

The operational mechanism of disaster management in China could be summarized as follows: a unified leadership, tiered responses and functional divisions, based on the local government and central government supports. Unified leadership means the government issued a policy, some regulations and planning, and then make decisions, orders, supervisions and coordination in order to implement the benchmark of disaster mitigation (Yi et.al., 2012, 296). Related to this, the Chinese government through the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the National Comprehensive Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) in 2011 where the earthquake response, relief and preparedness are included into such plan.

Tangshan 1976

The 1976 Tangshan’s disaster relief is inevitably slow due to President Mao decided to close the information and the region from foreign aid, and encouraging his fellow citizens to hold the principle of *Bai no date* or independence. Therefore, Tangshan disaster relief depends only on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and medical forces being set up by the government. The first aid provided by the central government through the Central Disaster Relief is sending 100,000 troops and 20,000 medical staff to work hand in hand in the affected areas. At that time, medical forces are divided into three parts. Firstly, medical staff who are responsible to provide the first aid needed by victims. Secondly, they who served as a mobile medical staff readily to conduct some medical treatments on the spot, such as surgeries. Thirdly, they who worked

at hospitals and in some regions around the earthquake (Amri, 2010).

Tangshan's rescue and relief acts showed up China's unpreparedness both in regulations and its actions while dealing with the quake. Actually, at the beginning of 1976 there has been a signal indicating the occurrence of a potential large earthquake, but the Tangshan government preferred to wait for a clearer sign indication, such as what have happened in Haicheng earthquake. Unfortunately, it was not a sign that appear but rather a massive earthquake that occurred on the first place; hence there was not any warning to society from the government. At that time, the government was hesitate to issue a warning because at that time Tangshan was the center of industry and economy, which if there were a fake alarm, then it could affect their economy. This indicated that China's policies and regulations are totally based on observation, and the early warning of earthquakes was still incomplete, and not fully supported by the local government (Ross, 1984, 783-784).

Another point concerning the quake was the weakness of building construction in Tangshan. Consequently, most of existing buildings, including a new building less than a year prior to the quake, are demolished by the earthquake. In fact, the government clearly issuing regulations and policies regarding the building safety standards related to the earthquake disaster alerts. In reality, many of these buildings did not meet the criterion of building security. This suggests that the availability of regulation in China is not obeyed yet by various sectors (Ross, 1984, 785).

Wenchuan 2008

Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 was one of the great disasters in the 20th century that hit China. Actually, China's quake measurement tools were classified fancy at that time. During this period, China already equipped with a network of Early Warning System (ESW); Network Disaster Remote-sensing Monitoring System (DRMS) that uses small satellites named Constellation

A and B; and has Earthquake Monitoring and Forecasting System (EMFs) that collected and analyzed data provided by 937 permanent seismic stations and 1,000 seismic stations located throughout the region. In addition, China has also established approximately 1,300 earthquake precursor observation stations throughout the region. According to a source, the Chinese ESW station previously showed a blink signal in a couple of weeks prior to the earthquake. However, it appeared to be an oversight so that this earthquake implied approximately 80,000 deaths and economic losses of up to 85 million US dollars (Pandey, 2012. 45).

CEA received information about the Wenchuan earthquake from the China Earthquake Network Center shortly after the earthquake, and immediately run the pre-disaster regulations. CEA sent the first wave of rescue forces and medical teams to the affected area and work closely with the head office of disaster management. They immediately conducted a small team to take necessary steps for supporting the disaster management. Along with the assistances of military forces, the central government led by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao formed 8 working committees consists of rescue and assistance units, monitoring and forecast units, medical and health services, housing reconstruction teams, infrastructure rehabilitation units, public order units, and news and publications teams. All government sectors mutually cooperated such as the interior ministry, the ministry of finance, the ministry of transportation and other ministries to executed the pre-disaster regulations, to established working committee, and to coordinated with their counterparts in the disaster management. Given the magnitude of the disaster, the government categorized the disaster management at level II, where the provincial governments of the affected region led all rescue activities, and CEA organized and coordinated all assistances under the control of central government.

Previously, only the military and the

Chinese Red Cross are given the access to the worst affected areas. As well as managing of Tangshan, the government forbade both the local and foreign non-governmental organizations to approach the area even though they already have a lot of resources, either volunteers or logistics. In contrast to Tangshan, both local and international NGOs could enter the worst hit areas in Wenchuan right after a research group called the Chengdu Urban Rivers conducted some lobby and intensive discussions with the central government, and ensuring that foreign donors would not interfere the political stability in China. As a result of this incident, the Chinese government had increasingly opened its door to foreigners and foreign donors since Deng Xiaoping administration (Amri, 2010).

Yushu, Qinghai 2010

On 14 April 2010, quake rocked China once again, where this time it struck the area of Yushu in Qinghai Province. The quake struck at 7:46 am with a magnitude of 7.1 on the Richter scale. Yushu is located in the mountainous area where it is the main hurdle against the government's rescue and aid operations. Forty minutes after the disaster, the government and the Chinese Qinghai Earthquake Administration issued a preplanned Earthquake Response Plan. Based on the *National Comprehensive Plan for Public Emergencies*, the Ministry of Home Affairs (Ministry of Civil Affairs or MCA) and the CEA preceded the level IV disaster management at 8:30 local time. However, due to the increasing number of deaths, the regulation is raised to the level I at noon that is approved by the deputy Prime Minister, Huiliangyu. National rescue team arrived at the epicenter of the quake eleven hours after the first shock. The local government immediately established seven working groups, and initiated disaster office which operates 24 hours ever since then. Fortunately, electricity and airports, located 30 minutes from the location, were still operating well so that all rescued efforts could reach the epicenter. MCA through CEA

immediately allocated 20,000 tents and 50,000 coats and blankets, as well as 500 sets of toilets to be sent to the worst affected areas.

In the process of disaster mitigation in Yushu there were some technical obstacles. For instance, extreme temperature in the area between day and night, causing many rescue forces suffered some illness. Furthermore, since most of the epicenter was in the region of Tibet, which 93% were Tibetan ethnic; the language was another hurdle to the rescue team. The rescue team spoke Mandarin but local Tibet residents spoke Tibetan. Hence they sometimes faced difficulties to communicate one another.

Several ministries that involved in the process of rescue and reconstruction on Yushu earthquake are the Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance and Trade and the Chinese Red Cross. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior immediately initiated a policy related to the short-term and long-term reconstruction for the areas affected by the earthquake, including the provision of temporary shelters, daily assistance funds, and apparels. A regulation governing the procedure for fund-raising and assistance for victims of Yushu is issued by China's Ministry of Home Affairs (MCA). This is done in order to prevent the misuse of public funds by irresponsible actors as happened in the case of mitigating the Sichuan earthquake in 2008. In addition, it is also done in order to ensure that any incoming aid could be directly delivered to the beneficiary in disaster locations through a strict supervision, as well as prohibiting the entry of unauthorized persons into the disaster sites (Tao and Van de Welle, 2013).

Ludian, Yunnan 2014

An earthquake measuring 6.1 magnitudes struck the southwest Yunnan Province, China, on Sunday, August 3, 2014. According to the USGS (US Geological Survey), the earthquake occurred at 16:30 local time. The earthquake is centered in 1 mile northwest town Wenping at a depth of 10 kilometers. The epicenter was in Longtoushan

Township in Ludian County. This region has a fairly difficult terrain with steep hills and narrow streets. The latest news said that the earthquake has caused 617 people died, and more than 240 people were injured, and more than 80,000 houses were destroyed (DMCDD, 2014).

The Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, immediately flew to the location and personally coordinated with the CEA and the local military. Rescue forces are sent directly from nearby provinces in order to save thousands of lives from the risky effects of earthquake such as the overflow of Kraal River. Under the coordination of Prime Minister, 2,825 special forces, 1,500 policemen, and 937 firefighters are deployed to the epicenter in order to assist the rescue operation. By the local CEA, the earthquake is considered as the level IV. However, regarding the death tolls was increased; weather conditions were getting worse; Kraal River would potentially drown the city; the disaster management level is raised to level III by the CEA (Earthquake-Report, 2014).

President Xi Jinping ordered to prioritize injured people, helped the establishment of shelters, and fulfilled their basic needs. 18,000 troops and rescue teams deployed to seek victims trapped on debris. Yunnan Red Cross allocated 50 folding beds, 50 blankets and 10 tents. Chinese Red Cross provided 200 blankets, 200 coats and 20 tents, while Hong Kong Red Cross distributed 100 emergency relief kits. All of these aids are provided by the government within 24 hours right after the earthquake is fitted with high-tech equipment and well-educated rescue forces. The rapid response of central government has earned positive appreciation from the international communities. By now, the responsive system of disaster management in China is regarded as one of the best in the world, whereby the government is responsive to handle disasters, providing information to the public continuously in every single hour, and regulating the influx of donations for earthquake victims. This is also evidenced by the influx of donations from Indonesia to Ludian residents through Dompot Dhuafa as a token of

solidarity given by the Indonesians (Earthquake-Report, 2014). It could be summarized that the single-style policies be applied by the Chinese government on disaster management is proven to be quite effective in dealing with disasters and disaster risk reduction, particularly in the case of mitigation.

CONCLUSION

After series of significant efforts, the Chinese government is finally able to build a system that is relatively comprehensive and integrated into the disaster management, especially after endorsing the policy of the State Emergency Plan System, and enacted various laws relating to disaster management. Furthermore, the government also established various institutions and organizations as well as making the working mechanism that is used for monitoring, preventing, mitigating, responding, and to do the disaster recovery. However, the disaster emergency management system in China still faces up many challenges, namely the disharmonious coordination among agencies and institutions. This is triggered by different orientations and priorities among those institutions. Most institutions are responsible to proceed the disaster management that has been designed to suffice various needs, and to deliver different policies. Hence, it is difficult for them to coordinating the agenda and the existing strategies. Furthermore, the presence of various organizations and institutions turn into barriers in accessing and communicating information effectively and timely. Instead, information is the main key of success for a disaster management especially in making some precise decisions. Thus, if there is a gap in the dissemination of information, it would hinder the work of an institution. Therefore, a commitment between each institution to share information and to work together in order to carry out the disaster management policies set by the government is inevitably needed.

Considering the effectiveness of earthquake mitigation in China, it could be

said that policies and regulations issued by the government in disaster management in China was a success. Although it was full of political intrigues during the Tangshan mitigation, the Wenchuan mitigation has a different story in which case the information disclosure occurred in China to some extent. Furthermore, two years gap between the Wenchuan and Yushu earthquakes showed some positive developments in implementing policies and accelerating responses to the latter disaster. The Chinese Government appeared to learn something from the management of Wenchuan earthquake. Afterwards, they already owned some standardized and institutionalized rules whenever they mitigated Yushu and Ludian earthquakes, where it was much more efficient and structured in facing a critical moment of future disasters. In addition, the government also put sufficient investment for developing the disaster management as shown by the latest high-tech rescue equipment. The combination between fancy technology and professional rescued forces is obviously seen on the mitigation of Yushu and Ludian earthquakes. In addition, the government was also implementing the rules relating to assistance for victims of Yushu and Ludian earthquake, including the rules of storage and logistics. This is done by the government right after the occurrence of a mess and some frauds concerning logistic assistance during the Wenchuan earthquake mitigation. In a nutshell, the policy and regulatory disaster management in China, in terms of rescue and the disaster aids, has integrated well although there is a lack of coordination and some information gaps in the existing institutions.

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THE JAVANESE IN LAMPUNG, STRANGER OR LOCALS? WITH THE REFERENCE OF CHINESE EXPERIENCE¹

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ABSTRAK

Orang Jawa merupakan mayoritas dari penduduk Indonesia. Secara geografis mereka tinggal di Jawa Tengah, DIY dan Jawa Timur. Namun sejak awal abad ke-20 pemerintah kolonial Belanda mulai memindahkan mereka ke Lampung di Sumatera bagian selatan dan kemudian ke berbagai tempat lain. Selama seabad Lampung menjadi daerah tujuan utama migrasi Orang Jawa, menjadikan Lampung “provinsi Jawa” setelah Jawa Tengah, DIY dan Jawa Timur. Berbeda dengan Orang Cina yang berhasil membangun bangsa dan negara Cina, Orang Jawa gagal dalam membangun bangsa Jawa; bahkan mendukung dibangunnya bangsa dan negara Indonesia. Dalam tulisan ini Orang Jawa di Lampung dilihat sebagai kasus bagaimana kejawaan sebagai sebuah identitas ditempatkan dalam konteks perubahan politik pasca-Suharto, ketika desentralisasi dan otonomi daerah mulai diimplementasikan. Dari pengamatan yang dilakukan terlihat bahwa Orang Jawa meskipun tetap mempertahankan sebagian besar identitas kebudayaannya namun terbukti tidak menggunakan identitas tersebut untuk melakukan mobilitas politik, misalnya pada saat pemilihan kepala daerah. Orang Jawa sudah merasa aman, dan tidak merasa sebagai Orang Asing, karena merupakan mayoritas meskipun berada di wilayah yang sejatinya milik Orang Lampung.

Kata kunci: Migrasi, Identitas Etnis, Penduduk Lokal, Mobilitas Politik

ABSTRACT

Javanese is the majority of the Indonesian population. Geographically they are resided in the provinces of Central Java, DIY and East Java. However, since the beginning of the 20th century the Dutch colonial government began to relocate them to Lampung in the southern part of Sumatra and then to other places. Within a century Lampung become the main destination of Javanese migration, making Lampung the “Javanese province” after Central Java, DIY and East Java. Unlike the Chinese that is able to construct Chinese nation and state, the Javanese failed in constructing the Javanese nation, instead supporting the construction of Indonesian nation and state. In this article the Javanese in Lampung is exposed as the showcase of how Javanese as an identity is located within the post-Suharto’s political development contexts, when decentralization and regional autonomy began to be implemented. Based on a fieldwork in Lampung, it shows that the Javanese while continue preserving the cultural identities yet reluctantly using their identities for political mobilization, for instance during the election of head of local government. The Javanese seems secure to be the majority, and not perceived themselves as strangers, although they resided in the land of the Lampungers.

Keyword: Migration, Ethnic Identity, Local People, Political Mobility

*“The Javanese continue to be the Javanese but modified by the Sumatran environment.”
(Wertheim, 1959)*

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INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is well known as a country that consists of more than three hundred large and small ethnic groups. What is also unique is its geographic contour; an archipelago consists of various ethnic groups residing on widespread islands. The Javanese is the largest ethnic group constituting approximately 40% of Indonesian population many of which live in Java island. Considering the declining of Javanese people's welfare, and a perception of an unbalance distribution between Java and other islands; the Dutch colonial government shipped the Javanese to other islands. Lampung was firstly the first destination in 1905. Ever since then, the Javanese have slowly turned Lampung into another Java, outside Java, as the policy to relocate people is continued by the Indonesian government. Moreover, many Javanese subsequently decided to move to Lampung voluntarily since there are both an abundant supply of land and well established Javanese communities many of which causing the newcomers feel at home.

Nevertheless, beneath the appearance of a smooth and peaceful migratory process, tensions and conflicts frequently happened between the migrants and the native communities. Luckily, the authoritarian and repressive nature of both colonial and post colonial governments are able to suppress the local disputes. In the last probably ten years, following the fall of unjust Suharto administration, the situation changes as the new decentralization policy is introduced by the new democratic government that has granted autonomy to the district level governments. In the last five years, the governors and the district heads have been elected directly by the people. As expected, the local populations reasserted their local identities and mobilize their claims as the sons of the soil (*putra daerah*), demanding the right to govern their territories. The Javanese who have become the dominant ethnic group in Lampung have adjusted themselves to the new social and political settings. The resurgence of political identities which is brought by the so

called *Lampungers*; has a political intention viz., evoking an emotional tension between the Javanese people vis a vis the native inhabitants. Yet it is interesting to note that the Javanese individuals seem unaffected by such politicking and apparently not interested in the politics of identity.

This paper, written as the result of a fieldwork in Lampung in 2011 and the study of some relevant literatures, aims to provide an explanation of why the Javanese people do not seem facing significant problems by being settlers in Lampung. In contrast to such focus, the question of whether or not the Javanese are locals is irrelevant to this particular article. Divided into five parts, this article, right after the introduction, describes the historical development of the general Javanese people within the context of Indonesian patriotism in the second part of this article. Moreover, the third part explores the process of Javanese migration and the resistance of local communities to their encroachment in Lampung. Next, the fourth part strives to fill the gap between what some literatures have claimed and the social realities be found during the fieldwork especially with regard to the recent implementation of decentralization. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in the fifth part.

DISTINGUISHING JAVANESE FROM CHINESE INDONESIANS (TIONGHOA)

Who are the actual Javanese that we are talking about? In Indonesia, at least, when people in every day conversation talk about the Javanese, it is assumed that we (Indonesians) know what we mean by the term. There is something similar in our minds while thinking about the Javanese. It is perhaps something similar when we (all of us) consider the Chinese. The Chinese, at the global level and the Javanese at the Indonesian level postulate a similar situation viz., their number is huge and their presence overwhelms us. Allen Chun (1966) a Taiwanese expert in Chinese studies, in a mocking article entitled

“Fuck Chinese: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity”, compels the following sentences:

“It is said that China is the oldest extant civilization in the world and that its population constitutes one-quarter of humanity. Something so well entrenched demographically, territorially, politically, and historically should be anything but an uncertain entity. It is easy, thus, to identify something called “Chinese culture and society.” Its political presence in the modern world system is incontestable, and the amount of intellectual discourse devoted to the study of China continues to fill libraries. In short, there is much to suggest that the very idea of China is an unambiguous or unquestionable entity. But what is so unambiguous about China that makes it an unquestioned object of gazing? What is the nature of Chineseness, and who are the Chinese? Finally, who is really speaking here?”

Chun then shows how diverse the meaning of China and Chineseness are:

“While the Western term for China appears to accentuate the unity of a civilization brought about by the Ch’in Empire, Chinese terms for China and Chinese, on the other hand, suggest other kinds of associations, some of which are historically or regionally specific. The term chung-kuo, China’s rendition of itself as “the middle kingdom,” has existed since antiquity, and the term chung-kuojen is commonly used nowadays to denote Chinese people who speak chung-kuo hua or some form of Chinese language. When Chinese wish to talk about themselves as a unified people belonging to a unified culture, however, they refer to themselves as “people of the Han (dynasty)” (han-jen), as belonging to a Han culture that originated in the region of the Han River. The process of sinicization is one of being Han-ized (han-hua), and the ethnic minorities within territorial China are likewise set apart as being non-Han. Southern Chinese, in contrast, typically those from Fukien and Kwangtung who constitute the vast majority of “overseas Chinese” in places such as Southeast Asia, express their Chineseness by saying that they are “people of the T’ang (dynasty)” (t’ang-jen) who speak “T’ang language” (t’ang-hua) and have

deep attachments toward a homeland called “the land of T’ang” (t’ang-shan). Perhaps not coincidentally, Chinatown is called “street of the T’ang people” (t’ang-jen chieh). Nonetheless, the historical metaphor cannot be carried too far. When speakers refer to t’ang-shan, it usually means the China of one’s home village and not that of the imperial court; likewise, t’ang-hua simply means “Chinese,” which, because it can refer to any Chinese, does not sit well with Mandarin speakers who claim to speak chung-wen.”

The Javanese are definitely not as overwhelming as the Chinese yet we could discover some similarities between them. The Javanese people, like the Chinese, are indeed not a single entity as they are diverse in terms of geography, history, language, economy, politics. Indeed, in the Java island itself, we easily find many blatant differences among the Javanese identities, such as between the central and the peripheral identities, between the coastal and the mountainous identities, and between the western and the eastern parts. We could imagine, therefore, such diversity would spread out as the Javanese people, like the Chinese at the global level, move and migrate to other places either within or beyond Indonesia. No wonder then that we find *Pujakesuma* (the acronym of Putera Jawa kelahiran Sumatra or the Sumatran Javanese), the Suriname Javanese, and Japung (the abbreviation of Jawa Lampung/Lampungnese Java). Recently, I visited the Netherlands where I met a Javanese who was born in Suriname, the Dutch colony in South Africa, where we know the Dutch coercively sent Javanese laborers in the 1920s and 1930s to unjustly work in various sugar plantations. This Javanese-Suriname person proudly told me about himself, “Suriname is my home, Holland is my country and Java is my soul”.

In the contexts of Java and the Javanese-ness, Clifford Geertz (1960,7) noted in the beginning of his book *The Religion of Java*:

“Java – which has been civilized longer than England; which over a period of more than fifteen hundred years has seen Indians, Arabs,

Chinese, Portuguese, and Dutch come and go; and which has today one of the world's densest populations, highest development of the arts, and most intensive agricultures – is not easily characterized under a single label or easily pictured in terms of a dominant theme. It is particularly true that in describing the religion of such a complex civilization as the Javanese any simple unitary view is certain to be inadequate; and so I have tried in the following pages to show how much variation in ritual, contrast in belief, and conflict in values lie concealed behind the simple statement that Java is more than 90 per cent Moslem. If I have chosen, consequently, to accent the religious diversity in contemporary Java – my intention has not been to deny the underlying religious unity of its people or, beyond them, of the Indonesian people, generally, but to bring home the reality of the complexity, depth, and richness of their spiritual life."

Having discussed the Javanese identities, perhaps it is appropriate to say that the Javanese people, like the Chinese share both a singular and a plural identities.

THE UNMAKING OF JAVANESE NATION

Javanese and Chinese people are likely to ignite controversies not because they share various cultures but their continual, constructed and reconstructed identities pave the way to frictions. If there are differences between the Chinese and the Javanese it may presumably be related to the notion that China does not only refer to a nation but also a state. In contrast, there is no such thing called the Javanese nation nor the Javanese state. As a consequence of such notion, we are aware of the existence of what is called Chinese citizens, but none of whom are called the Javanese citizens. In the Chinese particular context, we also notice the rivalry between the ROC (Taiwan) and the PRC the extent to which both are contesting for political legitimacy and authenticity as being the legitimate heirs of Chinese culture.

From the Indonesian history we learn that the idea of Javaneseness loses its political legitimacy right after the founding fathers, many of which comprised of the cross, ethnic, educated elites,

vowed on 28 October 1928 in Batavia declaring that they are: "one nation, one language and one country" that is called Indonesia. Ever since then, such idea of Javaneseness merely indicates a group of people that are more or less united by a similar language, traditions and customs, arts and cultural heritages. All those characteristics more or less signify what perhaps could be defined as the Javanese culture. Java as indicated by the culture is always in the making process but Java as a political identity is unfortunately shrinking. In the Javanese studies, perhaps Benedict Anderson (1972) is the one and only expert who elaborates eloquently what he calls as "the idea of power in Javanese culture". Meanwhile, John Pemberton (1994) scrutinizes the idea of reinvention of Java in his book *On the Subject of Java*.

To compare with the Chinese experience, Sun Yat Sen and Mao Tse Tung constructed a Chinese patriotism that needed to be based on culture, but Sukarno and Hatta ground their thoughts on the modern idea of nation which is based on civic instead of ethno-nationalism. Indonesian nationalism earned its legitimacy from the national struggle against colonialism and the shared experiences and ideals of what Anderson describes as the imagined community (2003). Moreover, Indonesian nationalism is not defined by the glories of the past but by the common goals on the future. Indonesia is a common political project that should be realized by the common efforts of all ethnic groups. The construction of nationhood is indeed influenced by the way nationalism is crafted. The state as the embodiment of the nation often requires a kind of national identity. National symbols in the forms of arts, languages, architectures and food are inevitably necessary as the characteristics of national identity and nationhood. In this regard it is interesting to remember that a nation always consists of different ethnicities that possess their own ethnic characteristics. In the case of China, despite the fact that the Han is the largest and most dominant ethnic group, there are minorities that also possess their ethnic identities. Such

a situation poses a problem as Allen Chun concludes:

“The existence of ethnic minorities within China’s national borders, on the other hand, created particular problems for reconciling notions of ethnicity in relation to national identity. For the most part, the government adopted a Stalinist policy of multiculturalism, with the Han ethnic majority positioned at the core of a family of nations.”

Ethnically speaking, Indonesia is probably more diverse than China although the Javanese, like the Han ethnic, could be regarded as the major ethnic group. The Javanese people, however, do not have the luxury to claim as the core of a family of nations as the Han in China does. On the one hand, the Han is deliberately constructed by the state as the core nation. On the other hand, the Javanese have never been so well constructed. The construction of the Han as the core nation, however, implies some consequences as shown by Allen Chun:

“The criteria of traditional practices and material customs applied to distinguish ethnic groups, however, made the very notion of ethnic identity within a cultural taxonomy problematic, especially in cases of historically known minority groups that had been undergoing a long process of sinicization. In this regard, the need to define ethnicity according to the kind of hard-and-fast rules characteristic of the boundedness of a modern nation-state ultimately fabricated ethnic divisions that did not exist in the minds and lives of the people themselves, while at the same time made cultural objectification a normative practice in the state’s institutional routine. As in the case of Taiwan, history and ethnicity thus combined to produce (a national) identity in which they were, in fact, nothing more than imagined constructions by the state to define the ethos of its own modernity.”

A long process of sinicization as experienced by minority groups in China also occurred in Indonesia, culminating during the reign of Suharto military government from the 1970s to the 1990s. The process of Javanization had already become a contentious issue in the 1950s at the time when the national government began advocating the transmigration programs as a policy to assimilate

the local populations into the so called national identity. Heeren (1979) and Wertheim (1986) observed the implementation of this policy in Lampung and Sumatra Selatan provinces. The national government created some enclaves of Javanese resettlements in the middle of Lampung communities. In the Suharto’s administration the transmigration program is intensified by the support from the World Bank both for controlling the population density in Java, and for supporting what they called as regional development. The ultimate goal of relocating the Javanese through transmigration programs was, however, ideological: to achieve the national integration (Tirtosudarmo, 2001).

The policy has been widely criticized because it implies both marginalizing the minority groups, and deforestation in order to open a new land. It is no secret that the timber companies take benefits from the transmigration program. On the pretext of strengthening national integration the transmigration program is also used in order to reinforce the strategic interests of military forces in several areas, perceived by the national government as a kind of fortified bastion against the separatist movements such as in Aceh, Papua and East Timor. Despite all controversies concerning the security system of transmigration program during the Suharto administration, it is still relevant to ask whether or not the durable process of Javanization in Lampung as the oldest place for relocating the Javanese, and as a result the province is by now demographically dominated by the Javanese; did come into reality.

Given that Java has essentially failed to be the basis for constructing a Javanese nation, in another paper (Tirtosudarmo, 2005, 14-15) I have explained the reason for such failures:

“The explanation as to why the Javanese failed to assert their political identity should be sought in the history of nationalism in Indonesia which began to emerge in the dawn of the twentieth century. The first generation of Javanese intellectuals that were the product of the Dutch educational system began to imagine what sort of future political community would

suit the indigenous people in the archipelago. Here I would like to cite the debate between two Javanese intellectuals, namely Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo - who advocated Indies nationalism - and Soetatmo Soeryokoesomo - who advocated Javanese nationalism. This debate – in Dutch not Javanese or Malay – took place in 1918, the same year in which the Volksraad (People's Council) was founded by the Dutch (see Shiraishi, 1981). In this debate, Soetatmo advocated Javanese nationalism, arguing that the nation could and should be built on the basis of common culture and language. Javanese nationalism had its basis in the common culture, language and history of the Javanese, whereas the cultural bases of Indies nationalism were nonexistent or, at best, a product of Dutch colonial rule. Javanese nationalism was the means of self-expression for the Javanese, while the Indies nationalism was no more than a reaction to Dutch colonial domination of the Indies. Therefore, he (Soetatmo) argued, only Javanese nationalism had the sound cultural basis on which the Javanese could establish their future political community. In reaction to this argument of Soetatmo, Tjipto defended Indies nationalism. In his opinion, what was totally lacking in Soetatmo's view was world historical development. He argued that Europe was clearly more advanced than Asia, and therefore the Javanese could learn from the European historical experience the direction in which the national formation in the Indies would go. The Indies were indeed composed of diverse ethnic groups, with each ethnic group having a different culture and language, but Java had lost its sovereignty and was only a part of the Dutch-dominated Indies. The fatherland of the Javanese was no longer Java but the Indies, and the task of the national leaders was to work for Indies nationalism. In the end, after a long process of negotiation and conflicts, Indies nationalism more or less prevailed as the new form of 'Indonesian nationalism.' Yet, Javanese-ness did not fade away, but instead contributed – in some instances through elite manipulation and reinvention of Java - to contemporary Indonesian politics" (Pemberton 1994).

Like China, Indonesia also faces some difficulties in the construction of national identity. National identity as perceived by the power holders is required by what they define as the national culture. But what is national culture? The constitution defines it as the peaks of all regional or local cultures. If this is the case, the

next question is how do we opt the regional or local cultures that ultimately represent the national culture?

JAVANESE MIGRATION AND THE LAMPUNGERS' RESISTANCE

The Javanese diaspora has existed since the earliest times as Hugo (1980) notes "A good example is the Javanese movement into the Banten and north coastal regions of Sundanese West Java which gaining its momentum in the sixteenth century ...". Furthermore, he argues that:

"This movement was instrumental in the spread of sedentary wet rice cultivation into West Java where previously almost all of the indigenous Sundanese population engaged in ladang (dry field) cultivation."

The presence of Javanese people in Sunda and Banten has become in turn the source of migration to Lampung.¹ According to the late Indonesian maritime historian, Adri Lapien, the Sunda Strait is geographically decisive in determining the interaction between people in both Banten and Lampung. Thereby, discussing Lampung should be necessarily complemented with Banten according to Lapien.²

In 1905 the unjust Dutch colonial government began to relocate people from Java to Lampung. Under the so called Ethical Policy, relocating people (land colonization) was one out of three related programs, with the other two are education and irrigation. Through the land colonization program, 155 Javanese families from Bagelen, Kedu areas in Central Java, are resettled to Gedong Tataan in Lampung, Southern Sumatra Selatan³. The motivation of

1 There are at least two theories about the place of origin of people in Lampung. The first theory holds that their ancestors came from Banten in the western part of Java while in contrast the second explains that the origin of the people in Lampung is Pagar Ruyung in Sumatra Barat.

2 Personal communication in May 2011 with A.B. Lapien in Jakarta.

3 Gedong Tataan is located at the foot of Mt Betung, about 20 km west of Tanjung Karang (Bandar Lampung). At the time Gedong Tataan became a subdistrict of the district of Pasawaran, Bagelen became the name of a village in the Subdistrict Gedong Tataan.

the Dutch is not merely the demography and economy based reasons but also due to security reasons. The Javanese countryside in the 19th and early 20th centuries are characterized by the sporadic social unrest, and the peasant rebellious movements against the Dutch unjust, repressive, agricultural policies (Kartodirdjo 1973). Not only did sporadic, the peasants' unrests and violent conflicts occurred almost on the entire Javanese rural areas between 1900-1920 in Tangerang, Pamanukan, Sukabumi, Ciasem, Kuningan (Jawa Barat), Pekalongan, Gombong, Semarang (Jawa Tengah), Mojokerto, Sidoardjo, Kediri and Jember (Jawa Timur), (ANRI, 1981). There might be a direct linkage of the Javanese rural unrest and land colonization in Sumatra although it is inconceivable that such a coincidence could posit a causal relationship.

The perception that land colonization is not only driven by some demographic reasons but also aimed to be a kind of social experimentation is also conveyed by ORSTROM (1980) in their report:

“Lampung’s destiny has been a prodigious one. Devoid of human inhabitants up to the end of the 19th century, this southernmost tip of Sumatra was to become, in the 20th, the privileged experimental zone for all the forms of organized colonization ever elaborated in the framework of the Dutch kolonisatie or the Transmigration program of independent Indonesia. The voluntary development policies were so successful there that today the government has been forced to take preventive measures in order to protect the natural environment and to rely upon the local offices of the Transmigration Ministry to encourage emigration to the other islands in the archipelago.”

The Dutch land colonization program that is perceived by ORSTROM as a social experimentation experienced several changes since its beginning in 1905 until the Javanese arrival in 1942, (ORSTOM, 1986, 83-87). Heijting, the architect of land colonization program, says that: “Javanese emigration can only be successful by establishing ‘little Java’ in Lampung”.⁴ The conceptual idea on which the

land colonization program is based – known as the “Javanese paradigm” – in principle is aimed to create a Javanese rural community in Lampung. The Javanese are relocated into an area that is considered by the Dutch as an empty land in the middle of local communities in Lampung as noted by Kingston (1990):

“In recreating the Javanese landscape, the government allotted about 1.5 bouw (1 bouw= 0.709 ha.) of land per family and encouraged wet rice cultivation by subsidizing irrigation. The government intended that the pioneer settlements engage in food production and did not encourage export commodity crop production; the Dutch image of what Javanese villages ought to be like overshadowed what they could be like. It was the ideal type of Javanese village, conveyed by the village elite and embraced by the colonial officials that defined the manner in which transmigration was implemented on the ground.”

Heeren (1979) argues that the reason for Heijting to relocate the Javanese in an area that is separated from the local communities was not primarily to make the Javanese people feel at home but due to the resistance from local communities in handing over their land to the Dutch unjust colonial government. Separating the Javanese communities from the local population, however, implied criticism from Nitisastro (1955: 125, as quoted in Heeren 1979, 17) by which such policy reflects the enclaved politics. Widjojo Nitisastro is of the opinion that the Javanese should be able to assimilate with the local population since both communities are Indonesian citizens. Based on his observation in 1956 in Lampung, Wertheim (1956) finds that assimilation between the Javanese and the local population occurred in practice but it did not turn the Javanese into Sumatran people or Indonesians, but rather be more Javanese with some adjustments to the Sumatran environment.

Kampto Utomo (1974) notes that until 1928 the resettlement pattern of the Javanese indeed followed the enclaved politics where the Javanese are engineered to form their own local governance.⁵ Until the *marga* system is

4 Kingston (1990).

5 Kampto Utomo’s study in Lampung was the basis for his PhD thesis at Bogor Institute of Agriculture where Professor W.F. Wertheim was his supervisor.

revived by the Dutch as “*inlandse gemeente*,” the Javanese communities are governed under the *marga* system. The Javanese communities spread out very fast ranged from Gedong Tataan to the west, and occupying places such as Pagelaran, and to the south encroaching the areas surrounding Rawa Kementara. In the western part, starting from Pringsewu (1926) that later on transform into a Javanese concentration, and to the north encroaching areas of Way Sekampung. The encroachment of Javanese in Lampung practically halted during the Japanese occupation but resumed immediately after the Japanese left (1942), and the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty by the Dutch in 1949. According to Kampto Utomo (1974) the reason for resuming the land encroachment by the Javanese in Lampung was primarily due to the communication and interaction between themselves with their relatives in Java run smoothly as people visited one another or sent letters that eventually encouraging the unstoppable, voluntary transmigration.

The waves of Javanese resettlement in Lampung, as Wertheim observed in 1956, eventually created some social tensions with the local population in which case the land competition inevitably increased:

“This situation leads to an increasing resistance of Sumatrans to the way in which resettlement has been carried on. Such resistance may seriously hamper further transmigration efforts. Thus it can be stated that the absorptive capacity of the outer islands is not only restricted by spatial and technical but also by social factors as well.”

Who are actually the local communities in Lampung resisting such Javanese encroachment? Referring to the definition used in the 2000 Population Census, those are: Orang Peminggir (6.42%), Orang Pepadun (4.22%) and Orang Abung Bunga Mayang (1.28%) Suryadinata et.al., (2003: 18). In their research on the local communities in Lampung, ORSTROM (1986: 91) identifies at least four groups: Orang Abung, Orang Menggala Tulang Bawang, Orang Pubian and Orang Pesisir. The migrant groups originating from South Sumatra, as identified by

ORSTROM are: Orang Ogan, Orang Sumendo, Orang Way Kanan and Orang Mesuji. In relation to the Javanese settlers, these people could be categorized as the local population or simply called Orang Lampung or the Lampungers.

Wertheim’s observation in 1956 is relevant to the wider political context after the Dutch left Indonesia. After the independence, the administrative system at the local level began to change in 1950 following the rapid change in the political system at the national level. The change in the land ownership system (previously organized through the *adat* (customary) laws but then the national laws) is one of the sources of dissatisfaction among the local population. The reorganization of *marga* (from the local government hierarchical structure into the new autonomous institution called *negeri*) also triggered social tensions. The *negeri* comprises several *marga* including the Javanese communities that reside into the respective areas. (Heeren, 1979). According to the national laws, a *negeri* should be created based on democratic principles rather than by the customary laws. Therefore, a Javanese could be the head of a *negeri* insofar as he/she is elected democratically.

The various changes related to the new arrangement concerning local governance caused local grievances against the national government. Both the regional rebellion in Sumatra Barat, Sulawesi Selatan and Sulawesi Utara under the banner of PRRI/Permesta in 1956-1958 paved the way for local populations in Lampung to articulate their feelings through a petition to stop the transmigration program which is launched in the *Adat* Conference, firstly in Palembang (January 1956) and then in Bukittinggi (March 1957).⁶ In response to the threatening political situation in 1959, President Sukarno, supported by the military forces, announced a decree to return to the 1945 Constitution, and arbitrarily dissolved the Konstituante that was preparing a

⁶ According to Heeren (1979: 50) the abolition of transmigration program was also one of the demands of PRRI/Permesta.

new constitution. Under this administration, the *negeri* and the *marga* systems are abolished as well, and all local administrative arrangements are organized by the district governments.

As the regional rebellions finally reduced the frequent resistance of local population in Lampung against the Javanese settler, transmigration is also practically halted due to the budget constraint of national government. Indeed, the program is stopped due to the arbitrary change of power from Sukarno to Suharto following the 1965 national political tragedy. In the 1970s, the transmigration program re-implemented under Suharto's New Order regime in which Lampung was one of the major transmigration destination areas.⁷ Here, the nationalization project of local government is reshaped by the Law No. 4, 1974 concerning the regional level government, and the Law No. 5, 1979 concerning the village level government. The uniformity process of local government throughout Indonesia proceeded almost without any significant resistance from the local population as Suharto arbitrarily appointed military officers to be both the district heads and the provincial governors.⁸

THE JAVANESE IN LAMPUNG AFTER THE NEW ORDER

The step down of Suharto, a Javanese, from power in May 1988 is described by a foreign observer as the end of the 'Last Sultan' in Indonesia (Loveard, 1999). Nonetheless, Suharto who held almost absolute power for more than thirty years is not considered as the Last Javanese King. Although Suharto's style of government is strongly associated with the Javanese political culture (Pemberton, 1994), only the Yogyakarta's Sultan is popularly known as the Javanese King.

7 The following is the national number of families moved under transmigration programs and the percentage. Repelita I (1969-1974): 11397 KK (29%), Repelita II (1974-1979): 4500 KK (8%), Repelita III (1979-1984): 42876 KK (12%), Repelita IV: 1984-1989: 17893 KK (9%), Repelita V (1989-1994): 12515 (5%), Repelita VI (1994-1997): 8412 (4%). Tirtosudarmo (2001: 212).

8 In Lampung from 1973 to 1998 the governors are always a Javanese military general: Sutyoso (1973-1978), Yasir Hadibroto (1978-1988) and Pedjono Pranyoto (1988-1998).

The collapse of Suharto's authoritarian political regime is perceived as the end of a centralist government that emphasized too much uniformity in the arrangement of local government. It is therefore quite understandable that one of the immediate demands in the aftermath of Suharto regime should be for political decentralization and regional autonomy.

Several new regional laws and regulations are created to support the implementation of a decentralization policy to open up the political space for the local populations to articulate their wishes. Under the new political space local populations began to mobilize their local identities to reclaim what they conceived as their local rights. *Adat* or customary laws, that are totally repressed under Suharto administration, revived by now. The local populations reclaimed their land ownership and organized their right to have their own local government and leaders based on the *adat* laws. In Lampung, local intellectuals actively reinvent their traditions in order to provide the justifications for their political claims such as the sons of the soil (*putra daerah*). They have reinvented traditions – to borrow Hobsbawm's terminology – through several projects such as rewriting the history of Lampung, reviving local customs, and teaching the Lampung language. Such activities, however, have implied limited impacts and are still in the early stages.

Migration of the Javanese to Lampung has occurred for more than a century so that Lampung has become demographically and culturally a kind of Javanese province outside Java. In many places such as Pringsewu and Metro for example, Javanese has become the lingua franca. In this regard the question put forward in the title of this paper "The Javanese.... locals or strangers?", seems to be relevant here. As the ORSTROM (1986) study has shown the majority of Javanese in Lampung comprises the second, the third even the fourth Javanese generations. These "Javanese-Lampung" as they are called do not even know where their Javanese ancestors originally came from. The Javanese have

dominated various positions and occupations, within the government offices, in the universities and local parliaments, as well as in the private sectors. As the position of the governors and the district heads are now contested through direct elections, the Javanese should be quantitatively the winners if they politically exploit their ethnic identities to win the elections. In contrast to such political configuration, the Lampungers would not mathematically vanquish the Javanese in elections though they could exploit their claim as the sons of the soil.

The new electoral system allowing the direct election of local leaders paves the way for the local population to mobilize their local identities to influence the election processes. In such a situation Lampung provides an interesting case as the majority of its population is Javanese and the local population is a minority. In the last gubernatorial election, the candidates used cultural symbols to attract votes. Interestingly, the Javanese candidates are lost to the local Lampung candidate. This reality could be interpreted as that the Javanese voters – that is the majority – apparently are not attracted to the Javanese candidate, and in fact they chose the local candidate as their governor. How can we explain this phenomenon?

According to Wertheim's (1959) observations on Lampung in 1956 says, the Javanese identity developed not according to the expectations of the designers of land colonization or transmigration program. Both the designer who wanted the Javanese to retain their Javaneness by engineering the enclaved politics, and other designers who expected the Javanese to be the agents of assimilation to create an Indonesia-ness in Lampung; should have disappointed by the reality as the Javanese maintain their Javanese-ness but be modified into the Sumatran environment to some extent. To be consistent with Wertheim's study, the Javanese in Lampung turn out to be the "Jawa-Lampung" or "Japung". This new identity of Javanese-Lampungers is a result of more than a century of Javanese cultural

transplantation into the Lampung environment. Indeed, the Javanese identity in Lampung is so much different from the Javanese in Solo or Yogyakarta the Javanese on the northern coast of Java or the Javanese in Suriname or New Caledonia.

The political participation of the Javanese in Lampung as reflected by their decision to vote for the local candidate instead of the Javanese candidates; indicates their pragmatism in their daily lives. For the Javanese it is not important what the ethnic identity of the candidate is insofar as he or she is perceived as a capable leader to foster peace and welfare to the society. The current euphoria in many communities to create a new district in Lampung for instance is also not a big deal for the Javanese as they might think that whatever happens, they are the majority in anyway.

CONCLUSION

Javaneness, unlike Chineseness, has not turn into a political identity. Some attempts done by a few Javanese elite groups to form a Javanese nationalism are proven to be unsuccessful because Indonesian leaders deliberately developed a civic instead of an ethnic based nationalism (ethno-nationalism). The Javanese have submitted their ethnic identity in favor of the trans-ethnic and national identity though they are demographically the dominant ethnic group in Indonesia. In other words, Javaneness transformed into merely a social and cultural identity rather than political identities. In the era of the post-Suharto political decentralization, as the case in Lampung has shown, the Javanese seem not to be interested in mobilizing their ethnic identity as it has been excessively taken for granted by many other ethnic groups in Indonesia.

Apart from the historical fact that the Javanese have relegated the idea of Javanese nationalism, in reality, they have already gained some economic and political important positions in Lampung. Their votes are always decisive to the local election results. In Lampung, the issue

of ethnicity is an elite issue while in contrast laymen, either Javanese or non-Javanese, pay no attention to such topic. Tradition is exercised by the local elites because they foresee some political opportunities provided by the new political developments in the post Suharto administration. The discourse of Lampungers as the sons of the soil (*putra daerah*) has increased in the last ten years, and indeed there is a common question to the Javanese, "how should they respond to such increasing politics of identity in Lampung?" Based on my short fieldwork in Lampung, I have come to several arguably premises regarding the main questions put forward in the title of this paper, "The Javanese in Lampung: Strangers or Locals?"

Firstly, the Javanese in Lampung are not really concerned about their ethnic identity. Secondly, if tensions and conflict occur in such a way, the source is not really ethnicity but rather the rivalry over various economic resources especially the land ownership. Thirdly, Javaneness apparently could not be mobilized for supporting the politics of identity in Lampung. Fourthly, the Javanese and Javaneness are certainly not static and homogeneous but diverse and constantly shifting in response to the changing environment. Fifthly, the Javanese in Lampung have created a new identity viz., the "Javanese-Lampung" or "Japung," that could be considered as the local identity. Yet, such thing is no longer relevant because they are somehow regarded as strangers.

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RINGKASAN HASIL PENELITIAN

CAUSALITY RELATION BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL TAX REFORM AND DOUBLE DIVIDEND IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

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ABSTRAK

Untuk meminimalisasi dampak perubahan iklim serta pola konsumsi dan produksi yang tidak berkelanjutan dapat dicapai dengan cara mengimplementasikan sebuah reformasi pajak lingkungan. Mekanisme reformasi pajak lingkungan dilakukan melalui penurunan tingkat pajak yang tinggi terhadap tenaga kerja dan dunia usaha dengan diimbangi penerapan pajak terhadap tindakan pencemaran lingkungan serta pada kegiatan ekstraksi sumber daya alam yang tidak dapat diperbarui. Tujuan dari studi ini adalah untuk menentukan hubungan kausalitas antara reformasi pajak lingkungan dan indikator ekonomi untuk pembangunan berkelanjutan di negara Republik Ceko. Selanjutnya, studi ini juga menganalisis interaksi antara kebijakan lingkungan dan kebijakan fiskal dalam mempengaruhi prospek terjadinya kejadian keuntungan ganda (double dividend). Keuntungan ganda adalah kondisi dimana penerapan pajak lingkungan dapat menghasilkan dua manfaat utama, yaitu: perbaikan kualitas lingkungan dan penurunan biaya di dalam sistem perpajakan. Hasil dari studi ini menunjukkan bahwa dalam kondisi yang relatif netral dan sederhana, kondisi keuntungan ganda tidak ditemukan pada studi kasus di negara Republik Ceko. Hal ini mengindikasikan bahwa pajak lingkungan yang diterapkan masih lebih rendah dibanding jenis pajak lain yang digantikan.

Kata Kunci: *Pembangunan Berkelanjutan, Reformasi Pajak Lingkungan, Double Dividend, Kausalitas.*

ABSTRACT

Minimizing the impact of climate change and unsustainable practices of consumption-production could be achieved by environmental tax reform. Environmental tax reform applied by reducing the high tax burden on human labor and the business sector and raised taxes on pollution and the exhaustion on non-renewable natural resources. The aim of this study is to determine the direction of causality between environmental tax reform and economic indicator for sustainable development in the Czech Republic. Furthermore, this study attempts to analyze the interaction between environmental and fiscal policies that influence the prospects for a double dividend. Double dividend is condition where the environmental tax can produce two main benefits that are an environmental improvement and a decrease in the costs of the tax system. The result in this study shows that under relatively simple and neutral conditions, the double dividend in the case of Czech Republic does not arise. That condition indicates the environmental tax is narrower than the other tax it replaces.

Keywords: *Sustainable Development, Environmental Tax Reform, Double Dividend, Causality.*

INTRODUCTION

This is the fifth years of the division of Europe P2SDR-LIPI to conduct research in the Czech Republic as part of studies about sustainable development in eastern European countries. The previous research topics such as

post-velvet environmental movement, adaptation to climate change, renewable energy use and the management of urban forest will be focused on a large frame that is sustainable development. The history of the environmental movement in the Czech Republic which start from the

action statement awareness of environmental degradation into an interesting discussion in the context of the dynamics of regional integration in the European Union. Concur with the euphoria of democratization which occurred in the beginning of the Soviet collapse, many eastern European countries use the environmental pollution issue as a tool to declare freedom from the influence of the socialist regime. Environmental issues become interesting to be studied in the case of the Czech Republic as the country, which prefer to adopt a green economy in order to catch up developmental advancement with the rest European Union member countries.

The Czech Republic's economy has been performed remarkably for almost a quarter of the century since the Velvet Revolution in 1989, from which the totalitarian government and planned economy were overthrown. There has been period of faster and slower development, complicated by the world economic slowdown (recession) in the recent time, but the overall performance of the socioeconomic system has moved closer to the West European model. Over the years, national policies have recognized that economic growth also had harmful side effects. The fossil fuel-based economy, a driver of growth in the past, may also hold back growth in the future.

The previous econometric model to examine the presence of Granger causality on the relationship between environmental taxes and economic growth is still under researched. One of them is studying by Abdullah and Morley (2014) which uses panel dataset from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the EU countries from 1995-2006. Abdullah and Morley (2014, 32) found that there is long-run causal effect of GDP and net adjusted savings to environmental taxes. That study provides robust evidence that an expansion of environmentally friendly tax policies will potential to enhance economic growth. Thus, following Abdullah and Morley (2014) this study seeks to examine the impact of environmental tax on the macroeconomic condition. The objective of

this study is to investigate the direction of causality between economic indicator of sustainable development and environmental tax reform in the Czech Republic. This study also attempts to analyze the interaction between environmental and fiscal policies which potentially create double dividend. However the difference with the previous study lies on this study is more focusing on causal relation among environmental taxes and sustainable development indicators in the Czech republic. In this study, we proposes that the causality relationship between environmental tax and sustainable development indicator should be followed by a probability of double dividend.

This study uses standard Granger causality tests to examine the presence of causal relation between environmental tax and economic indicator of sustainable development. Variables used in this study are the share of environmental tax to total taxes, share of environmental tax to GDP and adjusted net saving. Adjusted net savings are used as proxy of economic growth. We include variable adjusted net savings (ANS) to indicate genuine saving which measure the economic growth in a sustainable manner. Abdullah and Morley (2014, 29) argued the difference between GDP and ANS is that the former measure the physical capital whereas the latter incorporates the monetary values of physical, human, natural and social capital as well as the stock of knowledge.

Granger causality test model which use in this study are:

$$ANS_t = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^k \beta_j Tax_{t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^k \gamma_j ANS_{t-j} + \mu_{1t} \dots \dots \dots (1).$$

$$Tax_t = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^k \beta_j ANS_{t-j} + \sum_{j=1}^k \gamma_j Tax_{t-j} + \mu_{1t} \dots \dots \dots (2).$$

The Granger causality occurs if variable *Tax* statistically Granger causes variable *ANS*, then past values of *Tax* contain information that can be helpful in predicting *ANS* above the information contained in past values of *ANS* alone. Here *ANS* is defined as a variable of economic indicator for sustainable development. In this study, we use the Czech Republic adjusted net saving(ANS). The environmental taxes (*Tax*) consist of two variables: the share of environmental tax to total

taxes (*TaxT*) and the share of environmental tax to GDP (*TaxY*). Each of these environmental taxes variables (*TaxT* and *TaxY*) will be tested its causality with ANS separately. Meanwhile, μ_1 , μ_2 are stochastic error terms.

The time series data examined in this study are annual, with 12 years and runs from 2001 to 2012. The dataset for environmental tax revenue as a share of the Czech Republic total taxes were taken from Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat). Meanwhile, the dataset for adjusted net savings (ANS) is found from the World Bank in the World Development Indicators (WDI). As the ANS dataset is current US Dollar we deflate the data by the Czech Republic annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) using 2005 as a base year. We use computer program Eviews 7.1 to estimate the econometric model of the study.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Granger Causality Test

The results for the stationary test are presented in Table 1. It shows that all variables contain a unit root or not stationary in level. This condition, suggesting the need to differentiate these variables before testing for Granger causality.

Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test

Variable	Test for Unit Root in	
	Level	1 st Difference
ANS	-0.461713	-3.050881**
TaxY	-0.417099	-5.929141***
TaxT	-0.691155	-4.948928***

Notes: Lag length is determined by the Schwarz Information Criteria. Value in parentheses is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic.
 *** Indicates significance at the 1 % level (one tailed test)
 ** Indicates significance at the 5 % level (one tailed test)
 * Indicates significance at the 10 % level (one tailed test)

Table 2 presents the results of Granger causality tests. It shows a unidirectional causality from adjusted net savings (ANS) to the share of environmental tax to total taxes (*TaxT*), with 10 % level of significance. Meanwhile, when both

environmental taxes (share of environmental tax to total taxes (*TaxT*) and share of environmental tax to GDP (*TaxY*)) acting as dependent variable show no evidence of significant causality.

Table 2. Granger Causality Tests

Causality Direction		F-Statistic	Prob.
TaxY	ANS	0.64398	0.5722
TaxT	ANS	1.09463	0.4177
ANS	TaxY	4.04167	0.1096
ANS	TaxT	6.26288*	0.0586

Notes: $\longrightarrow$
 *** Indicates significance at the 1 % level (one tailed test)
 ** Indicates significance at the 5 % level (one tailed test)
 * Indicates significance at the 10 % level (one tailed test)

The results show that Granger causality null hypothesis (H_0) of no Granger cause which lie between the variables is not rejected. There is no causal relation between variables observed except in case when ANS acts as dependent variable and *TaxT* became the independent variable. Thus, it can indicate if there is no evidence of double dividend condition (where the implementation of environmental tax can produce two main benefits that is an environmental improvement and a reduction in the costs of the tax system) in the Czech Republic. Which is shown by there is no bilateral or feedback causality between ANS and environmental tax. But, there is one exception evidence of indirectional causality or one way relation running from ANS to share of environmental tax to total taxes (*TaxT*).

Double Dividend Hypothesis in The Czech Republic

The essence of the environmental tax approach is to provide incentive or permit for polluters to innovate and invent in the most efficient method which can reduce residual discharge. Through the implementation of environmental tax actually give freedom to the polluters for polluting environment, but of course

accompanied by a fee or charge that must be paid for every unit of residual emitted. Field and Olewiler (2002, 226) argue that the tax approach is making the polluters to find the best way to reduce emissions, rather than having a central authority to determine how it should be done. Moreover, by leaving polluters free to decide how best to reduce emissions, they can use their own energy and creativity, and their desire to minimize cost or to find the least-cost way of reducing emissions (Field and Olewiler 2002, 206). The introduction of environmental tax was required to achieve certain results not only in terms of revenue to the state budget, but also a positive environmental impact, which should be the primary essence of the inclusion of these taxes to the legal order of the Czech Republic (Sobotovicova 2011, 167). The introduction of environmental taxes also increases the yield of value added tax, as the value of these taxes enters into the taxation base.

The question arises, is the extent to which the double dividend is attainable. There is still under debate about the economic outcomes of environmental tax reform. The hypothesis of the double dividend which argue that the cuts in direct income taxation overweigh the burdens of the increase in indirect taxation. So that the implementation of environmental tax reform will not merely improve the environment condition, but also increase employment and economic growth. Bruha and Scasny (2005, 3) argues positive environmental effects are expected to come from changes in relative prices of goods and services, which would force economic agents to switch to more environmentally friendly consumption and production patterns.

On the other side Vojacek and Klusak (2007, 68) argues, if the cut in the direct taxes is not effective enough, the environmental tax reform may have very contrary effects on the economy, including negative impacts on the industrial competitiveness and welfare. Furthermore, if the tax base of the environmental taxation is going to erode, the implementation of environmental tax reform can cause problems of

unstable public finance. But, this view is not true, since whenever the price elasticity of a good is between 0 (perfectly inelastic) and -1 (inelastic). The increase of an ad valorem tax rate in case of that would not cause a tax base erode high enough to decrease tax revenues. Bruha and Scasny (2005, 3) states that in the extreme case of price elasticity equal to -1, the two effects (increase of the tax rate and the tax base erosion) exactly cancel out. Moreover, an increase of a tax rate would not diminish revenues even if the price elasticity was -1 because the demand has to be much more elastic to outweigh decrease revenues after an increase of a unit tax rate.

Meanwhile, relates to informal labor markets, because of this sector faces no labor tax, so there is a pre-existing distortion in the economy (labor in the informal sector is under-taxed relative to labor in the formal sector) (Goulder 2013, 55). Thus, the environmental tax can reduce this inefficiency by effectively raising the tax on informal labor and thereby reducing the disparity in taxation between formal and informal labor.

Environmental taxes in the Czech Republic that contain of energy tax, transport tax, and pollution/resource tax are taxes on both forms of labor because it raises the prices of goods purchased. It thereby lowers the real wage to all types of labor which consist of formal and informal labor. By environmental tax reform the revenues from the environmental tax are recycled through cuts in the tax on formal labor, this will be produce the net effect. That is the reduce wedge between relative taxation of formal and informal labor, and then efficiency will improve. Furthermore, if the associated efficiency gain is large enough, the costs of the tax system can be reduced. Moreover, overall employment will be increase.

CONCLUSION

The results from Granger causality tests in this study provide some evidence of an indirectional causality effect from adjusted net savings (ANS) to environmental taxes

(share of environmental tax to total taxes). This result indicates that the implementation of green economic in Czech Republic affecting the proportion of environmental taxes revenue which can be gained by government. Hence, the link between sustainable development and environmental taxes policy is important.

This study also show that under relatively simple and neutral conditions, the double dividend in case of Czech Republic does not arise. That condition indicates the revenue-recycling benefit is not enough to offset both the primary cost and the tax interaction effect. It's mean that the environmental tax is narrower than the direct tax and social insurance contribution replaces. Meanwhile, the implementation of environmental tax can reduce inefficiency in the labor market by effectively raising the tax on informal labor and thereby reducing the disparity in taxation between formal and informal labor.

The policy implication of this study suggests that environmental tax and the increase on share of energy from renewable source will probably need to continue in linkage with green economic and sustainable development targets. The evidence in this study suggest that increasing environmental taxes does not appear to have any substantial harmful impact on the economy. Futhermore, adjusted net savings (ANS) is better than GDP per capita to use as an indicator for sustainable development.

In addition, the future research will need to concentrate on measuring the impact from environmental taxes to economic and social society. That can be done by ordinary least square regression. However, it would be interesting to use alternative quantitative methods, such as Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) to make simulation model for analyze the impact of environmental taxes on economic as a whole.

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TINJAUAN BUKU

ANIME, COOL JAPAN, DAN GLOBALISASI BUDAYA POPULER JEPANG

Masao Yokota dan Tze-yue G. Hu (ed). Japanese Animation: East Asian Perspectives: Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 2013, xi + 313 hal

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PENDAHUULUAN

Tanggal 10 Desember 2014 mungkin menjadi hari yang ditunggu-tunggu bagi sebagian masyarakat Indonesia penggemar *Doraemon*, serial animasi populer asal Jepang tentang robot kucing dari abad ke-21. Pada hari itu, diluncurkan film terakhir *Doraemon* bertajuk “*Doraemon: Stand by Me*” (STAND BY ME ドラえもん). Banyak fans dari berbagai kelompok usia, terutama kalangan menengah, dengan antusias pergi ke salah satu jaringan bioskop ternama untuk menyaksikan pemutaran perdana film animasi ini. Tiket pra jualnya pun telah habis terjual enam hari sebelum hari-H pemutaran. Tingginya antusiasme para penggemar *Doraemon* ini tidak hanya terjadi di Indonesia saja, melainkan juga di 56 negara tempat film ini diputar. Hal ini menandakan bahwa *Doraemon* telah berhasil meraih dan mempertahankan popularitasnya di banyak negara.

Doraemon hanyalah satu dari sekian banyak *anime* Jepang yang populer di seluruh dunia. Sebagai salah satu bentuk budaya populer Jepang yang telah banyak dikenal masyarakat dunia, khususnya para penggemar budaya populer Jepang, *anime* (アニメ; *Japanese animation*) kini memang tidak hanya bisa dilihat sebagai sebuah karya seni dan media hiburan semata, namun juga sebagai sebuah fenomena global. Di Jepang sendiri, *anime* merujuk pada semua semua jenis

film animasi tanpa mengindahkan dari negara mana animasi tersebut berasal. Namun di luar Jepang, kata *anime* lebih sering diasosiasikan secara spesifik dengan ‘animasi Jepang’. Dalam artikel ini, definisi *anime* yang digunakan adalah definisi yang kedua.

Berbicara *anime* sebagai fenomena global, tidak pernah terlepas dari konsep Gross National Cool (GNC) yang diperkenalkan McGray (2002) dan juga konsep *soft power*-nya Joseph S. Nye (2004). Dalam artikelnya, McGray (2002) berargumen bahwa Jepang tidak lagi relevan disebut sebagai negara *super-power* dalam konteks Gross National Product (GNP), seperti Jepang era tahun 1980-an. Ia menilai Jepang lebih cocok disebut sebagai negara *cultural-super-power* dalam konteks Gross National Cool (GNC). Meminjam istilah Joseph S. Nye (2004), Jepang bisa dikatakan sebagai negara *super-power* dalam konteks *soft-power* karena ia dinilai memiliki kekuatan untuk me-*attract* orang dari negara lain melalui budaya, nilai-nilai, maupun kemampuan diplomasinya, termasuk diplomasi *anime*. Oleh karena itu, tidak mengherankan bila pada tahun 2008, MOFA (Kementerian Luar Negeri Jepang) “menunjuk” karakter *Doraemon* sebagai Duta Anime seiring dengan diberlakukannya kebijakan diplomasi *soft-power* Jepang melalui budaya populer, yang nantinya berkembang menjadi kebijakan “Cool Japan”

yang oleh banyak pihak dinilai kontroversial. Namun demikian, dengan segala kontroversinya, *anime* telah menarik perhatian banyak akademisi maupun praktisi untuk mengamatinnya sebagai suatu fenomena global.

Kehadiran buku “*Japanese Animation: East Asian Perspective*” ini menjadi penting untuk melengkapi studi-studi perkembangan *anime* di Jepang serta pengaruh yang dibawanya terhadap kawasan Asia Timur, baik sebagai objek penelitian maupun sebuah karya seni. Buku yang terdiri dari enam bagian tematik ini akan membawa pembaca mengenal lebih jauh perkembangan *anime* di Jepang, termasuk implikasi transnasionalnya terhadap kawasan di Asia Timur dan perkembangan teknologi pembuatan *anime* terbaru. Setidaknya, ada dua hal menarik dalam buku ini yang menjadikannya berbeda dibandingkan buku sejenis lainnya, yaitu: (1) adanya bagian yang menjelaskan sejarah Asosiasi Studi *Anime* di Jepang, yang berperan dalam mengantarkan *anime* sebagai objek penelitian yang bisa dikaji dan diakui secara ilmiah, dan (2) digunakannya perspektif Asia Timur, melengkapi studi-studi *anime* lain yang didominasi oleh perspektif Barat.

ANIME DAN PENELITIAN ILMIAH DI JEPANG

Anime yang saat ini telah menjadi komoditas internasional, semakin menarik perhatian banyak akademisi maupun praktisi dari berbagai bidang maupun negara. MacWilliams (2011: 5) menyebut dua urgensi penelitian mengenai *anime*. Pertama, *anime* merupakan bagian kunci dalam budaya visual populer di Jepang. Di tengah besarnya peran media massa (*masu-komi*) dalam masyarakat Jepang, *anime* dan juga *manga* (komik Jepang) menjadi bagian yang tak terpisahkan dalam kehidupan masyarakat Jepang yang sangat visual. Kedua, *anime* berperan penting dalam pembentukan *mediascape* global, baik cetak maupun elektronik. Sontag (2003) sebagaimana dikutip dalam McWilliams (2011, 3) menyebut Jepang sebagai “*image world*” dimana media

massa Jepang yang sangat visual dikonsumsi oleh tidak hanya masyarakat Jepang sendiri, namun juga kini oleh masyarakat global. Namun demikian, seperti yang diungkapkan dalam buku ini, masih terdapat beberapa kendala yang kerap ditemui dalam penelitian *anime*, seperti misalnya keterbatasan akses terhadap sumber data dan masalah perbedaan sudut pandang.

Sebagian besar publikasi dan sumber-sumber primer tentang *anime* pada awalnya, hanya tersedia dalam bahasa Jepang, termasuk yang dipublikasikan di jurnal *anime* terbitan Asosiasi Studi *Anime* di Jepang, *Japanese Journal of Animation Studies*. Hal ini menyebabkan para peneliti *anime* non-penutur Bahasa Jepang merasa kesulitan. Di samping bahasa sumber, masalah perbedaannya sudut pandang juga merupakan tantangan yang dihadapi oleh para peneliti *anime* yang sebagian besar berasal dari latar belakang pendidikan yang spesifik, misalnya kajian film dan media, kajian budaya, ilmu komunikasi, dan sebagainya, yang notabene kurang memiliki pengetahuan tentang konteks sosial budaya Jepang (Hu, 2013, 4-6). Berangkat dari permasalahan tersebut, buku ini diterbitkan sebagai media publikasi hasil-hasil penelitian mengenai *anime* yang berangkat dari sudut pandang akademisi maupun praktisi yang langsung diterjemahkan dari bahasa sumber ke dalam bahasa Inggris, supaya dapat menjangkau pembaca yang lebih luas.

Perkembangan studi *anime* di Jepang ini tidak terlepas dari kehadiran *Japan Society for Animation Studies* (JSAS, *Nihon Anime-shon Gakkai*). Awalnya, *anime* di Jepang tidak pernah dikaitkan dengan sesuatu yang ilmiah. Seringkali ia hanya dipandang sebagai sebuah karya seni yang tidak bisa diberi label ‘ilmiah’, meskipun pada masa itu, tidak sedikit *anime* yang dimanfaatkan sebagai rujukan primer maupun sekunder dalam penelitian-penelitian ilmiah (Koide, 2013, 58). Namun demikian, seiring dengan meningkatnya jumlah penelitian mengenai *anime*, sejumlah peneliti dan praktisi media seperti Koide Masashi dan Ikeda Hiroshi,

mulai bergerak untuk mendirikan apa yang kini dikenal sebagai JSAS pada bulan Juli tahun 1998. Kehadiran JSAS ini juga diikuti oleh penerbitan *Japanese Journal of Animation Studies* pada bulan Oktober di tahun yang sama. Memasuki tahun 2000-an, mulai dibuka departemen dan program studi khusus animasi di lingkungan pendidikan tinggi di Jepang, antara lain di Tokyo Polytechnic University, Tokyo Zokei University, Kyoto Seika University, dan Tokyo University of the Arts. Menariknya, Ketua JSAS saat itu bahkan diminta rekomendasinya sebagai syarat perizinan pembukaan program studi animasi ke MEXT (Kementerian Dikbud, Olahraga, dan IPTEK Jepang).

Selanjutnya, karena buku ini menggunakan perspektif Asia Timur, maka sudut pandang di dalamnya berangkat dari pengalaman ketiga belas kontributor/penulisnya sendiri yang notabene berasal dari tiga negara berbeda: Jepang, Korea Selatan, dan China. Beberapa nama akademisi dan praktisi di bidang *anime* Jepang dengan sangat baik menganalisis *anime* sesuai bidangnya, seperti sejarawan *anime* Tsugata Nobuyuki yang menjelaskan sejarah perkembangan *anime* di Jepang, serta Koide Masashi, salah satu tokoh pendiri Asosiasi Studi *Anime* di Jepang sepuluh tahun lalu, hingga Ikeda Hiroshi, mantan Direktur Toei Animation Studio yang telah menghasilkan lebih dari 50 karya animasi di studionya.

PERKEMBANGAN ANIME DI ASIA TIMUR

Beberapa isu menarik dalam buku ini antara lain mengenai perkembangan *anime* dalam konteks historis transnasional dengan negara-negara tetangga Jepang, pengaruh apa yang *anime* berikan kepada mereka, serta konteks politik di balik produksi dan konsumsi *anime* di kawasan tersebut (Hu, 2013, 14). Buku ini dibuka dengan deskripsi sejarah perkembangan *anime* di Jepang, yang berakar dari perkembangan *manga* (Tsugata, 2013, 25-30). Di tengah masyarakat Jepang yang sangat menjunjung tinggi konformitas di hadapan orang lain (建前、*tatemae*), dan juga

di tengah masa krisis akibat gejolak perang dunia II, *manga* saat itu menjadi media ekspresi terbaik bagi banyak seniman Jepang saat itu untuk mencurahkan pemikirannya dalam bentuk *story manga* yang kemudian banyak diadaptasi ke dalam bentuk *anime*. *Anime* diproduksi pertama kali pada tahun 1917, namun masih sebatas film animasi pendek berdurasi dua hingga lima menit yang sebagian besar bercerita tentang *folk tales* masa itu. *Anime* terus berkembang dengan dipengaruhi oleh konteks sosial politik pada masanya. Berbagai *anime* diproduksi, mulai dari *anime* bertema propaganda perang seperti *Momotaro no Umiwashii* (Momotaro's Sea Eagle) yang menggelorakan semangat perang yang mengambil latar waktu saat Jepang menyerang Pearl Harbour pada tanggal 8 Desember 1941 (Watanabe, 2013, 104), hingga *anime* yang merefleksikan harapan akan kebangkitan sains dan teknologi pascaperang, *Tetsuwan Atomu* (鉄腕アトム, atau yang lebih dikenal di dunia internasional dengan sebutan "Astro Boy"). *Anime* Astro Boy ini menjadi serial TV *anime* pertama di Jepang yang disiarkan pada tahun 1963-1966, serta merupakan salah satu *anime* paling penting dalam studi perkembangan *anime* di Jepang dan sekitarnya. Oleh karena itu, beberapa artikel dalam buku ini menjadikan *anime* ini sebagai objek kajian.

Dalam artikelnya, Koh Dong Yeon (2013, 155-175) menjelaskan dengan rinci proses-proses adaptasi Astro Boy dikaitkan dengan kondisi sosial politik di Korea Selatan, seiring dengan pengalamannya merasakan sendiri masuknya *anime* ke negaranya saat itu. Astro Boy merupakan sebuah *manga* berseri karya Tezuka Osamu yang terbit pada tahun 1952. Banyak yang menyebut bahwa Tezuka sangat dipengaruhi oleh Disney dan animasi Barat, yang tercermin pada ciri fisik pada karakter-karakter dalam Astro Boy. Sejalan dengan peningkatan popularitasnya, Astro Boy mulai diadaptasi ke dalam bentuk serial TV *anime* di Jepang pada tahun 1963, dan mulai masuk ke Korea Selatan pada awal 1970-an. Astro Boy saat itu seringkali dikaitkan dengan memori

kelam Jepang terhadap bom atom, namun di sisi lain, ia juga dilihat sebagai simbol optimisme akan kebangkitan sains dan teknologi di Jepang pascaperang. Sedangkan dalam konteks Korea Selatan pascaperang tahun 1970-1980, *anime* ini dipandang sebagai simbol pengharapan masyarakatnya akan Korea yang ideal dan modern, mengikuti jejak Jepang yang telah lebih dulu sukses menyelenggarakan modernisasi. Saat itu, pemerintah Korea Selatan yang berada di bawah kepemimpinan Presiden Park Jung-Hee, tengah gencar-gencarnya melakukan pembangunan.

Pada tahun 1968, Pemerintah Korea mencanangkan program lima tahun untuk pembangunan industri elektronik, yang sekaligus menandai dimulainya transisi pembangunan ekonomi di Korea. Proses modernisasi di Korea ini terjadi bersamaan dengan munculnya kekhawatiran pemerintah terhadap potensi masuknya pengaruh Jepang yang berlebihan, salah satunya melalui *anime*. Koh menyebut beberapa faktor yang berperan dalam budaya TV di Korea Selatan. Sekitar tahun 1970-an, program TV untuk penonton dewasa di Korea Selatan didominasi oleh program dari Amerika, sedangkan untuk penonton anak-anak, sebagian besar justru diimpor dari Jepang. Rendahnya biaya royalti *anime* Jepang dibandingkan animasi dari Amerika menjadi salah satu faktor penyebab dominasi *anime* di Korea. Astro Boy pun mulai disiarkan di TV Korea Selatan dan ditonton oleh masyarakat luas. Saat itu, faktor bertambahnya jam pelajaran bagi siswa dan derasnya arus urbanisasi seiring dengan industrialisasi turut mendorong peningkatan kebutuhan masyarakat akan hiburan. Masyarakat Korea Selatan yang saat itu tidak memiliki banyak pilihan hiburan, mau tidak mau menjadikan TV sebagai media hiburan mereka. Namun demikian, Pemerintah Korea Selatan saat itu tidak serta merta mengimpor *anime* tanpa melakukan adaptasi dan pembatasan. Ada beberapa adaptasi yang dilakukan, misalnya dengan mengganti semua nama karakter yang ada di Astro Boy menjadi nama Korea, termasuk

mengganti judul *anime* itu sendiri menjadi *Astro Boy Atom*. Di samping itu, fakta bahwa Astro Boy sendiri juga tidak mencerminkan ciri fisik orang Jepang, seperti hidung pesek dan mata bulat besar, juga menjadi penyebab mengapa sebagian besar warga Korea yang menonton Astro Boy Atom tidak menyadari darimana *anime* tersebut sebenarnya berasal.

Dari segi makna, Astro Boy pun bisa dilihat dari sudut pandang yang berbeda. Di Jepang sendiri, *anime* Astro Boy seringkali dikaitkan dengan memori kelam terhadap Bom Atom. Namun demikian, Schodt (2007) sebagaimana dikutip dalam Hu (2013), berargumen atom telah menjadi sumber energi yang paling banyak digunakan di Jepang pada era pascaperang, dan telah diakui sebagai bentuk energi baru yang humanis. Di sisi lain, Astro Boy dilihat sebagai simbol optimisme akan kebangkitan sains dan teknologi di Jepang pascaperang. Namun demikian, hal yang berbeda berlaku bagi masyarakat di Korea Selatan. Atom yang sangat berkaitan dengan peristiwa pengeboman Hiroshima-Nagasaki dilihat sebagai titik tolak kebebasan mereka dari pendudukan Jepang yang (Koh, 2013, 163). Di samping itu, sebagian besar penonton Astro Boy Atom di Korea adalah anak-anak, yang notabene tidak mengerti konteks historis politik di balik *anime* tersebut. Ia lebih dilihat oleh masyarakat Korea, terutama anak-anak, sebagai gambaran euforia atas teknologi Barat yang telah maju. Kedua contoh di atas menunjukkan dua sudut pandang yang berbeda dalam melihat globalisasi *anime* dalam konteks historis transnasional.

DARI ANIME KE COOL JAPAN

Masalah globalisasi *anime* yang sebetulnya telah dimulai sejak tahun 1960-an ini, juga menarik dibahas dalam konteks kekinian. Namun, konteks kekinian inilah yang belum dibahas secara khusus dalam buku ini. Buku ini diterbitkan tahun 2013, saat Pemerintah Jepang tengah gencar-gencarnya mengaktualisasikan kebijakan Cool Japan yang telah diimplementasikan secara

luas oleh MOFA (Kementerian Luar Negeri Jepang) sejak tahun 2007, sebelum diambil alih oleh METI (Kementerian Ekonomi, Perdagangan, dan Perindustrian Jepang) pada tahun 2011. Buku ini akan semakin mempunyai nilai lebih jika ada bagian khusus yang menganalisis globalisasi *anime* dalam kerangka Cool Japan yang saat buku ini diterbitkan sebenarnya sudah berjalan.

METI (2015a) mendefinisikan Cool Japan sebagai kebijakan strategi diplomasi Jepang melalui budaya populer dan industri kreatif, termasuk *anime*, manga, kuliner, film, musik, dll, yang melibatkan pihak pemerintah dan juga swasta. Sebagai sebuah kebijakan strategis, Cool Japan juga dilingkupi oleh pro dan kontra. Awalnya, Cool Japan merupakan sebuah program tentang budaya populer Jepang yang disiarkan di NHK TV tahun 2004. Seiring berjalannya waktu, program TV tersebut kemudian mulai diadaptasi menjadi sebuah kebijakan diplomasi luar negeri oleh MOFA. Di bawah MOFA, Pemerintah Jepang mulai memanfaatkan budaya populer untuk membentuk citra positif Jepang di mata dunia (Nakamura dalam Yudoprakoso, 2013). Melalui Cool Japan, pemerintah Jepang seolah ingin menunjukkan kepada dunia bahwa negaranya adalah negara yang baik, cinta damai, dan kaya akan budaya, tidak hanya budaya tradisional melainkan juga budaya populer seperti *anime* dan *manga* (Yudoprakoso, 2013). Pada tahun 2011, METI mengambil alih kebijakan Cool Japan yang berdampak cukup signifikan pada perubahan tujuan dari Cool Japan itu sendiri. Di bawah METI, pemerintah Jepang mulai berorientasi dan berfokus pada nilai profit yang dihasilkan dari industri budaya pop. Menurut METI, ada 18 sektor yang dinaungi oleh Cool Japan, mulai dari *manga*, *anime*, film, serial drama, sampai industri makanan dan *fashion*, digarap secara serius oleh pemerintah Jepang.

Namun demikian, konsep Cool Japan ini masih menyisakan pertanyaan, termasuk bagi orang Jepang sendiri. Seperti dikutip oleh Mihara (2014), banyak orang Jepang yang mempertanyakan apa sebenarnya yang “cool” dari

budaya populer Jepang, dan juga alasan mengapa diberi nama “cool”. Belum lagi mereka yang mempermasalahkan banyaknya APBN Jepang yang digunakan untuk mendanai proyek-proyek Cool Japan. Di tengah pro-kontra seputar Cool Japan, pada akhirnya Pemerintah Jepang melalui METI tetap melanjutkan proyek ini hingga kini, seperti yang tengah terjadi di Indonesia. Bagi Jepang, Indonesia dipandang sebagai pasar yang sangat potensial bagi industri budaya populer maupun industri kreatif Jepang. Beragam *event* bertema Jepang digelar, berbagai perusahaan kecil-menengah Jepang juga mulai membuka kantor cabang di Jakarta. Satu hal yang menjadi nilai lebih dari kebijakan Cool Japan ini ialah adanya sinergitas antara pemerintah dan pihak swasta dalam mempromosikan industri budaya populer Jepang ke seluruh dunia (METI, 2015a), yang bisa dilihat dalam penyelenggaraan acara AFAID 2015.

Berdasarkan rencana strategis METI (2015b) yang tertuang dalam proyek Cool Japan World Trial, ada empat negara percontohan tempat pelaksanaan proyek-proyek yang dinaungi oleh Cool Japan, yaitu: Indonesia, Vietnam, Rusia, dan Turki. Implementasi kebijakan Cool Japan di Indonesia sebenarnya telah dimulai pada tahun 2012 bersamaan dengan semakin derasnya arus *Japan content*¹ yang masuk ke Indonesia. Pada tahun 2012, diselenggarakan event “Cool Japan Indonesia” yang berlokasi di salah satu pusat perbelanjaan kelas atas di Jakarta Pusat. Namun, penyelenggaraan event tersebut lebih diakomodasi oleh pihak swasta, sedangkan peran METI sendiri belum terlalu dominan (METI, 2012). Mulai tahun ini, METI mulai berperan aktif, seperti terlihat dalam event *Anime Festival Asia Indonesia* (AFAID). AFAID merupakan salah satu event budaya populer dan industri kreatif Jepang yang terbesar di level Asia Tenggara. Selain di Indonesia, AFA juga diselenggarakan di Singapura (AFASG),

1 *Japan content* merujuk pada segala hal yang berhubungan dengan Jepang, mulai dari bentuk budaya populer Jepang, seperti *anime*, *manga*, hingga makanan, *fashion*, dan pernik-pernik Jepang.

Thailand (AFATH), dan Malaysia (AFAMY). Event yang digelar pada 25-27 September lalu ini diselenggarakan dalam kerangka Cool Japan, yang artinya METI turut berperan di dalamnya. Saat event tersebut berlangsung, METI menyediakan slot waktu dan tempat khusus untuk memfasilitasi perusahaan-perusahaan kecil-menengah Jepang untuk membuka bisnis industri kreatif di Jakarta. Sedangkan dari sisi pengunjung, AFAID menjadi acara yang sangat ditunggu-tunggu oleh para pecinta budaya pop Jepang, terutama *anime*. Selama acara, mereka dapat menyaksikan berbagai pertunjukkan, mulai dari pemutaran klip *anime* terbaru, *anisong* (*anime song*), lomba *cosplay*² (*costume player*) dan masih banyak lagi. Di venue acara juga terdapat puluhan *booth* yang menjual beragam pernik budaya pop Jepang, seperti *character goods anime*, berbagai judul manga, dan sebagainya.

PENUTUP

Perkembangan *anime* sampai saat ini menunjukkan adanya kecenderungan bahwa perkembangan *anime* sebagai bagian dari budaya populer Jepang, juga diikuti oleh perkembangan industri kreatif yang merupakan produk turunan dari *anime* itu sendiri, seperti maraknya event-event berbau Jepang, menjamurnya berbagai produk bernuansa *anime*, dan semakin banyaknya pegiat budaya populer Jepang. Hal ini kemudian menimbulkan pertanyaan bagaimana memaknai masuknya budaya populer Jepang yang kian deras ini. Pada penyelenggaraan AFAID yang pertama kalinya tahun 2012, komik asli karya anak bangsa berjudul “Volt”, mulai diperkenalkan ke publik. Nama Volt diambil dari tokoh utamanya, Volt, seorang pahlawan super pembela kebenaran namun tetap membawa nilai-nilai bangsa Indonesia. Namun sayang, popularitas komik ini masih jauh tertinggal dengan komik Jepang ataupun *anime* yang notabene merupakan karya bangsa lain.

2 *Cosplay* merujuk pada kegiatan bermain peran dengan menggunakan kostum lainnya karakter dalam *anime* atau manga. Sebutan untuk orang yang melakukan cosplay adalah cosplayer. Seorang cosplayer juga dituntut untuk menjiwai karakter yang sedang ia perankan, tidak hanya sebatas pada kostumnya saja.

Dengan memahami sejarah perkembangan *anime* dari awal kemunculannya hingga masa kini seperti yang disampaikan dalam buku ini, bisa diketahui bahwa *anime* bisa berkembang karena adanya sinergitas antara berbagai pihak di Jepang. Mulai dari kreator dan praktisi *anime* yang konsisten berkarya, akademisi yang terus mengkaji dan mengajarkan *anime*, serta pemerintah dan sektor swasta yang bersinergi dalam mengemas *anime* dalam industri kreatif hingga bisa diterima masyarakat global. Pemerintah Indonesia sebaiknya mulai memikirkan bagaimana seharusnya bertindak agar masuknya industri kreatif ini bisa bermanfaat juga bagi Indonesia, seperti yang Pemerintah Korea Selatan telah lakukan dengan melakukan beberapa adaptasi saat budaya populer Jepang masuk ke negaranya tahun 1960-1970-an. Di era internet saat ini, hal tersebut memang merupakan tantangan yang berat, karena arus informasi juga bergerak semakin cepat dan bebas, di samping perbedaan konteks sosial politik dengan masa lalu. Pemerintah Indonesia juga bisa belajar dari Jepang bagaimana mengemas industri kreatifnya untuk dijual ke seluruh dunia, sebagaimana yang telah Korea Selatan lakukan dengan *Korean Wave*³-nya. Saat ini, tidak dapat dipungkiri, Korea Selatan telah menjadi salah satu negara saingan Jepang dalam hal budaya populer dan industri kreatif, selain Amerika dan Inggris. Apa yang perlu dilakukan masyarakat Indonesia adalah belajar mengadaptasi dan mengambil manfaat dari masuknya industri kreatif Jepang bagi pengembangan kemajuan industri kreatifnya sendiri. Hal ini akan bisa terlaksana apabila seluruh pihak bersinergi dan bekerjasama dengan baik, seperti yang telah Jepang lakukan terhadap Astro Boy, Doraemon, dan proyek Cool Japan-nya. Pada akhirnya, buku ini dapat dijadikan sebagai satu referensi untuk memahami perkembangan *anime* di Jepang, serta bagaimana ia memberikan pengaruh kepada kawasan lain, sebagai pelengkap sudut pandang akademisi Barat yang cenderung fokus pada pengaruh apa yang

3 *Korean Wave* merujuk pada fenomena tersebarnya budaya populer Korea Selatan di seluruh dunia.

Barat berikan dalam perjalanan perkembangan anime di Jepang.

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