

DAFTAR ISI

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<i>Pengantar Redaksi</i> Babak Baru Kajian Wilayah di Indonesia	2-3
Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Process in Cambodia: The Perspective of Survivors <i>Akbar Meirio</i>	4-31
Proses Munculnya <i>Euro-Islam</i> sebagai <i>Transnational Norms</i> di kalangan Muslim Eropa <i>Mochamad Faisal Karim</i>	32-58
Migrasi, Kewarganegaraan, dan Partisipasi Imigran: Studi Kasus Imigran Turki di Belanda <i>Gusnelly.</i>	59-78
Transformasi Ekonomi-Politik Jerman dan Regionalisasi Ekonomi di Asia <i>Luqman nul Hakim</i>	79-100
Multilateralism in East Asia: Analysis of Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) within ASEAN+3 Framework <i>M. Sigit Andhi Rahman</i>	101-118
Religion, Imperialism, and Resistance in Nineteenth Century's Netherlands Indies and Spanish Philippines <i>Muhamad Ali</i>	119-140
Indonesia and Nigeria, 1965-1985: Structural Factors, Technocracy and the Politics of Rural Development <i>Riwanto Tirtosudarmo</i>	141-165

Pengantar Redaksi **Babak Baru Kajian Wilayah di Indonesia**

Berakhirnya Perang Dingin yang diikuti oleh keruntuhan sebagian besar negara komunis pada satu sisi dan meluasnya arus globalisasi pada sisi yang lain telah membuka babak baru dalam wacana akademis mengenai kajian wilayah (*area studies*), atau sebagian menyebutnya dengan kajian regional (*regional studies*). Jika pada masa sebelumnya kajian wilayah sering dicurigai sebagai bagian dari strategi pertahanan dan keamanan negara-negara besar, yang dikerangkai oleh batas-batas geografi pengetahuan dan politik ruang yang tegas, sekarang kajian wilayah berkembang menjadi sebuah disiplin (lebih tepatnya, disiplin yang inter-disiplin) yang berminat pada isu-isu transnasional dalam sebuah dunia yang mengglobal. Interkoneksi dan interdependensi adalah beberapa kata kunci dalam kajian wilayah pada babak baru ini, menggantikan pemahaman mengenai otentisitas yang sering muncul pada kajian wilayah babak sebelumnya.

Mengikuti Arjun Appadurai (1997), babak baru kajian wilayah, baik dalam hal asumsi, kategori, metodologi, hingga pilihan tema-tema penelitian, lahir sebagai bagian dari perubahan dalam dimensi-dimensi kultural globalisasi yang kental dengan nuansa *disjuncture* dan *difference*. Akibat dari hal tersebut, realitas mengalami 'deteritorialisasi' (*deteritorialization*) yang "*applies not only to obvious examples such as transnasional corporations and money markets but also the ethnic groups, sectarian movement, and political formations, which increasingly operate in ways that transcend specific territorial boundaries and identities*". Dengan perkataan lain, lokasi atau ruang dari apa yang sekarang kita sebut sebagai kajian wilayah terletak tidak hanya pada detail sejarah, bahasa, atau etnografi dalam konteks yang spesifik, tetapi juga pada hubungan yang tumpang tindih antar konteks spesifik tersebut.

Secara historis kajian wilayah sebagai sebuah disiplin akademis adalah sebuah transformasi dari arus besar tradisi orientalisme para sarjana Eropa pada masa kolonial yang diteruskan oleh para sarjana ilmu sosial Amerika Serikat pada periode pasca-Perang. Besarnya peran Amerika Serikat dalam pembentukan pusat-pusat kajian wilayah pada periode ini dilukiskan oleh Arjun Appadurai—sebagaimana dikutip dalam Terence Chong (2007: 211)—sebagai "*the largest institutional epistemology through which the academy in the United States has apprehended much of the world in the last 50 years*". Akan tetapi, khususnya dalam kajian Asia Tenggara, peran Amerika Serikat tersebut belakangan terlihat tidak sekuat pada periode sebelumnya. Beberapa universitas dan lembaga riset di Australia dan di negara-negara Asia

Tenggara sendiri, khususnya Singapura, selain juga di Eropa, khususnya Belanda, mendorong pengembangan pusat-pusat Asia Tenggara yang kuat. Perubahan ini dilatarbelakangi oleh kepentingan negara-negara tersebut terhadap wilayah atau kawasan di luar mereka pada satu sisi dan tersedianya kemampuan finansial mereka pada sisi yang lain.

Akan tetapi, sementara kajian wilayah di negara-negara maju bertransformasi sedemikian rupa, para sarjana Indonesia masih terlihat asik dengan kajian 'diri sendiri' (*the self*) (Winarto dan Pirous, 2008). Sampai akhir tahun 1990-an jarang sekali ditemukan karya-karya sarjana Indonesia yang berbicara mengenai 'yang lain' (*the other*), baik individu, komunitas, atau bahkan bangsa, di luar batas-batas negara-bangsa Indonesia. Sudah umum diketahui, para mahasiswa Indonesia yang mengambil studi sarjana di fakultas-fakultas ilmu sosial dan humaniora lebih sering memilih tema dan lokasi riset yang dekat dengan latar belakang kampung halamannya, bahkan begitu pula dengan mereka yang sekolah pascasarjana ke luar negeri, sebagian besar memilih tema riset mengenai Indonesia. Tentu banyak faktor yang menyebabkan kondisi tersebut, mulai dari ketiadaan dana, kurangnya komitmen pemerintah, hingga ketidakmampuan kalangan akademisi Indonesia sendiri dalam melakukan riset di luar Indonesia.

Melihat kondisi tersebut, *Jurnal Kajian Wilayah* yang diterbitkan oleh Pusat Penelitian Sumber Daya Regional (PSDR) LIPI ini menganggapnya sebagai sebuah tantangan. Dengan segala keterbatasannya, *Jurnal Kajian Wilayah* berkomitmen untuk menyebarkan pemikiran dan hasil penelitian mengenai kajian wilayah. Menyadari bahwa 'kajian wilayah' adalah sebuah istilah yang secara konseptual akan mengundang perdebatan, kami dalam volume dan nomor pertama ini membuka diri bagi tulisan-tulisan, yang dari segi tema, wilayah, hingga pendekatan sangat beragam. Meskipun demikian, dengan adanya beragam tulisan tersebut kami justru hendak menampilkan *disjuncture* dan *difference* realitas dunia yang kita tempati sekarang ini. ●

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Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Process in Cambodia: The Perspective of Survivors¹

Akbar Meirio²

Abstrak

Untuk menuntut pertanggungjawaban para pemimpin senior Khmer Merah dan mereka yang dianggap paling bertanggung jawab atas kejahatan kemanusiaan yang terjadi selama berkuasanya rezim Khmer Merah atau Demokratik Kampuchea (1975-1979), pemerintah Kerajaan Kamboja bekerjasama dengan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (PBB), telah mendirikan *Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia* (ECCC) atau yang lebih dikenal sebagai Peradilan Khmer Merah (*Khmer Rouge Tribunal*). Sebagai bagian dari proses keadilan transisional (*transitional justice*), proses peradilan terhadap pemimpin senior dan mereka yang dianggap paling bertanggung jawab tersebut diharapkan juga memberi kontribusi besar terhadap proses rekonsiliasi antara para korban dan para pelaku (baca: pelaku level rendah/*low level perpetrators*) yang saat ini belum tercapai. Artikel ini membahas pandangan mereka yang selamat dari kekejaman Khmer Merah (*survivor*) terhadap proses peradilan yang saat ini sedang berlangsung dan pengaruh atau kaitannya dengan proses rekonsiliasi di kalangan akar rumput. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan bahwa, berdasarkan pandangan para *survivors*, proses peradilan kurang dapat memberikan kontribusi yang signifikan dalam proses rekonsiliasi antara korban dan pelaku level rendah di kalangan akar rumput di Kamboja.

1 This article is written based on the field research undertaken in Cambodia from 20 December 2008 to 20 September 2009, funded by Bangkok based Asian Scholarship Foundation (ASF). The writer would like to thank to the ASF for funding this research project and to Documentation Center of Cambodia for being a host institution while the writer was doing the research.

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Temuan penelitian menunjukkan pula bahwa Kamboja perlu menggabungkan pendekatan retributif melalui mekanisme peradilan, dengan pendekatan restoratif melalui Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi (KKR).

Kata kunci: Khmer Merah, kejahatan kemanusiaan, peradilan, rekonsiliasi

Introduction

The Khmer Rouge's (KR) rule from 1975 to 1979, had brought a tragedy of humanity in Cambodia. It is estimated 1.7 million people died in a horrible attempt by the regime to revolutionize Cambodian society into one without class or ethnic diversity. Recently the Cambodian government in cooperation with the United Nations, has established Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a Cambodian-UN hybrid tribunal, to bring them to trial those who are most responsible for the gross human rights violation during the KR's rule.

The current judicial process aimed at the senior leaders of KR in Cambodia is a part of what social scientists call 'transitional justice'.³ Ideally, the transitional justice process in Cambodia should have an enormous contribution to the process of reconciliation in Cambodia. The KR's rule and nearly 20 years of conflict after the collapse of the regime, has resulted in creating a divided society in Cambodia. The community has been divided amongst the victims on one side and the perpetrators on the other side, and amongst the anti-KR on one side and the pro-KR on the other side. In order to create sustainable peace, this divided society needs to be reconciled.

This article focuses on exploring the perception of the survivors of the KR regime on the current transitional justice process and the state of reconciliation process in Cambodia. Specifically, it is aimed to address the following questions: what is the perception of the survivors of Khmer Rouge on the judicial process held in Cambodia? To what extent will the transitional justice process be implemented by the establishment of the ECCC, affect the reconciliation process in Cambodia? Is the ECCC the best way to deal with the past and promote reconciliation in Cambodia?

To collect data, the researcher use (1) literature studies, (2) observation, and (3) in-depth interview. The informants interviewed in this research are the survivors of KR, including both victims and perpetrators. In this research,

3 Five former KR leaders currently being charged are Kang Guek Eav alias Duch, former chief of S-21 prison; Nuon Chea, former head of the Democratic Kampuchea National Assembly; Ieng Sary, former minister of foreign affairs of Democratic Kampuchea; Ieng Thirith, former minister of social affairs of Democratic Kampuchea; and Khieu Samphan, former head of state of Democratic Kampuchea.

a victim is defined as someone who used to live under KR's regime, suffered from torture or harmed by them and was not affiliated with the KR. A former perpetrator is defined as someone who used as a cadre or agent of the KR, for example as guards, soldiers, chief of group, etc.

Due to geographical constraints and very finite resources, the field research was conducted in certain areas of Cambodia, namely in Kandal Province, Takeo Province, Kampong Speu Province and Phnom Penh municipality.⁴ The three provinces were selected because they represent the regions where the atrocities mostly happened. All of these provinces were part of KR's Southwestern Zone, which was considered by the KR as a model for the revolution.⁵ Phnom Penh was selected because it represented the area where the most radical change took place during the KR period. KR forcibly emptied the city by evacuating all the city dwellers to the villages to perform hard manual labour whom most had previously never performed.

In the three provinces, in-depth interviews and observations were conducted in sample areas where many victims and perpetrators live together without being reconciled. The areas are including the villages of Trapeang Sva, Trapeang Kak, Domrey Slab, Boeung Khyang, Boeng Khaek, Chambak Trab, Kandal Steung District in Kandal Province; Taleur and Sandao, in Tramkak District of Takeo Province; and of Chambak Sor, Chambak P'aim, Roleang Tlang, Thmei, and Wilpun, in Thpong District of Kampong Speu Province. In Phnom Penh, interviews were conducted with victims who attended the trial and also with victims at the Prek Pra area of Meanchey District, located in Km 8 and Km 9 area of Russey Keo District. These are the areas in Phnom Penh where Cambodia's Cham Muslims were concentrated. Thus, in addition to getting the perspective of the city dwellers, the researcher also could obtain the perspective of the Cambodia's Cham Muslims on the issues researched.⁶

Observation was performed in the villages where the interviews were conducted. It focused mainly on the interaction between the victims and

4 Cambodia has an area of 181,035 square kilometres (69,898 sq mi). It consists of 23 provinces and 1 municipality.

5 See Meng Try Ea, *The Chain of Terror: The Khmer Rouge South West Zone Security System*, (Phnom Penh: Documentation Cambodia, 2005). In 1976 the KR divided Cambodia into 6 geographical regions, namely East Zone, Southwest Zone, North Zone, Northwest Zone and West Zone. South West Zone consists of two district of Kampong Speu (Kong Pisey and Samrong Tong) and five district of Kandal (Kandal Stung, Sa-ang, Koh Tom, Kean Svay, and Leuk Dek).

6 Cham is one Cambodia's ethnic minority who are predominantly Muslim. About 90% of Cambodia's population is Khmer. The remainder includes Vietnamese, Chinese, Cham, and Khmer Loeu. The composition of religions in Cambodia is Theravada Buddhism (95%), Islam (3%) and Christianity(2%). For the stories of the sufferings and struggle of Cham Muslim during the KR, please see, Ysa Osman, *Oukoubah: Justice for the Cham Muslims under the Democratic Kampuchea Regime*, (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2002), and Ysa Osman, *The Cham Rebellion: Survivors' Stories from the Villages*, (Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2006).

the perpetrators. Meanwhile, literature studies analysed publication materials, including books, articles, journals, magazines, newspapers, and documentary films related to the issues of the research.

The total number of 63 survivors were interviewed (25 female and 38 male). Among them, 47 people can be categorized as victims and 16 people can be categorized as perpetrators. The victims interviewed are former prisoners, child survivors, those who lost their family members (children, husband, sister, brother, or in laws) and those who did not loss their family members but experienced forced labor. The perpetrators interviewed were former prison security guards, soldiers, cooks, medical staff, chief of group and chief of cooperative. Based on their ethnicity and religion, the interviewees included not only majority Khmer and Buddhists (77 people), but also minority Cham Muslim (6 people). While most of the interviewees are just common people working as farmers; 4 interviewees are village chiefs, 3 are religious leaders (Monks or Ustadz) and 1 is a head of primary school. Overall, the ages of the interviewees range from 37 years old to 82 years old.

Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

Transitional justice refers to the short term and often temporary processes addressing “the legacy of human rights abuses and violence during a society’s transition away from conflict or authoritarian rule” (Anderlini, Conaway, Kays, 2004: 1). Basically there are two approaches of justice that could be used to address the legacy of human rights abuses and violence during the era of transition: (1) retributive justice, and (2) restorative justice. Retributive justice is based on the philosophy that the criminal’s acts have created an imbalance of social order which should be addressed by action against the criminal. Therefore, for example, in cases of human rights violations, retributive justice puts emphasis on the importance of punishing the perpetrators. Meanwhile, restorative justice is based on the philosophy that imbalance of social order created by the criminal acts that should be addressed by undertaking comprehensive action on the victims, perpetrators and community. In the context of human rights violations, restorative justice emphasizes the importance of systematic responses to address the impacts of human rights violations on victims, perpetrators and community. By not focusing on punishment for crimes, restorative justice focuses on repairing the damage done, and offering restitution (O’Connor, 2006: webpage).

The process of transitional justice has a huge influence on the process of reconciliation between victims and perpetrators involved in past conflict or violence. Originating from the Latin word “*Conciliare*”, meaning “bring together”, the concept of reconciliation has been defined by many scholars in the field of peace and conflict studies. Suzannah Linton defines reconciliation as “the reestablishment of normal friendly relations after an estrangement, or a coming to terms with something in the past and moving on without

negativity" (Linton, 2004: 67). According to Hizkias Assefa, as an approach, reconciliation "not only tries to find solutions to the issues underlying the conflict but also works to alter the adversaries' relationship from that of resentment and hostility, to friendship and harmony". (Assefa, no year of publication: webpage).

John Paul Lederach emphasizes that reconciliation "must find ways to address the past without getting locked in a vicious circle of the past" (Lederach, 1997: 26). Lederach suggests that reconciliation is an effort to reframe the present by providing the space for encountering the acknowledgement of the past and envisioning the future. For this to happen, according to Lederach, "people must find ways to encounter themselves and their enemies, their hopes and their fears" (Lederach, 1997: 27). Similar to Lederach, Andrew Rigby states that "...reconciliation refers to the future and requires the active participation of those who were divided by enmity. At the core of any reconciliation process is the preparedness of people to anticipate a shared future" (Assefa, no year of publication: webpage).

These definitions appear to agree among the scholars on the basic elements of the concept of reconciliation, i.e.: (1) addressing the past, (2) moving forward to build the future, (3) reestablishing friendly relations (harmony) between parties involved in a dispute or conflict, and (4) actively involving those who were divided by enmity. In spite of the agreement on the basic elements of the concept of reconciliation, *how* the reconciliation can be achieved, is the subject of debates amongst academic scholars that further crystalize into two schools of thought: (1) idealist and (2) realist.

John Paul Lederach and Andrew Rigby embrace idealist school of thought in reconciliation studies. Lederach argues that there are four constitutive elements of reconciliation processes, i.e. truth, mercy, justice and peace. Reconciliation is the place where the four elements meet. He explains that,

"Truth is the longing for acknowledgement of wrong and the validation of painful loss and experience, but it is coupled with Mercy, which articulates the need for acceptance, letting go, and a new beginning. Justice represents the search for individual and group rights, for social restructuring, and for restitution, but is linked with Peace, which underscores the need for interdependence, well-being and security." (Lederach, 1997: 29).

Agreeing with Lederach, Rigby suggests that,

"...for reconciliation to take place and wholeness and harmony to be approached, people must enjoy a degree of security and freedom from fear of a return of violence and abuse, they must believe that the old sources of division and exclusion

are being transformed, and that the pain and hurt of their individual and collective past has been acknowledged. To the extent that such conditions are approached, over time, people will find themselves developing the capacity to forgive - forgiving the past in the sense of letting go of the old hatreds". (Rigby, 2000: 3).

Contrary to Lederach and Rigby, from a realist perspective Linton argues that reconciliation can be viewed "as simple as learning to live in peaceful co-existence with people one does not like or by whom one disliked" (Linton, 2004: 73). Linton suggests that reconciliation does not require forgiveness. She quotes Dwyer's argument that: "any conception of reconciliation - at either the micro or macro level - that makes reconciliation dependent on forgiveness, or that emphasizes interpersonal harmony and positive-fellow feeling will fail to be a realistic model of reconciliation for most creatures like us. If we care about reconciliation, let us advocate it in terms that make it credible to the relevant parties" (Dwyer, 1999: 81-98).

This research paper argues that the idealist approach is more effective and long lasting than the realist. On the other hand, the realist argument on "learning to live in peaceful co-existence" or "unimportance of forgiveness", simply will plunge the reconciliation process into the category of "negative peace" that sees the peace only as "the absence of violence" (Galtung, 1996: 31). More than the absence of war, reconciliation is a part of what is called as "positive peace" where the restoration of relationships, the creation of social systems that serve the needs of the whole population and the constructive resolution of conflict take place. (Galtung, 1996: 31). Consequently, it is argued that Lederach's approach to reconciliation involving the four constitutive elements: truth, justice, mercy/forgiveness and peace, is preferable and more effective.

The establishment of the tribunal and the current trial on the leaders of the KR can be categorized as a transitional justice process. Cambodia's society is currently in a transitional period, away from KR genocidal regime and the following conflict. During this transitional period, the government of Cambodia, in cooperation with the UN, attempts to address the legacy of the horror of genocide in Cambodia, happened during the KR era, by establishing the tribunal and bringing the leaders to trial and ask their responsibility for the atrocities. The writer, by adopting Lederach's idealist approach, explored the feeling and perceptions of the victims looking at the four constitutive elements of justice (truth, justice, mercy/forgiveness and peace) in relation to the current judicial proceedings against some key leaders of KR.

The ECCC: a Brief Background and Progress

In 1994, a year after United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) successfully held the first election and the coalition government of the Kingdom of Cambodia was formed, significant efforts demanding the accountability of the KR for the crimes they committed during Democratic Kampuchea era were made. The efforts were marked by the passing of Cambodian Genocide Justice Act in April 1994 by the US Congress and the passing of an act to outlaw the KR by Cambodian government in July 1994.⁷ In April 1997, the UN Commission on Human Rights requested that the UN provide assistance to the Cambodian government in bringing individuals to be responsible for the past human rights abuses. Two months later, co-prime ministers Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen formally requested UN assistance in setting up a tribunal (Whitley, 2006: 38). Since then, the Cambodian government and the UN have been involved in a long negotiation to establish a mixed national-international tribunal.

In January 2001, the Cambodian National Assembly passed the law to set up Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC Law). In June 2003, the UN and Cambodian government signed a draft agreement establishing a tribunal that would operate along the lines of the 2001 ECCC Law, but with modifications such as excluding amnesties and pardons (Whitley, 2006: 45). After the continuing negotiations about funding arrangements and the final form of the hybrid tribunal, in November 2005 the Extraordinary Chambers in Courts of Cambodia, was finally established and by May 2006 the judges and prosecutors has been appointed (Lambourne, 2008: 6)

The ECCC has jurisdiction to try only “senior leaders” of the KR’s regime and others who were “most responsible for serious violation of Cambodian and international law” between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979.⁸ As a hybrid tribunal, the judges, prosecutors and staffs consisted of a mix of Cambodian and international nationalities. Two co-prosecutors (1 Cambodian and 1 International) worked together to collect evidence and decide whom to charge and for what crimes. Cases were passed to two investigating judges (1 Cambodian and 1 International). If there was enough evidence, the case proceeded to trial (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 2008: 13).

7 Quoting Hammers and Urs, Lambourne noted those events as turning point in the path towards accountability. Wendy Lambourne, “The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: Justice for Genocide in Cambodia?”, paper presented at the Law and Society Association Australia and New Zealand (LSAANZ) Conference 2008 ‘W(h)ither Human Rights’, 10-12 December 2008, University of Sydney, p. 5.

8 Chapter II, article 2, Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea.

The ECCC consists of two levels of the court: the Trial Chamber and the Supreme Court Chamber. At the Trial Chamber there are 3 Cambodian and 2 International Judges, and at the Supreme Court there are 4 Cambodian and 3 International Judges.⁹

On 18 July 2007, the co-prosecutors submitted the name of the five suspects to be brought to the trial. On 31 July 2007, the investigating judges made the first arrest and within four months all the five suspects were under provisional detention at the ECCC (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 2008: 13). The five suspects are: Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch (former chief of S-21 prison¹⁰), Nuon Chea (former Head of the Democratic Kampuchea National Assembly), Ieng Sary (former minister of foreign affairs of Democratic Kampuchea) and Khieu Samphan (former head of state of Democratic Kampuchea).

During the period when this research was undertaken (January to September 2009), the only trial that had commenced was that of Kang Guek Eav, alias Duch. The trial began on 30 March 2009 and was still ongoing at the time when this research was completed (September 2009). The trials on the other suspects have not yet started. The ECCC originally estimated that all of the trials would run for three years, but were unable to give better estimates (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 2008:9).

Victims and Perpetrators: Their Daily Interaction

Many victims and perpetrators live in the same or neighbouring village. In Kandal Steung district's Trappeang Sva village, where Khmer Rouge's Sang Prison (Kuk Sang)¹¹ was located, some people who lost their family members in the prison during KR period currently live in the same area with some KR cadres who used to work as prison security guards. There are also some former prisoners in the Sang Prison who live in the neighboring villages, such as Boeung Khaek, Boeung Khyang, Chambak Trab, Prey Tatoich, which are located only within the radius of 3-5 kilometer from Trappeang Sva village.

9 Chapter III, Article 9, Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea.

10 S-21 was a detention centre located in Phnom Penh during the KR. According to the prosecutors, at least 12,380 men, women and children were executed at S-21, but as records may have been lost and some prisoners are not registered, the numbers are likely higher. According to David Chandler, strictly speaking, the S-21 was an interrogation and torture facility rather than a prison. The facility served primarily as an ante-room to death. For a detailed account about S-21, please see David Chandler, *Voice from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot's Secret Prison*, (California: the Regents of the University of California, 1999).

11 Sang Prison (Kuk Sang) was a building of teacher training college built by USAID in 1963. In 1977, under the direction of KR Southwest Zone Secretary Ta Mok, the KR transformed the building into a prison, called Sang Prison. According to one of the killers, around 5,000 people died in the prison. For a further story about this prison please see Craig Etcheson, "Mok's Work", *Searching for the Truth*, No. 8, August 2000, pp.39-40; No. 9, September 2000, pp. 41-42; No. 10, October 2000, pp. 39-40.

In Taleur village and Sandao village of Tramkak district, the victims of KR live side by side with some KR cadres who made them suffer or even contributed the killings of their family members during the KR's regime. Similarly, in Chambak Sor village of Thpong district, the victims of KR still recognized the people who made them suffer during the KR and now live in neighboring villages. Many informants reported that victims conducted revenge actions on the perpetrators right after the KR collapse in 1979. Informant A, a victim in Sandao village, for example, said that when two Khmer Rouge's group chiefs in Srae Romnong village came back to Sandao village after KR collapse in 1979, the people from Srae Romnong village came to Sandao and killed the perpetrators by burning them alive.¹²

There are, however, no recent reported clashes or revenge actions between the victims and the perpetrators.¹³ The survey conducted by Centre for Social Development (CSD) in 2005, for instance, shows that the councilors mostly considered the conflicts on the issue of land and domestic violence as the most important conflicts at the commune level (Ninh and Henke, 2005: 43). Theoretically, the reconciliation process in Cambodia is currently in the phase of peaceful coexistence. Although they live in the same or neighboring area, there is no violent conflict between the victims and perpetrators.

It seems like there are no problems between the victims and the perpetrators. However, if we observe more deeply, we will find problems when considering the interactions between the two groups. A survey conducted in 2008 by the University of California's Human Rights Center, in collaboration with Center for Advanced Study, showed that 84.6% of the people who lived under KR still harbored feeling of hatred toward those KR members responsible for violent acts (Pham, Vinck, Balthazard, Hean, and Stover, 2009: 29). Almost 72 % wish to see the KR members suffer in some way (Pham, Vinck, Balthazard, Hean, and Stover, *ibid.*). Living in close proximity, victims and perpetrators sometimes meet unexpectedly on a street or at some events, such as a village gathering, a wedding ceremony or a religious ceremony in a monastery. Interestingly, and what points to the relations between the two groups is that when they meet both victims and perpetrators never speak to each other and often prefer to move away from each other.

For many of the victims, unexpectedly, coming across perpetrators raises their anger. Informant B, a 40 year-old woman in Trappeang Sva, who lost her brother and sisters in the Sang Prison during the KR, recognized at least five people in her village who used to work as security guards in the prison.

12 For the reason of confidentiality, all of the name of informants will not be revealed in this article. Interview with Informant A in Sandao Village, Tramkak district, 1 May 2009.

13 In the interviews, some informants said that the revenge action took place after 1979, but now there is no revenge action anymore. For example, interview with informant ZB in Trappeang Sva.

Although she is not sure whether they were involved in the killing of her siblings, she has feelings of hatred for them. She often encounters them on the road. She said, "When I saw them, I felt angry and suffered but I didn't know what to do..."¹⁴ Informant C, a 72 year-old woman in Chambak Trab also has similar feelings. She knows that the people involved in killing her husband are still alive. Her husband was only a three wheel cyclist; however, the KR cadres accused him of being a Lon Nol soldier and killed him. "When I saw them on the road, I felt like [there is] a big fire on my chest." She continues, "One day, [when I encountered one perpetrator on the road] the person asked me 'where are you going?'. I felt very angry. If I had a gun I wanted to shoot him at that time."¹⁵

Such unexpected meetings with perpetrators remind victims about the past and make them sad and angry. Informant D, a 58 year-old woman, former prisoner who also lost his husband in the Kuk Sang and currently lives in Prey Tatoich, still remembers one prison guard in Trappeang Sva who took her and her husband to the prison about thirty years ago. She saw him several times when he walked in front of her house. When they came across each other, the perpetrator was unable to look at her face to face. However, she explained, "Seeing him raised my memory about sufferings in the past". It reminded her of the time when her husband was sent away to dig a channel, but he never came back. She is very unhappy because those who killed her husband, and also many such perpetrators from the past, still live happily now.¹⁶

Informant E, a 60 year-old man in Chambak Sor village, a former prisoner at Phnum Prasadh prison, recognises one of the security guards of the prison who currently lives in Wilpun Commune. Several months ago, he came across him in a campaign activity for the national election. When he saw him, he cried as memories came back of what happened in the Phnum Prasadh prison. He witnessed the perpetrator and other guards killed many prisoners. "When they killed the victims", informant E recollected, "They were very happy, like having party or ceremony".¹⁷

Such experiences of the past also bring about trauma-related fears to the victims. Informant F, a 63 year-old woman ex-prisoner in Sang Prison, who currently lives in Boeng Khaek said that she still recognized a former security guard who currently lives in Trappeang Sva. He has a motor-cart, and often passes the road near her house. When she saw him, she was really worried

14 Interview with Informant B in Trappeang Sva village, Kandal Steung district, 3 March 2009.

15 Interview with Informant C in Chambak Trab village, Kandal Steung district, 18 March 2009.

16 Interview with Informant D in Prey Tatoich village, Kandal Steung district, 19 March 2009.

17 Interview with Informant E in Chambak Sor village, Thpong district, 2 June 2009.

about her safety. She said, "When I walked alone and saw him, I always moved away from him. I was so frightened that he would torture me again as he did in the past."¹⁸

The experience in the past does not only affect the victims but also the perpetrators. Some perpetrators interviewed are also still worried that the victims will take revenge on them. One KR's former cooperative chief in Thpong district's Chambak Sor village, for example, decided to move to Chambak P'aim village to escape people's anger. Following the collapse of the KR's regime, some people in Chambak Sor wanted to take revenge on him and shot him in his legs. He was saved by the Cambodia-Vietnamese authority which controlled Cambodia after the collapse of the KR. Currently, he is still hated by many people in Chambak Sor and so he has not returned back to his own village.¹⁹

The Trial and Reconciliation Process

Based on the conceptual framework of the reconciliation process, how significant the contribution of the trial to the reconciliation process in Cambodia, can be assessed by observing the perception of the survivors (both victims and perpetrators) on the trial and the four constitutive elements of the reconciliation process: justice, truth, mercy/forgiveness, and peace.

The Trial and Justice

The KR's rule for three years, eight months and twenty days, has caused a lot of sufferings to the victims. Their horrific experience is something that they will never forget and even now steers emotions. Many victims interviewed said that they felt happy when they heard about the tribunal was bringing the KR leaders on trial. For them, the trial means the leaders would be punished and that will help them to relieve some of their misery and their anger.

This finding is in line with several general surveys which have been conducted in Cambodia. In 2005 a survey by the Open Society Justice Initiative found that 62% of respondents favored the establishment of a court (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2006: 24). A survey by International Republican Institute in February 2008, found that 71% of Cambodian citizens were aware of the KR Tribunal and 69% "very much agreed" with the trial of top KR leaders, while 17% "somewhat agreed" (International Republican Institute, 2008: 42, 44). The latest survey from 9 September to 1 October 2008 by Human Rights Center of University of California, Berkeley, in collaboration with

18 Interview with Informant F in Boeung Khaek village, Kandal Steung district, 18 March 2009.

19 Interview with Informant E, Y and U, 2 June 2009; Informant Z, ZA, 1 June 2009, in Chambak Sor village, Thpong district.

Center for Advanced Studies, shows that 90.5% of the people who lived during KR said that it is important to hold accountable those responsible for what happened during the KR regime. (Pham, Vinck, Balthazard, Hean, Stover; 2009: 31).

Informant G, a 58 year-old woman in Chambak Trab, a prisoner in Kuk Sang and also lost her husband and daughter during the KR, said that she felt happy when she knew there is a trial on the KR leaders. She said that she was angry with them who had made her suffer. Nearly crying, she said, "My husband and daughter had no mistakes. They were innocent. But, they killed them".²⁰ Informant H, 55 year-old woman in Chambak Trab, whose husband and daughter were also killed, said, "I want the tribunal to process and punish them. I am angry so much to the regime but I don't know what to do"²¹

Few victims felt that the tribunal would bring enough justice for them. Based on their belief that the tribunal will punish the leaders, even though the tribunal will try only the five leaders, they think that the trial will have an important symbolic meaning: that there is recognition that the KR regime was wrong and has to be punished.

Informant J, a 45 year-old man in Taleur village of Tramkak District, who was forced to work in a child unit, feels the trial is the way for him to find justice. For him, "Although the trial only punishes the five leaders, this means also punishment for all of the perpetrators."²² This view is shared with Informant K, a 60 year-old Cham Muslim victim, and currently Muslim religious leader in Phnom Penh. Informant K compared the criminality conducted by Polpot with the criminality conducted by Firaun (Pharaoh Ramses II) as written in the Islamic Holy Book, Al Qur-an. Whilst Firaun killed baby boys born during his reign because of the belief that they would be his enemy in the future, Pol Pot²³ killed a lot of Cambodian also as to eradicate future enemies. Like Firaun who was punished to death by the God, Pol Pot also should be punished. As Pol Pot is already dead, the leaders who are still alive are held to be responsible for their murderous policy of the past.²⁴

However, many other victims think that although the trial can make them feel happy, the trial will bring only partial justice for them. Some victims think that the trial should be not only on the KR leaders, but also the other perpetrators, including the low level perpetrators who live in the same or neighboring area with them. Informant B in Trappeang Sva insists that the

20 Interview with Informant G in Chambak Trab village, Kandal Steung district, 18 March 2009.

21 Interview with Informant H in Chambak Trab village, Kandal Steung district, 18 March 2009.

22 Interview with Informant J in Taleur village, Tramkak district, 27 April 2009.

23 Saloth Sar or Minh Hai, (May 19, 1928- April 15, 1998), widely known as Pol Pot, was the leader of the he KR and was Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea from 1976-1979.

24 Interview with Informant K in KM8, Phnom Penh, 28 March 2009.

former security guards who live in the same village with her have to be put on trial as what has been done to the five leaders. Through the trial process, she wishes to see them suffer like those made suffer by them during the KR.²⁵

Similar with informant B, informant G also demands that the low level perpetrators have to be put on trial because of the killings they committed. She said, "The people [who used to work in the Kuk Sang] have to be put on trial because they killed people directly"²⁶. Informant D mentioned that even after the trial on the leaders completed, her feeling will not be better. She actually does not know the leaders but only the low level perpetrators who live in the neighboring areas. To make her feelings better she wants them also to be punished. She said, "The five leaders didn't commit the killings directly but the low level perpetrators committed the killings directly".²⁷

Some victims also feel that the trial will only punish the leaders and will not bring enough justice for them if it is not accompanied by individual reparation. For some victims, reparation from the government will enable them to make their life better. Informant F, a woman victim in Boeung Kaek, is suffering from breathing difficulties caused by the torture she experienced during the KR. She mentioned that besides the trial, she wanted the government to give her money to go to the hospital.²⁸ Informant L, a 37 year-old man in Taleur, who lost his parents during the KR, said that when he returned to his village after KR collapse, unlike other people who received land distributed by the government, he did not receive land from the government because he was still a child at that time. He said, "I am very poor now. If my parents are alive I would not be very poor like now because my parents can support me to live better." He wants the government give him money, materials or land.²⁹ Informant G, a victim in Chambak Trab village, argued that the government should give her compensation for her being made to work and suffer during the regime. For her, a gift from the government can represent symbolic compensation for her sufferings. She said, "Any kind of gift from the government I will accept it".³⁰

Some other victims also hoped that if the government could punish the accused by asking them to pay for reparation, the money should be used for collective reparation to the victims, e.g. for building a hospital or memorial sites dedicated to the victims. Informant J, a victim from Taleur village, said, "If the tribunal can get money from the leaders on trial, it should be used to

25 Interview with Informant B in Trappeang Sva village, Kandal Steung district, 3 March 2009.

26 Interview with Informant G in Chambak Trab village, Kandal Steung district, 18 March 2009.

27 Interview with Informant D in Prey Tatoich village, Kandal Steung district, 19 March 2009.

28 Interview with Informant F in Boeung Khaek village, Kandal Steung district, 18 March 2009.

29 Interview with Informant L in Taleur village, Tramkak district, 3 May 2009.

30 Interview with Informant G in Chambak Trab village, Kandal Steung district, 18 March 2009.

build Stupa³¹ for the victim and (the government should) announced that the Stupa is built by taking money from the KR leaders.”³²

According to Internal Rule of the ECCC, the tribunal may award only “collective and moral” reparations to the victims. These shall be awarded against and be borne by convicted persons.³³ However, it appears that it is almost impossible for the victims to obtain these “collective and moral” reparations. All of the court’s current detainees have been declared too poor to pay for their own defense, meaning they would be unable to pay reparations either.³⁴

Besides victims who want low level perpetrators to be brought on trial or who wants reparations or compensation, others think that the trial will not bring enough justice for them due to the faulty process of the trial itself. During the interviews, victims often complained about the length of time needed to try the accused and the amount of money used for the tribunal. Informant M in Trappeang Kak village, a 50 year-old man victim of forced labor during KR, for example, hopes that the trial will last quickly. Considering the age of the leaders,³⁵ he is worried that the leaders will die before the trial.³⁶ Informant N, a 62 year-old man in Boeung Khaek village, who lost 3 siblings during the KR is very pessimistic that the tribunal can bring justice for him. He feels that the tribunal may take too long time to punish the leaders. He also raises the concern about the amount of money used for the trial³⁷ and that someday there will be a shortage of money that forces the tribunal to be shut down³⁸. “How should we do if the money finish?... If the tribunal can’t finish the case, the justice can’t be found”, he said.³⁹

Most of the victims interviewed have very low grade of education. Furthermore, their knowledge about the required procedure for a fair trial is very limited. As UN-Cambodian Hybrid tribunal, the ECCC implements

31 Stupa is a dome-shaped monument, used to house Buddhist relics or ashes of people who have died or to commemorate significant events in Buddhism.

32 Interview with Informant J in Taleur village, Tramkak District, 27 April 2009.

33 Rule 23, par. 11, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules.

34 “Lawyers Renew Call for KR Victim Trust Fund”, *Cambodia Daily*, 4 June 2009.

35 Duch is 66 years old; Ieng Sary is 83 years-old; Ieng Thirith is 76 years old; Nuon Chea is 82-years old; Khieu Samphan is 77 years-old.

36 Interview with Informant M in Trappeang Kak village, Kandal Steung district, 5 March 2009.

37 It was originally estimated that the ECCC would cost around \$20 million per year. In early 2008 it was estimated that the cost of the full operations of the court would rise to \$30 million a year. See, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, *An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials*, 3rd edition, Phnom Penh: Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia, 2008, p 19.

38 In March 2009 the ECCC ever experienced a shortage of money as international donors to the Cambodian side froze fundings amidst concerns of corruptions. As a result, it was announced that Cambodian staff would not receive their salaries in that month. “ECCC says no pay for national: judge says insufficient funding has left Cambodian side insolvent”, *The Phnom Penh Post*, 3 March 2009.

39 Interview with informant N in Boeung Khaek village, Kandal Steung district, 23 March 2009.

a strict procedural standard of justice, for example, the case has to be investigated thoroughly before being brought to the trial. During the trial process, the accused is given the right to defense, so lengthening the trial period. Most of the victims have an assumption that the leaders are already guilty as they are the cause of their suffering during the KR's regime. In the victims' minds, the trial should be over quite quickly. The concern about the old age of the accused also added their worries that the accused will die before the trial carried on.

Besides interviewing victims, perpetrators living in the same or neighboring area, were also interviewed to ascertain their feelings on the trial and justice it was designed to deliver. Some of the perpetrators think that the trial is important to bring justice for the victims. Informant P, a 67 year-old man, a former group chief in Taleur village, for example, said that he agreed that there should be a tribunal to put the leaders to jail because they killed million people.⁴⁰ However, some other perpetrators show no feeling towards the tribunal and the trial process. Informant Q, a 52 year old man, a former prison security guard in Trappeang Sva, for example, said that he did not care about the trial. He felt that the trial would not have any positive impacts. He explained, "Although the tribunal was established the people still cannot get back the lives of the dead."⁴¹

The Trial and the Truth

Many victims mentioned that they wanted to know about the truth in the past. The truth for them includes: who is responsible for the atrocities happened during the KR? Who did what in the KR? Who is right and who is wrong? What was behind the KR? Why Khmer killed Khmer? Many of them think that the trial will help them to find the truth on who was responsible for the atrocities in the past, who is right or wrong and who is behind the KR. However, it appears that many still harbor some doubts whether the trial will help them to find the truth on why Khmer killed Khmer.

In order to promote reconciliation between the survivors at the grass root level, the victims actually needs to have an understanding about the whole context of the atrocities, including the reasons and circumstances that lead the perpetrators to commit the cruel actions during the KR period. However, as suggested by Laura McGrew, the KR Tribunal process may help survivors know more about their past, but is unlikely to meet their need or desire to know the whole truth or a full historical account (McGrew, 2006: 140). Wendy Lambourne also argues that there are still questions as to the ECCC's ability to satisfy the need for an understanding of why such crimes were committed

40 Interview with Informant P in Taleur village, Tramkak district, 28 April 2009.

41 Interview with Informant Q in Trappeang Sva village, Kandal Steung district, 3 March 2009.

by the Cambodian regime against their own people (Lambourne, 2008: 7). The temporal jurisdiction of the Court, for example, prevents the investigation on the crimes perpetrated by the Lon Nol which preceded the Pol Pot regime, nor can the tribunal investigate the role of foreign governments in aiding and abetting the KR. This may contribute to a clear understanding of why Khmer killed Khmer during the KR (Lambourne, 2008: 7).

From the field research, it appears that although the trial is being conducted, many victims still do not understand the reasons of why the KR cadres, who are actually their fellow villagers, sent them to jail or killed members of their family. Informant R, a 50 year-old man in Chambak Trab village, still does not understand why he and his family were sent to the Kuk Sang by the person who was actually his neighbor. He remembers at that time that he was not able to complete his job to thresh a large pile of rice in one night because he was very tired. The KR cadre, who was actually his neighbor, caught him and then sent him to the prison with all of his family members. His wife and two children died in the prison.⁴² Informant C in Chambak Trab also does not understand the reasons why the KR cadres in his village, who knew very well that her husband was only a common person, accused him as a Lon Nol soldier and killed him.⁴³

Eventhough the trial is being conducted, the lower level perpetrators still find difficulties to acknowledge the past or their role in it. Although many victims witnessed and pointed out those who made them suffer, many perpetrators still refuse to admit their roles and mistakes. Informant Q who is still recognized by the victims as a security guard and one of the executors in the prison, refused to admit that he was a security guard. He explained that he the victims had been mistaken about him. When asked about his role in the past, he showed a testimony he gave to the ECCC. As per the testimony, he explained that he was only a farm worker inside the prison. He never killed people, but admitted that he used to see the killing conducted by other guards.⁴⁴ Informant S, a 47 year-old man in Trappeang Sva village, is another person who is recognized by the victims as one of the security guards in the prison; he explained that he was only a cook in the prison. His duty was only to cook and give the food to the prisoners based on the order of his upper. He has no regrets on what happened in the past because he only followed the orders.⁴⁵ Informant T, 48 year-old man, another former security guard in Sang Prison, denies the claim of thousands victims' bones found in the prison.

42 Interview with Informant R in Chambak Trab village, Kandal Steung district, 23 March 2009.

43 Interview with Informant C in Chambak Trab village, Kandal Steung district, 18 March 2009.

44 Interview with Informant Q in Trappeang Sva village, Kandal Steung district, 3 March 2009

45 Interview with Informant S in Trappeang Sva village, Kandal Steung district, 25 March 2009.

He explained that the bones were not only the victims of KR, but also the victims of Vietnamese invasion. He also does not regret his role in the past because he was a child at that time and only followed orders.⁴⁶

The Trial and Forgiveness

The current trial in Phnom Penh does not make the victims give forgiveness to the low level perpetrators. Many victims said that although the trial may punish the leaders, they still would not forgive the low level perpetrators. The trial on the KR leaders indeed makes them feel that justice is being done; however, it would not have any effect on their feelings of hatred and anger on the low level perpetrators who currently live in the same or neighboring area.

For the people in Chambak Sor village, for example, it is still hard to forgive one former cooperative chief who has moved to Chambak P'aim. Although the leaders of KR are now on trial and will be punished, the villagers still will not accept the former cooperative chief moving back to their village. Informant U, a 39 year-old man, who was a member of child unit and lives in Chambak Sor, explains his reason why he hates the former cooperative chief and that is his cruel actions during the KR's regime. He witnessed that he killed children by smashing them against a tree. Although the former cooperative chief currently has been working as layman in a monastery, informant U said, "(The man) was so cruel. Even he works for more than a thousand monasteries, his sins is unforgiven."⁴⁷

What the interviews show is that for many victims, it is difficult to link the punishment of the leaders with forgiveness to the low level perpetrators. Consequently, victims believe that the low level perpetrators should be also punished due to their direct complicity in killing or torturing. Informant D in Prey Tatoich village even said that she does not know the leaders, but only knows the low level perpetrators who used to be very powerful in the area where she lived during the KR.⁴⁸

The view that the low perpetrators are also as brutal as the leaders is caused by the absence of empathy between victims and the perpetrators. It means that there is lack of victims' understanding on the perpetrators' reason of "following orders" and lack of perpetrators' understanding on the sufferings felt by the victims. Empathy should come from both parties, victims and perpetrators. It can be gained with the victims' willingness to listen to the reasons for the actions of those who caused their pain and with the offenders' understanding of the anger and bitterness of those who suffered. (Bloomfield, Barnes, Huyse, 2003: 21).

46 Interview with Informant T in Trappeang Sva village, Kandal Steung district, 25 March 2009.

47 Interview with Informant U in Chambak Sor village, Thpong district, 2 June 2009.

48 Interview with Informant D in Prey Tatoich village, Kandal Steung district, 19 March 2009.

All perpetrators interviewed said that they did the cruelties in the past simply because they were ordered to do so from the top. If they rejected the order, they will be killed by the upper. However, only few victims believed that the low level received orders from the top. Informant K, a religious leader in Phnom Penh, for example, said that many perpetrators were still young at that time, some were even children. He remembered that one child soldier carried a gun which was even bigger than his arms. Since some were children, informant K believed that it was easy for the upper to influence to do brutal and cruel actions.⁴⁹

Many victims do not believe that low level perpetrators committed the cruelties simply because they received orders from above. Some victims argue that what the low level perpetrators committed was an expansion of the orders from above. Informant N in Boeung Khaek said, "The uppers only ordered a small thing, but what they (the lowers) did was bigger than the order".⁵⁰ Some victims do not understand why perpetrators accepted, without any reservation, orders to commit cruelties; whilst others believe that the cruelties were committed because of their own intentions.⁵¹

It is interesting to note that some perpetrators feel themselves also to be victims of the KR's regime. Many of them were still very young at that time and were forced to work for the KR with the risk of being killed or jailed if they refused or made mistakes. Meng Try-Ea, in his research on S-21 security guards explained how the KR cadre could also be perceived as victims. He concluded that:

"The young comrades of S-21 suffered many forms of abuse. The abuse began when they were recruited to become district militia and comrades. It worsened when they were taken, in many cases by force, far from their parents to live under the control of chiefs who could order their execution without a second thought. The process resembled kidnapping. Pressed into working for the party in the Center, these children lost their childhood, and in many cases, never saw their families again. They had no chance to attend school or play in the rice fields with their friends and buffalos" (Ea, 2001: 46).

However, many victims are not be able to empathise with the notion that the perpetrators could also be victims of the KR. On the other side, it was found that many of the low level perpetrators also lacked empathy with

49 Interview with Informant K in KM8, Phnom Penh, 28 March 2009

50 Interview with Informant N in Boeung Khaek village, Kandal Steung district, 23 March 2009.

51 For example interview with Informant C, G, H in Chambak Trab village, Kandal Steung District, 18 March 2009,

the victims. They did not acknowledge that their past actions were seen to be wrong or cruel. Since they believe that they only followed the orders, they do not regret about what happened in the past.

The Trial and Peace

The war in Cambodia formally ended when the four factions in Cambodia agreed to sign Paris Peace Accord on 23 October 1991.⁵² However the security condition in Cambodia remained unstable since the KR guerillas were still active in some regions. The important policy that started significant developments in peace in Cambodia was issued in July 1994, when the government offered amnesty or immunity from prosecution for KR/CPK members who defected to the government (Curtis, 1993: 23). By the end of 1994, the government had secured some 6,000 defections under the amnesty programme (Curtis, 1998: 35).

The KR movement was terminally weakened by the defection of its Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary, along with significant numbers of troops from the northwest of the country in 1996, and other high ranking KR cadres following the death of Pol Pot in 1998. Through the amnesty programmes, the government assured the physical safety and survival of the defectors, the right to work and carry out their professions and the security of their property. The government also gave them land and financial assistance to ease their integration (Linton, 2004: 46). Since 1998 the security condition in Cambodia has been relatively stable.

As explained previously, although there are still problems in the relations between the victims and the perpetrators, they currently live in peaceful condition. Cambodia, as argued above, has been in the phase of peaceful coexistence. The establishment of the tribunal to bring to a trial the KR leaders, is also made possible by the peaceful condition in Cambodia. It was revealed that many of the informants (both victims and perpetrators) feel the trial will not disturb the peaceful condition in Cambodia. Many of them believe that the accused leaders no longer have a significant number of supporters so the trial would not destabilize the country.⁵³

The former powerful leaders are old and do not have fanatic followers. More than 10 years after the defection that terminated the KR movement, many of the former KR members have profited the amnesty program given by the government. Some of them have even already risen to political positions in the government or parties.⁵⁴

52 After the UNTAC's administered general election in May 1993, the Royal Government of Cambodia established with Prince Norodom Ranariddh from FUNCINPEC party as first prime minister and Hun Sen from CPP as second prime minister.

53 For example interview with Informant J, 27 April 2009, and interview with Informant V, 28 April 2009, in Taleur village, Trankak District; interview with Informant A in Sandao village, Trankak District, 1 May 2005.

54 For example, Nhem En, the current deputy governor of Anlong Veng district is a former Khmer Rouge's photographer in S-21 prison.

However, at the time when this research was conducted, there was a debate between the co-prosecutors whether or not to bring KR leaders more to trial. In December 2008, the ECCC's international co-prosecutor asked for six additional individuals to be investigated. His Cambodian counterpart, however, has opposed any further investigation. One of her concerns was that prosecuting the perpetrators, other than the highest leaders, could harm Cambodia's stability and national reconciliation. On 2 September 2009 the ECCC published the decision of The Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC), declaring that it cannot resolve the disagreement by a super-majority decision and that therefore, in accordance with the Internal Rules of the ECCC, the investigation of additional suspects for future prosecutions shall proceed. A nonrandom survey conducted by Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC Cam) in February 2009 shows that from 1110 people from 185 districts more than half of the respondents (56.6%) did not believe that additional prosecutions would cause public disorder or violence in the country. Only 37.6% of them believed that further trials would cause public disorder, while 5.9% did not have and/or simply did not want to express their views (Chy, 2009: 16). Beyond this debate, there is a strong tendency to believe that the government of Cambodia is in favor of only trying the five accused. This is reflected by comments made by Prime Minister Hun Sen in his visit to France in July 2009 when he stated that the KR tribunal should not seek prosecution of any leaders of the KR beyond the five already in custody. The government believes that the trial on more than five, will threaten the peace in Cambodia.⁵⁵

Many informants have assumed that the tribunal or trial will punish the leaders. They have not considered that the tribunal could find them not guilty. When this was put to the informants, many of the victims said that they would be very disappointed. However, as citizens, they said they would follow the decision of the court and give up the matter to the government.⁵⁶

Dealing with the Past and Promoting Reconciliation in Cambodia

It appears that the establishment of the ECCC, as well as the process of the trial, as a part of transitional justice in Cambodia, according to the survivors, is unlikely to contribute much to improving the reconciliation process between victims and the low level perpetrators in Cambodia. Eventhough the trial is felt by the victims as very significant to release some of their misery or their anger at the KR regime and some of the leaders, it will satisfy only a half portion of the justice they ask. It is difficult for the trial to establish the whole truth or full account of history. The trial also

55 "Hun Sen Tells French President: 5 KR Prosecutions are Enough", Cambodia Daily, 20 July 2009.

56 For example, interview with informant V and interview with informant W in Taleur Village, Tramkak District, 28 April 2009.

will be unlikely to help them much to forgive or give empathy to the low level perpetrators. If the accused are found guilty and are sentenced to imprisonment, it is likely that the problems between victims and perpetrators in the daily interaction will remain. The current hatred and anger of the victims to the low level perpetrators will still prevent both victims and perpetrators from communicating to each other and interacting normally.

The establishment of the ECCC and the trial on the KR leaders is only one way to address the past and improve the reconciliation process in the transitional justice period. It is essentially an application of the retributive justice approach which punishes the wrongdoers. The judicial mechanism such as trials, besides bringing some justice to the victim, serve other purposes, namely:

“challenging a culture of impunity; individualizing guilt, to avoid assigning guilt collectively to an entire group; averting unbridled private revenge; fulfilling an obligation to the victims to publicly acknowledge guilt and innocence (by the accused); and deterring or punishing.” (McGrew, 2006: 140).

However, the judicial mechanism in the state of transition has one principal limitation. The mechanism is only able to put very few people on trial, those who are perceived as the most responsible. There are many low level perpetrators who cannot be brought to trial because of the security condition. A trial can also cover only few cases and involve only few victims as witnesses. In the case of Cambodia, this disadvantage and weakness result in the low contribution of the trial to the reconciliation process between a large numbers of victims and perpetrators at the grass root level.

To promote the reconciliation process in Cambodia and also deal with the past, there is a need for Cambodia to combine the retributive approach with the restorative approach in transitional justice. This focuses on reconciliation, rehabilitation and rebuilding of the society. The restorative approach will help the Cambodian survivors to restore their feelings of dignity and help both parties, victims and low perpetrators to restore their relationship. It needs a process involving a broad cross section of society toward reconciliation and societal healing. To achieve such ends, this article argues that Cambodia needs to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a complementary of the ECCC.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is developed from the format of truth commission. According to Priscilla Heyner, there are four primary elements of the truth commission: (1) focused on the past; (2) not focused on a specific event, but attempts to paint a picture overall of certain human rights abuses or violations of international law over a period of time; (3) exists temporarily and for a pre-defined period of time, ceases to exist with the submission of the report of the findings; (4) always vested by some sort of

authority, by way of its sponsor, that allows a greater access to information, greater security or protection to dig into sensitive issues, and a greater impact with its report (Hayner, 1994: 607). As suggested by its name, a TRC places an emphasis on the function of the commission for not only finding the truth but also undertaking restoration efforts for the victims, as well as promoting reconciliation between the victims and the perpetrators.

From the first time of its establishment in Uganda in 1974 until January 2005, 36 Truth Commission (including Truth and Reconciliation Commission) have been established in the world (Weissbrodt, 2005: webpage). However, the TRC of South Africa has been noted by many scholars as the most outstanding. It has served as a role model to many of the subsequent truth and reconciliation commissions set up worldwide. One mechanism in the TRC of South Africa, which contributed significantly for the reconciliation process, was public hearings. This mechanism provided victims with an opportunity to tell their stories before a public audience. By this mechanism the Commission could formally acknowledge past wrongs and encouraged public understanding and sympathy for the victims. During the public hearings, the Commission also invited the offenders to recount their crimes. At the same time, the victims and their families can listen, ask questions, and recount their own victimization. In exchange for their confession, the commission provided amnesty for the perpetrators. The Commission also recommended reparations for the victims financial compensation, rehabilitation and restitution. In summary, as reported, the TRC helped reconciliation in South Africa by restoring the human dignity of the victims and making peace with the trouble in the past (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 2003: 350). This could be achieved when “an astonishing willingness to forgive was displayed; those responsible for violations apologized and committed themselves to a process of restitution; and where the building or rebuilding of relationships was initiate” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 2003: 350).

Combining judicial mechanism with a truth and reconciliation commission, in fact, is not a new approach. Timor Leste combines The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation with the Special Panel for Serious Crimes Unit. The idea is that those who have not committed serious crimes can participate in the community-based reconciliation process held by the Commission, while those who committed serious crimes have to be accountable before the Special Panel.⁵⁷

57 For the procedure to determine whether a perpetrator can participate in the community-based reconciliation process held by the Commission or has to be accountable before the Special Panel for Serious Crimes Unit, please see, Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, *Chega! Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor*, (Dili: Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, 2005), p. 13. The report also can be accessed electronically from <http://www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm>

In Cambodia, the combinational approach of the judicial mechanism and TRC should be different from Timor Leste. Unlike Timor Leste, where the Commission has an authority to recommend whether or not there is a need for further judicial process on the perpetrators, in Cambodia the TRC can be designed for having authority to consider no further judicial process on the low perpetrators. The TRC in Cambodia, therefore, can be designed to deal mostly with finding the truth, without any judicial implication, and promoting reconciliation process between the victims and the other perpetrators beyond the five accused.

Cambodia needs to continue the trial process and, concomitantly, establish the TRC. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission can help Cambodians to find the whole truth in the following ways. *First*, it can establish a record of the past which is accurate, detailed, impartial and official (Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (eds.), 2003: 125), by deploying truth-seeking mechanisms such as statement taking, public hearings and investigation. *Second*, in its process, the truth and reconciliation commission can involve a large number of the population in the transitional justice process. Narratives from both victims and perpetrators can be gathered, compared and confirmed to make a comprehensive historical account. *Third*, acknowledgement can be gained through the public hearing process which enables the victims and perpetrators to hear and validate one another stories as well as their feelings and experiences.

The truth and reconciliation commission can help victims to ask justice by following ways. *First*, the Commission can be a forum to communicate to the survivors what happened in the trial. Here, it can be explained, for example, the reasons why only five leaders were brought to trial and why the process of the trial takes a long time. *Second*, the Commission can complement the prosecution process by “gathering, organizing, and preserving evidence that can be used in prosecutions” (Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (eds.), 2003: 125). *Third*, it can promote the accountability of the other perpetrators by recommending other forms of accountability such as “removal from office, restitution or community service schemes” (Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (eds.), 2003: 125-126). *Fourth*, the Commission can recommend “a necessary form of compensation for past abuses and for ongoing psychological, physical and economic injuries experienced by victims”. It can also innovatively suggest “symbolic forms of reparation for victims, such as memorials, reburials and commemorative ceremonies” (Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (eds.), 2003: 126). *Five*, by establishing the trauma healing section inside, the Commission can also help the victims to heal their trauma.

Many victims interviewed said that they may forgive the perpetrators if they confess about what they did in the past. Although they know that it may be hard for the perpetrators to apologize, they hope that the perpetrators will

be able to do this.⁵⁸ On the other hand, it was found that some perpetrators felt that the accusation of the victims was not precise and that a mediation forum would be a good way for them to explain their roles in the past.⁵⁹ Although some victims still harbor anger and refuse to talk with the perpetrators, it appears that as long as the government and the religious leaders play a facilitating role, they will participate in the forum.

The truth and reconciliation commission will contribute to the forgiveness between the victims and perpetrators. It can be a mediation forum between the victims and perpetrators where the victims can speak about their sufferings and the perpetrators can confess about what they did in the past. Through a public hearing mechanism, the commission can open a forum of dialogue between victims and perpetrators. It can promote tolerance and understanding by allowing conflicting parties to hear each other's grievances and suffering (Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (eds.), 2003: 126). This may help build empathy that may lead to confessions and forgiveness. The empathy, confession and forgiveness resulting from the process of the Commission can counter the rivalries and hatreds arising from past events. This, finally, will enable the strengthening of the peace condition in Cambodia.

The truth and reconciliation commission is suitable for the Cambodian society. As argued by Lambourne, the establishment of a Commission of Truth and Reconciliation in Cambodia is consistent with Buddhism, the religion of the majority of Cambodians. The Buddhist perspective on justice prefers restorative justice rather than retributive justice (Lambourne, 2008: 9). Buddhism teaches that justice involves the "undoing" of a crime so that order might be restored and the goal of harmonizing the parties rather than consistency with abstract legal principle (Lambourne, 2008: 9). The Buddhist monks can play an important role in the process of reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators. As shown in a documentary movie "Deacon of the Death", a Buddhist monk could play an effective role to assemble a meeting between victims with the perpetrators, gain confession from the perpetrators and release the anger of the victims.⁶⁰ Furthermore, in spite of their limited scope, some NGOs also have held similar activities with Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC Cam), for example, has collected thousands documents connected to the KR period and interviewed many victims and perpetrators in the projects such

58 For example, interview with informant D in Prey Tatoich village, Kandal Steung district, 19 March 2009, interview with informant E in Chambak Sor village, Thpong district, 2 June 2009, with informant R at Chambak Trab village, Kandal Steung district, 23 March 2009, interview X in Taleur village, Tramkak district, 2 May 2009, etc.

59 For example, interview with Informant S at Trappeang Sva village, Kandal Steung district, 25 March 2009.

60 *The Deacon's of the Death* (2004). A documentary film directed by Jan van den Berg, Sok Chea, and Chan Theory.

as 'Promoting Accountability', 'Victims of Torture', 'Victim Participation'. The Centre for Social Development (CSD) has run "public forum" activities where the survivors are given a chance to talk about reconciliation. The truth and reconciliation commission can involve these NGOs and their resources in achieving its aim to find the truth and promote reconciliation in Cambodia.

Conclusion

Ideally, the transitional justice process in Cambodia should have an enormous contribution to the process of reconciliation in Cambodia. However, the establishment of the ECCC and the trial process on the five accused appears to be unlikely to contribute much to the process of reconciliation between victims and low level perpetrators at the grass root level in Cambodia. Although the trial is very important for many victims to achieve some justice and relieve some of their suffering and anger with the regime, the victims feel that the justice delivered by the trial will not be sufficient enough. The trial will also not be of much help to the victims in discovering the whole truth or forgiving the low level perpetrators.

The retributive approach of the judicial mechanism combined with the restorative approach of truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) is needed to promote a reconciliation process in Cambodia. The trial needs to be continued, however, at the same time, a truth and reconciliation commission needs to be established. A TRC will enable the survivors to find sufficient justice and reveal the full account of the truth. It will also help promote the process of forgiveness between the victims and the perpetrators. The accounts given show that although there is peace at the surface level, to achieve a lasting, stronger, harmonious peace, a TRC is necessary to achieve a deeper, real and more sustainable peace in Cambodia. ●

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Proses Munculnya *Euro-Islam* sebagai *Transnational Norms* di kalangan Muslim Eropa

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Abstract

The study focuses on the formation process of Euro-Islam as a transnational norm among European Muslim to integrate Muslim into European society. There is a growing norm among the European Muslim society called as Euro-Islam norm. In this research, I use norm life cycle theory, brought by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink to assess the process of formation of Euro-Islam norm. Although Euro-Islam has not yet entered the stage of internalization norm, I argue that Euro-Islam gradually forms a norm which theoretically will become a base for the formation of future Euro-Islam identity among European Muslim.

Keywords: Euro-Islam, Norm, integration, identity

Pendahuluan

Eropa dikenal sebagai kawasan yang menjunjung tinggi multikulturalisme. Sejarah peperangan telah membuat Eropa membangun identitas bersama sehingga mencapai integrasi yang sedemikian rupa. Nilai-nilai universal seperti demokrasi, HAM (Hak Asasi Manusia), dan toleransi terhadap perbedaan telah menjadi nilai-nilai bersama (*shared values*) Eropa di bawah konsep multikulturalisme (Moddod, 2006). Sisi lain, Eropa tidak mampu menempatkan Islam sebagai bagian dari multikulturalisme Eropa. Fakta bahwa persinggungan antara Islam dan Eropa telah dimulai seribu tahun yang lalu, tidak cukup membuat Eropa memahami gambaran utuh mengenai Islam. Alih-alih, Islam dianggap seperti peradaban asing yang tidak pernah dipahami dan dimengerti, Islam diposisikan selalu sebagai antitesis dari Barat.

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Data statistik terakhir mengenai demografis Eropa menunjukkan bahwa orang Islam di Eropa (Uni Eropa) berjumlah 4% dari total penduduk Eropa atau sekitar 23 juta pada tahun 2003 meski data yang tercatat sekitar 15.5 juta. Presentase ini jauh lebih besar di Eropa Barat di mana pertumbuhan populasi muslim sungguh cepat. Padahal pada tahun 1982, populasi muslim di Eropa hanya 6.8 juta atau 1.6 %. Bahkan tiga dekade sebelumnya yakni pada tahun 1950-an, populasi Muslim berada dibawah 0,5 %. Jumlah ini sungguh sangat kecil bila dibandingkan dengan populasi minoritas lainnya seperti Yahudi dan Gipsi, namun, selama kurun waktu tiga dekade ini, telah terjadi peningkatan yang sangat signifikan terhadap jumlah populasi muslim di Eropa (Savage, 2005).

Peningkatan populasi Muslim menjadi sebuah permasalahan baru di Eropa. Apalagi dengan perubahan karakteristik imigran Muslim generasi kedua dan ketiga di mana mereka tidak lagi menjadi bagian dari imigran melainkan telah menjadi bagian dari warga negara. Hal ini membuat permasalahan baru ini menjadi kompleks (Cesari, 2003, h. 251). Permasalahan tersebut tidak lain adalah permasalahan identitas.

Permasalahan ini memunculkan sebuah pertanyaan serius terhadap masa depan Eropa: "Apakah Eropa akan bertransformasi dan menjadi kuat atau malah sebaliknya, menjadi pecah dan kehilangan identitas bersamanya? Kemunculan imigran Muslim di Eropa yang memiliki karakteristik lebih suka berintegrasi tanpa menghilangkan budaya mereka daripada berasimilasi, membuat Eropa mengalami kegamangan identitas (Savage, 2005).

Diakibatkan diskriminasi secara ekonomi dan sosial yang dilakukan Eropa secara terus-menerus, muncullah sekelompok muslim Eropa yang tertutup dari masyarakat Eropa dan mencoba membangun masyarakat mereka sendiri. "*They're there [in Europe] but not there,*" kata Shireen Hunter (seperti dikutip dalam Savage, 2005). Kebanyakan dari mereka adalah orang miskin. Mereka teralienasi dari masyarakat Eropa dan juga terputus hubungan dengan orang tua mereka sehingga mereka mencari identitas baru bagi diri mereka. Radikalisme Islam menjadi pilihan.

Sisi lain, berbagai gerakan dan inisiatif muncul untuk merekonsiliasi dua peradaban yang saling bertentangan ini. Banyak yang melihat bahwa inti dari ketegangan antara Islam dan Eropa yang berujung pada krisis identitas di Eropa adalah karena kurangnya dialog antarperadaban yang membuat masih banyak prasangka-prasangka yang akhirnya menjadi *civilization fortress* (Savage, 2005). Usaha-usaha dialog peradaban pun dimulai untuk menisbikan *clash of identity* antara Islam dan Eropa yang tentunya ditakutkan akan berakhir menjadi *clash of civilization*.

Baru-baru ini di Eropa, ada usaha untuk membangun norma yang mampu mengintegrasikan muslim dengan masyarakat Eropa. Dengan asumsi dasar Islam dan Eropa memiliki persamaan inti peradaban yang sama, proyek peradaban ini tidaklah mustahil dilakukan. **Konsep Euro-Islam**

adalah konsep yang menawarkan sebuah pemahaman liberal terhadap Islam yang dapat diterima baik oleh imigran muslim maupun masyarakat Eropa di mana ia mampu mengakomodasi ide-ide Eropa mengenai sekularitas dan individualisme (Tibi, 2008).

Namun konsep Euro-Islam tidaklah tunggal. Ada kontestasi wacana di dalamnya. Pada awalnya ia merupakan wacana, namun sekarang ia berubah menjadi sebuah norma yang coba diimplementasikan dan diperjuangkan oleh gerakan-gerakan *civil society* dan *think tank* di Eropa. Meski secara wacana ia masih terus mengalami kontekstualisasi dan perdebatan, kenyataannya, ia sedang bergerak dan membentuk sebuah norma baru. Norma yang mencoba menempatkan Islam sesuai dengan masyarakat Eropa yang sekular.

Pada tataran praktis, usaha-usaha untuk membangun identitas Euro-Islam di tengah-tengah kaum muslim Eropa terus dilakukan. Selain membumikan norma Euro-Islam di kalangan muslim Eropa, terdapat usaha-usaha melakukan dialog peradaban dengan Eropa agar identitas Euro-Islam dapat diterima sebagai solusi bagi permasalahan identitas Islam di Eropa. Dialog-dialog serta seminar yang dilakukan Tariq Ramadan berusaha untuk menumbuhkan kesadaran identitas Euro-Islam ini. Ramadan pernah berujar "*The challenge today is to make Muslims understand you don't have to be less Muslim to be more European. You can be both*". Selain usaha yang dilakukan Tariq Ramadan, terdapat beberapa usaha lainnya yakni pembentukam *Euro-Islam Project* sebagai usaha untuk membumikan konsep Euro-Islam kepada seluruh muslim di Eropa (Ramadan, 2004).

Dengan munculnya Euro-Islam pada tataran diskursus, setidaknya terdapat landasan konseptual bagi terciptanya integrasi antara Eropa dan Islam. Euro-Islam sendiri tidak hanya mampu menjadi landasan baru bagi identitas Muslim Eropa melainkan mampu menjadi instrumen bagi terciptanya dialog peradaban yang tanpa prasangka. Pada tataran diskursus, usaha-usaha membentuk Euro-Islam menjadi solusi paling mungkin antara ketegangan Islam dengan Eropa sekarang ini. Mau tidak mau, ide mengenai *Euro-Islamic Identity* akan menjadi sebuah proyek bersama Eropa. Dengan demikian, rumusan permasalahan yang ingin dielaborasi dalam tulisan ini adalah bagaimana proses munculnya *Euro-Islam* sebagai *transnational norms* di kalangan muslim Eropa untuk mewujudkan integrasi muslim di Eropa? Penulis menggunakan teori *life cycle norms* dalam melakukan analisis terhadap tahapan pembentukan norma Euro-Islam.

Konsep Euro-Islam

Konsep *Euro-Islam norm* masih merupakan konsep yang terus menerus menuai pro-kontra. Norma Euro-Islam yang menghormati nilai-nilai pencerahan dapat didefinisikan sebagai *Muslim Rejection of European aspiration of muslim assimilation into western European society, and instead opting for integration*. Sehingga proses pembentukannya pun melibatkan muslim dan serta nilai-

nilai dari masyarakat Eropa di mana muslim tinggal. Mereka berperan besar dalam membentuk corak Islam Eropa yang unik dan berbeda dengan Islam di daerah lainnya di dunia (Tibi, 2008).

Euro-Islam juga dapat didefinisikan sebagai *New Form of Citizenship* di mana ia berpendapat bahwa pemuda-pemuda muslim yang merasa kecewa dengan kondisi yang mereka hadapi di Eropa menjadikan Islam sebagai pelarian daripada obat-obatan terlarang (Cesari, 2009). Mereka kembali bukan kepada pemahaman tradisional Islam dari negara asal orang tua mereka, melainkan langsung kembali kepada ajaran Islam. Islamisasi muncul sebagai fenomena pembentukan solidaritas di kalangan anak muda muslim Eropa.

Kerangka Teori

Kerangka teori yang digunakan adalah teori Martha Finnemore dan Kathryn Sikkink yang membahas mengenai pembentukan norma di level internasional. Teori yang dimuat dalam Jurnal *International Organization* (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) ini membahas mengenai bagaimana sebuah norma dapat muncul dan menjadi bagian dari norma internasional yang diterima oleh semua orang.

Layaknya kebanyakan kaum konstruktivis, Finnemore dan Sikkink pun yakin betapa pentingnya struktur nonmateri seperti ide atau norma dalam mendefinisikan kepentingan karena struktur nonmateri dapat membentuk identitas seseorang. Menurut kaum konstruktivis, identitas juga dapat membentuk kepentingan seseorang yang dengan demikian juga dapat mengarahkan perilaku seseorang. Tabel dibawah ini adalah rangkuman dari teori yang dibuat oleh Finnemore dan Sikkink dalam melihat pembentukan norma pada level internasional.

Tabel 1. Dimensi dari tahapan pembentukan Identitas

Dimension	Stage 1 Norm Emergence	Stage 2 Norm Cascade	Stage 3 Internalization
Actors	Norm Entrepreneur with Organizational Platform	State, International Organization, Networks	Law, Profession
Motives	Altruism, empathy, ideational commitment	Legitimacy, reputation, esteem	Conformity
Dominant Mechanisms	Persuasion	Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration	Habit, institutionalization

Tahap pertama disebut oleh Finnemore dan Sikkink sebagai *Norm Emergence*. Aktor yang bermain pada tahapan ini adalah *norm entrepreneur*. Finnemore dan Sikkink walaupun tidak secara eksplisit menjelaskan siapa *norm entrepreneur*, menggambarkan *norm entrepreneur* adalah individu yang pertama kali melontarkan ide mengenai sebuah gagasan yang lambat laun akan menjadi norma. Namun, Finnemore dan Sikkink melihat bahwa *norm entrepreneur* saja tidak cukup. Ia harus didukung oleh *organizational platform*

yang mampu mengejawantahkan gagasan-gagasan *norm entrepreneur* ke dalam bentuk nyata.

Tahap pertama juga ditandai dengan motif yang berwujud komitmen ideasional. Tujuan yang mendorong *norm entrepreneur* untuk menelurkan sebuah gagasan tidak lain adalah komitmen akan gagasan yang ia percaya dan ingin ia perjuangkan. *Norm entrepreneur* bergerak berlandaskan komitmen yang ia buat dan ide yang ia yakini. Mekanisme yang berlaku adalah persuasi. *Norm entrepreneur* yang didukung oleh *organizational platform* melakukan penyebaran norma melalui persuasi dan diseminasi.

Pada tahap kedua, aktor yang bermain adalah negara, organisasi internasional, dan *network of norm entrepreneur*. Menurut Finnemore, sebuah gagasan norma dari *norm entrepreneur* akan diadopsi oleh baik negara, organisasi internasional, atau individu. Aktor-aktor inilah yang bermain dalam interaksi yang akhirnya membentuk sebuah norma. Tahapan kedua ditandai oleh motif untuk mencari legitimasi dan reputasi. Pembentukan Norma tidak lagi bergerak atas dasar komitmen ideasional saja melainkan sudah masuk menuju usaha mencari legitimasi atas norma tersebut. Karena motif pada tahapan kedua ini adalah legitimasi, maka mekanisme dominan dalam melakukan usaha pembentukan norma adalah dengan sosialisasi atau institusionalisasi. Bahkan, bisa saja terjadi kedua-duanya.

Pada tahap ketiga, norma sudah masuk pada tahapan internalisasi. Pada tahap ini, norma sudah terlembagakan dalam bentuk hukum maupun perilaku negara. Artinya, aktor bukan lagi negara atau organisasi internasional melainkan peraturan dan hukum. Motif dari tahapan ketiga ini bukan lagi mencari legitimasi melainkan konformitas. Orang melakukan tindakan sesuai norma karena ingin melakukan konformitas terhadap norma yang sudah ada. Pada tahap ini, mekanisme dominannya adalah kebiasaan serta institusionalisasi.

Apa yang coba disampaikan Finnemore dan Sikkink adalah adanya tahapan-tahapan dalam pembentukan norma yang harus dilewati norma mampu menjadi identitas. Tahapan-tahapan tersebut pada akhirnya dapat berujung kepada pembentukan identitas dengan syarat semua tahapan dan prasyarat-prasyarat dapat diikuti dan diselesaikan. Teori ini mampu menjelaskan pembentukan-pembentukan norma pada level internasional.

Analisa Tahapan Pembentukan Norma Euro-Islam di Eropa *Norm Emergence*: Tahapan Awal Kemunculan Norma

Dalam teorinya, Finnemore dan Sikkink mengatakan bahwa awal proses pembentukan norma adalah tahap *Norm Emergence*. Tahap *Norm Emergence* ditandai oleh munculnya beberapa aktor yang menjadi *entrepreneurs of norm*. Aktor-aktor ini akan menyebarkan gagasan-gagasan serta ide-ide yang kemudian menjadi dasar dari sebuah norma. *Norm entrepreneurs* dengan demikian menjadi sangat penting posisinya dalam pembentukan norma

karena tugas mereka adalah menciptakan perhatian publik terhadap norma yang mereka coba angkat dengan menggunakan diskursus yang mereka lemparkan ke ruang publik (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

Norm Entrepreneurs: Perdebatan Diskursus Awal Euro-Islam

Melalui pengembangan ide di level diskursus, *norm entrepreneurs* mencoba untuk membangun sebuah *cognitive frame* yang sangat esensial sebagai komponen norma. Dengan demikian, norma yang diangkat akan berkembang dan beresonansi dalam masyarakat sehingga norma dapat dipahami lebih luas oleh khalayak dan pemahaman publik akan norma tersebut membentuk perilaku. Bahkan, ia berujung kepada pendefinisian identitas dalam masyarakat (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Dengan demikian, peran dan keberadaan *Norms Entrepreneurs* sangat dibutuhkan dalam usaha awal melemparkan ide mengenai suatu norma ke masyarakat di mana norma tersebut akan berkembang.

Euro-Islam tidak akan mewujudkan menjadi norma jika hanya menjadi sekedar wacana. Euro-Islam pun merupakan konsep yang dikonstruksi melalui agen serta pengulangan-pengulangan melalui *speech act* oleh intelektual-intelektual muslim di Eropa di media dan seminar-seminar.

Setidaknya, dari hasil pengamatan penulis, terdapat dua *mainstream* dalam memahami Euro-Islam yang dihadirkan oleh dua orang intelektual yang sama-sama membangun dan mengkonseptualisasikan Euro-Islam di ranah wacana dan kemudian berhasil mengimplementasikannya ke ranah praktis. Penulis melihat terdapat dua *norm entrepreneurs* yang mencoba dikembangkan oleh intelektual di ruang publik Eropa. Dua orang intelektual muslim Eropa tersebut adalah Bassam Tibi dan Tariq Ramadan yang membangun basis bagi norma Euro-Islam, karena kontribusi mereka paling nyata dalam penyebaran diskursus mengenai Euro-Islam. Meski keduanya memiliki penafsiran, metodologi, serta cara pandangan yang berbeda mengenai Euro-Islam, namun keduanya berbagi tujuan yang sama yakni mencoba mengintegrasikan muslim dengan masyarakat Eropa.

Bassam Tibi

Bassam Tibi adalah intelektual yang mengklaim dirinya sebagai orang pertama yang mengutarakan ide tentang Euro-Islam. Tibi merupakan orang pertama yang mempopulerkan istilah tersebut meski kemudian ia mengaku istilah yang ia buat itu sekarang mengandung berbagai macam pemaknaan yang jauh berbeda dengan pemaknaan yang ia maksudkan pada awalnya (Nielsen dalam al-Azmeh & Fokas, 2007). Bassam Tibi mengutarakan istilah ini pada tahun 1992 tatkala pemerintah Prancis mencoba meninggalkan pendekatan asimilasi dan mulai menggunakan pendekatan integrasi dalam usaha menjadikan komunitas Muslim sebagai bagian dari masyarakat Prancis. Masyarakat Prancis secara umum lebih liberal dan cenderung tidak

memiliki pandangan rasial dibandingkan Jerman dan Inggris. Di Prancis, jika Anda dapat berbicara bahasa Prancis dengan baik, berperilaku layaknya seorang Prancis, dan berpendidikan Prancis, maka Anda adalah orang Prancis meskipun Anda memiliki kulit yang gelap (Tibi, 2008).

Euro-Islam, menurut Tibi, pada dasarnya adalah *Europeanization of Islam*. Euro-Islam dapat terbentuk melalui reformasi interpretasi terhadap ajaran-ajaran Islam yang paling fundamental. Terdapat usaha untuk menciptakan pemahaman baru akan Islam yang lebih liberal dan lebih terbuka terhadap nilai-nilai Eropa. Inti dari konsepsi Euro-Islam adalah pentingnya Islam untuk menganut ajaran-ajaran seperti toleransi, pluralisme dan sekularisme (Tibi, 2008). Toleransi di sini, tidak ditafsirkan dalam konteks sebagaimana muslim memahaminya, namun sebagaimana yang dipahami oleh masyarakat Eropa. Toleransi tidak hanya sekedar menerima kehadiran entitas lain di sekeliling kita. Meskipun seruan toleransi terhadap umat beragama dalam Al Qur'an justru lebih banyak daripada seruan untuk perasaan superioritas, bagi Tibi toleransi berarti muslim harus berani sepenuhnya menghilangkan konsep superioritas sebagaimana disebutkan dalam Al Qur'an 3:110.

Bagi Tibi sendiri, ia percaya bahwa proses *Europeanising Islam* melalui penghilangan beberapa aspek dari ajaran Islam seperti konsep syariah dan jihad, dapat membuat Islam diterima di Eropa. Menurut Tibi, dua konsep ini harus dihilangkan dari Islam karena kedua konsep ini tidak sejalan dengan dengan prinsip dasar dari modernitas yakni demokrasi, kebebasan HAM, dan *civil society*. Islam yang telah menghilangkan kedua konsep di atas baru dapat didefinisikan sebagai Euro-Islam. Euro-Islam sendiri tidaklah bersifat universal melainkan partikular. Ia tidak dapat diterapkan selain di Eropa. Ia merupakan sebuah keunikan Eropa di mana Islam menyerap nilai-nilai Eropa. Di sini, Tibi tidak mengedepankan universalisme Islam melainkan partikularisme Islam di mana Islam dapat berbeda-beda di setiap tempat, tergantung kultur di masing-masing wilayah (Tibi, 2008).

Yang akan menjadi ide dasar dari Euro-Islam adalah *laicité* di mana pemahaman akan toleransi dan liberasi melebihi penafsiran konvensional akan toleransi dalam Islam yang masih terbatas bila dibandingkan dengan kultur modern saat ini. Islam liberal ini disebut oleh Tibi sebagai *Islamic Laicism* (Tibi, 2008). Dengan demikian, basis dari Euro-Islam adalah penerimaan akan nilai-nilai politik sekular Eropa dalam identitas keagamaan Muslim.

Tibi jelas sekali menolak strategi politik multikulturalisme, bukan nilai multikulturalismenya sendiri, karena menurutnya, multikulturalisme tidak lain adalah alat bagi para fundamentalis Islam untuk dapat hidup dengan menggunakan identitas keislaman yang mereka miliki tanpa harus berintegrasi dengan masyarakat Eropa (Tibi dikutip dari Der Spiegel, 2009).

Bassam Tibi melakukan berbagai macam daya dan upaya untuk menyebarkan ide mengenai Euro-Islam. Pertama, tentu Tibi mencoba mempopulerkan istilah Euro-Islam melalui seminar-seminar yang ia berikan

di seluruh universitas Eropa. Hasilnya pun terlihat di mana sekarang istilah Euro-Islam sudah populer di kalangan intelektual dan akademisi di universitas-universitas Eropa.

Tariq Ramadan

Rather than being an Islam of immigrants, it must find new answers to the challenges of the time. However, it is based on the "universally valid" fundamental values of Islam
(Tariq Ramadan)

Tariq Ramadan adalah salah seorang intelektual muslim berbakat yang mampu melakukan sintesis antara rasionalitas Barat dan universalisme Islam. Sebagai seorang muslim yang tinggal di Eropa dan memiliki kewarganegaraan Eropa, Ramadan mendapatkan pendidikan sekular dan menyerap nilai-nilai sekularisme Eropa. Namun sebagai seorang muslim dan keturunan Mesir, Ramadan mendapatkan siraman prinsip-prinsip dasar Islam dan nilai-nilai universalisme Islam. Beberapa intelektual Eropa seperti Jocelyne Césari dan Mandaville melihat bahwa Ramadan adalah sosok intelektual yang mampu menjadi inisiator bagi munculnya *truly critical school of Islam* (Ramadan, 2009). Menurut Ramadan, setidaknya terdapat tiga dimensi permasalahan yang dihadapi Muslim Eropa, yaitu masalah *culture*, *identity*, dan *loyalty*. Ketiga permasalahan ini terus menjadi batu sandungan bagi keberadaan mereka di tengah-tengah masyarakat Eropa (Ramadan, 2009).

Terkait dengan dimensi pertama, Ramadan membangun logikanya dalam sebuah preposisi bahwa tidak ada agama tanpa adanya ekspresi budaya. Setiap agama menghasikan ekspresi budaya masing-masing. Namun tidak berarti kita dapat mengatakan bahwa agama sama dengan budaya. Edward Said, salah seorang oksidentalisme pernah berujar bahwa "*I am not a Muslim, I am a Christian, but I am a Muslim by culture*". Perkataan Said ini merupakan ekspresi dari perbedaan antara agama dengan budaya. Sebagai seorang Arab, tentu budaya Islam menjadi bagian daripada budayanya meski Edward Said bukanlah seorang Muslim (Ramadan, 2004).

Ramadan memperlihatkan bagaimana kasus mengenai kedatangan migran Islam ke Eropa dapat menjelaskan argumennya. Pada generasi awal Muslim di Eropa, mereka akan mempraktekkan Islam sebagaimana pengalaman mereka mempraktekkannya di negara asal mereka yang memiliki kulturnya masing-masing. Namun generasi kedua dan ketiga tidak memiliki pengalaman yang serupa dengan generasi pertama. Hal ini membuat praktek Islam pun juga berbeda. Di sinilah Ramadan mengenalkan konsep *culture of religion* yang berbicara mengenai praktek Islam. Dengan demikian, ia bukanlah agama itu sendiri. Tentu akan sangat asing bagi muslim generasi

kedua dan ketiga untuk mempraktekkan *culture of religion* orang tua mereka.

Dengan membedakan antara *culture* dan *religion*, Ramadan dapat menciptakan garis demarkasi yang jelas antara budaya dengan agama. Dengan modal ini, Ramadan maju ke tahap selanjutnya dengan mencoba membangun pemahaman akan adanya *European Islamic Culture*. Budaya di sini merupakan pengertian yang sangat luas. Tentu akan berbeda antara kultur muslim Asia Tenggara dengan kultur muslim Arab. Begitu juga dengan kultur Islam Prancis dengan kultur Islam Inggris. Namun yang ingin disampaikan Ramadan adalah walaupun agama memiliki ekspresi budaya yang berbeda-beda, namun ia tetap memiliki nilai-nilai yang universal.

Dimensi kedua yang menjadi kendala bagi kehadiran muslim Eropa adalah masalah identitas. Identitas selalu menjadi permasalahan bagi muslim tatkala mereka bersinggungan dengan masyarakat Eropa. Ramadan melihat bahwa identitas bukan sesuatu yang monolitik dan pembentukannya tidak serta-merta berasal dari upaya menegasikan kelompok lain.

Dengan demikian, Ramadan percaya bahwa identitas terbentuk melalui dua cara, pertama identitas yang terbangun atas dasar perbedaan dengan yang lain, kedua identitas yang terbangun atas dasar usaha mencari kesamaan. Agama akan selalu berada dalam koridor prinsip-prinsip fundamental yang tidak bersifat kultural, namun tetap terbuka terhadap hal-hal yang bersifat kultural.

Ramadan sampai kepada sebuah kesimpulan bahwa setiap individu memiliki *multiple identity*. Sejalan dengan apa yang dikatakan oleh Amartya Sen, identitas bukanlah sesuatu yang stabil dan mutlak melainkan sesuatu yang relatif dan nisbi di mana setiap individu memiliki preferensi dalam menciptakan kondisi identitasnya. Ramadan berujar "*I am a Muslim by religion, I am a European by culture, I am an Egyptian by memory, I am a Universalist by principle*". Dengan demikian, tidak perlu terjadi pembenturan identitas dan melawankannya antara satu dengan yang lain (Ramadan, 2004).

Dimensi ketiga dari permasalahan muslim Eropa adalah masalah loyalitas. *Citizenship* memerlukan loyalitas dalam beberapa hal. Loyalitas menjadi permasalahan tatkala muslim Eropa selalu memiliki sikap *sense of belonging* yang lebih kuat terhadap *International Ummah* daripada Eropa sendiri. Artinya, loyalitas muslim lebih terarah pada *ummah* yang bersifat transnasional daripada dengan *citizenship* Eropa di mana mereka tinggal ((Ramadan, 2009).

Menurut Ramadan, tingginya loyalitas tidak dapat diukur dari sejauh mana pembelaan buta kita terhadap negara. Loyalitas warga negara kepada negara berlaku tatkala negara tidak melakukan tindakan-tindakan yang tidak berlawanan dengan nilai-nilai kemanusiaan dan hati nurani. Begitu pula loyalitas seorang muslim kepada *ummah* tidak bisa dikontradiksikan dengan loyalitas terhadap negara. Loyalitas muslim kepada komunitas muslim secara global adalah loyalitas spiritual. Ia tidak dibangun berdasarkan kepentingan

sebagaimana negara memiliki kepentingan. Loyalitas spiritual ini pun juga berbasiskan kepada nilai-nilai kemanusiaan.

Penting kiranya bagi masyarakat Eropa untuk menumbuhkan *critical loyalty*. Artinya, proses integrasi muslim Eropa tidak serta-merta harus mengasumsikan bahwa mereka harus mengikuti seluruh kultur yang ada di peradaban Eropa. Tidak boleh diasumsikan bahwa kultur yang ada di dalam peradaban Eropa adalah bagus semua. Sebagai contoh, seks bebas yang sudah menjadi kultur di kalangan masyarakat Eropa tidaklah mesti harus dicontoh oleh muslim bila muslim ingin berintegrasi dengan Eropa. Tatkala muslim mengkritik budaya seks bebas ini, tidak dapat pula serta-merta mereka dituduh tidak loyal dan ingin mengubah tatanan sosial masyarakat Eropa. Kritik muslim Eropa terhadap nilai-nilai negatif dari Eropa dilihat sebagai bentuk ketidakloyalan muslim Eropa terhadap ke-Eropa-annya (www.redpepper.org). Padahal loyalitas seharusnya berbasiskan kepada pemahaman kritis akan apa yang kita lakukan. Hal itu bukanlah sinyal ketidakloyalan bila muslim mengkritik budaya seks bebas masyarakat Eropa. Namun, hal ini juga berlaku bagi komunitas Muslim. Muslim harus mampu mempertanyakan tradisi-tradisi yang tidak lagi relevan dengan kondisi dunia modern dan budaya Eropa yang terdapat dalam tradisi-tradisi Islam.

Organizational Platform:

Kemunculan Organisasi Euro-Islam di Eropa

Menurut Finnemore dan Sikkink, setelah *norms entrepreneur* mendiseminasi ide dan norma ke wilayah publik maka promosi norma tersebut akan tersendat bila tidak ada aktor yang mengejawantahkan norma dalam *platform* organisasi mereka (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). *Platform* organisasional mutlak dibutuhkan agar promosi terhadap norma terus dapat dilakukan. Norma tidak akan bertahan bila ia hanya berupa wacana dan ide namun ia akan dapat bertahan tatkala ada praktik norma yang dilakukan. Finnemore dan Sikkink mengatakan bahwa praktek norma tersebut dapat dilihat dari adanya *platform* organisasional. *Platform* organisasional ini dapat terejawantahkan oleh *non-governmental organization*. *Platform* organisasional akan menjadi lebih efektif dalam membentuk norma di level internasional bila terdapat jejaring komunikasi yang membentuk kerjasama internasional yang dilakukan oleh organisasi-organisasi pada level internasional. Dalam kasus Euro-Islam, maka *platform* organisasional pada level Uni Eropa mutlak diperlukan.

Apa yang diteorikan oleh Finnemore dan Sikkink ini sebenarnya sejalan dengan apa yang disebutkan oleh Jacques Waardenburg sebagai aktivisme Islam. Menurut Waardenburg, dimensi dari diskursus keislaman yang kritis memiliki tendensi untuk menjadi sebuah aktivisme yang lebih besar dengan partisipasi komunitas yang tinggi. Jadi, diskursus mengenai Islam yang dapat diterapkan dalam masyarakat sekular Eropa, tidak hanya sekedar menjadi wacana belaka, namun telah berubah menjadi aktivisme yang melibatkan

partisipasi muslim Eropa dalam komunitas-komunitas yang berbentuk organisasi-organisasi Islam dan kepemudaan (Waardenburg dalam Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1996). Dengan kata lain, *platform* organisasional adalah sebuah usaha untuk mewujudkan ide menjadi pergerakan.

Jacques Waardenburg (1996) juga melihat, pada paruh pertengahan dekade 1990-an dan usai peristiwa 11 September, pendekatan muslim terhadap masyarakat Eropa lebih dititikberatkan kepada partisipasi aktif muslim di organisasi komunitas daripada agitasi politis sebagaimana generasi pertama muslim. Sekarang mereka tidak akan melihat diri mereka terpisah dari masyarakat yang lebih luas, yakni masyarakat Eropa melainkan merupakan bagian dari *civil society*. Perubahan gaya dalam berpartisipasi aktif dalam masyarakat ini tidak dilihat sebagai sesuatu yang antipolitik atau nonpolitik, melainkan sebuah cara untuk melihat Islam sebagai sesuatu yang *political* dan bukan *political Islam*.

Dengan adanya niat baik dari otoritas politik di negara-negara Eropa, Muslim Eropa tidak hanya menjadikan Euro-Islam sebagai sebuah wacana belaka melainkan menjadi dimensi konstitutif dalam *European Public Sphere*. Euro-Islam tidak hanya menjadi sebuah diskursus yang kaku melainkan sebuah ruang diskursus yang secara nyata hadir di tengah masyarakat Eropa (Salvatore, 2007).

Beberapa organisasi Muslim Eropa bahkan mencoba mewarnai proses demokrasi dengan menerapkan nilai-nilai sekular republikanisme. Dengan berlandaskan kepada multikulturalisme yang dijamin nilai-nilai sekular republikanisme, organisasi-organisasi muslim Eropa mampu menghadirkan *Islamic Socio-Political Identity* yang dimaknai sebagai basis otonomi budaya dalam mempraktekkan nilai dari *citizenship*. Dengan menghadirkan *Islamic Socio-Political Identity*, masyarakat muslim Eropa mampu menjadi bagian dari Eropa karena dengan adanya *Islamic Socio-Political Identity* dapat mengantarkan muslim Eropa untuk merasakan *political participation* yang berujung kepada *citizenship*. Menurut Cesari, kemunculan gejala ini sebagai fenomena *Islam as a New Form of Citizenship* (Cesari, 2009).

Sebagai bagian dari *civic engagement*, muslim harus secara aktif berpartisipasi dalam menginterpretasikan dan mempraktekkan prinsip-prinsip sekularitas yang menjadi dasar dari nilai-nilai republikanisme Prancis. Dengan demikian, upaya untuk mendefinisikan batas antara ruang agama dan ruang publik sekular tidak saja dilakukan melalui *public critical discourse* belaka melainkan juga melalui keterlibatan praktis dari muslim dalam isu-isu di mana batas antara ruang agama dan ruang publik sekular dapat dinegosiasikan.

Kita menyaksikan bagaimana telah muncul fenomena kebangkitan muslim bukan sebagai individu-individu migran tetapi sebagai sebuah gerakan masyarakat sipil yang terorganisir dan bergerak baik dalam level nasional maupun level supranasional, yakni Uni Eropa. Sebenarnya, Islam

meski sebuah agama transnasional, tidak memiliki institusi resmi yang menaungi dan menjadi organisasi tunggal dalam merepresentasikan Islam. Hal ini cukup menimbulkan permasalahan di Uni Eropa karena susah bagi Uni Eropa untuk berinteraksi dengan komunitas Muslim yang tidak memiliki representasi otoritatif bagi kepentingannya.

Selain itu, komunitas Islam (*Ummah*) di Eropa tidak memiliki satu otoritas tunggal yang merepresentasikan umat. Hal ini membuat *state* tidak mampu melakukan kontrol terhadap komunitas Islam yang tersebar ini. Kurangnya institusi ini memaksa pemimpin EU dan negara-negara Eropa Barat untuk membuat beberapa *muslim council* yang terkesan artifisial (Fetzer & Soper, 2005).

Muslim mulai merambah ruang publik Eropa disekitar tahun 1970-an di mana mulai banyak pembangunan masjid dilakukan di seantero Eropa Barat oleh imigran-imigran muslim generasi pertama yang kebanyakan dibiayai oleh pemerintah negara-negara asal. Masjid-masjid atau *Islamic Center* ini mulai menjadi pusat-pusat budaya serta pembelajaran Islam yang secara berkelanjutan terus menjadikan identitas Muslim Eropa tetap tertanam. Menurut Silvestri, pada model pertama pergerakan ini memiliki karakter *Islam of the States*, *Islamist* dan *Diaspora Networks* (Nielsen dalam Allievi & Nielsen, 2007).

Lalu pada generasi selanjutnya, lahir aktifis-aktifis muslim yang lebih independen dari generasi sebelumnya. Mereka tidak tergantung dengan pembiayaan dari negara asal. Selain itu, secara gradual, komunitas-komunitas muslim semakin bervariasi seiring semakin banyaknya imigran-imigran muslim yang mendatangi Eropa. Generasi inilah yang menjadi pionir bagi kemunculan *platform* organisasional bagi norma Euro-Islam dimana organisasi-organisasi yang lebih baru ini memiliki independensi.

Organisasi Islam yang berada di Eropa melakukan operasi pada dua level, yakni level nasional dan transnasional. Di level nasional, Organisasi Islam dapat bergerak secara lokal berbasiskan di kota-kota besar atau bermain pada level nasional dengan melakukan advokasi pada tingkat pemerintahan. Pada level transnasional, gerakan-gerakan Islam bergerak dengan berbasiskan jaringan yang mereka punya baik di negara-negara anggota Uni Eropa atau di luar Uni Eropa.

Munculnya organisasi Muslim yang bersifat transnasional seperti *Federation of Islamic Organization in Europe* (FIOE), *Federation of European Muslim Youth Student Organization* (FEMYSO), dan *European Muslim Network* (EMN) ini memunculkan sebuah pemahaman bagi komunitas muslim akan pergerakan mereka yang luas. Institusi dan organisasi tidak hanya diartikan secara tradisional yakni masjid dan sekolah-sekolah tetapi sebuah gerakan transnasional yang mampu menjadi *pressure group* dan grup lobi bagi kebijakan-kebijakan pada level nasional dan Uni Eropa. Organisasi-organisasi muslim ini menjadi garda terdepan dalam melakukan promosi norma baik

pada level nasional maupun Uni Eropa.

Penulis mengklasifikasikan ketiga organisasi ini sebagai organisasi yang mempromosikan *Euro-Islam Norm* dengan tiga indikator. Pertama, Indikator isu yang mereka angkat yakni usaha menggabungkan nilai-nilai Eropa dengan nilai-nilai Islam. Kedua, Jejaring internasionalnya yang meliputi seluruh Eropa. Ketiga Uni Eropa sebagai *level of playing field*.

Pengejawantahan norma Euro-Islam sangat kentara dalam program-program serta aktivitas yang dilakukan oleh FEMYSO. Organisasi ini memfokuskan aktivitas mereka di tiga area besar yakni pemberdayaan warga negara, *interreligious and intercultural dialogue*, *human rights* dan *Islamophobia*. Pendidikan dan pelatihan, serta pengembangan media dan komunikasi juga bagian dari program tersebut untuk meningkatkan proses dialog antara masyarakat muslim dengan masyarakat nonmuslim di Eropa.

FEMYSO adalah organisasi pemuda muslim pertama yang didirikan dan memiliki jejaring yang tersebar di seluruh Eropa. Pemuda-pemuda muslim yang tergabung dalam FEMYSO adalah pemuda-pemuda yang memiliki perbedaan budaya serta etnis. Namun, mereka memiliki persamaan yakni merasa menjadi bagian dari Eropa.

Tabel 2. Platform Organisasi FEMYSO

<i>Organisational Platform</i>	Program-Program terkait Euro-Islam
FEMYSO juga meyakini nilai-nilai dasar Eropa seperti <i>Individual liberty</i> , <i>Religious liberty</i> (baik secara individu, komunitas, maupun institusi), dan <i>Human rights</i> .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Intercultural Dialogue</i> dan <i>interreligious Dialogue</i>. • Program pemberdayaan pemuda Muslim. • Advokasi kepada pengambil kebijakan terkait dengan permasalahan muslim.
FEMYSO Mendukung sekularisme.	
FEMSO percaya Islam merupakan bagian terpenting dari sejarah panjang peradaban Eropa	
FEMYSO percaya kepada nilai-nilai keadilan dan persamaan antara pria dan wanita	
FEMYSO percaya integrasi Islam dengan Uni Eropa didasar atas kesamaan nilai-nilai dasar antara Islam dan Eropa	

Selain FEMYSO, *European Muslim Network* adalah organisasi yang juga mengedepankan usaha-usaha untuk menciptakan harmoni antara masyarakat muslim dengan masyarakat Eropa. Berbeda dengan FEMYSO, *European Muslim Network* lebih merupakan organisasi yang menjadi *think thank group* di mana intelektual muslim dan aktivis muslim Eropa berkumpul

bersama membahas permasalahan terkait dengan muslim di Eropa. Tujuan dari didirikannya organisasi yang bersifat jejaring ini adalah menumbuhkan komunikasi yang setara dan analisa-analisa yang tidak bias, terkait dengan kehadiran muslim di Eropa.

Pada level nasional dan Uni Eropa, EMN didisain untuk memberikan ruang diskusi dan analisis di mana hasil dari itu semua dapat menjadi bahan pertimbangan bagi pengambil kebijakan dalam membuat kebijakan-kebijakan yang berkaitan dengan kehadiran muslim di Eropa. Pada level akar rumput, EMN menitikberatkan kepada kontribusi nyata mereka dalam melakukan pendidikan serta penyadaran mengenai hakikat ajaran Islam yang sejalan dengan nilai-nilai Eropa(euro-muslim.eu).

Keanggotaan EMN memang masih terbatas pada kalangan intelektual saja namun area penyebarannya merata di seluruh negara Eropa mulai dari Prancis, Belgia, Inggris, Portugal, Spanyol, Denmark, Norwegia, Italia, Austria, Belanda, Jerman, Bosnia, Masedonia, Turki, Swedia, dan Irlandia. Intelektual EMN tentu yang paling terkenal adalah Tariq Ramadan. Selain Ramadan, terdapat sejumlah intelektual-intelektual muslim Eropa yang memiliki kontribusi nyata terhadap perkembangan hubungan Islam dan Eropa dalam disiplin ilmu mereka masing-masing. Diantara intelektual-intelektual tersebut terdapat Abdelmumin Aya dari Spanyol, Abdool Magid Abdool Karim Wakil dari Portugal, Ahmet Alibasic, M.A. dari Bosnia, Batool Al-Toma dari Inggris dan lain-lain. Kepengurusan *European Muslim Network* tidaklah banyak. Selain memiliki representatif di setiap kota di Eropa, EMN hanya memiliki Presiden, Wakil Presiden, dan Sekretaris Jendral. Presiden EMN sendiri tak lain adalah Tariq Ramadan, Wakil Presiden EMN adalah Malika Hamidi dari Prancis dan Belal El Mogaddedi dari Jerman, serta Maima Boteldja dari Inggris sebagai Sekretaris Jenderal (euro-muslim.eu).

European Muslim Network setidaknya memiliki lima visi. Pertama, EMN berusaha mengelaborasi solusi-solusi atas permasalahan yang dihadapi muslim Eropa terkait dengan permasalahan sosial, politik dan budaya. Kedua, EMN aktif dalam proses mendidik muslim Eropa agar dapat berpartisipasi lebih aktif dalam permasalahan-permasalahan sosial yang ada di lingkungan mereka. Ketiga, EMN juga berkomitmen untuk terus menumbuhkembangkan komunikasi yang terbuka antara muslim dan nonmuslim maupun antara komunitas muslim Eropa dengan masyarakat Eropa yang lebih luas serta para pengambil kebijakan di Uni Eropa dan negara-negara Eropa. Keempat, EMN secara aktif mengembangkan forum-forum akademis untuk membahas mengenai permasalahan kontemporer Islam di Eropa. Kelima, terlibat aktif dalam perdebatan-perdebatan publik dengan memproduksi teks dan mendistribusikan informasi (euro-muslim.eu).

Tabel 3. Platform Organisasi EMN

Platform Organisasional	Program-program
EMN memperjuangkan nilai-nilai Eropa dan mengkontekstualisasikan nilai Islam ke dalam kultur masyarakat Eropa.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Menerbitkan puluhan penelitian-penelitian berkualitas yang bertujuan praktikal serta menghasilkan rekomendasi-rekomendasi praktis untuk pengambil kebijakan di level lokal, nasional, maupun Uni Eropa. • Mengadakan puluhan seminar dan simposium dengan output rekomendasi bagi pengambil kebijakan di Eropa. • Mengadakan Pelatihan-pelatihan ini ditujukan untuk organisasi-organisasi Muslim maupun nonmuslim agar dapat mendapatkan pengetahuan dan pemahaman akan muslim dan Eropa
EMN aktif dalam proses mendidik muslim Eropa agar dapat berpartisipasi lebih aktif dalam permasalahan-permasalahan sosial yang ada dilingkungan mereka	
EMN juga berkomitmen untuk terus menumbuhkembangkan komunikasi yang terbuka antara Muslim dan nonmuslim maupun antara komunitas muslim Eropa dengan masyarakat Eropa yang lebih luas serta para pengambil kebijakan di Uni Eropa dan negara-negara Eropa	

Federation of Islamic Organization in Europe atau biasa disingkat FIOE adalah sebuah organisasi payung nirlaba yang didirikan pada tahun 1989. Meski demikian, aktivitasnya mulai terlihat di pertengahan tahun 1990-an. Organisasi ini menjadi wadah persatuan sejumlah organisasi dan institusi Islam di 26 negara Eropa. Setidaknya terdapat 29 organisasi Muslim Sunni dan lebih dari 1000 organisasi lokal yang tersebar di negara-negara Eropa masuk menjadi anggota FIOE. Organisasi ini bukanlah organisasi yang kecil. Anggaran tahunan FIOE sendiri mencapai 400.000 Euro yang berasal dari para anggota dan donatur (www.eu-islam.com).

FIOE sendiri menyatakan tujuan didirikannya organisasi ini adalah untuk memperkenalkan nilai-nilai Islam dalam kerangka kebudayaan Eropa yang unik. FIOE mencoba mencari jalan tengah bagaimana Islam dapat diterapkan sesuai dengan nilai-nilai yang ada di Eropa. FIOE sendiri memiliki prinsip-prinsip yang menjadi dasar bagi FIOE untuk menjalankan aktifitasnya. Prinsip-prinsip inilah yang membuat peneliti mengategorikan FIOE sebagai organisasi yang memiliki *platform* organisasional Euro-Islam. Beberapa prinsip FIOE dapat disimpulkan seperti dibawah ini.

FIOE percaya bahwa Islam memiliki cara pandang yang holistik dalam melihat dunia, sehingga Islam datang untuk membebaskan manusia dari kungkungan ketidakadilan dan penindasan akibat kebodohan. Oleh sebab itu Islam memiliki semangat yang sama dengan semangat pencerahan Eropa. FIOE sendiri melihat sistem pendidikan yang holistik adalah jawaban bagi permasalahan-permasalahan yang ada di tengah muslim Eropa.

FIOE tidak setuju akan pemaksaan serta kekerasan dalam melakukan dialog serta komunikasi antarumat baragama. FIOE menekankan pentingnya

dialog sebagai jembatan untuk menghubungkan antara dua prinsip yang berbeda. FIOE juga berusaha untuk menciptakan sebuah pemahaman di kalangan Muslim sendiri bahwa mereka adalah bagian dari masyarakat Eropa dan masyarakat dunia yang memiliki tugas untuk menciptakan kebaikan bersama bagi umat manusia. FIOE percaya dengan nilai-nilai humanisme, kebebasan, serta persamaan yang juga menjadi nilai dasar dari Eropa. Dengan demikian, FIOE percaya bahwa tidak ada perbedaan yang mendasar antara Islam dan Eropa. Oleh sebab itu, FIOE juga berjuang untuk melakukan integrasi muslim terhadap masyarakat Eropa.

Dari semua tujuan FIOE, tujuan paling penting dari berdirinya FIOE adalah melakukan koordinasi dan konsolidasi terhadap seluruh organisasi-organisasi Islam pada level nasional maupun pada level lokal, sehingga terbentuk jejaring transnasional di level Uni Eropa yang mampu membuat organisasi-organisasi Islam ini memiliki kekuatan yang mampu merepresentasikan Islam di tingkat Uni Eropa.

Tabel 4. Karakteristik Organisasi-organisasi Euro-Islam

Karakteristik	FEMYSO	FIOE	EMN
Agenda Euro-Islam	Menyelaraskan nilai kehidupan pemuda muslim dengan masyarakat Eropa	Pendidikan untuk pemahaman nilai-nilai Euro-Islam (harmoni antara nilai Bara dan Islam)	Agar gagasan Euro-Islam terimplementasikan kedalam kebijakan negara Eropa dan Uni Eropa
Bentuk Organisasi	Forum	Federasi (organisasi payung)	<i>Network</i> (jejaring)
Target	Pemuda muslim Eropa	Masyarakat muslim Eropa secara umum	Jejaring intelektual muslim se-Eropa
Metodologi	Pemberdayaan pemuda muslim dan penyebaran Euro-Islam melalui	Penyebaran Euro-Islam ke kalangan muslim Eropa melalui lembaga-lembaga formal dan dakwah.	Memberikan analisa-analisa serta penelitian yang dapat menjadi acuan untuk pengambilan kebijakan terkait dengan keberadaan muslim Eropa

Salah satu aspek terpenting dari aktifitas yang dilakukan ketiga organisasi Euro-Islam di atas adalah *level of playing field* mereka yang berada di level Uni Eropa. Selama ini, organisasi-organisasi yang bersifat *top down* dan didanai dari negara asal serta beroperasi secara nasional lebih memiliki karakteristik cenderung menutup diri dari pergaulan dengan masyarakat. Beberapa organisasi hanyalah kepanjangan tangan dari negara-negara asal para imigran Muslim dan beberapa organisasi didanai oleh negara-negara teluk, seperti Arab Saudi. Hal ini tentu membuat organisasi-organisasi ini menjadi organisasi yang memiliki kepentingan tersendiri terlepas dari kepentingan membentuk *Euro-Islam Norm* yang mengedepankan perpaduan nilai-nilai Eropa dengan prinsip Islam. Organisasi seperti UOIF- *the Union*

of Islamic Organisations of France (*Union des Organisations Islamiques de France*) adalah organisasi Islam yang didanai oleh Aljazair begitu juga FNMF (*Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France*) yang didanai oleh pemerintah Maroko adalah beberapa contohnya (Bowen, 2003).

Berbeda dengan organisasi-organisasi diatas, Organisasi seperti FEMYSO, FIOE, dan EMN adalah organisasi yang bermain pada level Uni Eropa melalui jejaring mereka yang ada di setiap negara. Selain itu advokasi yang mereka lakukan langsung ditujukan kepada para pengambil keputusan di Uni Eropa, baik melalui lobi maupun dialog.

Bila dilihat dari karakteristik-karakteristik organisasi Islam yang mencoba menyebarkan norma Euro-Islam, maka terlihat, organisasi-organisasi yang memiliki *organizational platform* yang bermain pada level nasional belum mampu mengejawantahkan norma Euro-Islam sebagaimana organisasi-organisasi yang bermain pada level Uni Eropa. Dari sisi para pengambil kebijakan, Uni Eropa jauh lebih mengakomodasi usaha integrasi muslim ke dalam masyarakat Eropa daripada negara nasional, sehingga pembentukan Euro-Islam lebih banyak disokong dan didukung oleh Uni Eropa. Dalam teori *norms life cycle*, Uni Eropa menjadi aktor yang menandai terjadinya *tipping point* bagi proses pembentukan identitas Euro-Islam. Hal ini tentu ada jawaban mengapa Uni Eropa lebih akomodatif terhadap upaya penyebaran norma Euro-Islam yang dilakukan oleh organisasi-organisasi Islam.

Tipping Point:

Critical Actor (UE) yang mendukung Norma Euro-Islam

Menurut Finnemore dan Sikkink, tatkala norma sudah mulai diterima oleh orang banyak, tidak serta-merta norma tersebut dapat berkembang di masyarakat. Harus ada *critical actor* yang menjadi penentu bagi perkembangan norma yang stabil, sehingga tahap pembentukan norma dapat bergerak ke tahap selanjutnya. Menurut Finnemore dan Sikkink, norma akan diterima bila sepertiga lebih dari negara-negara pada level internasional menerima norma tersebut. Namun dalam kasus pembentukan norma Euro-Islam, *critical actor* untuk mendukung keberadaan norma tidaklah mesti sepertiga dari jumlah negara-negara di Eropa. *Critical actor* dalam pembentukan norma Euro-Islam di Eropa tidak lain adalah Uni Eropa. Dukungan Uni Eropa menjadi tahap *tipping point* bagi pembentukan norma Euro-Islam di mana dengan dukungannya, proses pembentukan norma Euro-Islam menjadi lebih cepat (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

Penulis melihat bahwa Uni Eropa merupakan aktor penting dalam usaha pembentukan Euro-Islam. Hal ini disebabkan oleh mekanisme yang berlaku di Uni Eropa lebih akomodatif terhadap usaha-usaha ini, sehingga norma Euro-Islam dapat lebih menguat. Menurut Melissa Ann Parker, hal ini disebabkan oleh karakter dari struktur Uni Eropa yang bersifat multilevel.

Karakteristik struktur multilevel Uni Eropa antara lain adalah *supranational level*, *national level*, dan *sub-national level*. Dengan adanya multilevel ini, setiap keluhan yang dikemukakan oleh *interest group* yang ada di Uni Eropa dapat disampaikan langsung ke Uni Eropa. Keputusan-keputusan yang dibuat berdasarkan audiensi antara *interest group* dengan Uni Eropa meskipun tidak langsung diterapkan oleh negara-negara Uni Eropa namun mampu memberikan pilihan-pilihan bagi pengambil kebijakan domestik. Hal inilah yang membuat organisasi-organisasi Islam lebih memilih bermain pada level Uni Eropa daripada level nasional di masing-masing negara. Dengan demikian, Uni Eropa dapat menjadi mitra strategis bagi organisasi-organisasi Islam yang memiliki kepentingan dalam melawan negara nasional mereka yang tidak responsif dalam menjawab keluhan-keluhan organisasi-organisasi ini.

Pertanyaan yang muncul, kenapa organisasi-organisasi Islam lebih memilih melakukan advokasi kebijakan melalui Uni Eropa daripada langsung melakukan advokasi ke negara-negara masing-masing? Jawabannya adalah tingginya tingkat kegagalan yang didera oleh organisasi-organisasi Islam tatkala mereka mencoba melakukan advokasi kebijakan pada level nasional.

Menurut Mellissa Anne Parker, setidaknya ada tiga alasan mengapa pada level nasional, tingkat kegagalan dalam melakukan advokasi kebijakan yang dilakukan organisasi Islam tinggi. Pertama organisasi Muslim mendapatkan tekanan tinggi secara sosio-ekonomi dan agama Islam termarginalisasi di beberapa negara. Di Jerman, Prancis, dan Inggris, komunitas-komunitas Islam masih harus menyelesaikan permasalahan-permasalahan dasar berupa pemenuhan kehidupan sehari-hari mereka dan keamanan diri mereka sehingga organisasi-organisasi Islam yang merepresentasikan komunitas-komunitas ini, masih belum dapat berbuat banyak dalam melakukan advokasi-advokasi kebijakan (Parker, 2007).

Kedua, parameter apa yang harus dilakukan oleh organisasi Islam yang ikut serta dalam aktivitas publik sepenuhnya didefinisikan oleh negara? Bagaimana muslim harus berinteraksi dengan negara dan prosedur apa yang harus dijalankan sepenuhnya diatur oleh negara? Terkadang aturan dan definisi ini membuat aktivitas organisasi Islam menjadi sangat terbatas. Di beberapa negara, bahkan Islam masih belum diakui sebagai agama. Hal ini terjadi di Jerman. Di Jerman terdapat hukum yang membedakan antara agama yang diakui negara dan agama yang tidak diakui. Islam meski menjadi agama mayoritas kedua tetap belum diakui sebagai agama resmi. Hal ini menyebabkan advokasi-advokasi organisasi Islam tidak begitu berpengaruh terhadap pengambil kebijakan karena tidak adanya saluran-saluran resmi untuk berkomunikasi, karena komunitas-komunitas Islam sering dianggap oleh pemerintah sebagai perpanjangan tangan negara lain seperti Turki (www.muslimnews.co.uk).² Begitu juga di Prancis di mana organisasi-

2 Diakses dari <http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/news/news.php?article=17655>

organisasi Islam masih belum mendapatkan akses untuk melakukan advokasi karena Prancis mensyaratkan sebuah kesatuan tunggal organisasi untuk merepresentasikan Islam sebagai mitra negara. Namun kenyataannya hal tersebut mustahil untuk dilakukan karena organisasi Islam di Prancis terpecah-pecah (Sebian, 2009). Di kedua negara ini, sulit bagi organisasi Islam untuk berinteraksi dan melakukan advokasi pada level negara nasional.

Yang terakhir, kekuatan yang dimiliki oleh organisasi-organisasi Islam sangat terbatas di dalam negara nasional, sehingga sumber daya yang mereka miliki pun juga sangat terbatas. Pada level nasional, organisasi-organisasi Islam yang ada di negara-negara Uni Eropa belumlah dianggap sebagai aktor nasional. Hal inilah yang membuat organisasi Islam memiliki kesempatan untuk melihat Uni Eropa sebagai *level of playing field* untuk memperjuangkan aspirasi dalam rangka integrasi muslim ke dalam masyarakat Eropa.

Uni Eropa sebagaimana disebutkan oleh Riva Kastoryano merupakan sebuah panggung baru bagi organisasi Islam untuk melakukan advokasi kebijakan, karena organisasi Islam lebih mudah untuk melakukan advokasi pada level Uni Eropa. Mereka pun harus bekerja sama dan membentuk solidaritas antarorganisasi-organisasi Islam di setiap negara-negara Uni Eropa. Lebih lanjut, hal ini membuahkan *transnational organization* yang memiliki *platform* serta agenda perjuangan yang sama (Kastoryano, 2002).

Uni Eropa menurut hemat penulis, menjadi semacam katalisator bagi proses pembentukan norma Euro-Islam. Disadari atau tidak, adanya level Uni Eropa merupakan sebuah pijakan dasar bagi komunitas Muslim Eropa untuk membentuk sebuah norma yang sama berdasarkan atas nilai-nilai Eropa, tanpa memandang batas negara dan sekat etnis. Menurut pendapat peneliti, setidaknya terdapat dua alasan mengapa Uni Eropa merupakan *critical actor* bagi proses pembentukan norma Euro Islam. Pertama, Uni Eropa menumbuhkan aliansi *Transnational Islam*; dan kedua, Uni Eropa memunculkan ruang bagi *Transnasional Ummah*.

Uni Eropa menumbuhkan aliansi *Transnational Islam*

Institusi Uni Eropa merupakan bagian terpenting dalam menumbuhkan aliansi dan kerja sama lintas negara yang dilakukan oleh organisasi-organisasi muslim Eropa. Semenjak tahun 1986, Parlemen Eropa (waktu itu) sudah memberikan dana bagi asosiasi-asosiasi imigran di mana tentu yang paling banyak adalah imigran muslim. Sampai sekarang, Uni Eropa masih tetap memberikan dana kepada organisasi-organisasi Islam. Dengan memberikan dana kepada organisasi-organisasi Islam, Uni Eropa telah mendukung pembentukan organisasi payung yang mewadahi organisasi-organisasi Islam yang ada di negara-negara Uni Eropa.

Selain itu, sudah watak dari Uni Eropa untuk mengurus permasalahan-permasalahan yang bersifat *low politics* di luar permasalahan keamanan. Tidak heran bila permasalahan imigran dan hak-hak minoritas menjadi isu

yang paling sering diangkat oleh Uni Eropa di mana negara-negara anggota selalu bersikap pasif untuk masalah-masalah seperti ini.

Interaksi antara Uni Eropa dan Organisasi Islam

Interaksi antara Uni Eropa dengan organisasi Islam transnasional membuat terbangunnya sebuah kesadaran dari organisasi-organisasi Islam bahwa untuk mencapai sebuah kesuksesan dalam melakukan negosiasi dengan Uni Eropa mereka harus bersatu. Dengan keberadaan Uni Eropa, komunitas-komunitas Muslim yang ada di berbagai negara anggota Uni Eropa menyadari bahwa keberadaan Uni Eropa memberikan ruang gerak bagi mereka untuk melakukan advokasi-advokasi yang tidak selesai pada level nasional (Byers, 2005). Untuk itu, mereka harus membuat jejaring organisasi yang juga berada pada level Uni Eropa.

Alhasil, keberadaan Uni Eropa juga membuat terbentuknya kesadaran akan pentingnya organisasi Islam Transnasional yang beroperasi di level Uni Eropa. Hal ini diperlukan karena dengan membuat organisasi formal pada level Uni Eropa, masyarakat muslim Eropa dapat langsung melakukan advokasi terhadap Uni Eropa (Parker, 2007).

Keberadaan organisasi formal pada level Uni Eropa menjadi kekuatan yang signifikan bagi komunitas Muslim Eropa. Peran organisasi formal Islam pada level Uni Eropa bukan saja berfungsi sebagai organisasi terstruktur bagi komunitas muslim tetapi juga sebagai kerangka strategis bagi institusionalisasi Islam dalam pengambilan kebijakan pada level Uni Eropa.

Menurut analisis Melissa Anne Parker, interaksi formal antara Uni Eropa dengan organisasi Islam di Eropa menghasilkan dampak bagi perkembangan norma Euro-Islam dalam masyarakat muslim Eropa. Lebih jauh lagi, keberadaan norma Euro-Islam mau tidak mau akan bertumbuh dan berkembang karena masyarakat muslim di Eropa terus mengorganisir diri mereka dalam jejaring organisasi transnasional agar dapat menyesuaikan diri dengan format struktur Uni Eropa di mana tempat masyarakat muslim melakukan lobi untuk kepentingan. Untuk membentuk jejaring internasional, mereka harus memiliki kesamaan *platform* dalam perjuangan sehingga mau tidak mau arah untuk membentuk kepentingan yang sama. Kepentingan yang sama ini menumbuhkembangkan norma Euro-Islam (Parker, 2008).

Norma Euro-Islam dan Uni Eropa

Dari uraian diatas, penulis melakukan pemetaan terhadap proses pembentukan identitas Uni Eropa. Pada tahap ini, peneliti menyimpulkan bahwa proses pembentukan norma lebih dipengaruhi oleh interaksi antara organisasi-organisasi Islam dengan Uni Eropa. Dari proses pembentukan tersebut, setidaknya ada tiga perubahan dalam usaha komunitas muslim berintegrasi dengan Eropa yang membuat arah pembentukan *Euro-Islam Norm* semakin jelas. Pertama adalah perubahan dalam strategi. Kedua, perubahan

isu yang diangkat. Ketiga, perubahan retorika. Ketiga perubahan ini semakin menguatkan proses pembentukan norma Euro-Islam.

Pertama, ada perubahan yang jelas dalam strategi. Strategi lobi yang dilakukan oleh organisasi-organisasi Islam lebih menitikberatkan kepada mekanisme-mekanisme yang ada di Uni Eropa. Dengan memperluas arena negosiasi dengan naik ke level yang lebih tinggi dari negara, organisasi-organisasi Islam mampu membentuk jejaring yang mampu mengumpulkan muslim Eropa dalam satu kesatuan *platform* organisasional yang sama. Bila setiap organisasi melakukan lobi terhadap negara nasionalnya, maka kesatuan *platform* organisasional seluruh organisasi Islam di Eropa tidak akan pernah terbentuk. Namun dengan adanya usaha pada level Uni Eropa, kesatuan *platform* ini dapat terwujud.

Perubahan strategi terlihat tidak hanya dalam strategi dan lobi, tetapi juga strategi dalam menghimpun dan membangun jejaring. Organisasi-organisasi Islam yang selama ini berbasiskan kepada etnisitas, mampu bekerja sama dalam satu *platform* umum yang disepakati. Strategi yang diangkat untuk menghimpun persaudaraan sesama Muslim pun akhirnya tidak lagi berdasarkan etnisitas yang selama ini menjadi mitos dalam pengorganisasian dan mobilisasi komunitas muslim.

Kedua, ada perubahan dalam pengambilan isu yang diperjuangkan oleh organisasi-organisasi Islam. Organisasi-organisasi Islam selama ini selalu berbicara dalam konteks negara-negara nasional serta menghabiskan waktu untuk melobi untuk urusan seperti rasisme, kekerasan, dan diskriminasi. Namun semenjak interaksi Uni Eropa dengan organisasi-organisasi Islam terbentuk, isu-isu domestik berubah menjadi isu-isu yang ditangani oleh Uni Eropa seperti pendidikan, ekonomi, dan sosial. Komunitas muslim dan organisasi Islam melihat bahwa mereka adalah bagian terpenting dari komunitas Eropa secara umum dan bukan lagi bagian dari negara nasional. Perubahan isu ini menunjukkan komunitas muslim tidak lagi melihat negara sebagai subjek kesetiaan. Mereka lebih merasa sebagai orang Eropa.

Ketiga, ada perubahan dalam retorika yang digunakan organisasi Islam dalam wacana-wacana yang mereka lontarkan baik dalam bentuk lisan maupun publikasi tulisan. Sebelumnya, wacana-wacana yang ditelurkan oleh organisasi-organisasi Islam di Eropa biasanya lebih mengedepankan kepada usaha untuk menyelesaikan permasalahan-permasalahan yang terjadi di dalam komunitas-komunitas muslim. Namun sekarang, retorika yang dibawa menyatakan bahwa kerja sama dengan sesama masyarakat Eropa untuk memecahkan permasalahan yang dihadapi oleh masyarakat Eropa secara umum lebih banyak dilontarkan oleh organisasi-organisasi Islam di Eropa. Retorika yang berubah ini memperlihatkan bagaimana elit dan pemimpin organisasi Islam lebih mengedepankan kepentingan-kepentingan masyarakat Eropa dibandingkan dengan memperjuangkan kepentingan komunitas muslim. Hal ini tentu menggambarkan bagaimana pandangan organisasi

Islam yang selama ini memosisikan diri berada di luar masyarakat Eropa mulai berubah dan mengarah kepada pandangan bahwa masyarakat muslim Eropa adalah bagian dari Eropa. Konsekuensinya tentu semua permasalahan masyarakat Eropa menjadi permasalahan yang harus juga diselesaikan oleh komunitas muslim Eropa.

Norms Cascade:

Peran Network of Organizational Platform Melobi Uni Eropa

Menurut Finnemore dan Sikkink, setelah melalui tahap *tipping point* maka norma akan menuju tahap selanjutnya yakni *norms cascade* yang merupakan kondisi di mana norma mulai diterima oleh masyarakat atau negara nasional yang menjadi tempat norma itu terbentuk. Faktor yang menjadi penting dalam proses *norms cascade* adalah *international socialization* (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

International socialization tidak harus dilakukan oleh negara melalui instrumen diplomasi yang digunakan melainkan juga dapat dilakukan oleh aktor-aktor nonnegara seperti organisasi-organisasi internasional yang membentuk apa yang disebut Finnemore dan Sikkink sebagai *networks of norm entrepreneurs*. Dalam kasus pembentukan norma Euro-Islam, organisasi-organisasi internasional yang bermain di level Uni Eropa seperti FEMYSO, FIOE, dan EMN telah menjadi *networks of organizational platform* yang menyebarkan norma Euro-Islam. Ketiga organisasi tersebut kemudian bertindak sebagai *agents of socialization* melalui instrumen lobi serta advokasi kepada aktor-aktor yang menjadi target mereka, agar terdapat kebijakan-kebijakan baru yang mendukung norma Euro-Islam yang masih dalam proses pembentukan.

Beberapa advokasi terkait dengan kebijakan-kebijakan baru atas norma Euro-Islam adalah keluarnya kebijakan-kebijakan Uni Eropa terkait dengan imigrasi, kohesi sosial, budaya, dan antidiskriminasi. Kebijakan-kebijakan ini walaupun belum memuaskan bagi seluruh komunitas muslim, namun setidaknya menguntungkan komunitas muslim di Eropa dalam proses integrasi ke dalam masyarakat Eropa (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

Belum lagi secara institusional, Uni Eropa semakin tertarik dengan permasalahan integrasi Muslim terhadap masyarakat Eropa. Hal ini dapat kita lihat dari inisiatif-inisiatif Uni Eropa untuk membuat lembaga pada level Uni Eropa untuk mengurus masalah Islam. Salah satu dari inisiatif awal ini adalah *Forward Studies Unit* (FSU) yang dibuat oleh Komisi Eropa. Pada tahun 2001, Salah satu inisiatif dari FSU adalah mendirikan *Group of Policy Advisers* (GOPA) yang kelak bertransformasi menjadi *Board of Policy Advisers* (BEPA). GOPA sendiri adalah semacam *think-tank* bagi Uni Eropa yang berisikan seluruh representasi dari berbagai organisasi termasuk organisasi keagamaan di Eropa mulai dari Kristen, katolik, Yahudi, Hindu, dan Islam. FEMYSO adalah representasi dari organisasi Muslim dalam BEPA. Selain Komisi

Eropa, Parlemen Eropa juga sangat menaruh minat dalam penyelesaian permasalahan integrasi muslim di Eropa (Allievi dalam Marechal, Allievi, Dassetto & Nielsen, 2003). Masuknya FEMYSO ke dalam BEPA menandakan semakin terinstitusionalisasikannya *agent of norm* Euro-Islam ke dalam Uni Eropa.

BEPA kemudian menjadi lembaga di bawah Komisi Eropa yang mengoordinasikan segala bentuk kebijakan terkait dengan isu-isu hubungan antara negara, gereja, dan lembaga-lembaga agama lainnya. Beberapa proyek yang dikoordinasikan oleh BEPA adalah proyek yang dilakukan oleh AEGEE yang mencoba menyebarkan ide Euro-Islam melalui *Euro-Islam project*. AEGEE adalah semacam asosiasi pemuda seluruh Eropa yang kegiatannya disponsori oleh Uni Eropa. Proyek yang paling mendapat sorotan dari AEGEE adalah *Euro-Islam project*. *Euro-Islam Project* merupakan proyek yang mencoba membangun landasan teoretis dan praktikal bagi terbentuknya norma Euro-Islam. Dengan demikian, tidak hanya komunitas Muslim yang memiliki kepentingan dalam pembangunan norma Euro-Islam, tetapi masyarakat Eropa secara keseluruhan pun mencoba memberikan kontribusi bagi pembentukan norma Euro-Islam.

BEPA dapat kita katakan sebagai bagian dari instrumen dari kebijakan Uni Eropa terhadap Islam. Meski pada awalnya, kebijakan Uni Eropa terhadap Islam masih bersifat sporadik dan tidak tersistematis, namun berkat adanya BEPA sebagai instrumen kebijakan Uni Eropa, kebijakan Uni Eropa terhadap Islam semakin tersistematis dan terformalisasi. Tidak hanya berhenti sampai di situ, Uni Eropa juga memfasilitasi keikutsertaan warga negara serta organisasi-organisasi yang merepresentasikan keagamaan untuk turut serta dalam membuat kebijakan melalui mekanisme konsultasi sebagai upaya membangun sisi akuntabilitas dalam pengambilan kebijakan, di mana grup lobi dan organisasi-organisasi Islam dapat memainkan peran mereka.

Terlihat dari penjelasan di atas bahwa dari seluruh institusi yang terdapat di Uni Eropa, adalah Komisi Eropa yang benar-benar menjadi promotor untuk menginstitusionalisasikan kehadiran Islam dalam setiap kebijakan-kebijakan Uni Eropa melalui BEPA. Selain BEPA, FSU juga mendirikan badan representatif untuk muslim pada level Eropa. Badan representatif ini diberi nama *Muslim Council of Cooperation in Europe* (MCCE). MCCE menjadi dewan sentral bagi Muslim karena melalui MCCE terdapat peluang bagi organisasi-organisasi Muslim untuk mengekspresikan diri mereka sebagai bagian dari *transnational ummah* Eropa. MCCE yang didirikan oleh FSU ini akhirnya menjadi jejaring organisasi-organisasi Muslim di level nasional dan di level lokal. Hal ini semakin memperkuat usaha untuk melakukan sosialisasi terhadap norma Euro-Islam.

Meski terkesan separadis dan tidak sistematis, inisiatif-inisiatif yang dilakukan Uni Eropa secara konstan dan berkelanjutan memperlihatkan bahwa Islam menjadi fokus yang penting bagi Uni Eropa. Bila kita lihat

lebih dekat, program-program serta inisiatif yang dilakukan oleh Uni Eropa terhadap isu-isu yang berkaitan dengan muslim memperlihatkan sebuah pola yang konsisten. Beberapa pengamat melihat pola ini dapat disebut dengan *Policy toward Islam* atau kebijakan Uni Eropa terhadap Islam. Kata *policy* memang terlalu berlebihan karena kata tersebut berarti sebuah tindakan yang sistematis dan koheren sedangkan pada kenyataannya inisiatif-inisiatif Uni Eropa tersebut masih terkesan *unintended* dan sangat reflektif.

Kebijakan-kebijakan Uni Eropa terhadap upaya integrasi Muslim ke dalam masyarakat Eropa semakin gencar terutama dalam membangun dialog antarkepercayaan dan antarperadaban (*Interfaith dialogue and civilization*). Kebijakan-kebijakan ini tersusun lebih disebabkan respon pragmatis dari kejadian-kejadian yang tidak dapat diprediksi seperti peristiwa 11 September, pemboman Madrid dan London pada tahun 2004 dan 2005. Usai pemboman London, kebijakan Uni Eropa terhadap Islam menjadi semakin tersistematis. Uni Eropa mulai melihat pentingnya membangun norma Euro-Islam yang dapat di terima oleh komunitas Eropa serta mampu mengintegrasikan muslim ke dalam masyarakat Eropa.

Kesimpulan

Identitas Eropa sedang diuji. Setelah ratusan tahun terperangkap dalam kondisi yang selalu dilanda perang, Eropa menemukan stabilitasnya setelah Perang Dunia usai. Identitas yang selama ini terfragmentasi oleh konsep *nation-states* menjadi menyatu dengan berdirinya Uni Eropa yang menjadi simbol dari institusionalisasi identitas Eropa. Namun pada saat bersamaan dengan tumbuhnya identitas Eropa, kehadiran imigran muslim lambat laun membuat Eropa mempertanyakan ulang identitasnya. Kehadiran muslim yang pada awalnya hanyalah imigran lambat laun bertransformasi menjadi bagian dari Eropa.

Kehadiran muslim di Eropa muncul akibat cepatnya persinggungan ini terjadi. Setelah lebih dari lima ratus tahun muslim tidak pernah menjadi bagian dari Eropa, mereka sekarang telah berada di pusat-pusat peradaban Eropa dengan kultur dan identitas yang mereka bawa sendiri. Tentu ini memerlukan waktu yang cepat untuk berintegrasi secara natural.

Proses integrasi harus dilakukan untuk menghindari benturan antarbudaya atau, dalam bahasa Huntington, benturan antarperadaban. Euro-Islam sebagai norma mampu menjadi jawaban bagi kebuntuan akan benturan ini. Euro-Islam yang berbasiskan kepada rasionalisme Andalusia menjadi jalan tengah bagi identitas masyarakat muslim yang ada di Eropa. Mampukah Eropa menerima identitas ini? Jawabannya tentu saja, ya.

Ide mengenai Eropa sendiri dari zaman ke zaman selalu berubah-ubah. Pada awalnya Eropa merupakan penamaan orang-orang Yunani terhadap kebudayaan di utara Yunani. Ekspansi Yunani ke Semenanjung Balkan dan Asia Minor membuat konsep Eropa semakin berkembang. Eropa tak

lain adalah peradaban Yunani. Seiring dengan munculnya Romawi, Eropa berkembang sejauh penaklukan-penaklukan Romawi mulai dari seluruh kawasan Mediterania hingga Inggris. Tanah Germania masih merupakan sesuatu yang sama sekali bukan Eropa.

Pada abad XIV zaman Rainasan datang dan abad Pencerahan pun dimulai. Eropa kembali mendefinisikan dirinya. Eropa tidak lain menganut nilai-nilai demokrasi, humanisme, dan sekularisme. Inilah cara baru bagaimana intelektual mendefinisikan Eropa hingga sekarang. Lantas dengan datangnya imigran-imigran Muslim, sekali lagi, Eropa harus mendefinisikan dirinya. Jawaban bagi Eropa adalah Euro-Islam. Karena, dengan Euro-Islam, muslim dan Eropa akan mampu bersatu untuk kedua kalinya semenjak Andalusia.

Euro-Islam yang dicetuskan oleh Bassam Tibi dan Tariq Ramadan merupakan sebuah identitas yang ingin dibentuk di kalangan Muslim Eropa. Menurut Finnemore dan Sikkink sebuah identitas berawal dari adanya norma. Sebelum menjadi identitas, Euro-Islam adalah sebuah norma. Sampai saat ini, norma tersebut sedang dalam proses pembentukannya.

Proses pembentukan norma Euro-Islam dimulai dengan adanya perdebatan wacana mengenai ide integrasi antara Muslim dengan Eropa yang dimunculkan oleh *norm entrepreneur*. Bassam Tibi, salah seorang intelektual Muslim Eropa didikan mazhab Frankfurt, datang dengan konsep Ide Euro-Islam sebagai sebuah usaha melakukan integrasi antara muslim dengan masyarakat Eropa. Euro-Islam menurut Tibi adalah proyek menggabungkan Islam dengan nilai-nilai Eropa seperti demokrasi dan liberalisme. Tibi menyebutnya sebagai *europeanizing of Islam*.

Tariq Ramadan, seorang filsuf dan intelektual muslim Eropa yang juga merupakan *norm entrepreneur* dari Euro Islam, tidak setuju dengan konsep Euro Islam sebagai *europeanizing of Islam*. Tariq Ramadan melihat bahwa meski Islam bersifat transnasional secara nilai, namun tetap dapat menjadi bagian dari kultur sebuah peradaban. Bagaimana menafsirkan Islam yang universal secara nilai menjadi bagian dari Eropa secara kultur adalah jalan yang harus ditempuh oleh Muslim Eropa.

Perdebatan antar keduanya menimbulkan sebuah kontestasi akan pemahaman Euro-Islam yang akhirnya pemahaman ini terejawantahkan ke dalam kerja yang sistematis. Ide Euro-Islam Tariq Ramadan menjadi pemenang dari kontestasi diskursus ini setelah ide versi Ramadan menyebar melalui pergerakan-pergerakan Muslim Eropa dalam bentuk organisasi-organisasi Islam. Finnemore dan Sikkink menyebut proses ini sebagai kemunculan *organizational platform* yang mendukung ide *norm of entrepreneur*.

Federation of Islamic Organization in Europe (FIOE), *Forum of Muslim Youth and Student Organization* (FEMYSO), dan *European Muslim Network* (EMN) menjadi contoh kemunculan organisasi yang menjadikan Euro-Islam sebagai norma yang menginspirasi platform perjuangan mereka. Usaha-usaha yang mereka lakukan tidak hanya ditujukan kepada pendidikan terhadap akar

rumpit mengenai norma Euro-Islam melainkan juga melakukan advokasi serta sosialisasi yang ditujukan kepada aktor-aktor negara nasional dan Uni Eropa.

Dari semua *targeted actors*, Uni Eropa adalah aktor yang sangat serius mendukung norma Euro-Islam. Dalam bahasa Finnemore dan Sikkink, Uni Eropa menjadi *critical actor* yang membuat norma Euro-Islam dapat bertahan dan semakin berkembang. Dengan demikian, organisasi-organisasi bentukan dari Euro-Islam lebih memilih melakukan lobi dan berinteraksi dengan Uni Eropa terkait dengan penyusunan kebijakan-kebijakan integrasi muslim dengan masyarakat Eropa yang berbasiskan norma Euro-Islam daripada dengan negara-negara nasional Uni Eropa (Parker, 2008).

Pembentukan *Forward Studies Unit* (FSU), *Group of Policy Advisers* (GOPA) yang kelak bertransformasi menjadi *Board of Policy Advisers* (BEPA) merupakan beberapa usaha yang dilakukan Uni Eropa untuk mengikutsertakan organisasi-organisasi Euro-Islam ke dalam pembuatan kebijakan yang terkait dengan identitas dan kehadiran muslim di Eropa. Institusi-institusi di atas menjadi instrumen bagi institusionalisasi norma Euro-Islam.

Baru-baru ini, organisasi-organisasi Euro-Islam bersama ratusan organisasi-organisasi muslim di level negara nasional menandatangani *Muslim Charter* yang sumbernya dibuat oleh FIOE. *Muslim Charter* menjadi awal dari proses institusionalisasi norma Euro-Islam di kalangan masyarakat muslim Eropa. *Muslim Charter* sendiri merupakan dokumen yang menjadi semacam konstitusi bagi muslim Eropa. Dokumen ini mengatur garis besar dasar-dasar hubungan antara warga Muslim dengan masyarakat Eropa.

Di dalam pembukaan *Muslim Charter*, tertulis dengan jelas bahwa piagam ini mencoba melihat kesamaan antara nilai-nilai muslim dengan nilai-nilai Eropa yang dapat dijunjung tinggi di atas perbedaan-perbedaan di antara keduanya. Dokumen ini jelas merupakan piagam yang memuat norma Euro-Islam. Uni Eropa sendiri melalui Komisi Eropa sudah menerima secara formal *Muslim Charter*.

Meskipun belum sampai pada tahap internalisasi norma, setidaknya Euro-Islam telah menjadi *transnasional norm* pada tahapan *norm cascade*. Peneliti yakin bahwa pada dekade berikutnya, seiring dengan semakin banyak jumlah populasi muslim di Eropa, norma Euro-Islam tidak hanya menjadi bagian dari norma yang diterima oleh semua kalangan di Eropa, melainkan menjadi identitas bagi masyarakat muslim Eropa, sebagaimana yang dikatakan oleh Tariq Ramadan *you don't have to be less Muslim to be more European, you can be both*. Inilah masa depan muslim Eropa. ●

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Migrasi, Kewarganegaraan, dan Partisipasi Imigran: Studi Kasus Imigran Turki di Belanda¹

Gusnelly²

Abstract

This article focuses on transnational migration in Europe, primarily on the Turkish migrants diaspora and their citizenship participation in the Netherlands. Their migration history and its patterns are unique, thus interesting to be explored. The presence of the Turkish migrants has enriched the ethnic diversity in the European Society, including the Dutch. They seek for acknowledgement in their *host* country through citizenship, to gain various accesses from the local government to the European society in general. The basic analyses of the paper based on empirical studies on the Turkish migrants. The questions posed in this article are (1) what is the importance of being "European" citizen and why are they applying the Dutch citizenship? (2) How is the relationship between the Turkish migrants and the Dutch government especially to gain various accesses from local government? To answer these questions, the article will explore the history and motivation of the Turkish, interaction between the Turkish migrants and the native society, and how they interact with other ethnic groups, local institution and government. These would lead to the discussion about the participation of the Turkish migrants on the public spheres.

Keywords: transnational migration, Turkish migrants, integration, Dutch citizenship

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- 1 Informasi dan data dalam artikel ini berasal dari kegiatan penelitian selama 5 tahun yang dilakukan oleh tim peneliti divisi Eropa PSDR-LIPI, sekaligus menjadi refleksi singkat dari hasil studi tentang migrasi etnik dan pembentukan masyarakat diaspora di Eropa (Belanda dan Jerman).
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Pendahuluan

Migrasi transnasional merupakan suatu konsekuensi langsung dari proses internasionalisasi yang sedang berlangsung saat ini. Aktifitas ini akan terus berlanjut di masa yang akan datang. Batas-batas lintas negara tampaknya juga akan semakin tipis karena terdorong oleh mobilitas manusia yang semakin sulit untuk dihentikan. Arus masuk manusia ke Eropa tidak hanya berasal dari negara-negara Eropa, tetapi juga dari luar Eropa. Pada tahun 1990 jumlah keseluruhan migran yang berdomosili di 12 negara Eropa adalah sekitar 13 juta orang. Sekitar 3 juta di antaranya datang dari beberapa negara berkembang dari luar kawasan Eropa. Bahkan migrasi transnasional pada masa yang akan datang, diperkirakan akan didominasi oleh para imigran yang berasal dari bukan negara-negara Eropa.

Negara-negara Eropa, sebagai penerima imigran sudah sejak lama dan terbiasa dengan dinamika masuknya orang-orang asing ke wilayah mereka. Bagaimanapun, migrasi telah berperan penting dalam proses transisi dan pertumbuhan penduduk di Eropa sejak dahulu.³ Jumlah penduduk Eropa yang mencapai lebih dari 680 juta merupakan hasil dari aktifitas migrasi dari masa ke masa.⁴ Diperkirakan pada tahun 1970-1971, terdapat sekitar 15 juta jumlah orang asing di Eropa dan kemudian meningkat menjadi 19 juta orang pada tahun 1992-1993. Pada tahun 2000 sudah ada sebanyak 21.16 juta orang asing di Eropa. Jumlah populasi orang asing tersebut berkisar 2.6 persen dari total penduduk Eropa pada tahun 2000. Bahkan jumlah imigran ini akan terus bertambah sekitar 13 juta setiap tahunnya mulai tahun 2000-2050 (Salt, John, 2001; 5-6).

Migrasi ke negara-negara Eropa, seperti Belanda terjadi karena kebutuhan akan tenaga kerja asing untuk membantu program restrukturisasi dan sebagai alat ekspansi perekonomian pasca PD II. Berkembangnya industri di beberapa negara Eropa termasuk Belanda, pemerintah Eropa melalui asosiasi *Common Nordic Labour Market* dan *Masyarakat Ekonomi Eropa* (MEE) memfasilitasi arus masuk tenaga kerja migran (*guest workers*) ke beberapa negara di Eropa Barat (Ohliger, and Schönwalder, 2002; p.4-5). Tidak hanya itu saja, mobilitas manusia dalam hal ini pengungsi menjadi bagian penting dalam perkembangan arus migrasi di Eropa, termasuk Belanda di kemudian hari.

3 Walaupun menerima aliran migrasi yang besar, sebagian besar negara di kawasan ini tidak menyatakan dirinya sebagai negara imigrasi untuk menghindari adanya aliran migrasi yang berlanjut. Di abad ke-20-an di beberapa negara, seperti Belanda, dan Perancis mengalami perubahan status, jika sebelumnya negara ini menjadi negara pengirim migran dalam seketika setelah berakhirnya Perang Dunia ke II berubah menjadi negara penerima imigran. (Amersfoort dalam Bocker et al, 1998: 119)

4 Ostergren. Robert.C. 2004, *The European: A Geography of People, Culture, and Environment* (New York- The Guilford Press), hal 67.

Ada dua hal penting yang mengubah tren dan pola migrasi di negara-negara Eropa Barat seperti Belanda. *Pertama*, terjadinya proses restrukturisasi perekonomian negara setelah PD II yang menjembatani masuknya tenaga kerja migran ke Belanda (Eropa). *Kedua*, terjadinya perubahan konfigurasi dan struktur perekonomian di kawasan Eropa yang disebabkan terbentuknya Uni Eropa (UE).

Migrasi yang terjadi pada masa restrukturisasi ekonomi setelah PD II ditandai oleh masuknya tenaga kerja migran ke beberapa negara Eropa Barat (Jerman, dan Belanda). Migrasi tenaga kerja asing (*guest workers*) dilakukan melalui mekanisme perjanjian bilateral dengan beberapa negara pengirim. Arus tenaga kerja pada awalnya berasal dari beberapa negara di kawasan Eropa Selatan, seperti Spanyol, Italia dan Yunani. Berikutnya, pada tahun 1960-an, perekrutan tenaga kerja di arahkan ke negara-negara di kawasan Mediteranian, seperti Turki⁵, Tunisia dan Maroko. Ketika terjadi resesi ekonomi tahun 1966, pemerintah memulangkan sebagian tenaga kerja ke negara asalnya. Setelah perekonomian Belanda mulai membaik pada tahun 1968, arus masuk tenaga kerja mulai kembali sampai terjadinya krisis minyak tahun 1973 (Vermeulen, 2000: 54).

Tren migrasi berikutnya terjadi dalam bentuk perpindahan keluarga (*family reunification dan family formation*) yang sekaligus menjadi awal terbentuknya proses *resettling* imigran bersama keluarganya di Belanda. Tren migrasi kelompok pencari suaka politik dan pengungsi merupakan arus migrasi selanjutnya yang ikut menambah jumlah orang asing atau pendatang ke Belanda. Gelombang migrasi lanjutan ini yang selanjutnya memberikan beban pada sistem integrasi sosial pada negara di kawasan ini, di mana salah satunya disebabkan karena rendahnya tingkat integrasi dalam pasar tenaga kerja (White, B. Jenny, 1997; 755-756). Bagaimanapun, imigran membutuhkan tempat untuk membangun sebuah komunitas yang baru. Oleh karena itu, penting bagi mereka untuk melakukan penyesuaian dan mengintegrasikan diri dengan kultur setempat. Menurut Penninx, integrasi adalah sebuah proses untuk menjadi anggota yang diakui, diterima dan menjadi satu bagian dalam sebuah masyarakat (Penninx, 2004). Dengan kata lain integrasi menekankan bahwa pendatang (*new comers*) harus mampu beradaptasi dengan budaya setempat dan membuat keberadaan mereka diterima oleh masyarakat setempat. Apabila didefinisikan secara lengkap maka integrasi adalah *sebuah*

5 Para imigran Turki pada awalnya hanya bermaksud mencari pekerjaan tanpa menetap lama (sebagai *guest workers*) di negara tempat mereka bermigrasi. Kebanyakan dari para pria yang pergi migrasi, semula hanya ingin mencari uang kemudian membawanya pulang untuk diserahkan kepada keluarganya. Namun kenyataan yang mereka temui adalah mahalnnya biaya hidup di negara yang mereka datang sehingga mereka harus menggunakan strategi agar dapat bertahan hidup. Para tenaga kerja migran ini biasanya tinggal di tempat-tempat yang kurang memadai. Uang yang dihasilkan sebisa mungkin disimpan.

proses adaptasi yang dilakukan oleh pendatang yang meliputi dua hal yaitu individu dan kelompok masyarakat di mana para pendatang harus membuat dirinya berada pada posisi yang dapat diterima oleh komunitas dimana dia berada. Dalam hal ini pendatang harus berasimilasi dan menerima ketentuan yang berlaku dalam komunitas yang dimasukinya. Proses integrasi harus berjalan perlahan-lahan dan setiap individu harus memahami di mana dan seperti apa budaya di tempat mereka berada.

Negara dan Imigran

Aktivitas migrasi transnasional memperlihatkan betapa negara sangat berperan sekali terutama dalam proses pengiriman dan penerimaan. Negara tidak hanya sebagai fasilitator yang mempermudah akses untuk individu atau kelompok untuk bermigrasi. Akan tetapi, negara juga mempunyai kepentingan secara politik. Perjanjian bilateral antara negara penerima dan pengirim merupakan salah satu strategi yang dibuat untuk memenuhi harapan dan kepentingan negara. Imigran berangkat ke tempat yang baru dengan membawa harapan bahwa pemerintah dan masyarakat di negara tujuan dapat menerima keberadaan mereka yang membawa serta prinsip-prinsip dasar atau budaya leluhurnya. Imigran berharap identitas budaya mereka sebagai sebuah kelompok etnik dilindungi di negara yang baru. Imigran juga menginginkan untuk memiliki identitas formal yaitu pengakuan dalam hukum sebagai warganegara untuk mempermudah akses dalam aktivitas keseharian sebagai sebagai kelompok pendatang.

Hampir semua negara-negara di Eropa Barat menjadi negara penerima imigran. Beberapa negara, seperti Perancis, Inggris dan Belanda menjadi negara penerima imigran sejak tahun 1960-an. Penempatan imigran secara berkelompok dalam satu lokasi dengan karakteristik yang sama merupakan kebijakan yang telah disepakati oleh negara penerima dan pengirim. Misalnya, imigran dari wilayah Mediterania seperti orang Turki dan Maroko tinggal bersama atau berdekatan dalam satu lokasi. Imigran dari India tinggal satu lokasi atau berdekatan dengan imigran dari Pakistan (Kastoryano, 2003; 5). Lokasi tempat tinggal pekerja tamu ini berada di kawasan pedesaan (*suburb*) dan tidak jauh dari lokasi pekerjaan kerja mereka.

Para migran termasuk imigran Turki dipekerjakan dengan sistem kerja kontrak di sektor-sektor industri. Mereka tinggal di asrama-asrama khusus (barak) yang sudah disediakan oleh pemerintah dan tidak diperkenankan untuk membawa serta istri atau keluarganya. Namun sistem ini dianggap tidak efektif karena jumlah migran atau pengunjung ilegal (tanpa izin) menjadi besar. Masuknya para pekerja ilegal ke negara Eropa Barat melalui daerah perbatasan menjadi sebuah isu yang cukup kuat pada awal tahun

1970-an terutama ketika resesi ekonomi dunia tahun 1973.⁶ Kondisi yang sama sebenarnya juga dialami oleh Amerika Serikat yang juga banyak didatangi oleh migran dari negara-negara tetangganya dengan tujuan utama mencari kerja. Sehingga pemerintah Amerika Serikat waktu itu pun mencoba memperketat arus masuk migran ke negaranya (Roodenburg, dkk, 2004:381).

Pada masa lalu pengelompokan tempat tinggal imigran ini ditujukan untuk mempermudah kontrol negara atas segala aktifitas imigran. Selain itu juga untuk menghindari terjadinya konflik antara pendatang dengan penduduk lokal, karena adanya perbedaan prinsip di antara mereka. Pemerintah di beberapa negara penerima imigran menyadari bahwa kedatangan dan masuknya orang asing memunculkan reaksi pro dan kontra dari penduduk lokal. Mereka hanya diakui sebagai pekerja tamu saja. Akses untuk menjadi warga negara juga diperketat oleh negara, namun secara bertahap dari masa ke masa masyarakat di beberapa negara penerima mulai mencoba untuk menerima keberadaan orang asing. Pemerintah negara yang bersangkutan membuka peluang untuk itu, misalnya di Jerman. Masyarakat di sana menerima dan mengakui keberadaan orang asing sebagai bagian dari masyarakat Jerman semenjak tahun 1990-an. Sikap ini diwujudkan dengan memberikan kesempatan kepada pendatang (terutama generasi pertama) yang sudah menetap lama di Jerman untuk mendapatkan akses naturalisasi. (Rhoades, 1978).⁷

Masyarakat Belanda, lebih cepat menerima keberadaan imigran. Pada tahun 1980-an, pemerintah Belanda mempermudah akses untuk imigran mengajukan permohonan naturalisasi (Ching Lin Pang, 2002; Muskens, George, 2005; 5).⁸ Sisi lain, pada periode tahun 1980-an kebijakan imigrasi diberlakukan lebih ketat terhadap orang asing. Melalui kontrol negara, orang asing yang bekerja dan berasal dari luar kawasan Eropa, menurut European Economic Area (EEA), hanya diperkenankan untuk bekerja dengan kontrak kerja yang singkat. Melalui pembatasan masa kerja (*shortage*) pemerintah

6 Krisis minyak tahun 1973 menciptakan kondisi yang tidak menguntungkan bagi beberapa negara. Pada akhirnya tenaga kerja atau kaum imigran dari beberapa negara yang terkena dampak krisis adalah mencari kerja ke negara-negara yang lebih makmur, terutama negara di kawasan Eropa.

7 Jerman sudah cukup lama dan terbiasa dengan foreign workers, namun istilah terhadap pendatang ini seringkali berbeda-beda. Pada masa para pekerja dari Polandia masuk maka mereka lebih dikenal dengan sebutan *Aussiedler*, ketika foreign workers dari Mediteranian seperti orang Turki, dikenal dengan sebutan pekerja tamu (guest workers). Hal ini tidak lain karena pemerintah Jerman tidak menginginkan orang asing menjadi warga negaranya karena bukan berasal dari keturunan bangsa Jerman. Lain halnya jika orang baru (new comers) yang masuk ke Jerman memiliki darah Jerman (Germany descent).

8 Permohonan naturalisasi oleh imigran merupakan implementasi dari kebijakan *Allochtonenbeleid'* (*allochthoneous policy or minorities policy*) tahun 1987 yang menetapkan siapa yang disebut imigran di Belanda dan harus berintegrasi dan akan difasilitasi oleh pemerintah. Kebijakan ini merupakan tindak lanjut dari draft minorities memorandum (*Ontwerp-minderhedennota*). yang dibuat oleh parlemen di tahun 1981 lihat dalam Siedenburg, Anton W. 2004, 5-6

Belanda mencoba untuk secara bertahap mengurangi jumlah orang asing. Setidaknya upaya tersebut berguna membantu proses recovery perekonomian pasca krisis minyak 1973 dan 1983 (Roodenburg, Euwals dan Terrele; 2004; 378). Berikutnya pemerintah Belanda mulai membuat kebijakan-kebijakan integrasi. Secara bertahap pula pemerintah mendorong imigran untuk berintegrasi dengan budaya dan masyarakat setempat. Kebijakan ini merupakan piranti yang penting untuk membantu berjalannya program yang telah disusun oleh negara.

Pada tahun 1981, pemerintah menyusun *draft minorities memorandum (Ontwerp-minderhedennota)* dan menetapkan *draft* tersebut menjadi undang-undang (*minorities act*) pada tahun 1983. Sejak keluarnya peraturan tersebut, kelompok minoritas dianjurkan belajar bahasa dan budaya Belanda sesuai dengan motto yang dikeluarkan "*integration while preserving one's own identity*".⁹ Secara bertahap pula kebijakan integrasi diperbaharui oleh pemerintah Belanda. Pada tahun 1987 pemerintah mengeluarkan kebijakan integrasi yang baru yaitu *Minorities Policy (allochthoneous policy)*, dan menetapkan bahwa imigran harus berintegrasi dan akan difasilitasi oleh pemerintah¹⁰. Kemudian pada tahun 1994, pemerintah memperkenalkan kebijakan integrasi yang baru yaitu *New Integration Policy*. Pemerintah menganjurkan kepada semua pendatang untuk kursus bahasa dan budaya Belanda dan melaporkan setiap perkembangan dari kemajuan yang sudah dicapai selama proses belajar berjalan. Program integrasi ini juga merupakan tindak lanjut dari kesepakatan bersama dari bab 5 perjanjian Maastricht tahun 1991 (*the Maastricht Treaty 1991*) yang menetapkan bahwa pemerintah di negara-negara nasional harus mulai memberikan perhatian kepada para imigran. Upaya pembatasan izin masuk terus dilakukan oleh pemerintah Belanda dan pemerintah kemudian mengeluarkan kebijakan *the Linkage Act (1998)*. Kebijakan yang lebih ketat terhadap pendatang ini sekaligus ditujukan untuk melakukan kontrol terhadap arus masuk imigran. Kebijakan integrasi pemerintah seharusnya mengikuti strategi dan taktik yang dipakai dalam proses integrasi pada level yang berbeda. Strategi yang dimaksudkan adalah kombinasi antara strategi kebijakan dari aktivitas mobilisasi tingkat "*top down*" dan "*bottom up*".

Pembaharuan kebijakan oleh pemerintah Belanda, tidak hanya karena adanya dorongan dari dalam negaranya semata, akan tetapi juga terjadi karena perubahan struktur dan konfigurasi secara politik dan ekonomi di kawasan Eropa. Konfigurasi politik itu terwujud dengan terbentuknya Uni Eropa. Kebijakan UE yang baru menuntut setiap negara anggotanya

9 Siedenburg, Anton W. 2004, "The Facts, Figures and Adjustments of the Dutch Newcomer Integration Act" see in Paper at the Workshop on Integration of Turkish Immigrants in Austria, Holland and Germany, p 2-3.

10 Ching Lin Pang, lihat pada <http://www.ces.boun.edu> akses tanggal 5 Mei 2006.

untuk membuat kebijakan yang terintegrasi dengan kebijakan UE. Masing-masing negara anggota diperkenankan untuk membuat kebijakan sendiri selama masih berada dalam kerangka integrasi UE. Sejak Amsterdam Treaty 1997, kebijakan itu disepakati secara bersama oleh negara-negara anggota. Pada saat itu pula disetujui bahwa kebijakan migrasi dari negara-negara anggota merujuk pada kebijakan migrasi pemerintah UE, termasuk kebijakan perekrutan tenaga kerja asing.

Pemerintah UE menetapkan bahwa perekrutan tenaga kerja asing untuk tenaga kerja tidak terampil lebih diprioritaskan untuk mereka yang berasal dari negara-negara dalam satu kawasan. Jika melihat tren migrasi UE berdasarkan negara asal, maka dari beberapa informasi diketahui bahwa negara pemasok tenaga kerja berasal dari negara-negara bekas Uni Soviet atau CEECs (*Central and Eastern European Countries*), seperti Andorra, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia dan Polandia. Kebijakan imigrasi UE untuk negara-negara bekas Uni Soviet agak berbeda dengan perjanjian imigrasi pada masa lampau. Kebijakan untuk pekerjaan kasar dan professional berbeda. Yang lebih diharapkan dari pekerja asing yang masuk adalah yang professional, karena untuk memenuhi tuntutan *World Trade Organizations General Agreement on Trade in Services* (GATS) (Jansen, Milan, dkk, 2003; p.102).

Negara Belanda, sebagai salah satu negara anggota UE, menjadikan kebijakan imigrasi Uni Eropa sebagai pedoman untuk menyusun kebijakan di negaranya. Misalnya dalam masalah kebijakan imigrasi untuk pendatang yang berasal dari bekas negara satelit Uni Sovyet. Negara-negara anggota UE menyepakati bahwa masyarakat dari negara-negara tersebut dapat memasuki kawasan Eropa. Bahkan pemerintah UE memberikan prioritas kepada mereka untuk memasuki pekerjaan yang tidak membutuhkan keterampilan (*unskilled labour*). Belanda menerima sekitar 130,600 imigran dari negara CEECs pada tahun 1999. UE secara tidak langsung menawarkan konsep identitas yang plural kepada warganegara, yaitu identitas sebagai orang Eropa dan identitas sebagai orang Belanda. Dengan identitas yang plural maka peran yang dilakoni pun beragam. Identitas sebagai imigran, kemudian "*foreigner*" dan "*black*", pada akhirnya menjadi strategi bagi politik identitas dan partisipasi bagi pendatang. Para pendatang membangun strategi politik identitas mereka berdasarkan kultur, etnik, nasionalitas atau agamanya. Bagaimanapun tetap ada sebuah identitas yang dipilih untuk diakui secara formal oleh negara, merupakan sebuah hasil dari interaksi dengan negara, kemudian publik menerima pengakuan tersebut (Kastoryano, 2003).


Interaksi yang dibangun dengan negara bukan tanpa alasan, adanya kepentingan yang besar terkandung di dalamnya. Selain pengakuan akan keberadaan sebagai imigran, juga menjadi alat untuk menjalin kerjasama dengan berbagai institusi baik pada level pemerintah maupun level nonpemerintah. Strategi yang dibangun melalui interaksi dengan

negara menunjukkan solidaritas mereka terhadap jaringan lintas negara (transnasional) berdasarkan identitas atau kepentingan tertentu. Jika interaksi dengan negara gagal dilakukan, maka individu tersebut akan dihadapkan pada pilihan untuk menjadi bagian dari sebuah komunitas dari mana dia berasal.

Diaspora Orang Turki di Belanda

Belanda, sebuah negara kecil dengan luas wilayah hanya 42.000 km dan biasa disebut sebagai "*small country, think big*". Pada masa lalu, Belanda hanya negara kecil yang belum terlalu diminati oleh kaum immigran, termasuk orang Turki. Negara-negara yang memiliki industri besar saat itu adalah Perancis, Inggris dan Jerman, sehingga tujuan migrasi mereka cenderung ke sana. Sebelum Perang Dunia II, negara-negara seperti Perancis, Inggris dan Jerman merupakan negara tujuan yang lebih menjanjikan bagi para imigran di sektor ekonomi, karena perkembangan dunia industri yang begitu cepat di Eropa kala itu dikendalikan oleh ketiga negara ini. Secara garis besar dalam grafik di bawah ini (Schoorl, 2001) mencoba menjelaskan tingkat ketertarikan orang Turki bermigrasi.

Grafik. 1
Negara Tujuan yang paling diminati oleh Migran Turki



Sumber: Schoorl, 2001

Belanda memiliki jumlah penduduk hampir 16,3 juta orang dalam setiap satu kilo meter terdapat sekitar 460 orang, dan inilah yang membuat padatnya negara kincir angin ini. Kepadatan penduduk di kota-kota ini sekaligus memperlihatkan kebhinekaan negara Belanda (Andeweg, R.B and

Galen A. Irwin, 2005; 1-2). Sebagai negara plural, pemerintah mengakui representasi kultural dan keagamaan serta mengakui keberadaannya di ruang publik. Keberagaman etnik pendatang yang hidup berkembang, menciptakan masyarakat diaspora. Demikian pula halnya dengan etnik Turki. Pembentukan komunitas diaspora terjadi karena adanya migrasi yang menjadi awal dari proses perpindahan budaya atau disebut "*travelling cultures*" (Crammer, 2002;23).

Sejarah diaspora orang Turki dimulai ketika pemerintah Belanda memerlukan tenaga kerja untuk menjadi alat ekspansi ekonomi pada tahun 1960-an. Pemerintah belum berpikir tentang asal usul tenaga kerja yang masuk apalagi memikirkan bahwa kelak pekerja tamu tersebut akan menjadi imigran di negaranya. Kebijakan pemerintah lebih fokus hanya untuk mendapatkan tenaga kerja murah, berbadan sehat, bersedia dipekerjakan sebagai tenaga kerja kasar, dan mereka hanya bekerja untuk sementara (*shortage workers*) atau disebut pekerja tamu. Melalui perjanjian bilateral *Labour Export Agreement* pada tanggal 19 Agustus tahun 1964 dan lebih dikenal dengan *Treaty of Recruitment*, arus migrasi pekerja tamu dari Turki pun dimulai.¹¹

Pada tahun 1966, sejumlah orang Turki datang ke Belanda secara ilegal (*unofficial channels*). Ketika terjadi resesi ekonomi pada tahun 1966, pemerintah memulangkan sebagian tenaga kerja ke Turki. Setelah perekonomian Belanda mulai membaik pada tahun 1968, arus masuk tenaga kerja dimulai kembali sampai terjadinya krisis minyak pada tahun 1973 (Vermeulen, 2000, p.154). Pada tahun 1970-an terdapat 36.000 imigran Turki, kemudian menjadi 142.106 pada tahun 1980-an dan menjadi dua kali lipat jumlahnya pada tahun 1990-an. Pada tahun 2007 sudah terdapat sekitar 740.000 orang Turki di Belanda dan merupakan kelompok imigran terbesar saat ini. Jika di Belanda saja jumlah imigran Turki sudah menjadi kelompok etnik terbesar, maka sudah pasti jumlah mereka juga mendominasi di beberapa negara Eropa lainnya¹².

Jumlah kelompok imigran yang semakin membesar dan makin besar pula peranan mereka dalam perekonomian, pada akhirnya memunculkan tanggapan negatif dari sebagian kalangan di Belanda. Padahal tujuan dikeluarkannya kebijakan minoritas adalah untuk mempersempit jarak di

11 Orang Turki merupakan salah satu etnis penyumbang terbesar para imigran di kawasan Eropa. Data dari *SOPEMI (Continues Reporting System on Migration)* menyebutkan bahwa jumlah orang Turki di Eropa mengalami peningkatan dari tahun ke tahun. Pada tahun 1980, jumlah orang Turki hanya 1.845 ribu orang kemudian meningkat menjadi 2.333 ribu orang pada tahun 1990 dan tercatat 2.606 ribu orang pada tahun 2001. Data lain dari *World Economic and Social Survey* tahun 2004, menyebutkan bahwa pada tahun 2000 proporsi Turki adalah 73.4% dari semua imigran di Jerman. Sedangkan pada tahun yang sama proporsi Turki di Perancis hanya sebesar 8.1% (*World Economic and Social Survey*, 2004:46).

12 Siedenburg. Anton.W. 2004, "The Fact, Figures and Adjustment of the Dutch Newcomer Integration Act", paper dalam workshop tentang Integrasi Orang Turki di Austria, Belanda dan Jerman, dilaksanakan oleh Universitas Bogazici, Jerman.

antara keduanya. Pada satu sisi, kebijakan ini bertujuan untuk memberikan kesempatan kepada kelompok minoritas untuk berpartisipasi (berintegrasi) ke dalam semua sisi kehidupan. Sisi lain, hal ini juga membuka peluang kepada kelompok imigran yang tidak mampu berintegrasi untuk kembali ke negara asal (Siedenburg, Anton W. 2004;5-6). Persoalan integrasi kelompok minoritas bukan hanya sekedar persoalan kebijakan legal formal, akan tetapi juga menyangkut relasi kekuasaan yang mendasari relasi mayoritas-minoritas dalam masyarakat Belanda (Muzakir, 2007, 45).

Persoalan ekonomi dan latar belakang budaya kaum imigran tampaknya menjadi masalah yang rumit di Belanda. Jika tanah Belanda merupakan ruang sosial, maka ia terdiri atas berbagai macam pelaku-pelaku sosial yang beraneka ragam dalam berbagai bidang kehidupan yaitu politik, ekonomi dan sosial budaya. Masing-masing pelaku memiliki relasinya sendiri-sendiri. Para pelaku sosial itu memiliki keunikan dan nilai budaya sendiri yang masih memiliki keterikatan yang kuat dengan negara asalnya. Etnik imigran juga memiliki nilai-nilai budaya yang menjadi habitus mereka. Pengakuan akan habitus mereka yang unik dan khas adalah hasil dari interaksi atau dialektika dengan yang lain, dan bagaimana orang-orang tersebut melihat dirinya dan bagaimana yang lain melihat mereka (Barth, 1988). Identitas mereka yang unik, menandai dan sekaligus menjadi simbol etnik mereka.

Ketika pertama kali datang ke Belanda, orang Turki masih dikategorikan sebagai masyarakat yang homogen yaitu generasi pertama yang didominasi oleh kaum laki-laki. Setelah gelombang generasi pertama masuk, disusul oleh generasi kedua, ketiga dan seterusnya. Selanjutnya mereka sudah bersifat heterogen. Kelompok generasi berikutnya ini sudah lebih baik daripada generasi sebelumnya terutama dalam adaptasi dengan kehidupan sosial, ekonomi bahkan politik. Generasi ketiga muncul sebagai pembawa perubahan dalam dunia pendidikan yang dipengaruhi oleh nilai-nilai Eropa. Artinya bahwa imigran Turki di Eropa khususnya di Belanda sudah menjadi komunitas diasporik yang telah terfragmentasi sedemikian rupa, sehingga batas-batas identitas tradisional yang menjadi karakteristik yang khas dari kelompok mereka mengalami peleburan dan dikonstruksi kembali ke dalam format yang baru. Fragmentasi ini tidak hanya berlangsung dalam konteks relasi antara kaum imigran dengan masyarakat *host country*, tetapi juga di dalam internal kaum imigran sendiri.

Generasi pertama lebih cenderung memilih identitas sebagai orang Turki, sementara generasi berikutnya terutama generasi ketiga lebih memilih untuk menjadi warga negara Belanda. Alasannya karena mereka lahir, tinggal dan mendapatkan pendidikan di Belanda maka identitas sebagai orang Turki sudah tidak diperlukan lagi. Anak-anak dari kelompok imigran Turki generasi-generasi selanjutnya sudah tidak menganggap lagi kultur Turki sebagai satu-satunya sumber acuan bagi pembentukan identitas dirinya. Generasi sebelumnya selalu memiliki keinginan yang kuat untuk

pulang, dan mereka menabung untuk bisa pulang ke Turki. Namun bagi anak-anak keturunannya, pulang ke negara asal sudah tidak menarik lagi. Mereka tumbuh dalam kehidupan sehari-hari masyarakat Belanda (Eropa) pada umumnya, menonton program televisi yang sama dengan mereka, dan memakai pakaian atau mengonsumsi makanan yang juga dipakai dan dikonsumsi oleh orang Eropa pada umumnya (White, 1997).

Generasi pertama yang datang ke Belanda tahun 1960-an dan 1970-an murni karena adanya dorongan ekonomi dan tidak memerlukan integrasi dalam kehidupan sosial dan ekonomi. Kelompok generasi kedua yang datang di tahun 1980-an, terdorong oleh kondisi dan situasi politik yang tidak kondusif di Turki. Sisi lain, kelompok generasi ketiga yang lebih terbuka, meminta untuk diperlakukan sama dengan masyarakat pribumi, memiliki toleransi sosial, bersedia terlibat dalam partai politik dan sering melakukan dialog lintas budaya (Sen;2004;3-4). Kelompok ketiga inilah yang kemudian menjadi perwakilan yang utuh dari diaspora etnik Turki di Belanda baik dalam bidang politik dan ekonomi.

Partisipasi Kewarganegaraan Orang Turki di Belanda

Adanya fenomena masuknya orang-orang Turki sebagai pekerja tamu, kemudian berganti bentuk menjadi reunifikasi keluarga, membuat Belanda disebut sebagai negaranya para imigran. Belanda memberikan banyak harapan karena pemerintahnya menerima orang asing secara terbuka. Secara bertahap pemerintah mulai membuka peluang kepada imigran untuk memulai aktifitas meraih harapan yang telah mereka impikan. Jika pertama datang mereka hanya dijadikan sebagai alat ekonomi semata, namun pada periode pertengahan tahun 1980-an mereka mulai dipandang sebagai makhluk sosial yang memiliki hak untuk diperlakukan sama dengan warga lokal.

Kedatangan imigran, bagaimanapun tetap memunculkan persoalan bagi pemerintah Belanda. Meskipun jumlah mereka terbatas (minoritas), namun pemerintah mengakui bahwa belakangan kelompok *allochtonous* ini mulai ditekan oleh kelompok tertentu. Istilah *allochtonous* pun belakangan dikonotasikan secara negatif yaitu disebut sebagai kelompok "*black people*". Istilah "*black*" kemudian dilekatkan pula pada "*black school*", "*black street*" dan "*black market*". Penyebutan *allochtonous* untuk kelompok pendatang, baik imigran Turki maupun etnik lainnya sebenarnya ditujukan untuk membantu mempermudah akses imigran berintegrasi dengan masyarakat setempat (*autochtonous*). Kepada semua etnik pendatang yang disebut *allochtonous* pemerintah memberikan kemudahan untuk akses naturalisasi menjadi warganegara Belanda.

Dengan keberagaman imigran maka dibutuhkan solusi guna menghindarkan diri dari ancaman perpecahan yang dapat timbul karena gesekan di antara mereka maupun dengan warga lokal di negara tujuan. Guna mengurangi konflik di negara penerima imigran, hal yang

harus dilakukan adalah memfasilitasi imigran untuk berintegrasi dengan masyarakat di mana mereka tinggal (Carmon,1996:23). Integrasi juga dapat mendorong imigran untuk mengajukan permohonan naturalisasi atau mengajukan diri menjadi warga negara di tempat yang baru. Bagaimanapun status kewarganegaraan berada di dalam sebuah posisi yang penting dalam masyarakat.

Konsep dari *citizenship* (kewarganegaraan) memang agak sulit untuk didefinisikan. Pendefinisian yang umum atas konsep *citizenship* cenderung melihat pada hubungan antara kewenangan atau hak warganegara. Sementara itu kewarganegaraan itu sendiri adalah gabungan antara pengetahuan, kemampuan dan keinginan untuk berpartisipasi dalam masyarakat. Persoalan integrasi dan wacana *citizenship* adalah salah satu hal yang selalu diperdebatkan sepanjang masa. Menurut Musembi (2002) yang disitir ulang oleh Gaventa (2002)¹³, konsep *citizenship* menurut pemikiran Barat secara tradisional terkait dengan persamaan hukum bagi perorangan yang dilengkapi oleh seperangkat hak dan kewajiban yang dilimpahkan oleh negara kepada individu.


Pendekatan baru yang lebih plural mengkonseptualisasikan kembali dan menjadikan konsep tersebut lebih berorientasi kepada negara (*state centred approach*) dan lebih berorientasi pada pelakunya (*actor oriented approach*). Pendekatan baru ini berpendapat bahwa kewarganegaraan dapat dicapai melalui agen (*agency*) kewarganegaraan yang memiliki identitas yang berbeda-beda. Sebagai sebuah pendekatan, hak-hak yang dimaksudkan juga dikembangkan dari hak-hak sipil dan politik, hingga mencakup hak-hak ekonomi, sosial dan budaya termasuk pula hak untuk berpartisipasi secara nasional dan global (Gaventa, 2002, 5). Dengan demikian, konsep *citizenship* terkait erat dengan persoalan politik dalam masyarakat. Saat ini kekuasaan politik yang banyak memberikan pengaruh dan kontribusi terhadap kebijakan kewarganegaraan. Bahkan politik ikut menentukan pendefinisian kewarganegaraan sebagai sebuah wujud nyata dari keanggotaan komunitas politik.

Kesempatan yang diberikan oleh pemerintah Belanda bagi para imigran untuk berpartisipasi dalam bidang ekonomi tampaknya direspon dengan baik oleh imigran Turki. Keterlibatan dan ketertarikan sebagian besar imigran Turki dalam kegiatan kewirausahaan tidaklah semata-mata karena keterdesakan ekonomi, akan tetapi juga untuk meraih peluang untuk diterima dan diakui eksistensi mereka oleh warga lokal sebagai kelompok

13 Tulisan Gaventa tentang *citizenship* ini sudah disadur ulang oleh Yando Zakaria dari judul aslinya "Introduction Exploring Citizenship, Participation and Accountability" dalam IDS Bulletin Vo 1.33. No. 2, 2002. Dalam naskah aslinya yang disebut dengan warga adalah *citizen*. Sementara untuk kewarganegaraan ditulis dalam bentuk *citizenship*.

mayoritas (Pecoud, 2000). Pada tahun 1992 terdapat sekitar 5385 orang yang terlibat dalam kewirausahaan. Kemudian jumlah tersebut meningkat menjadi 7453 orang pada tahun 1997. Jumlah ini diprediksi terus bertambah mengingat etnik Turki adalah salah kelompok imigran yang memiliki minat yang besar pada sektor ini. Tidak hanya itu, mereka yang terlibat dalam dunia usaha sebagian besar adalah kaum perempuan. Perempuan Turki sangat jarang yang diperkenankan bekerja di luar rumah, terutama sektor formal dan terikat oleh jam kerja yang ketat, karena proporsi kerja mereka lebih banyak untuk keluarga. Oleh karena itu menjadi pedagang atau membuka usaha restoran menjadi salah satu pilihan. (Jansen, Milan, dkk, 2003).

Grafik. 2
 Imigran Usia 15-65 tahun yang bekerja berdasarkan
 Kelompok Etnik Periode tahun 1987-2003



Sumber: CBS (EBB'87-'03) dalam Gijsbert Merrove, 2004

Dalam dunia usaha, imigran Turki berada di posisi kedua setelah warga Belanda. Akan tetapi, dalam dunia pendidikan kelompok etnik Turki tidaklah lebih baik daripada orang Suriname dan Antilan. Rendahnya partisipasi orang Turki dalam dunia pendidikan salah satunya disebabkan oleh adanya larangan bagi perempuan Turki untuk sekolah lebih tinggi. Anak perempuan Turki hanya diperkenankan untuk sekolah sampai usia 18 tahun saja dan itu pada umumnya adalah lulusan sekolah menengah pertama.¹⁴ Pada tahun 1991, CBS melaporkan bahwa sekitar 97 % perempuan Turki berusia 15-24 tahun adalah lulusan menengah pertama (ISEO Report, 1991).

14 Wawancara dengan bapak Santo Koesobjono pada tanggal 31 Mei tahun 2006.

Tabel. 1

Persentase etnik minoritas yang menamatkan pendidikan berdasarkan level pendidikan yang berlaku di Belanda tahun 1998.

Highest Educational Attainment	Turkish	Moroccan	Dutch
Primary school at the most	34%	40%	10%
Lower vocation education (Vbo), Lower genera; secondary education (Mavo)	37%	28%	22%
Senior secondary vocational education (Mbo), Senior general secondary education (Havo), Preparatory university education (Vwo)	23%	27%	36%
Higher professional education (Hbo), university (WO)	5%	5%	32%

Source: SPVA 1998, ISEO/EUR

Note: The top row of Table 2 represents individual who finished primary school only (normal age 12), Mbo is equivalent to Havo, because both diplomas give access to higher vocation school (Hbo)

Budaya Turki masih sulit menerima kaum perempuan menghabiskan usia untuk bersekolah. Bagi penganut nilai-nilai tradisional, terutama generasi-generasi tua, hal ini berbenturan dengan nilai-nilai yang telah disosialisasikan di dalam keluarga dan itu berarti menentang keluarga. Dalam struktur masyarakat tradisional, kaum perempuan ditempatkan di area domestik atau rumah tangga¹⁵. Artinya, perempuan Turki sulit untuk bersaing dan mendapatkan pekerjaan di sektor formal atau sektor yang membutuhkan keterampilan di Belanda. Ini dikatakan sebagai salah satu bentuk perlindungan dan antisipasi terhadap kaum perempuan agar tidak terlalu banyak bergaul dengan warga lokal, terutama kaum laki-laki Belanda (Eropa).


Secara perlahan, seiring dengan berbagai perubahan yang terjadi, media-media massa atau pendidikan modern juga dijadikan alat yang efektif untuk menyuarakan kesetaraan antara perempuan dan laki-laki dalam berbagai hal. Kultur Turki yang membatasi kesempatan pendidikan untuk perempuan mulai mendapat perlawanan dari kaum perempuan itu sendiri. Menurut mereka, dunia modern menuntut kaum perempuan untuk mendapatkan pendidikan tinggi sebagai tuntutan dari modernisasi. Sementara modernisasi itu bukanlah sebuah westernisasi. Kedua konsep ini memiliki perbedaan dalam pemaknaannya. Modernisasi terkait erat dengan partisipasi perempuan dalam berbagai hal sedangkan westernisasi adalah menempatkan perempuan dalam bagian yang tidak terpisahkan dari Barat (Belanda). Menjadi modern bukanlah harus mengikuti budaya Barat atau meninggalkan ke Turki-an (ke-Islam-an) mereka (Timmerman, 2000). Tugas dan perjuangan kaum perempuan Turki tersebut pada dekade belakangan mendapatkan dukungan dari organisasi *Diyanet Isleri Turk Islam Birliği*

15 The Country Studies Series by Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1995, "The Status of Women", dalam <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13954.html>, akses 25 Juli 2006

/DITIB.¹⁶ Dari perjuangan untuk partisipasi tersebut, perempuan Turki berharap ikut memberikan kontribusi secara ekonomi kepada keluarganya¹⁷. Pada kenyataannya secara umum etnik Turki bukanlah penyumbang utama angka pengangguran di Belanda yang posisi teratasnya dipegang oleh etnik Maroko (lihat grafik 2).

Grafik 3.

Jumlah Pengangguran Berdasarkan Kelompok Etnik (1994-2003)



Sumber: SOPEMI dalam Ellie Vasta, 2006

Tingginya tingkat pengangguran di kalangan etnik Turki antara lain disebabkan oleh rendahnya partisipasi mereka dalam dunia pendidikan. Persoalan yang kerap kali menjadi kendala adalah mereka sulit untuk beradaptasi dengan anak-anak Belanda. Dibandingkan dengan orang Suriname, maka etnik Turki masih sulit menerima kebudayaan Eropa (Belanda) dan memilih sekolah yang sama dengan anak-anak Belanda. Meskipun demikian anak-anak Turki yang menamatkan sekolah menengah sudah mengalami peningkatan. Anak-anak Maroko dan anak-anak Turki yang tidak bersedia bergabung di sekolah umum (Belanda) akan diperlakukan diskriminatif dan sekolah mereka disebut "*black school*". Kecenderungan orang tua Turki memasukan anak-anaknya ke sekolah khusus adalah untuk mendapatkan pengajaran tentang budaya Turki yang dekat dengan kultur Islam. Orang tua merasa agak sedikit khawatir karena kecenderungan yang

16 *Diyanet Islari Turk Islam Birligi* (DITIB) salah satu organisasi keagamaan yang dibentuk tahun 1985 sebagai bentuk dari perlawanan terhadap Milli Görüs yang sangat konservatif.

17 Toker, Umut And Zeynep Toker, 2003, *Family Structure and Spatial Configuration in Turkish House Form in Anatolia From Late Nineteenth Century to Late Twentieth Century*, Proceedings 4th International Space Syntax Symposium London dalam <http://www.spacesyntax.net/symposia/SSS4/fullpapers/55Toker-Tokerpaper.pdf>, akses tanggal 14 Agustus 2006

terjadi pada anak-anak mereka adalah menolak mencari tahu dan mengenal tentang budaya Turki. Pada akhirnya anak-anak yang sudah memasuki sekolah menengah enggan melanjutkan sekolah, karena apa yang mereka ingin dapatkan terutama pengetahuan tentang dunia modern tidak diperoleh di sekolah. Bahkan seringkali mereka merasa bahwa sebutan “*black school*” atas sekolah yang dimasuki oleh imigran memperlihatkan perlakuan yang diskriminatif (Vasta, 2006).

Tabel 2.
Tingkat Pendidikan Anak-Anak Imigran Berdasarkan Etnik

	Native Dutch		Turks		Moroccans		Surinamese		Antillians	
	1998	2002	1998	2002	1998	2002	1998	2002	1998	2002
Primary school	18	12	65	51	74	58	29	22	29	20
Lower vocational & general secondary	27	25	16	23	10	14	31	33	30	32
Intermediate vocational & general secondary	26	41	15	20	11	21	24	31	27	28
Higher education	28	23	4	6	4	8	15	14	15	20
(N)	2024	--	2880	1897	2234	1553	2404	1367	1157	906

Source: Dutch Sopemi Report 2003 (Snel, et al. 2005, 90)

Pendidikan menjadi jembatan bagi setiap orang untuk menjadi apa yang diharapkan dan membuat seseorang mampu membangun potensi yang ada dalam dirinya. Pemerintah Belanda menyadari akan pentingnya pendidikan untuk warga negaranya, terutama anak-anak imigran karena mereka memerlukannya ketika akan memasuki dunia kerja dan ketika mereka berbaur bersama masyarakat. Melalui pendidikan, seseorang akan memperoleh pengetahuan, keahlian dan prinsip yang menjadi unsur dari kompetensi seseorang. Kompetensi yang dimiliki akan membantu seseorang agar sukses dalam melakukan integrasi terutama integrasi dengan lingkungan di mana pun dia berada. Oleh karena itu, imigran perlu untuk mendapatkan pendidikan, terutama pendidikan yang disesuaikan dengan nilai-nilai yang ada di tempat yang baru. Perlakuan yang diskriminatif pun akan tereliminasi ketika salah satu imigran yang mewakili kelompok minoritas tertentu mampu menunjukkan bahwa dirinya berpendidikan dan memiliki kemampuan.

Bagi imigran Turki yang kebanyakan berkemampuan rendah, mendirikan bisnis sendiri merupakan alternatif lain dalam mencari penghidupan. Dengan menjadi wirausahawan para imigran ini memperoleh peran lain yang sedikit agak berbeda dari mereka yang menjadi kelas pekerja (Rath et al, 2002:2).

Memiliki bisnisnya sendiri bagi mereka selain berarti menciptakan lapangan kerja bagi dirinya sendiri juga menyediakan lapangan kerja untuk orang lain. Lebih jauh lagi Rath menjelaskan bahwa di tengah-tengah komunitasnya, para imigran Turki yang berkecimpung di dunia wirausaha acapkali ditunjuk menjadi pemimpin.

Membuka usaha juga merupakan salah satu jalan keluar untuk dapat beradaptasi dan berinteraksi dengan bebas dengan konsumen yang merupakan warga lokal atau etnik lainnya. Batas-batas budaya dan pengetahuan tentang budaya Turki yang sejak kecil ditanamkan oleh orang tua mereka, secara perlahan mulai melebur. Identitas budaya sebagai orang Turki akan dipakai ketika seorang imigran untuk pertama kalinya terjun ke dalam dunia usaha. Bantuan saudara-saudara, termasuk di dalamnya bantuan finansial, sangat dibutuhkan. Etnik Turki memiliki *network* yang sangat kuat dalam hal ini. Akan tetapi, dalam perkembangannya, faktor etnisitas tersebut belum cukup, karena dunia wirausaha tetaplah membutuhkan kemampuan manajerial, termasuk di dalamnya kemampuan menganalisis tren dan selera pasar. Tanpa itu, seorang wirausahawan akan segera berhadapan dengan kegagalan. Komunikasi dengan etnik lain, terutama dengan orang-orang Belanda merupakan akses untuk mendapatkan informasi penting dalam mengelola usaha. Pada situasi seperti ini, identitas menjadi cair.

Identitas kultural berperan sebagai penjaga hubungan baik dengan keluarga, kerabat atau teman dari etnik sesama (Turki). Identitas sebagai orang Belanda, berperan untuk menjaring konsumen, relasi dan untuk mendapatkan kemudahan dalam berwirausaha. Pada periode belakangan, terutama pasca peristiwa 11 September, memburuknya pandangan warga lokal terhadap kelompok pendatang (terutama yang memiliki latar belakang Islam), membuat etnik Turki menjadi lebih liberal. Identitas sebagai orang Belanda lebih ditonjolkan daripada identitas yang lainnya. Bahkan ketika generasi pertama cenderung tertutup terhadap dunia politik, maka generasi selanjutnya mulai mencoba untuk memasukinya. Mereka yang sukses sebagai pengusaha dan yang memiliki pendidikan tinggi akan diperhitungkan untuk menjadi penentu kebijakan di Belanda. Hal yang sama juga terjadi di Jerman. Para imigran Turki memilih untuk berintegrasi dan menjadi warga negara di negara penerima mereka dengan tujuan untuk mendapatkan akses yang mudah pasar tenaga kerja. Dengan kata lain, dengan berintegrasi secara politik, sosial dan ekonomi, imigran Turki akan memperoleh kesempatan yang lebih baik dan kesuksesan ekonomi.

Kesimpulan

Migrasi tidak hanya menciptakan masyarakat diaspora dan ras baru, tetapi ikut memberikan perubahan yang mendorong terjadinya peralihan masyarakat dalam satu wilayah yang tradisional ke arah masyarakat modern atau masuknya pengaruh asing ke dalam unsur budaya lain, yang dapat juga

disebut sebagai budaya Hibriditas (Luhulima, 1992, p.23-24). Dalam wacana pascakolonial, konsep hibriditas mengacu pada suatu penciptaan format-format transkultural baru dalam zona hubungan kolonialisasi. Konsep inilah yang banyak diasosiasikan dengan Homi Bhaba dalam tulisannya *"The Location of Culture"* (1994) yang menganalisis relasi antara penjajah dan terjajah yang saling memiliki ketergantungan di mana konstruksi budaya tidak akan mungkin dihindari, misalnya lahirnya musik Rap dan Hip-Hop, yang merupakan musik campuran Karibia-Amerika, telah menjadi bentuk musik diaspora kulit hitam.

Peralihan dari masyarakat tradisional menuju masyarakat modern membutuhkan kemampuan mengekspresikan pengetahuan, keahlian dan prinsip yang dimiliki. Semua akan diperoleh melalui dunia pendidikan. Keterlibatan seseorang individu sebagai warga negara dalam dunia pendidikan merupakan bentuk dari partisipasi dalam kehidupan bernegara. Pendidikan penting bagi imigran karena hal itu akan membantu mereka untuk dapat beradaptasi dalam upaya mereka untuk berintegrasi ke dalam struktur masyarakat di negara penerima. Berintegrasi bukan berarti akan kehilangan jati diri sebagai etnik pendatang. Akan tetapi, hal itu justru membantu menciptakan identitas yang baru tanpa menghilangkan identitas yang lama. Identitas bersifat cair. Ketika seseorang menunjukkan identitas formal, maka identitas nasional yang ditonjolkan. Untuk menjalin harmonisasi dan hubungan dengan komunitas etnik, maka yang dipakai adalah identitas kultural. Begitu banyak peran yang dapat dimainkan dengan identitas yang plural. Semua itu tergantung kepada kemampuan seseorang menggunakannya. ●

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Transformasi Ekonomi-Politik Jerman dan Regionalisasi Ekonomi di Asia

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Abstract

The pressures to transform the Modell Deutschland have been culminated, particularly by the triumph of the ordo-liberal coalitions. Reunification process, European Union regionalism, and economic liberalization waves were the historical momentum in which the ordo-liberal groups gain its legitimacy. Such transformation also brought about in the context of globalizing production system which has massively insisted the German industries to transnationalize and to improve its competitiveness.

The expansion of German economy around the world went hand in hand with the massive regionalization in Asia. The industrial shape since 1980s has been highly attractive for the developed countries to take part in the Asian regionalization. Besides presenting the political economic transformation in Germany, this paper also seeks to examine the significance and the dynamics of its economic networks in Asian regionalization.

Kata Kunci: *Modell Deutschland*, transformasi ekonomi-politik, restrukturasi industrial, jejaring ekonomi, regionalisasi Asia

Pengantar

Jerman adalah salah satu negara yang mengalami kerusakan paling parah akibat perang dunia kedua, yang kondisi ekonomi politiknya waktu itu kerap digambarkan sebagai *Jahr Null*, Tahun Nol. Namun dalam beberapa dasawarsa kemudian Jerman (saat itu Jerman Barat) sanggup bangkit dan

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bahkan menjadi salah satu negara dengan struktur ekonomi paling kuat di dunia. Pada tahun 1967-1971, nilai eksportnya berkembang rata-rata 16%, jauh berada di atas Amerika dan Inggris yang masing-masing hanya mencapai 9% dan 12%. Pada periode yang sama, investasi asing di Jerman juga mengalami kenaikan 24,5%, dibandingkan dengan Inggris yang hanya naik 8%, Amerika 10% dan Perancis 12% (Beaud, 2001: 227). Jerman juga mengalami surplus perdagangan yang tinggi, yakni melonjak dari 2,4% pada penghujung tahun 1970 menjadi 3,2% pada tahun 1980-an (Vitols, 2005).

Performa ekonomi Jerman, yang disebut-sebut sebagai "*The German Miracle*", tidak lepas dari kemampuan Jerman untuk melakukan transformasi ekonomi politik pasca-perang (Hallet, 1990: 79-80). Rahasia kesuksesan ekonomi Jerman ini sering diasosiasikan dengan keberhasilannya "menggabungkan prinsip daya saing ekonomi internasional dan konsensus sosial" dalam reformasi ekonominya (Beck, et.al, 2005: 1; bdk. Weiss, 1998: 116-166). Model ekonomi inilah yang disebut sebagai *Modell Deutschland*. Satu sisi, model ini menegaskan perlunya lembaga-lembaga politik yang kuat untuk menjamin pemenuhan kebijakan sosial (*social policy*). Sisi lain, model ini juga menuntut adanya daya saing industri yang kuat. Dengan demikian, dinamika ekonomi politik Jerman itu sangat ditentukan oleh pengelolaan dua pilar ini yang dalam prakteknya menuntut adanya hubungan produktif antara negara, masyarakat, dan pasar.

Akan tetapi, pada tahun 1990-an *Modell Deutschland*, yang menjadi penopang ekonomi Jerman, mengalami tantangan serius. Proses reunifikasi yang berlangsung pada awal 1990-an segera diikuti dengan pemindahan besar-besaran pelbagai lembaga ekonomi politik Jerman Barat, atau Republik Federal Jerman (FRG), ke bekas negara Republik Demokratik Jerman (GDR) atau yang dikenal dengan Jerman Timur. Instalasi lembaga-lembaga Barat ini dipandang sebagai cara terbaik untuk mempercepat pembangunan ekonomi dan politik di bekas Jerman Timur itu (Eichengreen, 2007: 318-321). Akan tetapi, lebarnya disparitas ekonomi antara Jerman Timur dan Jerman Barat itu membuat instalasi lembaga-lembaga tersebut menghadapi persoalan serius. Pada periode 1990-1991, GDP riil bekas negara Jerman Barat anjlok hingga 30% dan angka pengangguran melonjak hingga sepertiga dari seluruh angkatan kerja (Eichengreen, 2007: 319). Angka pengangguran yang terus naik itu ditambah lagi dengan tingginya pertumbuhan penduduk usia nonproduktif yang menjadikan beban belanja sosial pemerintah semakin melonjak. Beban-beban ini membuat struktur ekonomi Jerman hampir lumpuh.

Selain itu, struktur industrial Jerman yang gigantik juga mengalami goncangan seiring dengan massifnya perubahan sistem produksi global yang semakin fleksibel dan terdesentralisasi. Pada tahun 1980-an, lebih dari 3,6 juta orang Jerman bekerja di perusahaan-perusahaan dengan lebih dari 1000 pekerja. Sekitar 0,8 juta orang bekerja di perusahaan menengah, dengan 500-999 pekerja, dan 1,8 juta orang bekerja di perusahaan dengan

100-499 pekerja. Karakteristik struktur industri Jerman yang rigid, dengan sentralisasi pekerja dan hierarkisme sistem produksi itu dipengaruhi oleh gelombang liberalisasi finansial dan perubahan sistem produksi global yang lebih fleksibel. Implikasinya, antara tahun 1989 sampai tahun 1996, hampir sepertiga lapangan pekerjaan di perusahaan-perusahaan dengan lebih dari 1000 pekerja itu hilang. Padahal pertumbuhan perusahaan sektor industri kecil dan menengahnya masih relatif konstan (Klobes, 2005: 70-73).

Terkait dengan konteks geoekonomi pada tahun 1990-an, globalisasi ekonomi memaksa negara-negara melakukan restrukturisasi ekonomi politik dan meningkatkan daya saing industrinya. Hal ini berbarengan dengan semakin terbukanya pasar dan basis produksi baru di kawasan negara-negara berkembang yang sedang melakukan industrialisasi, terutama di belahan Asia Timur dan Asia Tenggara. Negara-negara maju berlomba-lomba untuk membangun jejaring pasar dan produksi di kawasan ekonomi baru ini. Dinamika kompetisi ini paling tidak bisa disaksikan dari lonjakan investasi asing langsung (*Foreign Direct Investment, FDI*) di kawasan negara-negara berkembang ini, sekaligus di tingkat kompetisi antarkawasan di Asia. Sebagai ilustrasi, misalnya, pada tahun 1989-1994, rerata investasi asing di negara-negara Asia Tenggara mencapai 13.973 juta dollar, dan melonjak menjadi 25.285 juta dollar pada 1995 dan 30.846 juta dollar pada 1996. Sementara di China yang pada tahun 1989-1994, nilai investasi asingnya sebesar 13.951 juta dollar, kemudian naik menjadi 35.849 juta dollar pada tahun 1995 dan 40.180 juta dollar pada tahun 1996 (Felker, 2003: 258).

Tulisan ini secara sistematis akan menyajikan dua klaster pembahasan. *Pertama*, tentang dinamika transformasi ekonomi politik Jerman dan implikasinya bagi perubahan struktur industrinya. Pemeriksaan ini menjadi sangat penting bersamaan dengan massifnya proses regionalisme di negara-negara Eropa dan globalisasi sistem produksi dunia. Bagaimana struktur ekonomi politik Jerman, yang dikenal dengan *Modell Deutschland*, mengalami transformasi dan bagaimana dinamika struktur industrial baru itu berkembang. *Kedua*, tentang kebangkitan geoekonomi baru pada awal tahun 1990-an di kawasan negara-negara Asia. Secara khusus, bagian ini akan diberikan penekanan dan dinamika jejaring ekonomi Jerman dalam proses-proses regionalisasi di kawasan geoekonomi Asia ini.

Transformasi Ekonomi Politik Jerman: Dua Cara Pandang

Struktur ekonomi politik Jerman, yang menjadi rangka dasar bagi *Modell Deutschland*, digambarkan dengan baik oleh Peter J. Katzenstein (1987), seorang profesor perbandingan politik dari Universitas Cornell, dalam karyanya yang berpengaruh, *Policy and Politics in West Germany: Growth of the Semisovereign State*. Menurutnya, proses-proses kebijakan di Jerman selalu terkait dengan “*incremental outcomes*”, yang ditentukan oleh pencapaian konsensus antara struktur negara yang terdesentralisasi dan “semiberdaulat”

berhadapan dengan organisasi-organisasi massa yang kuat dan terkoordinasi secara sentralistik (Katzenstein, 1987: 1-3).

Kompleksitas hubungan negara, masyarakat, dan pasar dalam struktur ekonomi politik Jerman, menurut Katzenstein, ditentukan oleh tiga lembaga kunci, yang disebutnya sebagai "simpul jaringan". *Pertama*, adalah simpul jaringan partai politik. Sejak negara Federal Jerman didirikan pada tahun 1949, sistem kepartaiannya didominasi oleh dua kekuatan besar, yakni *Christlich Demokratische Union* (CDU) dan *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD). Kedua partai ini lebih menyerupai organisasi massa daripada partai yang bebas kelas yang jelas. Mereka memiliki keanggotaan luas yang menjembatani pemisahan tradisional, terutama antara agama dan kelas, dan berpretensi untuk menjadi "partai semua orang" (*Volksparteien*). Oleh karena itu, partai-partai politik ini mesti melakukan rekonsiliasi terhadap lingkup dan isu yang begitu luas, dan kemampuan untuk membangun konsensus di dalam masing-masing partai itu. Kemudian hal itu menjadi fondasi bagi terbangunnya koalisi politik dalam struktur pemerintahan Jerman.

Kedua, simpul jaringan federalisme. Sistem federalisme di Jerman didisain sebagai medium di mana konsensus-konsensus politik dan fungsi-fungsi kerjasama dapat dibangun, baik dalam masyarakat di satu negara bagian (*länder*), antar*länder* maupun dengan pemerintah federal. Masing-masing *länder* ini memiliki kedudukan penting dalam *Bundersrat*, semacam lembaga parlemen, yang memiliki hak untuk memveto pelbagai rancangan undang-undang. *Ketiga*, simpul jaringan lembaga-lembaga parapublik. Lembaga ini lebih bersifat teknokratik, yang legitimasinya tidak ditentukan oleh kekuatan politik melainkan oleh klaim-klaim administratif dan teknis. Untuk menjalankan fungsinya lembaga-lembaga ini memang harus bersifat independen terhadap kepentingan-kepentingan politik. Lembaga parapublik yang paling penting, tentu saja, adalah *Bundesbank*, yang bertanggungjawab untuk menjaga kestabilan moneter di Jerman (Katzenstein, 1987: 58-80).

Model yang dibayangkan oleh Katzenstein itu, yang dikenal dengan Model *Governance Semi-berdaulat* (*Semi-sovereignty Governance Model*), sangat dominan dalam analisis-analisis ekonomi politik Jerman (Green dan Patterson, 2005). Model ini mengandaikan bahwa segala perubahan kebijakan dalam politik Jerman pada dasarnya hanyalah merupakan hasil negosiasi beragamnya kekuatan sosial yang berjalan secara mekanistik melalui, apa yang disebutnya sebagai, tiga "simpul jaringan" itu. Oleh karenanya, menurut Katzenstein, perubahan-perubahan kebijakan dalam struktur politik Jerman akan selalu berjalan secara, dan merupakan proses-proses yang, inkremental (Katzenstein, 1987).

Pandangan Katzenstein ini kendati mendapat apresiasi yang luas di kalangan ilmuwan perbandingan politik, juga beroleh kritik yang tajam. Pengandaian bahwa proses-proses semata-mata berjalan secara inkremental dinilai terlalu simplistik. Kritik-kritik terhadap pandangan Katzenstein

ini secara umum dapat diikhtisarkan sebagai berikut: membangun sebuah konsensus yang terpenting bukan hanya soal disain medium rasional yang memungkinkan terjadinya negosiasi, tetapi sebuah konsensus itu juga hanya mungkin dicapai ketika ada nilai-nilai yang dapat diyakini bersama. Sayangnya, Katzenstein sama sekali tidak memberi perhatian pada dimensi ini.

Kenneth Dyson (2002; 2004) berikhtiar untuk mengatasi kelemahan Model *Governance* semiberdaulat yang dibangun Katzenstein ini. Menurut Dyson, terdapat dua kelemahan mendasar yang terkandung dalam pendekatan Katzenstein. *Pertama*, pendekatan Katzenstein telah mengabaikan pentingnya peran kontestasi gagasan dalam proses-proses perubahan kebijakan. *Kedua*, asumsi bahwa perubahan kebijakan hanya berjalan secara inkremental juga sangat bias dan akan mereduksi pentingnya dimensi tujuan atau arah suatu kebijakan. "Bias inkremental ini," tulis Dyson, "hanya memberitahu kita amat sedikit tentang perubahan kebijakan, terutama ihwal trajektorinya" (Dyson, 2005: 117).

Kebijakan-kebijakan ekonomi politik Jerman diasumsikan Dyson sebagai resultan dari persaingan ideologis-koalisional tentang nilai-nilai kebijakan ekonomi, mekanisme-mekanisme, dan arah proyek-proyek kebijakan, daripada sebagai sebuah konsensus yang sistematis. "Masing-masing koalisi yang berbeda itu disatukan oleh nilai-nilai yang diyakini bersama tentang sebuah kebijakan. Jadi yang dipersoalkan kemudian bukan hanya apa yang seharusnya dilakukan, tetapi juga bagaimana pengelolaan kebijakan ekonomi itu harus dijalankan" (Dyson, 2005: 118). Pendekatan Kenneth Dyson ini disebut sebagai "pendekatan koalisional".

Dinamika ekonomi politik Jerman, tulis Dyson, merupakan resultan dari pertarungan tiga koalisi besar yang memiliki akar sejarah dan sosiologis yang panjang dalam struktur sosial dan politik Jerman. Tiga koalisi itu adalah:

1. Kelompok Ordo-liberal, yang menekankan pentingnya peran negara untuk membangun kerangka bagi stabilitas ekonomi dan menjamin terciptanya pasar kompetitif;
2. Kelompok Kapitalisme terkelola (*managed capitalism*), yang menekankan pentingnya peran negara untuk melindungi dan mempromosikan kesejahteraan sosial;
3. Kelompok Neo-Keynesian, yang menekankan pada pentingnya peran negara dalam hal pengelolaan permintaan (*demand management*) untuk mengoptimalkan pertumbuhan ekonomi dan penciptaan lapangan kerja dengan menggunakan instrumen-instrumen fiskal berupa pajak dan pengelolaan belanja publik.

Melemahnya performa ekonomi Jerman sejak pertengahan tahun 1980-an dan perubahan-perubahan politik global pada awal dekade 1990-an menjadikan pertarungan tiga koalisi itu semakin nyata. Perdebatan-perdebatan tentang kebijakan ekonomi politik pada masa itu bahkan sampai pada ihwal redefinisi fungsi dan struktur negara Jerman yang paling kompatibel (Dyson, 2005: 118-120). Setidaknya terdapat tiga momentum besar sewaktu tiga koalisi itu bertarung untuk mengubah sruktur ekonomi politik Jerman. *Pertama*, proses reunifikasi Jerman Barat dan Jerman Timur dengan pelbagai implikasi ekonomi dan sosialnya. *Kedua*, tekanan-tekanan eksternal dalam proses regionalisasi Eropa yang mau tidak mau harus dilakukan penyesuaian terhadap struktur ekonomi politik. *Terakhir*, desakan globalisasi dan liberalisasi ekonomi memaksa Jerman harus melakukan reformasi industrial.

Reunifikasi Jerman

Runtuhnya tembok Berlin, yang memisahkan Republik Demokratik Jerman (GDR) dan Republik Federal Jerman (FRG), menandai hancurnya dinding ideologis yang memisahkan dua negara Jerman semasa Perang Dingin. Pada bulan Mei tahun 1990, Helmut Kohl, Kanselir Jerman pada masa itu, segera menyepakati perjanjian rencana unifikasi moneter dan ekonomi, serta mentransfer *deutschmark* – mata uang Jerman Barat – ke Jerman Timur yang berlaku mulai 1 Juli 1990. Rencana ini memperoleh sambutan hangat dari masyarakat Jerman Timur. Dalam suatu demonstrasi pelbagai spanduk bertuliskan: “*Kommt die D-Mark, bleiben wir. Kommt sie nicht, gehen wir zu ihr*” (Kalau D-Mark datang, kami tinggal di sini. Kalau tidak, kami akan menyongsongnya). Kemudian, pelbagai sistem keuangan Jerman Barat beserta kerangka legalnya juga segera dibangun di Jerman Timur. Proses-proses implementasi perjanjian unifikasi moneter dan ekonomi yang sangat rumit itu dianggap selesai pada akhir bulan Agustus dengan penandatanganan perjanjian di Moskow yang mulai berlaku pada 3 Oktober 1990. Sejak itulah negara Jerman Timur secara permanen terhapus dalam peta Eropa.

Pada saat proses reunifikasi itu, tidak ada gagasan lain untuk mempercepat pembangunan di Jerman Timur selain dengan mentransfer dan memindahkan langsung lembaga-lembaga ekonomi dan politik Jerman Barat (Eichengreen, 2007: 318-321). Dengan cara demikian, pengelolaan transisi ekonomi politik di bekas wilayah Jerman Timur harus menghadapi banyak resiko dan meningkatkan beban yang demikian besar. Data-data statistik menunjukkan lonjakan biaya belanja sosial 30, 03% dari total GDP pada periode 1970-1980 menjadi 39, 80 pada 1991-2001 (Streeck and Trampusch, 2005: 177). Padahal pada saat yang bersamaan, GDP Jerman terus mengalami penurunan, dari 2,8% pada tahun 1970-1980 menjadi 2,3% pada tahun 1981-1991. Setelah sepuluh tahun proses unifikasi, GDP Jerman turun drastis sampai 1,3% (Green dan Paterson, 2005: 9).

Tabel 1.
 Performa Ekonomi Jerman, 1970-2001.

Periode	Belanja Sosial* (% GDP)	Pertumbuhan GDP** (%)	Pertumbuhan Ekonomi** (%)
1970-1980	30,03	2,8	0,8
1981-1991	34,85	2,3	0,2
1991-2001	39,80	1,3	-0,1

Sumber: * diolah dari Streeck and Trampusch, 2005, hal. 177.

** diolah dari Green dan Paterson, 2005, hal. 9.

Penambahan lima negara bagian atau *länder* baru selepas unifikasi tidak hanya memperpuruk kapasitas perekonomian Jerman, tetapi juga mengubah pola relasi dan orientasi politik antar*länder*. Model penciptaan konsensus sistemik antar*länder* dan fungsi kooperatif federalisme yang dibayangkan oleh Katzensten sudah hampir tidak bisa dipraktikkan lagi. Ketimpangan ekonomi yang mencolok antar*länder* juga menjadi tantangan baru bagi *Modell Deutschland*. Pada tahun 1997, GDP tertinggi di *länder* bekas Jerman Timur itu hanya sebesar 75% dari GDP terendah di *länder* Jerman Barat. Angka pengangguran di *länder-länder* baru pada awal 2000 mencapai 17%, dua kali lebih besar dari angka pengangguran di Jerman Barat yang hanya di bawah 8% (Dyson, 2005: 124).

Untuk mempercepat pembangunan ekonomi di *länder* baru itu, pemerintah federal Jerman sampai tahun 2002 telah mengeluarkan dana kurang lebih € 800 milyar. Sebagian besar program itu dibiayai oleh hutang luar negeri yang terus melonjak jumlahnya – dari € 600 milyar pada tahun 1991 menjadi € 1. 224 trilyun awal 2001. Besarnya beban belanja pemerintah itu menjadikan Jerman pada tahun 2002 dan 2003 mengalami defisit anggaran paling buruk di seluruh negara anggota Uni Eropa, yakni masing-masing - 3,5% dan -3,9% (Green dan Paterson, 2005: 11).

Kebuntuan ekonomi politik domestik ini menjadi medan pertarungan bagi tiga koalisi ideologis itu untuk mentransformasikan *Modell Deutschland*. Kelompok ordo-liberal mengusulkan agar segera mereformasi sistem negara kesejahteraan, perburuhan, dan kebijakan fiskal yang kondusif untuk memacu pertumbuhan ekonomi melalui peningkatan daya saing perusahaan-perusahaan besar Jerman. Sebaliknya, kelompok kapitalisme terkelola tetap mengedepankan prinsip kebijakan kesejahteraan dan mengoptimalkan lembaga-lembaga kemitraan sosial (*social partnership*). Dengan kuatnya lembaga-lembaga korporatisme sosial dan hubungan industrial di Jerman, isu-isu kesejahteraan tetap menjadi perkara yang sensitif dalam sejarah panjang masyarakat Jerman. Akan tetapi, kapasitas ekonomi yang semakin lemah dan beban belanja sosial yang membengkak sejak pertengahan 1990-an hampir mustahil untuk bisa mengedepankan jaminan-jaminan negara kesejahteraan lagi.

Kritik-kritik yang dilancarkan oleh kelompok ordo-liberal atas kemandekan *Modell Deutschland* itu kemudian menjadi orientasi baru bagi kebijakan ekonomi politik Jerman, terutama untuk mendorong liberalisasi dan reformasi sistem perburuhannya. Kelompok ordo-liberal ini sebenarnya telah berakar di Jerman sejak tahun 1930an—yang terdiri dari para ekonom, ahli hukum, dan politisi—yang dikenal sebagai *mazhab Freiburg*. Secara ideologis mereka percaya bahwa ekonomi adalah prinsip utama dalam tatanan sosial. Negara harus melakukan liberalisasi ekonomi dan memberikan jaminan legal dan infrastruktur bagi berlakunya pasar terbuka (Walters dan J.H. Haar, 2005: 49-50). Pada tahun 1996, pemerintahan Kohl telah mengadopsi gagasan-gagasan ini dalam rencana kebijakan-kebijakan ekonominya; namun ia mendapat ganjalan karena mendapat kritik keras dari mayoritas SPD dalam *Bundesrat*. Pada ranah yang lain, program-program negara kesejahteraan juga tetap mengalami kemandekan, bahkan Menteri Keuangan Federal yang berpaham Keynesian, Oskar Lafontaine, mengundurkan diri pada tahun 1999 karena tekanan dari kelompok-kelompok ordo-liberal.

Pertarungan tiga koalisi ideologis itu juga masih berlanjut tatkala pemerintahan Schröder membentuk komisi ahli untuk mereformasi sistem kesejahteraan menyusul kemenangannya pada pemilu federal tahun 2002. Inti perdebatannya: apakah kebijakan kesejahteraan (*welfare policy*) dalam *Modell Deutschland* itu masih bisa dipertahankan atau tidak. Akan tetapi, tidak ada jalan keluar konklusif dalam perdebatan-perdebatan itu. Kebuntuan-kebuntuan politik pemerintahan Schröder pun semakin memuncak setelah dirinya gagal mengupayakan reformasi struktural antara buruh dan pasar (*labour-market reform*) melalui dialog *focal point* dengan lembaga korporatisme-kesejahteraan terbesar, *Bündnis für Arbeit* (*Alliance for Jobs*).

Kebuntuan ini kemudian berakibat pada merosotnya pertumbuhan ekonomi dan melonjaknya angka pengangguran di Jerman. Kebijakan-kebijakan ekonomi Lafontaine—dan model-model neoKeynesianisme—menjadi sasaran kritik kaum ordo-liberal. Sementara kegagalan Schröder dalam mengupayakan reformasi kesejahteraan melalui pembangunan konsensus dengan *Bündnis für Arbeit* menunjukkan bahwa cara-cara pengelolaan kekuasaan dalam *Modell Deutschland* tidak bisa bertahan lagi. Akhirnya, pada tanggal 14 Maret 2003, Schröder mengumumkan *Agenda 2010*, yang berisi paket-paket reformasi ekonomi dan kebijakan sosial yang sangat propasar. Terobosan ini, bagaimanapun, merupakan bentuk kemenangan kelompok ordo-liberal dalam struktur politik ekonomi Jerman kontemporer (Streeck, 2005: 142-164).

Eropanisasi dan Globalisasi

Selain perubahan konstelasi politik domestiknya, paling tidak ada tiga konteks perubahan eksternal yang penting diperhatikan untuk membaca transformasi ekonomi politik Jerman dan untuk menjelaskan kemenangan

koalisi ordo-liberal ini (Bdk. Vitols, 2000: 375). Yang pertama, tentu saja, adalah kian masifnya proses regionalisasi di negara-negara Eropa. Sejak awal dekade tahun 1990-an, negosiasi-negosiasi ekonomi dan politik di Eropa telah mencapai tahap baru, yakni mengarah pada formalisasi lembaga-lembaga regional untuk mengelola kebijakan ekonomi bersamanya terutama setelah dibentuknya EMU (*European Monetary Union*) pada tahun 1993.

Ada tiga pilar utama yang menjadikan EMU sebagai konstrain regional baru terhadap struktur ekonomi politik Jerman. *Pertama*, adalah dibentuknya Bank Sentral Eropa (*European Central Bank, ECB*) yang menggantikan signifikansi *Bundesbank* dalam pengelolaan kebijakan ekonomi nasionalnya. *Kedua*, mandat ECB sebagai bank sentral yang independen dan memiliki otoritas untuk mengatur stabilitas harga dan strategi kebijakan moneter di Uni Eropa menjadi ruang baru bagi penerapan gagasan-gagasan kelompok ordo-liberal. Kebijakan-kebijakan moneter ECB ini bersifat nonakomodatif, sehingga ia bisa memaksakan kebijakan fiskal dan upah yang membuat model kebijakan kesejahteraan tidak bisa bertahan lagi. *Ketiga*, adalah fungsi koordinasi ekonomi di level Uni Eropa, terutama dengan pembentukan *Broad Economic Policy Guidelines* yang bertugas mengkaji dan memberikan rekomendasi kebijakan kepada negara-negara anggota untuk menopang proses-proses regionalisasi (Dyson, 2005: 127-128).

Selain itu, kemenangan kelompok ordo-liberal juga didukung oleh gelombang liberalisasi yang semarak, baik di Eropa maupun di seluruh belahan dunia. Untuk mengakselerasi penciptaan Pasar Tunggal Eropa, mulai tanggal 1 Januari tahun 1993, agenda liberalisasi dan deregulasi dijalankan secara serempak dan meluas di semua negara anggota Uni Eropa, dari sektor industri, perbankan sampai sektor jasa. Skema liberalisasi dalam Pasar Tunggal ini telah memaksa mereka untuk mengharmonisasi lebih dari 100.000 peraturan nasionalnya (Crouzet, 2001: 235). Sementara dalam konteks multilateral, negosiasi agenda liberalisasi perdagangan yang alot dalam GATT (*General Agreement on Trade and Tariff*) di Uruguay Round juga telah berhasil membentuk WTO (*World Trade Organization*) pada tahun 1994, yang semakin mengikat semua anggotanya untuk lebih gencar melakukan liberalisasi perdagangan.

Di samping mekanisme bilateral dan multilateral itu, liberalisasi perdagangan di pelbagai kawasan dunia juga berkembang melalui skema *Regional Trading Arrangements* (RTAs), atau yang secara umum disebut sebagai regionalisasi ekonomi. Menurut data WTO, sejak 1948-1994 sudah terdapat 124 RTAs dan hanya 65 RTAs saja yang masih bertahan sampai tahun 1994; namun pada periode 1995-2003, dalam rentang waktu delapan tahun, terdapat 130 RTAs baru yang telah disepakati. Volume perdagangan dalam lingkup RTAs juga tercatat sangat besar, mencapai 43% dari total perdagangan dunia di tahun 2000 (Ravenhill, 2006: 117).

Bagaimanapun hadirnya lembaga regional yang memiliki otoritas untuk mengatur ekonomi dan moneter negara-negara anggota Uni Eropa menolak ide tentang, apa yang digagas oleh Katzenstein sebagai, lembaga-lembaga parapublik dalam struktur ekonomi politik Jerman. Sejalan dengan proses-proses regionalisasi itu model pengambilan kebijakan yang “*incremental outcomes*”, yang dicapai dengan konsensus, hampir tidak mungkin bisa ditempuh lagi. Proses-proses liberalisasi juga semakin membuka ruang tantangan baru bagi Jerman untuk lebih berkonsentrasi meningkatkan daya saingnya. Dengan demikian, dapat dikatakan bahwa kebutuhan untuk meningkatkan daya saing itu pada satu sisi didorong oleh mandeknya “*incremental innovation*” dalam *Modell Deutschland*, sedangkan pada sisi yang lain dipicu oleh globalisasi ekonomi yang membuka peluang bagi Jerman untuk lebih membangun kebijakan ekonomi industrial yang berorientasi ke luar (*outward looking oriented*).

Konteks penting lainnya yang mentransformasikan *Modell Deutschland* adalah perubahan sistem produksi global yang berlangsung beberapa dekade terakhir, yang kian mengarah pada paradigma fleksibilitas: fleksibilitas organisasi produksi, fleksibilitas tuntutan pasar, dan fleksibilitas buruh. Model industri Jerman merupakan warisan bentuk Fordisme, dengan bentuk-bentuk perusahaan gigantik, jumlah pekerja yang besar, dan serikat buruh yang kuat. Budaya industrial fordisme yang sudah berakar itu sangat sulit untuk beradaptasi dengan perubahan-perubahan global yang semakin menuntut daya saing tinggi dan desentralisme hubungan industrial. Upaya pengubahan struktur industri ini, dan berbagai implikasi turunannya, adalah tantangan paling berat bagi Jerman karena harus mengubah pula pola hubungan negara, pasar dan masyarakat dalam arti yang luas.

Restrukturisasi Industri

Kemandekan dalam struktur industri domestik dan munculnya pesaing-pesaing baru dalam pasar dunia membuat industri-industri Jerman mengalami krisis daya saing sejak tahun 1990-an. Problem utama yang dihadapi Jerman adalah bagaimana menghadapi para pesaing asing yang memiliki efisiensi produksi lebih tinggi dan semakin ekstensif menguasai pasar dunia. Rendahnya daya saing ini, menurut Sigurt Vitols (1995), terutama sekali, dapat dilacak sampai ke sentralitas *engineer* dalam struktur industri-industri Jerman, yang mengakibatkan produk-produk industri Jerman itu lebih ditentukan oleh tingkat kecanggihannya daripada pertimbangan-pertimbangan pasar (Vitols, 1995: 7-8). Dengan kata lain, krisis daya saing ini berakar dari strategi inovasi industri Jerman yang lebih bersifat *technology-driven* daripada *market-driven*.

Sebagai perbandingan, misalnya, Jepang justru menggunakan strategi yang berkebalikan dengan yang diambil Jerman. Yang dilakukan pertama kali oleh industri-industri Jepang adalah mengenali pasar, barulah kemudian diikuti dengan disain teknologinya. Dengan strategi demikian, Jepang semakin

kuat daya saingnya dalam pasar internasional. Misalnya, pada akhir tahun 1980-an, Jepang sudah berhasil menguasai pasar ekspor di negara-negara Asia sebesar 61,1%, dibandingkan dengan Jerman yang hanya mencapai 25%. Sementara produk-produk mesin Jepang juga dapat diserap oleh pasar Asia sampai angka 45%, jauh lebih besar dari produk Jerman yang hanya 12% (Weiss, 1998: 141-144).

Restrukturisasi industri pada zaman fleksibilitas produksi—atau era globalisasi sistem produksi itu—harus diarahkan bukan hanya untuk mendorong efisiensi internal, tetapi juga untuk memperluas rantai nilai tambahnya (*value-added chain*). Rantai pertambahan nilai inilah yang dianggap sebagai sumber kemakmuran baru bagi bangsa-bangsa di dunia dalam sistem ekonomi global yang semakin saling tergantung — *global interdependence* (Scott, 1985: 98-99). Dengan sistem produksi yang fleksibel, industri-industri dapat menjamin efisiensi produksinya dan dengan jejaring yang panjang mereka pun lebih sanggup untuk mendesentralisasi resiko-resiko pasar (Klobes, 2005: 71-74).

Pada akhir tahun 1980-an, strategi internasionalisasi *value-added chain* dan desentralisasi sistem produksi itu telah menjadi paradigma baru dalam restrukturisasi industri. Perusahaan-perusahaan besar tidak hanya berambisi untuk memperluas ekspor ke pelbagai kawasan di dunia, tetapi juga berebut untuk membangun afiliasi dengan perusahaan-perusahaan di luar negeri, terutama dengan strategi merger dan akuisisi lintas negara (*cross-border M&As*). Hal ini bisa ditimbang dari pergerakan investasi asing dunia dan ekspansi perusahaan-perusahaan transnasionalnya yang sangat masif. Pada tahun 1980, total FDI inflow di dunia hanya sebesar \$ 55.262 juta, kemudian melonjak hampir 24 kali menjadi \$ 1.305.852 juta pada tahun 2006. Saat ini diperkirakan terdapat 78.000 perusahaan transnasional di dunia dengan perusahaan afiliasi asing lebih dari 780.000 perusahaan. Perusahaan-perusahaan transnasional ini, pada tahun 2006, telah menyerap lebih dari 73 juta tenaga kerja, atau naik tiga kali lipat dari tahun 1990 yang hanya mencapai 25 juta (UNCTAD, 2008: 29).

Terkait dengan konteks reformasi industrial global, semenjak awal tahun 1990-an Jerman pun telah mulai masif melakukan internasionalisasi industrinya. Pada tahun 1992, angka total FDI outflow Jerman sebesar € 14.851 juta dan mencapai angka tertinggi pada tahun 1998 dan 1999, masing-masing € 79.916 juta dan € 102.018 juta (UNCTAD, 2004b: 14-15). Jerman juga mulai gencar melebarkan perusahaan-perusahaan transnasionalnya ke seluruh dunia. Di negara-negara Eropa Barat, jumlah perusahaan yang berafiliasi dengan perusahaan transnasional milik Jerman bertambah dari 13.602 pada tahun 1991 menjadi 17.341 pada awal 2000. Pada periode yang sama, di kawasan Amerika Latin dan Karibia pertambahan perusahaan afiliasinya tidak cukup mengesankan: dari 1.060 menjadi 1.708 perusahaan. Sisi lain, pertambahan perusahaan-perusahaan yang berafiliasi dengan perusahaan

transnasional Jerman di kawasan Asia dan Eropa Timur mengalami lonjakan sangat tajam, masing-masing dari 1.002 menjadi 2596 dan dari 358 menjadi 4.383 (UNCTAD, 2004b: 24-26).

Sebaran geografis perusahaan-perusahaan transnasional Jerman juga berkembang sangat mencolok dalam satu dasawarsa terakhir. Di antara perusahaan-perusahaan transnasional dunia yang memiliki sebaran geografis paling tinggi, empat perusahaan transnasional Jerman masuk dalam ranking sepuluh besar.

Tabel 2.
TNCs dengan persebaran geografis paling tinggi

Ranking	Perusahaan	Home Country	Host Countries
1	Deutsche Post AG	Jerman	103
2	Royal Ducth/Shell Group	Inggris-Belanda	96
3	Nestlé SA Switzerland	Swiss	85
4	Siemens AG	Jerman	85
5	BASF AG	Jerman	84
6	Bayer AG	Jerman	76
7	Procter & Gamble	Amerika Serikat	72
8	IBM	Amerika Serikat	66
9	Phillips Electronics	Belanda	62
10	Total	Prancis	62

Sumber: diolah dari UNC-TAD, 2007. Hal. 236.

Problem kedua yang mengakibatkan krisis daya saing adalah bahwa Jerman tidak bisa terus mempertahankan industri-industri manufaktur tradisionalnya sebagai motor pertumbuhan ekonomi, melainkan ia juga harus memerhatikan sektor-sektor ekonomi yang baru (Burton dan Hansen, 1993: 47). Jerman memang dikenal unggul dalam inovasi di sektor industri tradisional, tetapi sangat terlambat untuk memasuki sektor-sektor baru yang memiliki pasar luas, seperti mikro-elektroelektronik, teknologi informasi, dan semikonduktor (Weiss, 1998). Akibatnya, ekspansi pasar yang dilakukan Jerman berjalan relatif sangat lambat.

Jerman juga mengalami keterlambatan untuk menggarap sektor-sektor industri jasa. Kendati tren tersierisasi ekonomi, peralihan dari sektor industri ke sektor jasa, di negara-negara maju sudah terjadi sejak lama, Jerman tetap saja merupakan negeri yang terlambat dalam pertumbuhan sektor jasanya. Persoalan yang paling utama, sebagaimana dikatakan Vitols, adalah kesulitan untuk mentransformasikan struktur industrial Jerman yang gigantik menjadi lebih fleksibel dan adaptif. Di Amerika Serikat tersierisasi ini sudah gencar dimulai sejak pertengahan tahun 1950-an. Sementara di Jerman proses ini baru

berjalan dengan tersendat-sendat pada akhir tahun 1970-an. Itu pun masih terbatas dalam bidang jasa-jasa industrial seperti software, R&D, konstruksi, disain, perencanaan, dan konsultan (Klobes, 2005: 70).

Padahal, sejak setengah abad terakhir ini pergeseran tren investasi dunia terhadap sektor jasa sudah sangat mencolok. Pada tahun 2005, nilai FDI untuk sektor jasa telah mencapai 61% dari total FDI dunia, dibandingkan dengan tahun 1990 yang hanya menyerap 49% (UNCTAD, 2008: 30). Internasionalisasi sektor-sektor tersier ini juga berkembang dengan pesat. Data-data *Cross-border M&As* menunjukkan perkembangan internasionalisasi sektor ini dengan sangat mencolok, dari 37% pada tahun 1987-1990 menjadi 58% pada tahun 2002-2006. Sebaliknya, dalam periode yang sama *Cross-border M&As* di sektor manufaktur justru mengalami penurunan – dari 52% menjadi 31% (UNCTAD, 2007: 23).

Tabel 3.

FDI dari dan ke Jerman di Sektor Tersier, 1991-2000 (Juta Euro)

FDI Sektor Tersier	1991	1994	1998	2000
FDI Inflow	3.873	7.372	25.339	224.296
Total FDI Inflow	4.011	5.920	22.127	215.209
FDI Outflow	7.641	8.406	29.764	41.036
Total FDI Outflow	20.038	15.648	79.916	61.387

Sumber: Diolah dari Deutsche Bundesbank, Balance of Payment Statistics Division; UNCTAD, 2004b.

Meskipun relatif terlambat, proses tersierisasi sistem industrial di Jerman berkembang intensif sejak tahun 1990-an. Peningkatan ini bisa dilihat dari semakin tingginya *FDI inflow* dalam sektor ini. Dalam satu dasawarsa, 1991-2000, investasi asing di Jerman dalam sektor tersier naik dari € 3.873 juta menjadi € 224.296 juta, atau mengalami lonjakan sebesar 58 kali lipat. Pada kurun waktu yang sama, volume investasi asing Jerman untuk sektor jasa ini juga naik tajam, dari € 7.641 juta menjadi € 41.036 juta. Dibandingkan dengan sektor yang lainnya, investasi asing Jerman di sektor tersier mengalami lonjakan, dari sekitar 38% total *FDI outflow*-nya pada tahun 1991 menjadi 67% pada tahun 2000 (UNTAD, 2004b).

Regionalisasi Asia dan Pertarungan Ekonomi Dunia

Proses-proses transnasionalisasi industri dan investasi Jerman, juga di negara-negara maju secara umum, berlangsung berbarengan dengan bangkitnya situs-situs baru ekonomi kawasan, terutama di negara-negara Asia. Selain Uni Eropa, ASEAN merupakan organisasi kawasan paling asertif dan gencar

melakukan regionalisasi ekonomi sejak awal tahun 1990-an. Berkembangnya regionalisasi baru ini terkait dengan dua perkembangan ekonomi politik Asia Tenggara kontemporer (Breslin dan Higgot, 2003). Satu sisi, regionalisasi merupakan konsekuensi langsung dari proses industrialisasi di negara-negara ASEAN yang semakin meningkatkan interdependensi. Sementara pada sisi yang lain, regionalisasi di Asia juga menjadi arena persaingan ekonomi politik baru bagi negara-negara maju pasca Perang Dingin.

Sebagaimana dikatakan Breslin dan Higgot (2003), regionalisasi ekonomi di kawasan Asia Tenggara tidak dapat dipisahkan dari basis material perkembangan industrialisasi di negara-negara ASEAN. Transformasi industrial di negara-negara ASEAN pada pertengahan dekade tahun 1980an, yang mengarah pada model industrialisasi berorientasi ekspor, berimplikasi pada peningkatan tajam sektor industri manufaktur. Pertumbuhan sektor ini di Indonesia misalnya mengalami lonjakan dari 10,3% pada tahun 1970 menjadi 24,1% pada tahun 1995. Pada periode yang sama, Malaysia juga mengalami kenaikan dari 12,4% menjadi 26,4%. Sementara sektor industri manufaktur di Thailand melonjak dari 15,9% menjadi 28,2% (Jomo, 2003: 29). Perkembangan sektor-sektor industri ini berhasil meningkatkan nilai ekspor pada sektor manufaktur negara-negara ASEAN—dari 31,1% total volume perdagangan ASEAN pada tahun 1980 menjadi 75,2% di tahun 1993 (Ravenhill, 1995: 856).

Reformasi industrial di negara-negara Asia segera mengundang negara-negara maju untuk merebut pengaruh di kawasan ini. Sejak pertengahan tahun 1980an, Jepang tampil sebagai negara paling besar nilai investasinya di negara-negara ASEAN. Pada periode tahun 1985-1989, persebaran *FDI*-nya di kawasan Asia rata-rata tumbuh sebesar 52%, dan negara-negara Asia Tenggara merupakan resipien terbesar. Di Thailand, investasi Jepang meningkat 162% pada tahun 1985-1989 dan pada periode yang sama investasinya di Malaysia melonjak 70%. Pada tahun 1986-1989, nilai investasi Jepang di Filipina naik menjadi 108%, dan pada tahun 1989-1992, *FDI* Jepang di Indonesia berkembang 42% (Munakata, 2006: 38). Dua kekuatan ekonomi lain yang juga berpengaruh di Asia adalah Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa-5 (Jerman, Perancis, Inggris, Belanda, dan Italia). Pada 1990-1994, rerata *FDI* Amerika Serikat di Asia mencapai 4,6% dan naik menjadi 9,3% pada tahun 1995-1999. Pada kurun yang sama rerata *FDI* Uni Eropa-5 di kawasan Asia melonjak cukup tinggi, yakni dari 2,7% menjadi 16,3% (UNCTAD, 2004).

Dua perkembangan ini—industrialisasi negara-negara ASEAN dan keterlibatan negara-negara maju—menjadi karakter terpenting dalam bangun arsitektural regionalisasi di Asia yang lebih berorientasi pasar (Aggarwal dan Koo, 2008). Selain itu, dinamika ekonomi regional di Asia secara umum juga patut mendapat perhatian. Kebangkitan ekonomi China sejak dua dekade ini secara umum dipandang oleh negara-negara ASEAN sebagai ancaman. Pada pertengahan dekade tahun 1990an, rerata investasi asing di China dan

negara-negara ASEAN relatif setara, namun dalam tahun-tahun berikutnya ASEAN semakin tertinggal jauh. Hingga pada tahun 2004 jumlah FDI yang mengalir ke China sudah hampir dua kali lipat dari negara-negara ASEAN, masing-masing 60.630 juta dolar dan 35.245 juta dolar (UNCTAD, 2007: 251-255).

Proses-proses regionalisme ekonomi di Asia dimulai oleh ASEAN sebagai motor integrasi ekonomi paling aktif. Inisiasi regionalisme ekonomi itu dilakukan dalam kerangka ASEAN secara evolutif, mulai dari pemberlakuan AFTA (*ASEAN Free Trade Area*), sebuah skema untuk menurunkan dan menghapus tarif perdagangan antarnegara ASEAN, pada awal tahun 1993 hingga kesepakatan membangun *ASEAN Economic Community* pada tahun 2003 yang bertujuan untuk menjadikan ASEAN sebagai kawasan pasar tunggal dan basis produksi dan untuk mengintegrasikan ASEAN sepenuhnya ke dalam ekonomi global (Chia, 2007).

Selain melalui kerangka ASEAN, regionalisasi ekonomi di Asia juga dilakukan melalui kerangka-kerangka regionalisme yang lebih terbuka (Aggarwal dan Koo, 2008). Sejak tahun 1989, negara-negara ASEAN tergabung dalam APEC (*Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation*) yang menjadi arena utama bagi Amerika Serikat untuk meningkatkan peran ekonomi politik pascaPerang Dingin di negara-negara Asia Tenggara. Sementara itu, kerjasama ekonomi negara-negara ASEAN dengan Uni Eropa baru dimulai secara formal sejak dibentuknya ASEM (*Asia-Europe Meeting*) pada tahun 1995. Akan tetapi, dua format regionalisasi ini kemudian menghadapi banyak hambatan karena krisis ekonomi Asia pada tahun 1997.

Krisis ekonomi tahun 1997 yang menghancurkan hampir seluruh negara-negara Asia semakin menunjukkan kuatnya interdependensi antarkawasan ekonomi di Asia. Momentum krisis itu juga membuka dialog antara negara-negara ASEAN dan Asia Timur Laut—yakni Jepang, Korea Selatan, dan China—untuk membentuk blok ekonomi Asia Timur, melalui kerangka ASEAN+3 (Chia, 2007; Soesastro, 2006). Sebenarnya gagasan untuk membangun blok Asia Timur ini pernah diusulkan Mahathir Mohammad, Perdana Menteri Malaysia, pada awal tahun 1990 melalui Kaukus Ekonomi Asia Timur (EAEC), namun karena tidak didukung oleh Amerika Serikat dan Jepang, gagasan ini kemudian tidak pernah terwujud (Wunderlich, 2007: 128).

Setelah krisis ekonomi itu, ASEAN+3 menjadi mesin regionalisasi Asia yang melampaui kerangka dalam AFTA, dan membuat regionalisasi Asia semakin dinamis. Pada bulan November tahun 2000, Perdana Menteri China Zhu Rongji mengajukan keinginannya untuk membentuk *Free Trade Area* (FTA) antara China dan ASEAN. Pada tahun 2002 "*Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation*" yang menjadi basis bagi *China-ASEAN Free Trade Area* (CAFTA) ditandatangani. Langkah progresif China ini dipandang oleh Jepang sebagai tantangan untuk mengukuhkan supremasi

kekuasaan ekonominya di Asia Tenggara. Jepang segera merespon dengan mengajukan “*Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Accord*” dengan ASEAN dan mendirikan Ba’ao Forum di Pulau Hainan, semacam *World Economic Forum* di Davos yang mempertemukan secara informal para pemimpin Asia Timur pada awal 2001 (Zha, 2004: 245-250).

Regionalisasi Asia pascakrisis, sebagaimana juga sebelumnya, menjadi arena persaingan kekuatan-kekuatan ekonomi, baik yang berada di dalam satu kawasan, yakni Jepang dan China, maupun kekuatan ekonomi dunia lainnya (Jayasuriya, 2004). Dengan adanya blok Asia Timur ini, tentu saja, Amerika Serikat merasa kepentingannya di Asia semakin terancam, terutama oleh Jepang dan China. Sementara untuk menghindari persaingan Jepang dan China di Asia, negara-negara ASEAN berupaya untuk melibatkan negara-negara Uni Eropa yang memiliki kapasitas ekonomi kuat sebagai pengimbang kekuatan melalui forum ASEM.

Melalui konteks persaingan ini, redefinisi kepentingan negara-negara maju, termasuk Jerman, dan bagaimana mengamankan kepentingannya itu menjadi tantangan paling penting bagi masa depan hubungan ekonomi di Asia. Secara khusus, Bersick dan Pasch (2007) dalam *Southeast Asia: The Future of German Relations*, mengatakan bahwa ada dua kunci penting dalam mengarahkan kebijakan ekonomi luar negeri Jerman—yang saya kira juga berlaku untuk negara-negara maju lainnya—di Asia (Bersick dan Pasch, 2007: 2). Pertama, meningkatkan kapasitas untuk membangun jejaring ekonomi dalam proses regionalisasi di Asia. Kedua, meningkatkan keterlibatannya, juga Uni Eropa secara umum, dalam diplomasi-diplomasi yang menentukan hubungan-hubungan ekonomi dan politik di Asia.

Konsolidasi vs Polarisasi:

Membaca Jejaring Ekonomi Jerman di Asia

Membangun kekuatan jejaring ekonomi di Asia Tenggara, terutama dalam bingkai regionalisasi Asia, merupakan fondasi paling penting bagi Jerman untuk membangun pengaruh ekonomi politik di Asia Tenggara (Bersick dan Pasch, 2007: 2). Kawasan ekonomi yang solid dengan jumlah penduduk lebih dari 553 juta merupakan pasar sekaligus basis produksi yang potensial yang layak menjadi pertimbangan bagi masa depan kepentingan ekonomi negara-negara maju, termasuk Jerman. Melalui konteks ini, pertanyaannya adalah bagaimana sesungguhnya kekuatan jejaring ekonomi Jerman yang riil di Asia dan bagaimana dinamikanya?

Meskipun tidak sekuat Jepang dalam melakukan relokasi industri dan investasinya di tahun 1980an, Jerman sejak awal tahun 1990an sudah mulai menjadikan negara-negara Asia—terutama Asia Timur, Asia Tenggara dan Asia Selatan—sebagai tujuan investasi dan perluasan industrinya. FDI Jerman yang mengalir ke negara-negara Asia ini pada awal tahun 1991 mencapai € 381 juta, dan secara konsisten naik menjadi € 2.876 juta pada tahun 1998 dan

€ 5.068 juta pada tahun 2000 (UNCTAD, 2004). Perkembangan ini cukup mengesankan kalau dibandingkan dengan total investasi asing yang mengalir ke negara-negara itu yang mencapai \$ 11.911 juta pada tahun 1990 dan \$ 80.772 juta pada tahun 2000 (UNCTAD, 2008).

Internasionalisasi industri Jerman di Asia, yang diukur dari perkembangan industri-industri Asia yang berafiliasi dengan perusahaan transnasional Jerman, juga melonjak tajam. Data UNCTAD menunjukkan perkembangan perusahaan-perusahaan yang berafiliasi dengan Jerman, dari 1279 perusahaan pada tahun 1991 berturut-turut menjadi 2591 dan 3097 perusahaan pada tahun 1998 dan tahun 2000 (UNCTAD, 2004). Dari jumlah itu, sebagian besar perusahaan-perusahaan yang berafiliasi dengan perusahaan transnasional Jerman tersebar di negara-negara Asia Timur, Asia Tenggara dan Asia Selatan. Pada tahun 1991, 78,3% perusahaan-perusahaan di seluruh Asia yang berafiliasi dengan Jerman berada di tiga subkawasan industri itu. Sementara pada tahun 2000, perbandingan itu naik menjadi 84%, atau dari 3097 perusahaan di Asia yang berafiliasi dengan Jerman 2596-nya berada di negara-negara tiga subkawasan itu.

Tabel 4.

Industri-Industri di Asia yang berafiliasi dengan TNCs Jerman, 1991-2000

	1991	1994	1998	2000
Total	20.892	21.745	29.041	34.357
Seluruh Asia	1.279	1.428	2.591	3.097
Di Asia Timur, Tenggara dan Selatan	1.002	1.195	2.211	2.596
China	80	86	137	189
Korea	98	116	234	257
India	47	54	91	103
Indonesia	99	130	181	208
Malaysia	32	29	77	85
Filipina	208	86	363	436
Singapura	83	96	143	135
Thailand				

Sumber: diolah dari UNCTAD, 2004; UNTAD, 2004b.

Oleh karena ketatnya persaingan kawasan-kawasan di dunia yang juga berkepentingan untuk merebut FDI dan sebaran industrinya, maka jejaring ekonomi Jerman di Asia pun penting dibaca dalam konteks perbandingan dengan kawasan-kawasan yang lainnya. Dengan cara demikian kita bisa memperoleh gambaran yang lebih jelas tentang dinamika jejaring ekonomi Jerman. Data mengenai dinamika investasi Jerman di luar negeri dan perluasan afiliasi industrinya di pelbagai kawasan dunia sangat membantu untuk menimbang kekuatan riil jejaring ekonomi Jerman di kawasan-kawasan itu.

Kekuatan ekonomi Jerman di Asia, sebagaimana digambarkan di atas, ternyata masih relatif kecil dibandingkn dengan kawasan ekonomi yang lain. Sebagaimana kecenderungan negara-negara maju lainnya, investasi Jerman pun masih terkonsentrasi di negara-negara maju. Pada tahun 1991, total investasi Jerman di negara maju mencapai € 18.166 juta dari total *FDI outflow* € 20.038 juta atau sekitar 90,6%. Pada tahun 2000 presentase investasi Jerman di negara maju menurun, yakni menjadi 67,7% atau hanya sebesar € 41.618 juta dari total *FDI outflow* Jerman yang mencapai € 61.387 juta (UNCTAD, 2004b).

Tabel 5.
Perbandingan sebaran FDI Jerman di dunia, 1991-2000 (juta dollar)

	1991	1994	1998	2000
Total FDI	20.038	15.648	79.916	61.387
Negara Maju	18.166	12.188	68.749	41.618
Asia	490	1.061	3.402	6.229
Amerika Latin	748	937	2.356	8.229
Eropa Timur dan Tengah	710	1.469	2.089	4.745
Republik Ceko	413	302	746	1.188
Hongaria	213	580	1.635	1.162
Polandia	35	175	1.902	839
Slovenia	39	163	1.042

Sumber: Diolah dari UNCTAD, 2004b.

Sebaran industri-industri yang berafiliasi dengan perusahaan transnasional Jerman juga kurang lebih menampilkan gambaran yang serupa dengan pola sebaran investasinya. Sebagian besar perusahaan-perusahaan itu masih berbasis di negara-negara Eropa Barat. Dari 20.895 perusahaan yang berafiliasi dengan perusahaan transnasional Jerman pada tahun 1991, sebanyak 13.602—atau sekitar 65 persen—berada di negara-negara Eropa Barat. Sedangkan pada tahun 2000, dari 34.357 total perusahaan yang berafiliasi dengan Jerman, sebesar 50% atau 17.341 perusahaan itu berlokasi di negara-negara Eropa Barat. Dengan demikian, persebaran perusahaan Jerman di dunia sebenarnya tidaklah lebih dari 50 persen saja.

Tabel 6.
 Industri-industri dunia yang berafiliasi dengan TNCs Jerman, 1991-2000

	1991	1994	1998	2000
Total	20.895	21.745	29.041	34.357
Eropa Barat	13.602	13.425	15.922	17.341
Amerika Latin dan Karibia	1.060	987	1.389	1.708
Afrika	308	239	275	297
Asia	1.279	1.428	2.591	3.097
Eropa Timur dan Tengah	358	1.357	3.547	4.383
Hongaria	199	459	812	908
Polandia	69	308	1.088	1.366
Slovenia	-	69	197	257

Sumber: diolah dari UNCTAD, 2004b.

Dari jumlah investasi dan sebaran industri transnasional Jerman yang mengalir ke negara-negara berkembang itu, persebarannya ternyata tidak terkonsolidasi dalam sebuah kawasan saja. Dari periode tahun 1991-2000, kawasan Asia dan Amerika Latin masih menjadi resipien utama investasi Jerman. Rekonstruksi ekonomi negara-negara pascakomunis di Eropa dan perluasan keanggotaan Uni Eropa yang meliputi negara-negara Eropa Tengah dan Timur pada tahun 2004 dan 2007 membuat dinamika investasi dan sebaran industri transnasional Jerman semakin terpolarisasi (Wunderlich, 2007).

Signifikansi kekuatan jejaring ekonomi Jerman di Asia senantiasa berada di bawah bayang-bayang kebangkitan ekonomi negara-negara Eropa Tengah dan Timur. Pada tahun 1991, sebaran industri-industri Eropa Timur dan Tengah yang berafiliasi dengan industri transnasional Jerman tidak lebih dari 358 perusahaan, sementara pada saat yang sama jumlah industri di Asia yang berafiliasi dengan Jerman sudah mencapai 1279 perusahaan. Hingga akhir tahun 2000, jumlah perusahaan yang berafiliasi dengan perusahaan transnasional Jerman telah mencapai 4.383 perusahaan, melampaui kawasan Amerika Latin dan Asia yang hanya 1.708 dan 3.097 perusahaan (UNCTAD, 2004b).

Penutup

Transformasi *Modell Deutschland* Jerman sejak dua dasawarsa lalu menjadi akar genealogis untuk memahami struktur ekonomi politik Jerman kontemporer. Kemenangan kelompok ordo-liberal, yang ditopang oleh pelbagai momentum perubahan dalam konteks domestik, regional maupun global, menjadi kekuatan ideologis baru dalam struktur ekonomi politik Jerman. Pada level praktis, keberhasilan Jerman melakukan liberalisasi ekonomi yang ditopang oleh reformasi struktur industrialnya menjadikannya sebagai kekuatan

ekonomi dunia yang penting.

Semakin gencarnya transnasionalisasi industri dan investasi Jerman di dunia sejak dekade tahun 1990-an menjadi alasan utama tulisan ini untuk menimbang signifikansi kekuatan ekonomi Jerman dalam regionalisasi ekonomi di pelbagai belahan dunia, terutama di Asia. Melalui kajian perbandingan, sulit untuk mengatakan bahwa jejaring ekonomi Jerman ini semakin terkonsolidasi di Asia. Polarisasi sebaran investasi dan industri Jerman, yang sebagian besar dipengaruhi oleh dinamika regionalisasi di Eropa, semakin menjadi preseden baru akan melemahnya peran Jerman di Asia ke depan. Sisi lain, keterlibatan Jerman – juga Uni Eropa – dalam forum-forum diplomasi ekonomi dengan Asia bisa diharapkan menjadi salah satu pintu masuk untuk meningkatkan peran ekonomi dan politiknya di Asia yang kini diwarnai persaingan antara Jepang dan China. ●

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Multilateralism in East Asia: Analysis of Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) within ASEAN+3 Framework

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Abstrak

Sektor finansial merupakan sektor kerjasama yang paling intensif di dalam ASEAN+3. Penandatanganan *Chiang Mai Initiative* (CMI) pada Mei 2000 dan kemudian diperluas melalui *Chiang Mai Initiative multilateralization* (CMIM) atau *Common Fund Agreement* pada bulan Mei 2009, menandakan sebuah babak baru dalam relasi antara negara-negara tersebut dan juga dalam perdebatan akademik mengenai multilateralisme dan regionalisme di wilayah Asia Timur. Makalah ini menganalisis CMI dalam konteks multilateralisme, bukan dengan cara membandingkan dengan Uni Eropa misalnya, akan tetapi dari segi prinsip-prinsip multilateralisme itu sendiri sebagaimana diformulasikan oleh John Gerard Ruggie.

Kata kunci : Chiang Mai *initiative*, multilateralisme, regionalisme, ASEAN +3

Introduction

The ASEAN+3 framework (China, Japan, and the Republic of South Korea)² has broadened and deepened in many areas of cooperation (20 areas). It ranges from political cooperation and security to youth and women. Researchers have been debating whether ASEAN+3 can be considered as multilateralism in East Asia or not (See Acharya 2008, Liu and Yan 2004, Mahbubani 2008,

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2 Although many discussion on whether East Asia Community should include Australia, New Zealand, and India as stated in the first East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005, ASEAN+3 has being considered as the main vehicle for East Asian regional integration and carrying out many cooperative activities compare to EAS.

see also the concept of soft institutionalization in Qin 2007). The signing of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in May 2000 and then its extension-Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) or Common Fund Agreement in May 2009- has brought new discussion to the debate. CMI is one of cooperation within ASEAN+3 framework in term of finance and monetary.³ This paper wants to address the question: to what extent CMI within ASEAN+3 framework can be considered as multilateralism in East Asia?

Several studies on East Asian multilateralism have tried to compare ASEAN+3 to European Union (EU) as a model for regional cooperation (See for example Baldwin 2003 and Stubbs 2002). But it is important to focus the discussion on the definition and criteria of multilateralism itself. It should not make conclusion only by comparing the CMI with the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF). Multilateralism has indeed existed in many different forms long before the formation of EU.

ASEAN is considered different with EU in term of institutionalization process. ASEAN has characteristic of informal agreement, lack of binding rules and procedure in its process than to EU. ASEAN focuses on trust building and maintain good relations. Qin Yaqing called ASEAN style as soft institutionalization (Qin 2007). This different style does not imply that ASEAN is not multilateralism. John Gerard Ruggie defines multilateralism as the practice of coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles (*Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* 1993, 8). The "certain principles" are the key point that differentiates multilateralism with bilateralism. It is not differentiated by the number of states as Keohane described (*Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research* 1990, 755). Those principles of multilateralism are non-discriminatory, indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity.

The paper will examine whether CMI has those principles. Section 2 after the introduction will present briefly the CMI. This will be followed by Section 3 which consists of 3 parts. Part 1 will examine the existence of non-discriminatory principle, part 2 will examine the principle of indivisibility and part 3 will deal with the principle of diffuse reciprocity. Section 4 is the conclusion that will answer whether CMThe importance of this study is also to understand the condition of peace in East Asia after the Cold War especially after Asian financial crisis. Mahbubani stated that Asian financial crisis was predicted as fuel of conflict between East Asian States (79). As in the early 1980, Ruggie argued that multilateralism was crucial to the stability of relations among states in the West after second World War. An extended period of cooperation and economic growth among states in Europe, US,

3 Chiang Mai Initiative (CIM) which launched together Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) was signed after Asian Financial Crisis.

Japan and some of other Asian states are made possible by multilateral arrangement of Bretton woods (Griffiths 1999, 197). If this study concludes that CMI is multilateralism, it will contribute to the previous studies on the role of APT in East Asia peace building.

This paper uses the constructivist approach of Ruggie. Ruggie gives strong critique to the realist approach who neglects the importance of institutionalization process in international relations. The interaction between states helps them to institutionalize certain rules of behavior and conducts. These rules later on guide them how to behave toward each other. International relations are not merely the struggle of power between states in the anarchical system. In this respect, Ruggie perspective is in line with the liberal institutionalist such as Goldstein and Keohane.

Despite of the agreement on institutionalization aspect of liberal institutionalist, Ruggie criticizes the nominal aspect of institutionalization from Keohane. As mentioned before, it is not the number of states who interact determine relations between states as multilateralism or bilateralism, but the existence of certain principles. Ruggie also criticizes Keohane in the neglect of ideational factor in the institutionalization processes. Keohane only focus in the mutual interest between states, while Ruggie stresses the importance of idea in transcending their national interest. The role of ideas in international relations will be presented in the discussion concerning diffuse-reciprocity principle.

Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)

In ASEAN+3 annual meeting in Chiang May, Thailand, May 2000, financial ministers of ASEAN+3 member states, agreed in principle to pool their hard currency resources. This multilateral currency swap arrangement was called as Chiang May Initiative (CMI). CMI was a response to the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis.

There are three tracks of cooperation in the agreement: currency swap, surveillance and early warning system for future financial crisis, and exchange views among the ASEAN+3 members on reform needed to international financial structure (Stubbs 2002, 449-450). Currency swap is an agreement to exchange one currency for another and to reverse the transaction at a date in the future. It builds the expanded intra-ASEAN US\$ 1 billion standby swap arrangement. Miyazawa Initiative put in place by Japan in the late 1998 to assist Asian countries. The surveillance and early warning system will be in form of exchange of information on short-term capital movements in East Asia. It will make governments aware of potential problems. The last track will become the basis for recommendation to international forums on the international financial structure reformation.

CMI in the first stage combined the previous ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) and new Bilateral Swap Arrangement (BSA). The ASA started in 1977

which allowed ASEAN members to exchange local currency for US dollars on a short term basis to alleviate “temporary international liquidity problems.” BSA is a network of new bilateral agreements consists of 30 agreements between the 3 States (Japan, China, South Korea) and each 5 ASEAN members (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, The Philippines, Singapore), plus agreements among the 3 states themselves.

Table 1.
Bilateral swap agreement under Chiang Mai Initiative

Countries	status as of July 2002	Amount (billion of dollars) ^a	Currency
Japan-South Korea	signed July 4, 2001	2	Dollar-won
Japan-Thailand	signed July 30, 2001	3	Dollar-Baht
Japan-Philippines	signed August 27, 2001	3	Dollar-peso
Japan-Malaysia	signed October 5, 2001	1	Dollar-ringgit
China-Thailand	signed December 6, 2001	2	Dollar-baht
Japan-China	signed March 28, 2002	3	Yen-renminbi
South Korea-China	signed June 24, 2002	2	Dollar-renminbi or dollar-won
South Korea-Thailand	Announced, not signed	1	Dollar-baht or dollar-won
South Korea-Malaysia	expected 2002	[1]	Dollar-ringgit or dollar-won
South Korea-Philippines	expected 2002	1	Dollar-peso or dollar-won
Japan-Singapore	in progress	[3]	Dollar-Singapore dollar
China-Malaysia	in progress	[1]	Dollar-ringgit
China-Philippines	in progress	[1]	Dollar-peso
Japan-Indonesia	in progress	[3]	Dollar-rupiah

a. Brackets indicate provisional figures

Source: http://www.piie.com/publication/chapter_preview/345/3iie3381.pdf

CMI has become a framework for ASEAN+3 member states to make contract between themselves bilaterally. All arrangements generally swap US dollars for local currency. For instance, Japan and Thailand contracted swap agreement in certain amount of US dollar against Thailand Baht and so on. Only one exception which is Japan and China contracted in Yen-Renmimbi . If a state wants to withdraw a necessary amount of money from more than one source, the state must negotiate individually with each of the swap providing counterpart.

This arrangement is being criticized because of its structural weaknesses in terms of transparency and efficiency in the operation. In order to address the crisis in the future, the swap arrangements must be readily available to

allow time disbursement. In order to meet such need, the CMI must be carried out under a multilateral operational framework (Asami 2005, 20).

The Multilateralization of CMI (CMIM) or Common Fund⁴ in February 2009 has transformed a network of CMI bilateral currency swap arrangement between the members, valued \$78 billion, into a single \$120 billion pool of funds committed by the members. This was the second stage of CMI. Under this Common Fund Agreement, member states could swap their respective currencies with US dollars for an amount up to the participants contribution multiplied by respective purchasing multiplier as provided.

The arrangement was proposed to convert BSAs into single contract of common fund. This essentially replicates the model of reserve pooling of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF). This is meant to be legally binding and enforceable contract, which would give effective protection to participating members (Park 2009, 52).

4 Formerly called as Self-Managed Reserve Pooling Arrangement (SRPA) and then in Finance ministers of ASEAN+3 meeting in Phuket, Thailand on 22 February 2009 has acquired new name: Chiang May Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM). The informal name is common fund agreement. The informal name, common fund will be used through out the paper to avoid confusion.

Table 2.
CMIM (Common Fund) Contributions and Purchasing Multiples

	Financial contribution		Purchasing Multiple
	USD (billion)	(%)	
China	38.40	China (Excluding Hong Kong, China) 34.20	28.50 0.5
		Hong Kong, China 4.20	3.50 2.5
Japan	38.40	32.00	0.5
Korea	19.20	16.00	1
Plus 3	96.00	80.00	-
Indonesia	4.77	3.97	2.5
Thailand	4.77	3.97	2.5
Malaysia	4.77	3.97	2.5
Singapore	4.77	3.97	2.5
Philippines	3.68	3.07	2.5
Vietnam	1.00	0.83	5
Cambodia	0.12	0.10	5
Myanmar	0.06	0.05	5
Brunei	0.03	0.02	5
Lao PDR	0.03	0.02	5
ASEAN	24.00	20.00	-
Total	120.00	100.00	-

* Hong Kong - China's purchasing is limited to IMF de-linked portion because Hong Kong - China is not a member of the IMF

Multilateralism Principle in CMI

The three generic principles of multilateralism-nondiscriminatory, indivisibility, and diffuse reciprocity-within CMI will be analyzed through out this section. Those principles will be analyzed within the three tracks arrangement in CMI. Nondiscriminatory principle will be analyzed in currency swap track, indivisibility principle in surveillance mechanism track, and diffuse-reciprocity principle in the mechanism of view exchange on regional and international financial structure reformation track.

Those three principles are actually difficult to be separated from one another. The same thing happened in term of the three tracks of CMI. Each tracks can be analyzed with all principles because they have all elements related

to all principles. This theoretical framework is built by focusing the principle which is dominant in each CMI tracks. Only additional remarks in certain small extent will be added to give us a clear view on the interconnectedness of all principles and all tracks.

1. The Non-Discriminatory Principle in CMI

In this part, the analysis of the nondiscriminatory principle in CMI will focus on the first track of CMI that is the currency swap arrangement track. This arrangement was dealing with the membership, contributions and also right of states within the CMI. It is the reason that nondiscriminatory principle is discussed in the currency swap track.

Nondiscriminatory principle means that states should carry out their treaty obligations without any contingencies or exceptions based on alliance, or on idiosyncrasies of the circumstances at a hand or on the degree to which national interests are perceived to be at stakes. The example of non-discriminatory principle in economic realm is the obligation of every member of GATT (and then its successor, WTO) to extend to all members the status of most favored nation (MFN). In security realm, it is the requirement that states respond to aggression whenever and wherever it occurs whether or not any specific instance suit their individual likes and dislikes.

The Common Fund of CMI suits the nondiscriminatory principle of Multilateralism. This has broadened the participation in regional financial facilities beyond the eight countries that presently have BSAs. It has included Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma/Myanmar, and Brunei in the process for the first time.

Under this arrangement all member states of ASEAN+3 have to contribute to the currencies pool in certain amounts. Japan, China and South Korea contribute 80 percent of the pooled funds. Five ASEAN nations, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines – each contribute \$4.77 billion (3.97 percent). Vietnam pools \$1 billion (0.83 percent), Cambodia \$120 million (0.1 percent), Myanmar \$60 million (0.05 percent), Brunei and Lao PDR. \$30 million (0.02 percent) each (The Jakarta Post 2009, 1).

On the other hand, each of ASEAN+3 member states has the right to swap its currency for dollars according to the agreement mentioned without having the obligation to undergo any bilateral negotiations as in BSAs agreement. There are differences in the amount of the states contribution but still it is under the same agreement without any exclusion. Japan, which contribute the most to this arrangement with \$38.4 billion or 32 percent of the total funds, and gets a 0.5 purchasing multiple, can swap its yen up to \$19.2 billion. Indonesia, with \$4.77 contribution, get purchasing multiple of 2.5, can swap rupiah up to \$11.93 million.

But, it is not enough to conclude the existence of nondiscriminatory principle without discussing the principle in the light of national interest of states. One of important thing is to look the existence of dual-frameworks

CMI Common Fund was planned to become fully multilateral framework. Although it gives more structural benefit, ASEAN+3 member states prefer use BSAs in CMI. This can be explained due to the risk when there is a disagreement among ASEAN+3 member states in using the fund in CMI common fund collectively. State pairs might retain the option to activate bilateral swaps in crisis.

This is the reason why there was a long debate among ASEAN+3 member states to include Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam, Burma/Myanmar, and Brunei in CMI common fund arrangement. ASEAN+3 had difficulties to agree on how large of common fund extension. The difficulties largely correspond to differences in their size, economic development and structure, external trade and investment relations, and political institutions, among other factor (Henning 2009, 5). To include Burma/Myanmar is politically a problem for other ASEAN members.

Nondiscriminatory principle in its full manner (only use the CMI common fund) will risk ASEAN+3 member states to be trapped in long and complicated decision making process. This will jeopardize their national interest in the face of financial crisis. Henning states that coexistence of common fund (nondiscriminatory) and BSAs (discriminatory) could facilitate agreement on joint decision making by reducing the risk that adopting a supermajority or unanimity decision rule that would block disbursements in crisis (6).

This is different with MFN which is pushed into practice through constant negotiations. CMI will unlikely retire all its BSAs arrangement in the future. CMI will unlikely expand its nondiscriminatory principle to its entire frameworks and practices.

2. Indivisibility Principle in CMI

This part of section 3 will focus on indivisibility principle of multilateralism in the second track of CMI, the surveillance mechanism. First it will discuss what is meant by indivisibility principle according to Ruggie and then will discuss the formation of collectivity of ASEAN+3 member states in the historical process of CMI surveillance mechanism formation. This part will end by the analysis whether surveillance mechanism of CMI has provided indivisibility principle for ASEAN+3.

According to Ruggie the indivisibility can take many different forms, ranging from physical ties or railways lines that the collectivity choose to standardize across frontiers, all the way to the adoption by the states the premise that peace is indivisible (11). In the context of military cooperation, states are required to meet their commitments to all states in collective security agreement. Griffiths adds that for multilateral security regimes, this refers to the requirement that peace be regarded as indivisible for and by each signatory to the treaty (196). The indivisibility of Peace is a social construction

and not technical condition. Ruggies said that states *behave as though that* peace were indivisible, and thereby make it so (16).

NATO is the ideal type of indivisibility principle in which a subset of states organized a collective self defense scheme of indefinite duration, *de jure* against any potential aggressor though *de facto* against one. Nevertheless, internally the scheme was predicated on the indivisibility of threats to bring collectivity together with the requirement of an unconditional respond.

Ruggie gives an example of the concert of Europe, which also exhibited elements of multilateral form. The concert version is characterized by the dominance of great powers; decisions are taken by informal negotiations and consensus, and no specification of the mechanism for implementing collective action. This is why concert also put in the collective security arrangement. A concert nevertheless is predicated on the notion of all against all. This is the indivisibility of peace among the member of concert and their nondiscretionary obligation to respond to acts of aggression (*Ibid.*).

In the context of CMI, it can be analyzed in the same way. Has it formed an indivisibility of financial relation among ASEAN+3 member states or not? Richard Stubbs stated that Asian Financial Crisis has become a major catalyst in institutionalizing the new arrangement (CMI). First, it added to the sense of common history that has emerged in the region. Secondly, it demonstrated the ineffectiveness of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) and ASEAN. Thirdly, a clear consensus has emerged in the region that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in conjunction with the U.S government, initially misdiagnosed the problem and chose to impose a set solution that only served to exacerbate the situation (9).

Asian Financial Crisis happened due to the lack of coordination and collaboration between ASEAN+3 member states. Even not all ASEAN+3 member states directly affected by it, nearly every government felt its reverberations and had to deal with the fallout from the crisis(*Ibid.*). The crisis was very contagious. Asian Financial Crisis erupted in July 1997 when the Thai government was forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime to adopt a flexible exchange rate, resulting in substantial depreciation of the Thai Baht. This crisis affected the depreciation of Indonesian rupiah and Korean won simultaneously.

There is change in the thinking among both political and business leaders in Northeast Asia and a growing realization of the urgent need for the creation of formal regional mechanism to deal with any similar crisis in the future and to maintain the economic growth of the region (Chai 2001, 11). China, Japan, and South Korea realized that they need to develop their institutional connections between them for a better cooperation in economic issues and also the need to increase investment and trade with ASEAN members. Richard Stubbs adds that the economic health of ASEAN members was very much of the the 3 states interest. And for many ASEAN members

the crisis underscored the benefits of establishing formal economic links to the more developed economies of Japan and South Korea and the dynamic market of China as a means of facing any possible future crisis (10).

The construction of CMI in the ASEAN+3 framework has built the sense of solidarity among ASEAN+3 member states in term of economic and trade especially in financial sector. And by the set up of common fund arrangement, it has marked new development in term of indivisibility principle of multilateralism. Surely, future problem on one member's financial structure, will be a threat to all members.

It is important to analyze how the ASEAN+3 perceive and formalize their indivisibility. It means how they coordinate and collaborate their action with the same foundation to face the problems, especially financial crisis. The second track of CMI, the surveillance system is the indicator of how they arrange the financial coordination and collaboration in a single unit, in an indivisible unit.

The surveillance system can be discussed into 3 its important parts. First, the ASEAN+3 launched a regional surveillance mechanism called the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) in April 2002. This was planned to be the mechanism of providing information and analysis that would permit the identification of financial and economic vulnerabilities among members and provide a foundation for regionally defined conditionality in the event that CMI in term of BSAs and also common fund were called upon (Henning 2009, 3).

ERPD was a compromise between China and Japan. In November of 2001, a Japanese Ministry of finance backed a proposal for surveillance facility at CMI which then rejected by China. China lead to a creation of a less formal mechanism, ERPD. In April 2005, participation in the ERPD process became a condition for release of funds from CMI. At the meeting in Bali, Indonesia in 2009, they agreed to establish an independent regional surveillance unit to monitor and analyze regional economies and support CMI decision making. As a start, there would be an advisory panel of experts to work closely with the Asian Development Bank and the ASEAN Secretariat. But despite such strengthening the ERPD is still incapable of providing the level of economic surveillance (Rathus 2009, 2).

Secondly, it concerned with policy adjustment and conditionality. This also one of problems that ASEAN+3 member states still do not agree. Policy conditionality of IMF at the previous financial crisis proved to be the most contentious and resented aspect. Still there are no strict regulations on how a member state has to adjust its policy when facing financial crisis.

The third is the governance body in a permanent secretariat. By setting up of common fund, CMI mechanism needs to operate within a permanent secretariat. Prior to multilateralization, the CMI process as a network of BSAs did not require a secretariat. It is unlikely that the option for the CMI

secretariat within the ASEAN secretariat, but it is unlikely that ASEAN can provide the technical elements required. In December 2008, they met and tried to locate the CMI secretariat, but there was no conclusion yet to be reached. It is an important decision, because it will affect the locus of regional economic cooperation more broadly (*Ibid.*).

The surveillance mechanism should identify economic vulnerabilities and desirable policy adjustments for the states under review. CMI still has problems concerning with its informal economic surveillance, unclear policy conditionality, and the question of the CMI secretariat location.

The problem in establishing CMI surveillance mechanism is due to the strong noninterference principle in the history of ASEAN particularly and the 3 states relations in general. The politically established principle of noninterference to other member's affairs, peer pressure or policy coordination constitutes limitation to the effectiveness of the surveillance process of CMI (Asami,14). The discussion in Section 3.1 on currency swap, stated that ASEAN+3 member maintain BSAs outside common fund. BSAs relatively support the resentment of ASEAN+3 member states of the interference from other member states or regional institutions. It can be said that common fund is a form of indivisibility or solidarity and BSAs is form of flexibility. ASEAN+3 member states might well place a higher value on flexibility than on solidarity (Henning, 6).

ASEAN+3 also finally agreed that the decision making process within CMI should be made on the weighted-voting system, similar to IMF. Despite of any adjustments made, it is clear that China and Japan will together be able to approve, or block, any application of CMI. With this kind of decision making, if we use the collective security model mentioned above, CMI will likely to be a concert in term of financial arrangement in East Asia. It is due to the role of great (economic) powers, the informal negotiations and consensus-based decisions, and the lack of clear formal rules in the arrangement.

The indivisibility principle in CMI surveillance mechanism is still in process. In the case of the EU, a multilateral surveillance mechanism did not work until the early 1990s, although the origins of multilateral surveillance can be traced back to the 1970s.

3. Diffuse-Reciprocity Principle in CMI

The last principle of Multilateralism according to Ruggie is the diffuse-reciprocity. It means that joint participation has to take place over an extended period of time. In diplomatic practice, reciprocity can be differentiated in to specific reciprocity and diffuse reciprocity. While the concept of specific reciprocity leads to simultaneous exchange or one with strictly delimited sequence (simultaneity), diffuse-reciprocity provides mutual benefits sequentially (Bolewski 2007, 45).

Through consistent of cooperation, states generally accepted standards of behaviour. These standards exert their own normative pressure on state action, contributing to the development of long-term obligations between states which stress cooperation. Thus, in a system of diffuse-reciprocity, according to Keohane states do not need to seek the intermediate benefit guaranteed by specific reciprocity, but act in the confidence that their cooperative actions will be repaid in the long run (*Reciprocity in International Relations* 1986, 145).

The long-term participation and not single shot of interaction become the basis for, anticipation about the longer-run of the functioning of the collective. In other words, Griffiths said that states extend what is sometimes called "the shadow of the future". The interaction of states in multilateral setting also helps states to transform their sense of self-interest (196).

There is important point that we can use from discussion above. It can be said that in order to understand the diffuse-reciprocity principle in CMI, we should analyze two aspects in CMI: the accepted standard of behavior and the transformation of states in a sense of self-interest, especially in the mechanism of exchange view on regional and financial structure reformation.

The standard of behavior can be found in the set of rules that govern states in CMI arrangement. It already discussed in first and second part of this section concerning the nondiscriminatory and indivisibility principles. The rules in CMI is far from developed and formalized. There are already rules concerning with the contribution of each state and also their rights, but still consensus is the most important decision making to determine whether some states has the right to activate the common fund in CMI and on what terms.

The rules of how states should behave both before and after the financial crisis are also not yet settled. The difficulties of surveillance mechanism to penetrate in domestic matters of each states is the main obstacle. The rules concerning what states should do in order to recover from crisis in term of policy adjustment is not yet agreed, due to the resentment of the member states. ASEAN+3 member states are not yet having total trust in the CMI mechanism, especially in term of its surveillance mechanism. It can be said that CMI is far from having the accepted standard of behaviour which is important aspect in diffuse reciprocity.

On the other hand, the BSAs of CMI has relatively well developed mechanism; for example, in the question of term. Beyond the first 20 percent of the swap, borrowers could originally activate on 90-day basis, renewable seven times, at increasing increment over Libor. The surveillance mechanism is based on the judgment of the lender. The policy adjustment also negotiated between the pair states involved in the BSAs. The lender will activate the BSA on the compensation that agreed by the borrower. The agreement of BSAs in CMI between the lender and the borrower can be considered more as specific reciprocity than diffuse reciprocity.

Trust building in collective collaboration is not only built from formalized set of rules. It is also built from the interaction between members. The exchange view between ASEAN+3 member states on financial structure reformation through CMI third track is important to discuss. Has the exchange view between them has transformed their sense of self interest?

As discussed before, Asian Financial Crisis has brought new perspective in the mind of ASEAN+3 member states (see page. 7). Asian Financial Crisis actually was not only important as a material fact or factor. The most important thing is the ideational factor of Asian Financial Crisis. The same crisis can be seen as reason for protectionist policy or “behind its fortress policy”. Financial crisis also can be seen as reason for war. Yet, the opposite of those were chosen by ASEAN+3 member states. They prefer to think that they are in the same boat with common history. They chose to think that there is no reason for not cooperating. This is the ideational factor of the financial crisis according to Ruggie (*What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge* 1998). For comparison, British nuclear capabilities were a very different social fact (in term of ideational factor) for United States from Soviet nuclear capabilities [Wendt 1994, 384(6)].

There was a swift on how they perceived its own interest and other interest. In term of financial interest, the stability of others has becoming their interest. It is interesting to see the changes of view of the member states, especially China concerning cooperation. China has been known for its preference on bilateral ties than multilateral, but since 1990s, China has changed its view ranging from security issue to the most intensive regional meeting on financial and economic issues. (Kornberg & Faust 2005, 171).

Mahbubani stated that there are some progresses to note in regional role of China, especially its relation toward other East or East Asian Countries. When US and EU turn its back from East Asian countries after Cold War especially in time of financial crisis 1997-1998, China help those countries by refused to devalue its currency, maintaining a rate 8.3 renminbi to US\$1. As it had done by 33 percent in 1994, that would have made China’s exports less costly and also undermined efforts by affected ASEAN countries to restore their economies. In addition, China gave economic assistance more than US\$1 billion to Indonesia and another US\$1 billion to Thailand, the two countries most affected by the crisis (229). China has seen its interest laid in the stability of other states.

The success of CMI framework in putting 13 countries in regular meetings is important to note. This is especially due to the hostility relation between ASEAN+3 member states. The relation between Japan, China and South Korea can not be considered as in good relations. They hardly talk to each other. There is mistrust, competition and deep misunderstanding between Japan and China. The number of Chinese people who have friendly feelings toward Japan has declined sharply since the end of 1980s; and same

thing happened in Japan. Japan and China has most share in CMI common fund and this has forced them to cooperate. Japan and China has learned to cooperate within CMI framework ranging from the discussion of the amount of share from each state in Common Fund to surveillance mechanism issues. Japan and China has learned to put aside their rivalry and seen the financial stability of East Asia as their common interest.

It is also interesting to see the diverse ideological background and ideological rivalry between the ASEAN+3 member states. There is division between the noncommunist ASEAN, South Korea and Japan and communist Indochina, China and North Korea. As Mahbubani said that the history also told us the hostile relation between those states and it can be traced back from the beginning of World War II or further, the invasion of Japan to Manchuria and then to China mainland latter on, Korean War, Japan colonization in Southeast Asia. During Cold War, China supported many communist movements in those countries to overthrow the regimes in South East Asia (*Ibid.*)

It is remarkable to see communist states such as China and Vietnam has joined in the CMI. It is also important to mention the contribution of small and poor states such as Cambodia, Burma/Myanmar in CMI arrangement. This can be explained by the interest of those states for recognition as an actor from others (Wendt, 2). Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma/Myanmar, and also Lao PDR have transformed its interest above and beyond the survival through brute force.

Although CMI lack of formalized set rules or standard behavior, the constant meeting between the ASEAN+3 member states has contribute on their view of their own interest and others. Qin Yaqing called this as soft institutionalization, which pays great attention to process maintenance and trust building, due to the lack formal institutions to sustain its consensus, and then contribute to difficulties in implementation of CMI decisions and important measures.

There have been constant discussions on the role of IMF in the respect of their interests. As stated in the CMI agreement that ASEAN+3 member states has common intention to contribute the reformation of international financial structure. It started with the common resentment to the IMF after Asian Financial Crisis. Richard Higgott said this as politics of resentment (Higgott 1998).

Related to the linkage to IMF, CMI in the first stage arranged that borrowers can draw up 20 percent of their swaps prior to agreeing on an IMF program, including required policy adjustment. Several borrowers would like to see this linkage reduced; the 13 member states were committed to reviewing the link periodically.

It is not important to go further detail on ASEAN+3's proposals in CMI arrangement for IMF reformation. But it is important to see how the

member states perceived their financial interest in the context of regional and international financial structure. Certainly, there are always individual motive in their effort to reform the regional and international financial structure, but there are also many options to pursue state financial interest outside cooperation. Unilateralism is always possible. CMI with its third track of exchange views on financial structure reformation, has marked a new swift on how the ASEAN+3 member states pursue their own financial interest. This is the indicator of the existence of diffuse-reciprocity in the CMI.

Conclusion

It is difficult to answer the question whether CMI in ASEAN+3 framework has suited the definition of Ruggie on multilateralism. The difficulties lay on the mixture of both multilateral and bilateral principles in CMI arrangement especially each of its tracks. The nondiscriminatory principle of multilateralism exists in the first track of CMI on currency swap. The involvement of all ASEAN+3 member states within the CMI common fund which was signed in the April 2009 after almost a decade of CMI process, is a clear indicator of nondiscriminatory principle. But by maintaining the BSAs outside common fund arrangement has put CMI in ambiguous position concerning this principle. BSAs mostly suited the discriminatory principle of bilateral framework. CMI has both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory principle in its framework and this will unlikely change in the future.

Asian Financial Crisis and then CMI as the respond of it, have built the collectivity and indivisibility among ASEAN+3 member states. Because of the lack of formal set of rules in governing in its surveillance mechanism track, consensus based decision making, CMI is best defined as a concert model of multilateralism in the respect of indivisibility principle. Japan and China as dominant states will likely determine the process and direction of CMI in the future.

The lack of rules mentioned is the reason to question the existence of diffuse-reciprocity principle in CMI. On the other hand, the constant discussions and exchange view between ASEAN+3 member states concerning reformation of regional and international financial structure have a certain feature of diffuse-reciprocity principle. From several facts, CMI has constituted an ideational factor that transform states sense of interest. There was a swift in the view of ASEAN+3 member states of their interest in wider perspective; in the relation of other states interests and in the relation with the regional and international financial structure.

If we link with findings above to the general question of whether bilateral relations are building block or stumbling block for a multilateral relation, BSA in CMI will be an obstacle or stumbling block for more solid multilateral relation between ASEAN+3 member states. When the process of multilateral arrangement needs member states to give up some of its national interest,

they will tend to avoid it and turn back to the BSAs. The existence of BSAs in CMI will prevent the ASEAN+3 from having a strong institutionalization.

The dominant role played by Japan and China actually can be seen positively as a potential to bring CMI or ASEAN+3 in general to become truly multilateral relations in East Asia. There were proofs of constant tension between states preference on noninterference (state sovereignty) and wider multilateral involvement, especially concerning surveillance mechanism. If Japan and China especially able to give examples to come out from that tension by giving up some of "their financial sovereignty" to strengthen the surveillance mechanism, CMI/ASEAN+3 will have more strong institution. Japan and China should take lead in the formation of set rules in it.

There is always price to pay for having strong multilateral framework. To build strong supranational institution, it needs certain aspect of national sovereignty to be sacrificed, but it does not to be a zero-sum; strong supranational institution or national sovereignty. In certain extent it is possible to have them both. The long process of ASEAN+3 has helped to build trust between its member states. This is the time that ASEAN+3 have to move forward. CMI as the most intensive cooperation in its framework can be its vehicle. BSAs in CMI can still exist for allowing temporary adjustment. But the most important thing to start with is to strengthen the surveillance mechanism system within CMI to become more strong, rule-based and independent. ●

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Religion, Imperialism, and Resistance in Nineteenth Century's Netherlands Indies and Spanish Philippines¹

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Abstrak

Artikel ini menjelaskan bagaimana agama berfungsi sebagai pembenar imperialisme dan antiimperialisme, dengan mengkaji kekuatan imperialis Belanda di Hindia Belanda dan imperialis Spanyol di Filipina pada abad XIX. Pemerintah Kolonial Belanda tidaklah seberhasil pemerintah kolonial Spanyol dalam menjadikan jajahan mereka menjadi bangsa seperti mereka, meskipun agama digunakan sebagai alat dominasi. Bagi Spanyol, agama Katolik menjadi bagian peradaban mereka, dan menjadi bagian penting proyek kolonialisme mereka, sedangkan bagi pemerintah kolonial Belanda, agama Kristen tidak menjadi bagian penting kolonialisme mereka (kenyataan sejarah yang menolak anggapan umum di Indonesia bahwa kolonialisme Belanda dan kristenisasi sangat berhubungan). Misionaris Spanyol di Filipina menguasai daerah koloni melalui metode-metode keagamaan dan kebudayaan, sedangkan pemerintah kolonial Belanda, dan misionaris dari Belanda, harus berurusan dengan masyarakat yang sudah memeluk Islam di daerah-daerah Indonesia. Pemerintah Belanda mengizinkan kristenisasi dalam beberapa kasus asalkan tidak mengganggu umat Islam dan tidak mengganggu kepentingan ekonomi mereka. Akibatnya, mayoritas Filipina menjadi Katolik, sedangkan mayoritas Hindia Belanda tidak menjadi Protestan. Di sisi lain, agama juga berfungsi sebagai kekuatan antiimperialisme,

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seperti dalam penggunaan *pasyon* bagi sebagian bangsa Filipina yang Katolik, dan *jihad* dan *ratu adil* bagi sebagian masyarakat Hindia Belanda yang muslim. Penafsiran terhadap agama masing-masing dipengaruhi oleh konteks kolonial. Agama mengalami lokalisasi atau pembumian sebelum ia menjadi alat perjuangan antikolonialisme. Agama menjadi sistem budaya simbolik dan praktikal yang mereka butuhkan ketika mereka perlukan. Dalam situasi dibawah imperialisme, agama menjadi alat yang kuat untuk mendukung ketidakpuasan dan harapan.

Kata kunci: agama, imperialisme, antiimperialisme, kolonialisme, Hindia Belanda

Introduction

Empires are created by conquest, and conquerors have always attempted to keep those they have conquered in subservience. This has been achieved by a mixture of simple force and some kind of ideology. It is also assumed that virtually those who live under imperial rule, would stand up against their conquerors (Pagden, 2001. xxi). This paper seeks to demonstrate how religion served to legitimize both imperial control and resistance to empire, by focusing on two imperial cases: the Dutch in the East Indies (today's Indonesia) and the Spanish in the Philippines, during the nineteenth century, a period of both colonialism and resistance.

Colonial effects were not confined to areas of physical conquest alone (Stoler, 2002). Colonialism was more than just an economic and military expansion; it was cultural and religious too. The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), a company with strong commercial motives, was not able to prevent Protestant missionaries from proselytizing in the colony. Spain, endorsing no separation of church and crown, was preoccupied with the catholicization of the natives, from the very beginning of colonization until the end.

This paper suggests that comparatively speaking, the Dutch colonial in the East Indies were less successful than the Spanish in the Philippines in using religion as an instrument of imperial control because while the former was ambiguous in church-state relationship, the latter prioritized missionary activities over all others since the beginning. Therefore, the Spanish gained a more complete imperial control over the Philippines. This paper also argues that resistance should be understood in the context of colonial transformations resulting from changing colonial policies. The two cases of resistance, the Java War (1825-1830) and the Katipunan Revolution in 1896, represent not only local responses generated by the processes of imperialism but also sustained collective protests involving religious, millenarian leaders. This paper will demonstrate how religion became a crucial instrument of such resistance, although the driving factors were not purely religious.

Colonial Goals: Between Commercial and Religious

It is well-known among Dutch and Indonesian historians that the underlying motive for Dutch imperial expansion was economic in nature. Externally, the rivalry between European empires, notably Portugal, Spain, British, and French during the sixteenth century, forced Dutch capitalists to conquer the home of spices, the East Indies. Sea power, based on superior ship design and the development of artillery in sailing vassals, was the most decisive advantage of the VOC in the early centuries of its involvement in the East Indies (Th Sumartana, 1993, 1-2). As historian Albert Hima pointed out, it was the secular forces that enabled Dutch merchants of the seventeenth century to gain advantage over their competitors in foreign lands. In addition, the development of capitalism in Holland during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries contributed to the motive of expansion. During these centuries, for example, Amsterdam, became a center for trade, transportation, and banking (Hima, 1941, 11).

Since the sixteenth century, the VOC had faced conflicts between the secular capitalists and the missionaries. In all the directives issued by the Dutch central government (*Staten Generaal*) and by the provincial governments (e.g. *Staten van Holland*), there was not a single statement on religion. Although there was some tension between religious Orders and the government in the Netherlands, the government had decided not to endorse the union of Church and State (*ibid*, 27). The Federal Government was dominated by the entrepreneurs and capitalists who prioritized economic over religious zeal. Thus, the VOC initiated expansion into Asia, first and foremost represented the economic power of the capitalists, but later began to move toward the acquisition of political power. As the VOC entered the East Indies archipelago and found local and international rivalries, it had to maintain control and domination. It had to prevent the other Europeans from entering the archipelago economically and politically. Since the spice trade did not prove to be such a bonanza, the VOC turned to establishing a plantation colony in Java. After the founding of Batavia in the islands, the VOC continued to maintain control by claiming that it was the vassal of the indigenous Kingdom of Mataram which had previously dominated most areas in the archipelago (Adas, 1979, 4). For the VOC, Java was the most fertile island and over a period of about eighty years, commercial activity was dominated by VOC (Kumar, 1980, 43).

Spain, on the other hand, was a "theocracy" in the sense that Crown and Church supported each other *de jure* and *de facto*. Some historians have contended that Spain's initial goals included establishing an entrepot in the Philippines for Chinese and Japanese trade, converting China and Japan to Christianity as well as the "heathen people" of the archipelago (later called the Philippines) to Christianity. Of the three goals only the last one, missionary ambition, proved realizable because the intervention of the Dutch ultimately

dashed to pieces Spanish interests in the Spice Islands, and the commercial and spiritual conquest of China and Japan was to prove a chimera (Phelan, 1967, 7,13-4). Spain seriously considered withdrawing from her involvement in the islands because the islands were far from Spain and did not yield the riches found in the New World. It was the Roman Catholic Church which insisted on Spain's maintaining this colony in Asia. Although few Spanish settlers went to the Philippines, missionaries of the religious orders entered the islands in significant numbers. These missionaries saw in the islands a real opportunity for establishing a solid base of Catholicism in Asia (Deats, 1967, 14-5).

Although a small merchant oligarchy reaped good profits, the Spanish colonial government produced an annual deficit and the treasure of Mexico had to pay this deficit (Phelan, 13-14). More than any other single factor, a religious commitment kept the Spanish state in the economically profitless colony of the Philippines. Thus, the religious motivation for staying in the Philippines was much more important than the economic one. As Gregorio Zaide has argued, "even though in the pacification of the Philippines, missionaries and conquistadores worked side by side, economic wealth and political grandeur were to Spain secondary colonial aims." (Zaide, 1957, 158-9).

From the very beginning of the conquest, the goals of Spain and of the Roman Church were inseparably linked. Soon after Captain Ferdinand Magellan arrived in Cebu on March 16th, 1521, Cebu's King Humabon was baptized on April 14 and mass baptism followed. Later that same day, "in the presence of Filipinos and Spaniards, Magellan solemnly planted a huge wooden cross on the summit of a hill overlooking the sea, and took the possession of the country in the name of Spain." (Zaide, 115). It was in 1571 that Spain, under King Philip II, succeeded in firmly establishing her sovereignty through the efforts of Miguel Lopez de Legaspi. Legaspi was accompanied by a group of Augustinian missionaries who immediately began intensive missionary labor. Shortly afterward, in 1577, the Franciscans came to the islands. The Jesuits and Dominicans came in 1581, and finally the Recollects arrived in 1606. Through these five religious orders, Catholicism was firmly planted on Filipino soil due to the number of working missionaries and to the number of conversions. Although at first conversion was slow, with only one hundred baptisms during the first five years, by 1622 there had presumably been over half a million baptisms (Deats, 15).

The above motives and goals had a significant impact on how the colonial government designed its colonial bureaucracy and policies. A major impact resulted from the use of religion as an instrument of control. The extent to which religion served to legitimize imperial control also depended on circumstances in the colonies, as shall be demonstrated in the following section.

Colonial Bureaucracy and Missionaries

In his general account of the expansion of the West, Philip D. Curtin argued that it was primarily Europe's administrative technology that enabled the colonial powers to control the colonies. Curtin further argued that imperial control was of little use to the colonial power unless it could administer the conquered territories cheaply and effectively in ways that suited imperial interests (Curtin, 2000, 32-4). But Curtin was only concerned with secular organization and understood imperial control merely in terms of economic cost-benefit calculation. It is true that in the case of the Dutch colonial bureaucracy in the East Indies, the secular (i.e. the commercial) government dominated and when the government eventually approved missionary activities in the colony, it did not regard religion as an indispensable instrument of imperial control. In the case of Spanish bureaucracy, however, secular and religious activities were closely intertwined and Spain didn't pay as much attention to the cost of maintaining her armies as to her support for greater success of conversion.

Unlike the Spanish, the Dutch bureaucracy in the East Indies was formally secular in the sense that there is no union of church and state prevailed. The VOC was a government of merchants acting to promote mercantile interests. Religion was not a VOC priority. Thus, for example, Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587-1629), the architect and administrator of Dutch power in the East Indies, after his arrival in the region in October 1613, wrote:

Should we try to make Christians of the Ternatanes or take what is ours by right from them even with force, if need be?... Say in reply that in the Moluccas at present religion should by all means be left alone. We must maintain our right to export cloves - by force even - but in respect to other matters we should turn a blind eye to a great deal (H.T. Colenbrander, 1934, 463. in Steenbrink, 1993, 61).

Coen's main argument revolved around the perceived impossibility of any long-term cooperation with the Muslims. Coen did not explicitly support plans to convert the Muslims. The rare cases in which Coen speaks of spreading Christianity concerned mainly non-Islamic villages, the Christianization of which would help in the struggle with Islam. In most cases he prefers discussing the consolidation of Christianity. In 1627 Coen proposed a number of suggestions, "all of them contributing, that is, to the promotion of God's Holy Word and crushing what is left of the infidel religion of the Moors there". However, Coen was not responsible for any large-scale schemes for Christianizing the East Indies and certainly no concrete initiative (ibid).

Later, governor-general Van der Capellen (1816-26) still focused on economic and political controls. He was conservative in the sense that he moved towards complete government control of the economy, rather than

the opening up of Java to Western economic influence. He had planned to suppress the principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta and to abolish the post of regency (*bupati*), but he did not succeed. He attempted to maintain the Dutch monopoly of key cash crops, such as coffee and sugar, and forbade Chinese and Europeans to trade freely while also prohibiting the continued lease of land to Europeans in the principalities in May 1823. By introducing these measures, he hoped to pave the way for complete government control of the economy and administration in Java (Knight, 2000; Carey, 1980, 61-3).

It was not until 1855 that the government issued a law to legalize missionary activities in the colony under certain conditions. Moreover, "whenever the permission is found harmful, or its conditions not adhered to, the permission may be revoked by the Governor General" (Vandenbosch, 1944, 46-7). However, despite the fact that the government did not legalize missionary activities in the East Indies until 1855, Christian proselytizing occurred in the seventeenth century. The missionaries believed that they were obliged to spread their religion across regional boundaries. Hugo Grotius published a short summary of the Christian faith which he hoped would be a guide for sailors for their own spiritual salvation and for the dissemination of Christianity. The translation of the Bible into Malay language was actively pursued. The Malay text of the New Testament was first published in 1688, and a translation of the entire Bible was finished in 1734. A seminary was founded in Batavia in 1742 with a goal of educating evangelists for Java and Eastern region (Th. Sumartana, 2). Ministers in the Indies conducted services in Malay, because VOC settlements were polyglot communities in which Portuguese and Malay rather than Dutch were the lingua franca (Kilgour, 1935; Latouratte 1939, in Kipp, 1990, 25-6). A numbers of conversions to Christianity occurred only in isolated cases, including in Batavia, Ambon, Menado, and Timor (*ibid*).

Especially during the nineteenth century, Muslims in the East Indies became more connected to the Middle East and this was seen as a threat to Dutch imperial dominance. The number of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and that of Arab settlers in Java increased, resulting in a stronger Islamic identity among the Javanese leaders and society. In a Javanese chronicle *Serat Centini*, Islamic orthodoxy became part of the Javanese sense of cultural identity. External wars, such as the Crimean War (1854-56) between the Ottoman Turks and Russians, also caught the imagination of the Javanese. The fortunes of the Turkish armies were eagerly followed and each victory of the Turks was celebrated with prayers and offerings (Carey, 99). It was not until the nineteenth century that the Dutch governors had to deal with the "Islamic question". There were two different positions that the Dutch colonial governors took. Some supported Christianization as a means of containing the development of Islam in the East Indies, whereas others did not see the need to convert the Muslims to Christianity and argued in favor of maintaining the

secular, economic character of the Dutch colonialism.

For the supporters of Christianization, there were many reasons to pursue a mixture of political and religious goals, aimed at securing the region economically and politically, securing the spice monopoly in the peripheries and stopping or containing the spread of Islam (Hendrik E. Niemeijer, in Holtrop & Mcleod, 2000, 32-49). For a number of Christian Dutch scholars, such as van J.V.L. Gericke, N. Adriani, Alb.C.Kruyt, and Hendrik Kraemer, Christianization and colonialism constituted a mutual beneficial (Suminto, 1985,17-8).

In the nineteenth century, many Dutchmen, both at home and in the Indies, had great hopes of eliminating the influence of Islam by the rapid Christianization of the majority of Indonesians. These hopes were partly anchored in the widespread Western belief in the superiority of Christianity to Islam, and partly in the assumption that the syncretic nature of Indonesian Islam at the village level would render conversion to Christianity easier in Indonesia than elsewhere in Muslim lands. While not as closely allied with missionary enterprises as had been the Spanish government, Dutch government at times fell under strong pressure from religious parties in parliament. The Netherlands Constitution eventually allowed Christian missions, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, to operate in Indonesia, and missionary work in the colony was subsidized by public funds. According to historian Harry J. Benda, in spite of such governmental assistance, Christianity was able to spread only very slowly, and only among Indonesians living in areas which had not previously been Islamized (Benda, 1958, 19-20).

The most passionate promoter of Christianization was perhaps A.W.F. Idenburg (1861-1935, ruled 1909-19), influenced by Abraham Kuyper (1839-1920), who promoted Christianization alongside with secular economic projects in the Indies. Idenburg connected the idea of the Netherlands as a Christian Power to its 'moral calling' in Indonesia. But Idenburg was not a missionary in the strict sense; he did not use his office for ecclesiastical activities. In fact, he repeatedly stated that according to him there was a clear distinction between church and missions on the one hand, and the state on the other hand (Pieter N. Holtrop, in Holtrop & Mcleod (eds), 2000, 142-56).

The most influential government adviser was Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936), who disagreed with overt Christianization of local Muslims, but recognized the need to deal with the "Islamic question". An expert on Islam and local languages, Snouck founded the Office for Native Affairs. In dealing with Islamic affairs, he appointed religious judges, the leaders and preachers of the main mosques and organized other Islamic matters (Karel Steenbrink, 1993,89). Snouck Hurgronje's recommendations for an "Islamic policy" envisaged a division of Islam into a religious and a political sphere. With regard to the former, Snouck counseled in favor of toleration (spelled out in terms of neutrality *vis-à-vis* religious life), for pacification and for

stability. Suppression was to be stopped and no obstacles were to be placed on the pilgrimage to Mecca. In the political sphere, the Dutch were to distance themselves from religious affairs as long as they did not pose a political threat.

Furthermore, according to Snouck, the application of the twin policies of tolerance and vigilance would go hand in hand with Dutch support for those social elements not under the sway of Islamic fanaticism: the *adat* chiefs and the *priyayi*-elites on Java (Benda, 23-4). Snouck stressed the importance of *adat* (customary law) institutions and the necessity of a close alliance between the colonial government and the *priyayi* elite in Java. At the same time, he recognized the limitations of the *adat* and its inability to withstand the pressures of Islam. He sought instead to facilitate the process of Westernization in Java by freeing the Javanese elite from "the narrow confines of the Islamic system" and by allowing them to participate fully in Dutch culture. This entailed an expansion of Dutch education and the opening of the colonial administration and politics to qualified Indonesians. Snouck thus hoped to steal a march on Islam in terms of modern development and to wean the bulk of religious leaders in Java away from Islamic militancy by governmental noninterference in specifically religious affairs. His hope that the *priyayi* elite could guide the process of Westernization and modernization in Java proved unrealistic. A few regent families did indeed enjoy the benefits of Western education but their links with the vast mass of the Javanese population had already been severed by the impacts of colonialism. Westernization merely heightened their isolation and ineffectiveness (Carey, 103).

Unlike the Dutch government, the Spanish crown, from the early days of conquest, officially supported missionary activities. The missionaries were occupied with secular and religious activities. Moreover, Spanish religious orders did not have to deal directly with the "Islamic question" in the northern Philippines, although they had to face Muslims' resistance in the south.

As the Spanish conquered Cebu, Luzon, and other islands, the Spanish government established colonial bureaucracy, complete with an army, navy, police, ecclesiastical administration, provincial administration, and municipal administration. In terms of ecclesiastical administration, the union of church and state which prevailed in Spain, was also practiced in the Philippines. The church was supported by taxation. The clergy drew their salaries from the state. The Spanish priests enjoyed great political power and prestige. Besides being the guardians of the Christian religion, they were the paladins of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines.

The head of the religious administration was the Archbishop of Manila, who exercised general supervision and control over all religious affairs of the colony. He was appointed by the Pope upon recommendation of the King of Spain. Under him were the bishops, who were heads of their respective dioceses; and below these bishops were the parish priests, who were in charge

of the parishes. The priests usually had assistants called coadjutors, who were young priests. The Church exercised religious, political, and judicial functions. Its religious functions were the propagation and preservation of Christianity. Its political functions came out of its union with the State. All clergymen enjoyed political power and prestige. The judicial functions of the Church were discharged by the Archbishop's Court and the Holy Inquisition (Zaide, 177-8).

In such system, the real authority in the Philippines towns was the parish priest, "the virtual ruler of the town". The parish priest controlled the local elections, and usually the one elected to the office of *gobernadorcillo* (governor), was his *protégé*, or one who was his personal choice. Furthermore, he was also in charge of education, charities, social welfare, and other activities of the community. He was the inspector of taxation (tribute), the chief examiner of the bright pupils in the public schools, the arbiter of morals, and the censor of books, comedies, and dramas in the language of the country. He certified as to the character and civil status of the *quinto* (every fifth man drawn by lot to serve in the army). Finally, he was also the adviser of the municipal council. His recommendations on all matters affecting the town, were heeded by the provincial and central authorities. (Zaide, 132). "The padre," wrote the traveler Dr. Jagor, "is frequently the only white man in his village, probably the only European for miles around. He becomes the representative not only of religion, but of the government; he is the oracle of the Indians, and his decisions in everything that concerns Europe and civilization are without appeal. His advice is asked in all important emergencies and he has no one whom he in his turn can consult." (Jagor, 119, in Zaide, 132).

The King sent more and more friars of different religious orders to the Philippines at the request of those already residing in the Philippines. To prevent rivalry and conflict between these different orders, these orders were delegated to different towns (Virginia Benitez Licuanan and Jose Llavador Mira (eds), Book 5, 1991, 526). The King ordered the friars to construct the monasteries in various towns at the expense of Spain, but also asked the Filipino natives to contribute their labor for the construction of the buildings (The order of His Majesty, Antonio de Eraso, 13 May 1579, in Licuanan and Mira (eds), book 3, 1991, 317-8).

Since the early centuries of conquest, the Spanish missionaries had been busy converting local people. They were not only evangelizers but also linguists and philologists, masters of the Filipino vernaculars (Zaide, 147). Moreover, the missionaries also served as builders of roads, bridges, forts, irrigation dams, and other public works. For example, Frays Francisco Paula Marquez and Francisco Roxas were Agustinian builders of the road between Dagami and Tanauan. Father Antonio Sedeno, a Jesuit missionary-architect, built the first stone fortifications of Manila. The missionaries also introduced new plants and animals into the Philippines and taught the Filipinos new

industries and crafts. Dr. Laubach said, "Immense was their value to the Islands in the transfer of animals and plants to the Philippine from Spain and Mexico." (Zaide, 191-2).

The missionary orders brought to the Philippines not only the Catholic faith, but also cultural contributions. Missionaries played a crucial role in various fields, including industries, education, printing, libraries and museums, social welfare, literature, music, science, and art. For example, Father Manuel Plaza contributed to Philippine economic progress by promoting the cultivation of bananas in Bohol. The missionaries founded schools and colleges. It is true that the early Spanish missionaries were responsible, to a certain extent, for the destruction of the ancient Filipino writings. But the Spanish education facilitated the Filipino assimilation to the Latin alphabet, the Spanish language and culture, together with the Christian religion. The early missionaries also converted their convents into "schools of art" and taught the Filipinos the rudiments of Western painting and sculpture. (ibid, 192-3). Religion was stressed in all school curricula. Other subjects were Spanish language, Spanish history, music, morality and classical studies. There were no courses in Philippine history and civics, Filipino culture, and national language (ibid, vol.2, 89-90). In short, the missionaries regarded themselves as 'civilizing agents'. Hispanization rose to prominence in almost all aspect of social, political, and cultural life of the Filipino throughout the period from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century.

While the Catholic missionaries gave many contributions toward giving shape and direction to the building of the Philippines, the passing of years unfortunately also saw the church play an increasingly detrimental role in the islands. By the end of the nineteenth century the church, as represented by the religious orders, was seen by the local leaders of the Philippines as one of their enemies, and anticlericalism became one of the dominant factors in the Philippines Revolution. The following section will demonstrate how religion played a crucial role in resistance movements in the East Indies and the Philippines during the nineteenth century.

Religion and Resistance: Java War and Katipunan Revolution

As a result of European colonialism, new groups, ideas, objects, and organizational patterns were introduced into non-Western societies, where they altered and threatened the positions of previously established groups. As Michael Adas has argued, the theory of relative deprivation is well-suited to the comparative study of social protest and rebellion (Adas, 1979, 44). Dispute over land tenure had social, religious, and psychological implications that extended far beyond the obvious factors of production and subsistence (See Scott, 1976). The displacement of elite groups also had multifaceted effects as these groups had previously played economic, social, political and religious roles. Religion was all-pervasive, and in times of stress all men were warriors.

Javanese peasants did not relate to their indigenous rulers in merely political ways; among other things the king functioned as administrator, military commander, custodian of Javanese culture, and mediator between the forces of cosmos and the terrestrial realm (Adas, 45-6).

For three and a half centuries, Dutch colonialism created economic, political, and cultural transformation in different regions of the East Indies in varying degrees. In Java, the central place of Dutch control, such transformations were felt most acutely. The period from 1800 to the Java War (1825-30) was a turning point in the history of Java. Culturally and economically, the period witnessed a remarkable extension of European influence on Javanese society. Before the nineteenth century, contacts between Dutch officials and the local inhabitants had been mainly confined to the administrative elite. By the 1820s, however, the impact of the colonial administration had begun to make itself felt at the village level, and nearly the whole Java had passed under the direct control of the colonial government. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Java was divided between areas administered directly by the Dutch East India Company and the two independent principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta in Central Java (Carey, 1980, 45-6).

Historians have proposed a number of reasons for Prince Dipanagara's resistance to the Dutch. The reasons include economic hardship due to the heavy burden of taxes, rent system, forced labor, and land annexation by the Dutch government, political instability due to a threatening Dutch intervention in the Yogyakarta and Surakarta courts, leadership conflicts within the court, and the worsening position of the native elites (Steenbrink, 1984, 17-8). Dutch historian Justus M. van der Kroef and Javanese historian Sagimun, shared the suggestion that the main reasons were political and economic, but they also pointed to religious factors. Prince Dipanagara saw how Islamic and traditional Javanese customs degenerated rapidly due to the Western influences. The declining adherence to Islamic and Javanese traditions and immorality at the court attributable to the influence of the Dutch, forced Dipanagara to the conviction that reform was imperative. The first step toward reform would be to purify Islam and its practices in Java and thus to eliminate the source of the crisis. Under these circumstances, Dipanagara proclaimed himself *panatagama* (religious leader) who combined the secular and the religious elements. The religious element was clearly evident; Islamic-mystical symbols were used before and during the war. Dipanagara prophesized from the Koran (Holy Scriptures) the evil that befalls the Dutch officials (van der Kroef, 1949, 443, 470; Sagimun M.D., 1960).

Prince Dipanagara was an Islamic-syncretic mystic. For his followers, Dipanagara represented an Islamic ascetic piety (Ricklefs, 1998, 341-2). He was educated in Islamic law and Koran exegesis; one of his teachers made the pilgrimage to Mecca and others had lived for some period in the Holy City. At the same time, Dipanagara was encouraged to make pilgrimages to

various shrines and holy places associated with the Mataram Dynasty. Prince Dipanagara grew up in Yogyakarta, but mostly at the village of Tegalrejo where he obtained his Islamic education (Soekanto, 1959,15-6). Although he visited his family at the court, he was most of the time brought up to live apart from the court and established close contacts with the religious communities in the area. He often criticized the court when it fell under the influence of the Dutch, and his connections with important religious figures afforded him widespread local support during the early stages of the Java War (Carey, 63-5). To Dipanagara, the colonial order posed challenges to indigenous ritual and religious order. The Dutch posed a threat to the rule of Muslim princes in Java.

More than anything, religious, moral, and cultural crises eventually prodded Dipanagara and his adherents into open revolt. Western lifestyle, disrespect of Islamic law and tradition, and immorality were perceived as a threat to religious order. Thus, for example, Prince Dipanagara bitterly castigated a resident who merely “enjoyed eating and drinking and followed Dutch ways.” (ibid, 68). The number of local regents who had been Westernized greatly worried Dipanagara. Elements of the Western life-styles such as drinking and dress were strikingly threatening to the traditional and Islamic life-style of the Javanese Muslim community (Steenbrink, 1984, 18). From this can be understood why Dipanagara was later seen to have represented as an Islamic-Javanese-nationalist resistance to Western civilization brought about by the Dutch in the East Indies (van der Kroef, 1949, 424).

The influence of religion played a crucial role in the course of the fighting, because the religious communities had suffered the same economic and social constraints as their contemporaries in the court towns and the countryside. The attitude of Christian Europeans, especially governmental civilian and military personnel, towards Javanese Muslims appeared disdainful and insulting. Government actions against respected religious teachers in Central Java aroused considerable local resentment. Moreover, the legal reforms by governor-generals were viewed by religious communities (*santri*, students and *kiyai*, teacher) and even by the court elite as an unjustifiable infringement on the sovereignty of Javanese-Islamic law. The combination of these factors helped to reinforce a sense of common identity in the face of what the religious communities saw as ‘religious persecution’ on the part of the European government (Carey, 1981, xlv-xlvi). In addition, the Sultan was regarded as the sole link between man and the cosmos, and as such essential for the maintenance of harmony between the heavenly and terrestrial realms. The advance of Dutch power threatened a potential separation of religious and political, sacred and secular authority. These distinctions were seen as alien to the community of believers (*ummat*). Thus, no group in Java resisted Dutch expansion more tenaciously than the Muslim scholars (*ulama*), teachers (*kiyai*), and those who made the pilgrimage to Mecca (*haji*). In Prince Dipanagara

these diverse groups found a patron and defender (Adas, 58).

How did Dipanagara and his followers use religion to legitimize their resistance? They used Islamic symbols such as *kafir* to refer the infidels (i.e. the Dutch official). Of further interest is the fact that the Islam of Dipanagara and his followers was a localized, syncretic Islam. The appeal and ability of Dipanagara to mobilize widespread support were rooted in his personality, revelations and millenarian visions. He proclaimed himself as *Sultan* and *Ratu Paneteg Santagama* (the King who stands as the supreme arbiter of religion). He dressed in the garb (turban) of a Muslim leader engaged in the holy war (*jihad or perang sabil*). His followers were surrounded by the gilded umbrellas, inscribed banners, and the pomp and ceremony befitting the entourage of a Javanese monarch (Adas, 143).

The factor which enhanced his support immeasurably was the widespread belief that he was the Javanese Messiah, the *Ratu Adil*, who would institute a rule of truth and plenty after a period of decline. This belief, probably derived in Java from a Hindu cycle, was expressed in Javanese literature in the recensions of the prophecies of the legendary King of Kediri, Prabu Jayabaya (Carey, 70). In his proclamations and pleas for support from the nobility and the general populace, Dipanagara emphasized his belief that he was the leader of a holy crusade to drive out the infidel Dutch from Java (Adas, 58-9, 97).

In his chronicle (*babad*), Dipanagara describes the serious visions that was began when he was a young man. On several occasions, he was visited by such revered figures as the Goddess of the Southern Ocean (*Nyai Roro Kidul*) and the Muslim holymen (*walis*) to whom the conversion of Java to Islam was attributed. On these encounters, he learned great sufferings and struggles ahead and was told that he would someday become a King. He also records that he was addressed by many titles, including *Erucakra* ("Just King"), Lord of the Faith, and *Khalif* of the Prophet of God. These claims were widely accepted by both his noble and peasant followers as well as by Muslim religious figures who flocked to his cause. As befits a millenarian figure, Dipanagara's early escapes and recovery from battle wounds convinced his followers that he was invincible and invulnerable (Adas, 99, 128). The Java war ended in 1830 with the capture of Dipanagara in Java. He was exiled to Sulawesi and died there. But his resistance to the Dutch was continued by his followers in Java and other places in the archipelago.

In the Philippines, the story was somewhat different. Filipino revolution was closely tied to a system of belief adopted from Spain. Jose Rizal portrayed in *Noli Me Tangere* (published in Berlin in 1887) how Catholicism had been pervasive and the priests were important in local society. For example, one important character in the novel, named Ibarra, said: "I am Catholic and I keep pure the faith of my fathers." (José Rizal, 1997, 172). But not unlike the Java war, resistance and revolution in the nineteenth century's Philippines was largely religious in nature.

Economic, political, cultural, moral, and religious aspects were mixed. Increasing population, dissemination of the *pasyon*, the discrimination practiced by the Spanish clergy, rising rice prices, an economic recession,

an increasingly unfair tax burden, the Cuban revolution, and the growing incapacity of the Spanish bureaucracy, all helped to trigger resistance (Steinberg, 2000, 64). Yet, the peasant communities expressed their discontent against the Spanish regime through religious idioms. Popular movements were largely framed in religious rather than secular terms. It was not “aberration”, to use Reynaldo Ileto’s phrase, “but occasions in which hidden or unarticulated features of society reveal themselves.” Ileto argues that “the mass experience of Holy Week fundamentally shaped the style of peasant brotherhood and uprising.” In particular, the *pasyon* offered a language and a metaphor for expressing the suffering and hope within peasant society. Christ’s *pasyon* was an intensely personal and understandable experience for the Filipino, and a string of peasant leaders, such as Andres Bonafacio, who founded the Katipunan in 1892 (a Tagalog abbreviation for the Highest and Most Respectable Association of the Sons of the People) and led movements of both political and religious significance. Bonafacio’s retreat to the caves of Mount Tapusi during Holy Week, caves claimed to be those of the Tagalog folk hero Bernardo Carpio, was a symbolic act of vital importance. To the Katipunan, independence (*kalayaan*) and redemption were one (ibid., 58-63).

Internal issues within the religious institutions also triggered hatred against the colonial Spanish. Tensions emerged between the regular clergy and Filipino clergy (Eliodoro G. Robles, 1969, 43-4). A number of political measures adopted by the Spanish clergy, resulted in creating or deepening an antagonism between the Spanish regular clergy and the native secular clergy which rapidly degenerated into a national and racial enmity. Together with the development of a native clergy were the visitation controversy and the secularization controversy (Horacio de la Costa, 1969, 103-4). The Council of Trent in 1564 mentioned that any priest serving a parish should be subject to the authority of the bishop. In addition, bishops and archbishops had the right to supervise parishes within their respective jurisdictions. Despite this ruling, however, the power of the Spanish religious orders was such that there was no way of implementing secularization (the replacing of a regular by a secular priest). The friars became powerful and irreplaceable in the Philippines. These later became crucial background of anticlericalism and nationalism in the Philippines during the nineteenth century. In 1890, Jose Rizal wrote to Ferdinand Blumentritt:

I wanted to hit the friars, but since they used religion not only as a shield but as a weapon, protection, castle, fort, and armor, etc., I was forced to attack their false and superstitious religion to fight the enemy who hid behind it...God should not be utilized as a shield and protector of abuses, and there is less reason for religion to be used for this purpose. If the friars really had more respect for their religion they would not often use its sacred name or expose it to the most dangerous situations. What is

happening in the Philippines is terrible: they abuse the name of religion for a few pesos, preach it to enrich their properties, to seduce an innocent maid, to destroy an enemy, and to disturb the peace of a marriage or family, if not the honor of the wife (Epistolario Rizalino 1938, 528 in Majul, 1969, 159-60).

The major dispute concerned the issue of canonical visitation and it developed into the issue of possession of the parishes. Later in the 19th century, it acquired a racial and political color because the Filipino secular priests were denied the rights and privileges granted to the Spanish friars. The native priests increased in number and quality, in the sense that they are educated and well-trained. In many instances, they showed superiority, intellectually and morally, over the Spanish friars in charge of the parishes. Thus, for example, on June 27, 1864, the young Father Jose Burgos published in Manila a defense of the Filipino clergy entitled *Manifiesto to the Noble Spanish People which the Loyal Filipinos Address in Defense of Their Honor and Loyalty that Have Been Grievously Offended by the Newspaper "La Verdad" of Madrid*. This was one example of how the Filipino clergy suffered injustices and racial discrimination. Out of this conflict, it developed a grievance against Spain, which became one of the causes of the propaganda reform movement (1872-1892) and later of the Philippine Revolution of 1896. (Zaide, vol.2, 40-9). The martyrdom of Father Burgos, Gomez, and Zamora who were accused by the Spanish government to have fomented a revolt at the Cavite Mutiny in 1872, reinforced the growing grievances against Spain among the natives. This contributed to revolution (Steinberg, 83).

How did Catholicism serve to legitimize the Philippine revolution? As it has been shown above, religious conversion was crucial to the consolidation of Spanish power in the Philippines. Catholicism affected in large measure the structuring of the patterns of authority and submission in the history of colonial society. It shaped as it solicited the terms of native surrender, just as in later years. It would lend itself to the formation of idioms of native resistance to colonial rule. For example, one of the Katipunan leaders (*Katipunero*), Genaro de los Reyes wrote the following: "For three generations, the Spaniards have been enslaving the Philippines. Now they are irritable a lot and they kill anyone who comes out in defense of reason. They came as conquerors, and along with the members of the religious orders, they trampled upon our lives and seized our properties. Using religion as a mean of deceiving the people, they appropriated our land and resources..." (in Santiago V. Alvarez, 1992, 160).

Religious language was now widely employed, in a way that the Spanish priests neither welcomed nor expected. Thus, for example, Emilio Jacinto, who was acclaimed by his people as the 'brains of the Katipunan', and the 'Moses of the Filipino people' wrote in his '*Ang Maling Pagsampalataya*' (False

Belief), as follows:

By false belief we wish to say a blind belief in what another say.... And they who do not practice any of its teachings of Christ, call themselves men of Christ?

Christ said: love one another; you are all brothers and equal. And the love of those who call themselves Christians consists in defrauding and robbing their fellowmen, and equality and fraternity they practice by exploiting their similars (sic) and absconding with their wealth....He who wishes to call himself a disciple and man of Christ must imitate him in his humility, kindness, and love for his fellowmen....God is the father of humanity...hence the true respect and obedience to God consists in respect, love, and obedience to the dictates of reason, and to them we must just all our acts, words, and movements, because reason originates with God himself... (Ibid.,42-3; also Agoncillo, 1956, 16).

Thousands were attracted to these teachings of the Katipunan. The harsh methods used by the friars, especially in the execution of Jose Rizal, only brought the people closer together and ensured the advent of a revolution. Religion and revolution were inextricably interwoven in this instance. On the side of Spain, the religious orders were aligned with those forces seeking to stop the revolution and preserve the status quo. On the side of the Philippines, the abuses practiced by the friars topped in the list of grievances that people articulated against the colonial power. Anticlericalism, strong in Latin America and Europe at that time, easily found its way to the Philippines where magnified religious abuses were rampant. While it was not the only rallying cry over the revolution, all other issues – independence, equality, justice, freedom, and land reform – they were related to the question of religion, because of the wide scope of the friars' power and concomitant abuses. The religious orders remained aligned until the end with the forces of reaction that were stifling Philippine nationhood. As Emilio Aguinaldo, who became the first President of the Philippine Republic, said, "it is a widely known and notorious fact, recognized by all the foreigners who have studied Philippine affairs, that the primary causes of the Philippine revolution were the ecclesiastical corporations which, taking advantage of the corrupt Spanish government, have robbed the country, preventing progress and liberty." (Report of the Philippine Commission, 1900, I, 130, in Deats, 1967, 41).

Despite of the fact that the majority of the Filipinos professed loyalty to the Church, the revolution was directed against the friars. Yet, as Richard Deats suggested, this anticlericalism was directed solely toward the foreign priests. The Filipino priests, who had not been in any position of power or prestige within the Church, did not suffer from the people's anticlerical feelings. Three

of their Fathers, Burgos, Gomez, and Zamora, had been the first martyrs of the revolution (executed in 1872) and native priests felt the sting of racial discrimination by the foreigners (*ibid.*, 42). This discrimination against the Filipino clergy was of primary concern, as it was the Filipino clergy that had attained a level of education which ought to have enabled them to take their place alongside their Spanish counterparts (John N. Schumacher, SJ, 1981, 31; John. N. Schumacher, SJ, 1991, 23-30). Moreover, the revolutionaries did not direct their movement against the Roman Catholic Church as such. The Spanish friars tried desperately to convince the people that efforts against the religious orders were actually rebellion against the Church. The revolutionary leaders however held that "they fought the friars and not the Church and that if the Church was endangered, the blame was to be laid on the friars who obstructed the formation of a Filipino clergy whose business was to see to it that the interests of the Church in the Philippines were protected." (Deats, 1967, 42).

Reynaldo Ileto has persuasively demonstrated the persistence of an ideology of resistance based on Spanish-Christian notions of suffering and paradise. Ileto has shown how ideas of revolution and independence of the Katipunan were expressed in the idiom of the *pasyon*. Thus, as Ileto puts it, "the history of the Filipino people was seen in terms of lost Eden, the recovery of which demanded the people's participation in the *pasyon* of Mother Country. Initiation rituals involved transformation of *loób*, a rebirth in the brotherhood, a passage from darkness to light. And paradise became *kalayaan* – not only independence from Spain but enlightenment, prosperity, and true brotherhood." (Ileto, 1998, 254).

Reynaldo Ileto further argued that the Spanish missionaries taught a mystified and 'other worldly' version of Christianity to indoctrinate and subdue the Filipino people for their Spanish overlords. However, Filipinos interpreted Christianity in terms of their own cultural practices and beliefs, rather than adopting the Spanish perspective. Filipinos were able to articulate in the language of Christianity a means for expressing their own values, ideals, and hopes for liberation from their colonial oppressors. As Vicente L. Rafael has argued, language played an important role in shaping the diversity of meanings pertaining to the Spanish friars and to the native Christian converts. Rafael emphasized the differences between Spanish and Tagalog ways of signifying that would problematize the former's claims of power over the latter based on the translation of their language and the "conversion of their bodies and souls". Rafael suggested that the Tagalog reception of colonial rule, as evidenced by their rapid conversion to Christianity, was premised on a sense of what it meant to *submit* to and *negotiate* with authority in ways that were considerably at odds with Spanish expectations (Rafael, 1984).

Although there was a common religious identity among the Spanish friars/priests and the native priests/people, each group had reinterpreted

Christian ideas in its own way (Andaya, 2001, 59). An example of this is Isabelo de los Reyes Florentino's book (1899, Madrid) entitled "The religion of the Katipunan which is the religion of the ancient Filipinos" (Isabelo de Los Reyes Florentino, 1980). In this regard, the conflict between the colonizer and the colonized was powerful and deeply felt.

Thus, Filipinos used Catholicism to formulate resistance to Spanish colonialism. From the Spanish perspective, the *pasyon* was to discourage the natives from enriching and educating themselves to the point that they might constitute a threat to colonial rule. From the Filipino perspective, the *pasyon* was understood in the view of their own world, a world of suffering and hope, independence and redemption.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to demonstrate how religious identifications served to legitimize both imperial control and resistance to empire. This paper has demonstrated that during its colonial rule, especially in the nineteenth century, Dutch failed to make the East-Indies to be Dutch to a similar extent that the Spanish succeeded to make the Philippines Spanish. In both cases of colonialism, religion was a crucial instrument by which to maintain and strengthen domination over a colonized people. For the Spanish, Catholicism was part of their Hispanic civilization and therefore it needed to be part of their colonial projects. To be Hispanic was to be Catholic. By contrast, although Dutch missionaries were able to convert certain sections of the Indonesian population to Christianity, the Dutch government did not conceive proselytization to be a vital part of the colonial enterprise.

Spanish missionaries attempted to control the natives through various religious and cultural means, without any suspicions that the natives would use the religious teachings they acquired to resist colonial authority. *Pasyon* of Christ was the most influential teachings of the missionaries that the natives received and used it for their own purposes. Spanish missionaries managed to convert the majority of the natives they encountered and they maintained their control through ongoing Christianization. The Dutch, on the other hand, struggled to deal with an already Islamized Indonesia. The Spanish believed that Christianization and colonialism were inextricably linked, whereas the Dutch government only allowed missionaries to perform their duties on the condition that they did not threaten economic interests. The Spanish worked among people practicing local religions, while the Dutch missionaries faced an, at the time, antagonistic world religion.

Why was Spain more successful in using religion as an instrument of imperial control? As a theocratic state, the Spanish made Catholic missionary activity its priority, whereas the Dutch had to face internal debate at home over the legality of the Protestant missions abroad and did not surreptitiously support the missions until the late nineteenth century (although some

missionaries had decided to convert the Indies, despite government restrictions).

Moreover, in terms of bureaucracy, Spanish missionaries dealt with both religious and secular affairs, whereas the Dutch separated the two. Consequently, Spanish missionaries interacted directly with local people, while the Dutch largely interacted with the elite (regents and aristocrats). The extent of Christianization was wider and more popular in Spanish case than in that of the Dutch East Indies. Consequently, the Christianity impact on Indonesia was far less severe than was the case in the Philippines, partly because the Christian missions never received a similar level of state support.

Imperialism was accompanied by local resistance and in both cases, the colonized used religion, as they interpreted and localized it, to legitimize resistance to the colonials (See Reynaldo Ileto, 1999, 193-244). They interpreted religious symbols and teachings in their own way and used them as an instrument for their anticolonialism. The Javanese Muslims used Islamic symbols such as *kafir* (to be interpreted as infidel) and *jihad* (to be understood as holy war) as well as local Javanese idioms such as *Panataagama* (religious leadership) and *Ratu adil* (just rule). In a different way, the Filipino revolutionaries used the passion of Christ during the Holy Week and reinterpreted the teachings in the Bible to strengthen their sense of discontent and hope, love and reason, freedom and justice. Thus, religion became localized before it became an instrument of resistance to colonial powers.

Religion had become part of the natives' worldview. They lived as they understood life through interactions with the outside world. Conversion entailed a plethora of adaptations of the new religion; resistance to colonialism was merely a facet. Moreover, religion constituted both abstract and practical cultural system on which man could depend on times of need. In regard of political, economic, and cultural crisis, religion became a powerful mean to legitimize discontent and hope. ●

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Indonesia and Nigeria, 1965-1985: Structural Factors, Technocracy and the Politics of Rural Development¹

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo ²

Abstrak

Tulisan ini membandingkan perkembangan ekonomi antara Indonesia dan Nigeria pada periode tahun 1965-1985. Kedua negara merupakan negara pascakolonial yang kaya akan minyak, padat penduduk, multietnis, dan pihak militer mendominasi kehidupan politik. Faktor struktural maupun institusional yang terintegrasi ke dalam ranah sosial dan sejarah politik perlu dinyatakan untuk memahami perkembangan kedua negara. Tulisan ini akan menunjukkan bahwa teknokrasi beroleh peran penting dalam menata perkembangan ekonomi, khususnya dalam pengembangan pertanian dan pembangunan pedesaan yang terpengaruh kuat oleh politik pembangunan pedesaan. Faktor struktural yang saling memengaruhi ini, baik secara *exogenous* maupun *endogenous*, menjadi penopang bagi kebijakan yang mendukung rakyat miskin maupun strategi untuk mereduksi angka kemiskinan, dan kebijakan itu dapat diterapkan dalam waktu jangka panjang. Stabilitas politik pada masa Orde Baru di Indonesia merupakan faktor penting bagi para perencana ekonomi untuk menerapkan kebijakan ekonomi mereka. Sedangkan di Nigeria, faktor-

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faktor struktural yang tidak memiliki benang merah, utamanya permasalahan antara negara dan masyarakat, memperlihatkan adanya kelemahan institusi politik yang mengakibatkan para elit-teknokrat tidak dapat merumuskan maupun mengimplementasikan pembangunan ekonomi. Kesuksesan pembangunan ekonomi pada periode tahun 1965-1985 di Indonesia terlaksana berkat adanya kelompok ekonom-teknokrat yang membantu perkembangan ekonomi dan sebagian besar dari mereka mengurus pembangunan pedesaan.

Kata kunci: pembangunan ekonomi, kebijakan, pertanian, pembangunan pedesaan, ekonom-teknokrat

“...the New Order’s trajectory did not come out of nowhere. This ‘Order’ was not the antithesis of the political situation that preceded it, but rather its continuity”.

Goenawan Mohamad (2005)

“...largely inherited from the colonial experience and reproduced by the dependent accumulative base of the ‘new’ Nigerian bourgeoisie, that Nigeria began to experience serious political conflicts and disturbances beginning in 1962.”

Julius O. Ihonvbere and Timothy M. Shaw (1998)

The historical course of development sets a pattern, but paths may be altered and new equilibria attained. Economic development rests upon politically negotiated institutions.

Peter Lewis (2007)

Comparative Study on Nigeria and Indonesia

Scholars, mostly in the field of economic development, only recently became interested in a comparative study of Indonesia and Nigeria. It began in the late 1980s, particularly among the economists who were working at the World Bank which looked at the development processes across the globe. The international data panel and cross country study, shows similar features between Indonesia and Nigeria in terms of its geographic and demographic size, political development and ethnic diversity. The two countries faced relatively similar economic conditions in the late sixties, but within two decades showed a different path in their economic performance. The first comparative analysis appears in public was a study by Brian Pinto, as part of

a comparative World Bank study.³ The study emphasized the spending effect and its impact on resource allocation in the non-oil sectors of the economy. The comparison reveals that there were important differences between countries with regard to fiscal and exchange rate policies. The major differences also existed in their foreign borrowing strategies, which were more conservative in Indonesia; and agricultural policy, which was market-oriented and included provision of transitional assistance in Indonesia. Pinto's comparative study shows clearly the different outcomes of economic policies in Nigeria and Indonesia during and after the oil-boom period.

In an attempt to explain what factors influenced the development policies, which was not discussed in Pinto's study, Erik Thorbecke in 1996 wrote a conference paper that dealt with the institutional basis for economic development. The paper that eventually appeared in the proceedings of the conference in 1998 was entitled "The Institutional Foundations of Macroeconomic Stability: Indonesia versus Nigeria".⁴ The main question raised by Thorbecke was "What then accounts for the widely divergent paths they have followed – for Indonesia's stability and impressive growth and Nigeria's instability and economic stagnation?" According to Thorbecke there were four initial conditions that played a major role in leading the two countries into different paths: (1) the size, distribution, composition and characteristics of the main ethnic groups; (2) the form and content of the original Constitutions; (3) the process through which Independence was obtained; and (4) the background of the leaders. Thorbecke argued that looking at the similarity in its initial factors Indonesia, in fact, could easily have followed Nigeria's path. Yet Indonesia's performance was helped by some favorable conditions, particularly more consensual ethnic relationships, a unitary constitution and uninterrupted leadership.

Ten years after Pinto had published his study, another World Bank study was published in 1999 that was based on what its authors, Bevan, Collier and Gunning called "analytical economic history" and "political economy".

3 Appears as an article entitled "Nigeria During and After the Oil Boom: A Policy Comparison with Indonesia", in *World Bank Economic Review* 1, no. 3, pp. 419-45, 1987. Though less substantial, the comparison between Indonesia and Nigeria's development also appears in several other studies, among others: Sara J. Scherr (1989) "Agriculture in an Export Boom economy: A Comparative Analysis of Policy and Performance in Indonesia, Mexico and Nigeria", in *World Development*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 543-560.; Robert Dible (1998) "Cross-National Economic Development in Indonesia and Nigeria", in *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives and Area Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 65-85.; Sven Wunder (2003) *Oil Wealth and the Fate of the Forest: A comparative study of eight tropical countries*. Especially chapter six "More tales of oil wealth and forests: Mexico, Nigeria and Indonesia". London and New York: Routledge.; and Andrew Rosser (2007) "Escaping the Resource Curse: The case of Indonesia" in *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 37, No. 1, February, pp. 38-58; Francois Regoli, 1996, "Integrating Social Formations into The World Economy: The case of Indonesia and Nigeria", Unpublished Master Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Ottawa.

4 See Thorbecke's contributing chapter (pp. 106-139) and Mari Pangestu's comment on Thorbecke's paper (pp. 140-143) in Yujiro Hayami and Masahiko Aoki, 1998.

The book, entitled *The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth in Nigeria and Indonesia, 1950-86* provides a substantial analysis on the development of the two countries from the early 1950s to the mid-1980s. By pairing the two countries within a particular long historical period, it was expected that the study would be able to offer “a novel and promising way of reconciling in-depth case studies with a broader comparative method of analysis”. The study could also be seen as a move from what is conventionally called “statistical comparative studies” to an analysis that goes “beyond statistics”. The central question explored in the book was “why equitable growth did not take place in Nigeria after 1972 when, at least superficially, it had the same opportunities as Indonesia”.⁵ Since both countries received an enormous oil windfall during this period, it is tempting to focus on differences in the handling of the windfall as accounting for the differences in outcomes. According to this study, Indonesia turned oil income into productive investment, whereas Nigerian oil income was either siphoned abroad or used for prestige projects. According to the authors of this book, the key for success for Indonesia was because Indonesia was capable to establish an environment conducive to growth in the non-oil economy, while Nigeria could not. Indonesia was also able to implement an economic liberalization policy which was in general sustained since 1967, whereas Nigeria delayed liberalization until 1986, and subsequently reversed it.⁶ The book, which was published after Indonesia experienced a severe economic crisis in 1997-98, concludes and supports the author’s argument that “far from being deep-rooted, the reasons for divergent performance reflected temporary and change conjunctions of circumstances.

In 2007, Lewis, a Nigerian specialist, from an institutional perspective published a book, entitled *Growing Apart: Oil, Politics and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria*. Lewis began his book by asking two basic questions: “What types of institutional arrangement are essential for economic growth in poor countries?” and “What are the political conditions that foster the development of growth-inducing institutions?” Viewing Indonesia and Nigeria in the mid 2000s, Lewis was apparently able to look at Indonesia and Nigeria after both countries had experienced a long authoritarian regime, economic crises and a political transition from an authoritarian to a civilian government and democracy. Again the striking different paths of governance and economic performance from the late 1960s through the 1990s, have also led other observers to make a comparative analysis of what constitutes the driving force to find a better explanation in which Lewis believes in

5 See David Bevan, Paul Collier and J.W. Gunning, *The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth in Nigeria and Indonesia, 1950-86*.

6 It is surprising that Lewis did not mention in his book (2007) any findings of Thorbecke’s analysis on the institutional fundamentals of macro economic development in Indonesia and Nigeria (1998).

institutional dimensions of economic change. The main thrust of the book is therefore about the interplay of politics, institutional change, and economic growth; that produced the economic divergence (and lately convergence) in Indonesia and Nigeria. Lewis analytical framework can be seen as a further analytical refinement of what has been done previously by Thorbecke and Bevan *et al.* While these previous studies emphasized mostly the endogenous factors, only Rosser, in his article "Escaping the Resource Curse: The case of Indonesia" (2007) looked at both endogenous and exogenous factors that fundamentally contributed to the success story of Indonesia in avoiding the resource curse – as experienced by other resource rich countries such as Nigeria. Those two fundamental factors, according to Rosser, are: (1) the political victory of counter-revolutionary social forces over radical nationalist and communist social forces in Indonesia during the late 1960s; and (2) the country's strategic Cold War location and proximity to Japan. In viewing the development prospect, particularly in Africa, there are apparently two existing views. On the one hand, observers believe in the deep determinants of development, namely geography, institutions and history. For this reason their outlook is more pessimistic. On the other hand, there are observers who hold that the problems lie in the policies, and what matters is whether or not right policy levers could be pulled at the right times to yield the big policy impacts (Johnson *et. al.* 2007: 26).

Technocracy and Development

In the period of the 1960s and 1970s, political realities proved to be difficult for the major proponents of the Non-Aligned Movement, such as Indonesia, Egypt, India and China, to stay away from the increasing contentious polarization of Cold War politics. The world apparently entered new political realities, in which the members of the Third World were pushed or pulled into the socialist-communist or liberal-capitalist blocks. During this critical period, academic communities and scholarships could also not be isolated from this political polarization. Kahin (2003: 140) the founding father of Indonesian studies in the US, wrote in his testament "In early 1953 the Ford Foundation's Board of Directors concluded that the United States was embarrassingly deficient in the knowledge necessary to understand political, economic and social conditions in much of postwar Asia. It singled out Japan, India, Indonesia and Iran as areas where American scholarship was particularly deficient and where scholarly studies should be funded to help rectify this deficiency. In the course of their discussions, an apparent majority of the foundation's board members concluded that special emphasis should be given to research on Communist movements in these countries, and this was envisaged as a major component of all of the studies".

The flourishing of various social theories that belong to the modernization school of thought was also influenced by the Cold War politics, in order to

expand the ideological basis, both from the socialist and capitalist blocks. The increasing number of authoritarian states adopted various developmental paradigms along the line of modernization theories in many of the post-colonial states in Asia, Latin America and Africa, should be seen in this light. The Cold War political context provides a momentum for the Third World to get access to development aid as well as military assistance from both the Soviet and American blocks. The Vietnam War in Asia and the civil wars in Africa often represented the actual Cold War's conflicts and contestations. It was during this period that authoritarian military regimes emerged as the dominating power sometimes after the bloody *coup d'état*. Indonesia, South Korea, Chile and Nigeria offer perhaps some good examples of this newly emerging regimes coming out of the Cold War politics.

The political changes in many post-colonial states as influenced by the Cold War politics interestingly also coincided with the growing perspectives within the American social science disciplines, particularly in economics and political science. It was during this time that many economists who were trained in America returned to their countries to work on developing their countries' economy. The fact that many developing countries were under an authoritarian military regime reflects developmentalism as the dominant ideology in which autocracy and technocracy could go hand in hand. The development of developmentalism in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, can not be separated with the expansion of anti-communist strategy that was nurtured by the US since the early 1950s, as asserted by Kahin (2003). The involvement of the Ford Foundation in developing a new generation of economists who were trained mostly at the University of California, Berkeley, who in the late 1960s became very influential in directing economic development, is widely known.⁷ While the military government of Nigeria also emerged since the mid-1960s, the role of technocracy in this country in formulating and implementing economic development policy was more diffuse and less significant.

In a symposium on "Technocrats in Southeast Asia"⁸ Pauker (1976: 1197-1201) in the concluding session posed a provocative question "Are

7 In 2005, The Ford Foundation office in Jakarta commissioned, several social scientists wrote various issues concerning the development of social sciences and power in Indonesia. In a chapter on the development of scholarship and research on agrarian issues, Benjamin White (2005) showed the influence of American scholars in the discourse and the agricultural policy orientation adopted by the Indonesian policy makers. The publication on the Ford Foundation activities in Indonesia, especially in relation to the birth of influential economist-technocrats group from University of Indonesia, are numerous, ranging from the very critical view of David Ransom 'Berkeley Mafia' (1974), to the more positive view like the latest Ford Foundation's 100 years anniversary celebration in Indonesia (2003).

8 The three papers, by Richard Hooley (The Contribution of Technocrats to Development in Southeast Asia), John James MacDougall (The Technocratic Model of Modernization: The Case of Indonesia's New Order) and Laurence D. Stifel (Technocrats and Modernization in Thailand) that were published in *Asian Survey* (Dec, 1976) was originally presented at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies.

There Technocrats in Southeast Asia?"⁹ Pauker argued that because the label technocrats had gained acceptance in referring to certain Western-oriented modernizers currently influential in Southeast Asia. It was logical to ask whether the term has substantive meaning. After tracing the historical development of the term in Western Europe and North America, Pauker suggested that what events were developing in Southeast Asia in the 1970s, had actually very different realities. According to Pauker, Western technocratic ideas were a response to the disruptions created by the impact of science and technology in countries which were industrializing successfully. While in Southeast Asia, the so-called technocrats – mostly trained as economists in Western universities – were primarily concerned with overcoming various obstacles to the modernization and development of their countries. The aim of technocracy in Southeast Asia, according to Pauker, was simply achieving rapid economic growth. Precisely because of their preoccupation with achieving economic development goals, technocrats in Southeast Asia aligned themselves with the military authoritarian regime. Yet, except for their antagonism toward professional politicians, technocrats in Southeast Asia have nothing in common with the school of thought which originated in the western liberal democratic tradition.

Lande (1976: 1151-1152) in the introduction of the symposium noted that technocrats in the governmental sphere may be defined as highly trained professionals who exert extraordinary influence on the formulation and execution of policy because of their professional expertise. They share commitment to a pragmatic, non-ideological approach to development which looks to the West for models and material assistance. They find themselves attacked by their critics, both local and foreign, for neglecting egalitarian, nationalistic, and civil libertarian goals in their primary dedication to the goal of economic growth. The interrelationship of technocracy and authoritarianism in Southeast Asia in the 1970s, according to Milne (1982) cannot be generalized. While Indonesia and the Philippines during the Marcos' era show similarity since the technocrats under the authoritarian regimes were limited to their subordinate roles. In Thailand, on the other hand, indicates the role of the technocrats increased even there was a decline in authoritarian rule. According to Milne, in Thailand, unlike Indonesia and the Philippines, some technocrats were members of political parties, and maybe referred to as "political", as opposed to "non-political", technocrats.

⁹ Guy J. Pauker, a senior staff member in the Social Science Department at the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, is well known of his role in the early years of the New Order in Indonesia. For some people, Berkeley Mafia, is a pejorative identification of a young group economists from the University of Indonesia who are mostly trained at the University of California at Berkeley. It was suspected that Guy Pauker who masterminded these young economists to become instructors at *Seskoad* (*Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat*), the Army Staff and Command School in Bandung in which Soeharto, the army general is closely associated with *PSI* (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia* or Indonesia Socialist Party) and Pauker's colleague became the school's headmaster.

The discourse among academics on the technocracy often lumps together the technocrats in the broad category of the intellectuals. While technocrats are people who have expertise and tend to be a-political and non-ideological, and intellectuals are people who are perceived as always being concerned about the faith of the society. Therefore, intellectuals tend to be political and ideological in expressing their views. In Nigeria, for example, Bangura (1994) has written about the constraints and opportunities in the formation of a Nigerian technocracy from a broader perspective. In the monograph published by UNRISD, Bangura explored the dynamics that shaped the emergence of academics as a social force in Nigeria. He also elaborates the complex process that facilitated their recruitment into the principal state institutions for managing the economic and political reforms. In Nigeria, according to Bangura (1994), a diffuse technocracy emerged in which academics played a leading role, but their effectiveness was hampered by the nature of the political reforms, which lacked sufficient institutionalization and enduring rules for political bargaining and the building of a stable coalition. Technocrats were exposed to many changes in rules, personnel and policy and became active participants in the struggle for offices and influence which ultimately concentrated power in the hands of the president and the military establishment.

Olukoshi (2004), in his article "Democratization, Globalization and Effective Policy making in Africa", argued that since the early 1980s when African countries began to slide into economic crisis from which most of them are still to recover, a considerable amount of scholarly and policy attention has been devoted to improve what has been broadly described as the "policy environment" on the continent. The aim has been to overcome perceived shortcomings in the policy formulation and implementation with a view to making it more "effective" from a managerial and delivery point of view. Following the argumentation proposed by the World Bank (1981) and Bates (1981), Olukoshi argued that the dominant assumption underlying the mainstream focus on the African policy environment is simple: Africa's economic crisis was, in origin, primarily the product of accumulated policy distortions built up since the independence in the 1960s. Overcoming the crisis required a wholesale revisiting of the policy environment to eliminate the distortions that hampered economic growth and discouraged private initiative. This perception of the root of the African economic crisis, first popularized by the Berg Report, was soon to be codified into the ubiquitous structural adjustment programs which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank encouraged African countries to adopt throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, under the banner of "getting the prices right," structural adjustment became the main, overarching framework within which different efforts were made to improve the African policy environment. With regard to the role of technocracy, Olukoshi (2004) argued that the political

effectiveness of the technocratic elite which the Bank tried to nurture was, however, compromised by the fact that its leading lights were seen locally as being too closely tied to external interests at the same time as they were increasingly cut off from the rest of the local policy community either by commission or default. They were also ill-equipped to navigate the domestic political terrain, making it easy for them to be outmaneuvered. When the crunch came, they were mostly unable to cope with or surmount the nationalist instinct in the bureaucracy and polity and were, therefore, readily sacrificed by the political leaders who appointed them or whose support they ultimately needed to remain effective.

The Structural and Institutional Factors as Preconditions for Economic Development

Economic development in Nigeria and Indonesia during 1965-1985 constitutes a dynamic process that reflects embedded structural and institutional factors within the social and political history of both countries. Structure and institution are two social entities that are closely interlinked by the interplay between and among its respected factors, embedded in the history of the country. There are eight major structural and institutional factors that are identified as preconditions in shaping economic development during 1965-1985. Those are: (1) Nationalism and ideology, (2) Format and structure of the state, (3) Ethnic politics, war and secessionist movements, (4) The military, (5) The party system, (6) Regional dynamics and contagion effect, (7) International factors (foreign aid, loans, and investment), (8) The economist-technocrats group.

1. Nationalism and Ideology

The political processes in obtaining independence and statehood, is strongly influenced by the substance and the strength of nationalism and the state ideology. In Indonesia, national consciousness among few educated elites began to form its formal institutions in 1908 when *Budi Utomo* was declared as the first nationalist movement. In Nigeria, such nationalist movement did not exist and the British during this time even began to consolidate its colony and protectorate through indirect rule. In 1922 part of the former German colony "Kamerun" was added into what was called 'under British rule' by the "League of Nations". In 1928 the nationalist movements in Indonesia reach its historical momentum when a youth conference pledged the so-called youth oath (*Sumpah Pemuda*) to work for "one nation, one language and one country" - Indonesia. In 1945 Indonesia's nationalist leaders proclaimed Indonesia's national independence. Soekarno became the first president of the Republic of Indonesia. In 1960 the British gave the independence to Nigeria after a relatively fair general election in 1959 in which former Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa led a coalition government. Balewa was asked by

the British to form a federal government, and he was then inaugurated as the first president. According to Mundt and Aborisade (2004: 700) Nigeria at the time of independence was considered to be conservative and “pro western”, especially in contrast to such radical regimes of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana.¹⁰ As a nation, Nigeria was created based on federation of different ethnic groups. While Indonesia was united by a strong civic nationalism. In Indonesia, *Pancasila* was agreed by consensus, by different political factions and groups inherited national ideology of the state. In Nigeria, the national ideology was based more on the temporary and situational political consensus, reached between elites of different ethnic groups that were achieved through the federation format of the state. Comparing to Indonesia, the Nigerian state’s ideology is less cohesive and even tend to be divisive than Indonesia’s which has been more inclusive as an outcome of its long history of nationalist movement.

2. Format and Structure of the State

The state’s format and the structure of the government are outcomes of the long political process, mostly before independence. In a way that the format and structure of the state are also an institutional manifestation of the country’s state ideology. The federal format adopted in Nigeria is also seen in many other countries, such as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, India, Kenya, that show the significance of British political influence to the elites of its former colonies. The indirect rule as the way in which the British governed its colony has created a clearly segregated territorial sub-nations of which the boundaries are based on ethnicity. Ethnicity has become the defining territorial boundaries and the basis for regionalization and the creation of the sub-state. Federalism as the format of the state is therefore representing the political consensus among the existing sub-states during independence. In Nigeria, the number of states (sub-nations) is increasing every time a new consensus regarding the distribution of resources is achieved. Indonesia’s independence movement strongly influenced the unifying character of the state. The struggle for independence that was advocated by the nationalist leaders strongly emphasized the urgent need to unite all forces in order to oppose the strong attempt by the Dutch colonial government to weaken the nationalist movement by using the ‘divide and rule’ political strategy. In Indonesia, the decision to form a unitary state rather than a federal state was therefore strongly influenced by the spirit of the nationalist movement and the struggle for independence. The strong will is to unite all the political factions as well as all the disparate regions and

10 The prime minister at independence, Tafawa Balewa, announced the country’s gratitude “to the British whom we have known first as masters, then leaders, and finally as partners, but always friends” (Mundt and Aborisade, 2004: 700).

territories within a single national state. It is logically created a strong centralistic government that by its nature opposed the demand to decentralize power to the regions.

3. Ethnic Politics, War and Secessionist Movements

Partly resulting from the way the state was formatted and structured along ethnic politics became a strong feature of the polity in Nigeria. The creation of a new state became the end, but also the strategy by the political elites to distribute the political and economic resources. As succinctly observed by Mustapha (2006: 43): "Since 1966, efforts to reform inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria have had only limited success. Bureaucratic and political powers are frequently used for personal, and not collective, advancement. While reforms have fundamentally transformed the Nigerian state, they have yet to solve the problem of ethnic mobilization and conflict". The war and secessionist movements that often occur in Nigeria could be seen as a result of the concentration of power in a particular ethnic group that triggered a political movement to challenge such power of concentration. After oil revenues began to flow, it was quite understandable that oil became the resource that attracted different power centers to contest in order to control much of the oil revenues. In this context, the development of a fragmented political patronage that strongly characterizes Nigerian politics should be understood. The civil war following the creation of a separate Biafra state and the continuing incidence of ethnic conflicts, reflect the fragile nature of the state format and the political mechanisms in resolving the problem of resource distribution between the different groups and territories. Although Indonesia is also a multi-ethnic country, ethnicity does not represent the dividing factor within Indonesian society. The trans-ethnic nature of Indonesian nationalism and the unitary state format, provide a strong basis for the nurturing of Indonesian nationhood and undermine the demand for creating a separate, local and narrow sense of ethno-nationalism. In Indonesia political grievances from the region to the central government abound. Aceh, Papua and East Timor (during the Indonesian occupation: 1975-1999) represent the political challenge to the strong centralistic government. Yet, it is perhaps misleading to see it as a secessionist moment. Their grievances about the national government (except for East Timor) represent more the resistance movement against the repressive and authoritarian ways the central government distributed the proceeds from their natural resources. Aceh and Papua, as well as Riau and East Kalimantan are natural resource-rich provinces that strongly felt being treated unjustly by the central government in the sharing of the resource revenues.

4. The Role of the Military

The military play a decisive role in Nigeria and up to Soeharto's fall also in Indonesia. The state ideology and the format and structure of the state,

however, provide a different basis upon which the military play their political roles. In Indonesia the military was strongly influenced by the strong nationalist movement and the struggle for independence. In this regard, the Indonesian military often claimed themselves as the national guardian of the state ideology and the defender of the unitary state. The state's ideology *Pancasila* and the state's "1945 constitution" have been claimed as the military's fundamental basis for their mission to protect the country from any threats, externally and internally. Under General Soeharto, the military organization was restructured in order to secure the Soeharto's regime, in particular to repress any possible internal threats, both from the left and the right, as well as from the military itself.¹¹ The military's dual function doctrine that was introduced by General Nasution as part of his military strategy to prevent communism, under Soeharto became the major policy to legitimize the deployment of military personnel deep into the civilian bureaucracy. It was under Soeharto that many generals were appointed as provincial governors and district heads. The military also strongly penetrated into the political parties that under Soeharto were reduced to three major political parties. Apart from appointing military personnel as the party's leaders, the military also closely scrutinized any civilian candidates during the party's conventions to elect their leaders. It was a normal practice that the party top leaders should be endorsed by Soeharto to secure their candidacy. The full control of the military by Soeharto was in sharp contrast with the military situation in Nigeria. Although as a group the Nigerian military could be described as nationalist, yet it became factionalist as the political dynamics brought about by the state's federal character became vulnerable to power contestation among the military elites. The strong tendency of the various factions of Nigeria's military elite's easily penetrated into the already fragmented political parties along territorial, religious and ethnic lines. The frequent incidents of military *coup d'état* in Nigeria evidently show the vulnerability of any political consensus in Nigeria.

5. Party System

The party system under Soeharto's government was strongly controlled by the state. Although there were formally three political parties, only one party was strongly backed by the government – the *Golkar* party. The other two parties, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the Muslim Unitary Development Party (PPP) were only dummies in order to show that every five years there

11 After the biggest student demonstration and riots in Jakarta – the 15 January 1974 Affair – Soeharto became increasingly concerned about the danger of factionalism within the army that could destabilize the entire political system. Over the succeeding years, mainly under General Mohamad Jusuf's leadership, a major reorganization of the army was put in train, ending the practice of long-time service of junior officers in a single territorial division, and making the army a more truly national institution (Bresnan, 1993: 162).

was a general election to form a new government. In all the general elections, the *Golkar* party always emerged as the winner with a landslide victory to secure the majority members of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the country's highest state body. Every five years Soeharto became the only candidate for Indonesia's presidency and was always easily elected by the MPR. According to the state's constitution, the president is also holding the position as the highest arm forces commander. While for a long period of time General Soeharto was able to engineer the party's elections and systems and its respected political repertoire, Nigerian political parties have been trapped within a zero-sum game that continue to destabilize any emerging political regimes. The fragility of Nigeria's party system has become more problematic as the military were also divided along the different factions and political patronages. The ideology and state formation constitute the political basis upon which the system of political parties was adopted. In Indonesia, the strong appeal of nationalism and the unitary format of the state, influenced the centralistic and top-down nature of the party organization. The political parties in Indonesia were formatted as a national political party with the branches in the province and the districts. In Nigeria, on the other hand, political parties are strongly based on a specific region, ethnicity and religious affiliation. The appeal of nationalism is weak and the parties became very divisive when it came to the so-called national interest and national integration. The federal state format adopted by Nigeria was also influenced by the fragmented character of political parties and the difficulties in any attempt to the party's leader to nationally mobilize its branches to any national issues.

6. Regional Dynamics and Contagion Effects

In world politics, geography and natural resources matter. Being geographically located in Southeast Asia, Indonesia was strongly influenced by the Cold War and the US global strategy of communist containment. As Indonesia is a country rich in natural resources, tapping the benefit from these resources would become the aim and target of many foreign economic interests. The history of Indonesia, as perhaps also the history of many other post-colonial states - including Nigeria - is in fact the history of colonialism looking for various natural resources desperately needed by the western colonial countries. After World War II, its strategic location and vast natural resources placed Indonesia as a strong attraction for both the socialist and capitalist blocks during the Cold War. The Vietnam War in which the US military supported the South Vietnamese government against the Communist Vietcong and North Vietnam, constituted the regional political dynamics that strongly influenced domestic politics in Indonesia. Anticipating the domino-effect based on the assumption that South Vietnam would fall under the control of North Vietnam and the Communist Vietcong, the US strongly

supported the emerging Soeharto's New Order government which emerged after he led the action to destroy the Indonesian communist party and its alleged sympathizers.¹² Nigeria as well as other African countries also can not be isolated from the influence of Cold War politics. The Nigerian federal government since the outset was closely linked with the West, especially the British government. Interestingly, many Nigerian intellectuals equated the West's capitalism with colonialism, which they contended continued after independence through neocolonial economic ties. Mundt and Aborisade (2004: 700) observed that Nigerian political discourse through the first 30 years after independence was often based on the ideological poles of capitalism and socialism, and relationships with the major powers involved staking a position between the two camps. Yet in comparison with Indonesia, Nigeria's lacked geostrategic importance as enjoyed by Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. The inherited political fragmentation also resulted in the divided foreign influence which occurred during the Biafran war in 1967, when the Biafran rebels were supported by the US and the federal government by the Soviet Union. Therefore, although Nigeria enjoyed being an oil-rich country, it did not enjoy a sustained strong interest from the US and its Western allies of occupying a geographically strategic position during the Cold War. Nigeria and its neighboring African countries are too remote compared to the Southeast Asian countries which are geographically close to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan which became the strategic partners for not only the expansion of US liberal democracy, but also for the social and economic engineering and experiments. The direct influence of US policy on land reform, for example, has clearly provided the fundamental basis for industrial development in the Northeast Asian countries. The creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in which Indonesia became a major member in 1967 was strongly supported by the US since this regional grouping expanded the US's interest in the region. The emergence of the East Asian 'economic tigers' in the 1970s and 1980s provides the basis for the economic development in Southeast Asia in which Indonesia was an important member country. On the other hand, Nigeria was negatively affected by the fact that it is surrounded by former French colonies-Benin (formerly Dahomey), Niger, and Cameroon. These francophone postcolonial

12 In a recent interview, Noam Chomsky (Hewison, 2007) noted the significant place of Indonesia during the Cold War, specifically in relation to the spread of "communist virus" and the contagion effect of the so-called "domino theory". Chomsky said: "The most important country was Indonesia which was of course, the richest country in natural resources.. In 1965, there was the Soeharto coup. That coup, incidentally, was reported accurately in the West. The New York Times, for example, described it as a "staggering mass slaughter" which is "a gleam of light in Asia." The description of the huge massacres was combined with euphoria - undisguised euphoria. The same was true in Australia. Probably Europe as well, but it hasn't been studied there to my knowledge. The Soeharto's massacre really made sure that the virus didn't spread to a country that they were really concerned about.

states have developed close economic ties among themselves, and Nigeria, although based on its size and strength, would conceivably be the leading country in the region, proved not to be the case (Mundt and Aborisade, 2004: 701)

7. International Factors (Foreign Aid, Loan, and Foreign Investment)

The role of international factors in the form of foreign aid, foreign loans and foreign investment can not be separated with the opening up of Indonesia and the other Southeast Asian nations into the US strategy to contain the expansion of communism in the region as discussed in the previous section. The success of Soeharto's New Order regime in eliminating the growing threats of communism in 1965 can not be separated from the fact that since the early 1950s the US has targeted Indonesia as its potential ally. The strong anti-communist stand of the Soeharto government provided ideological legitimacy for the US and the other Western countries to provide international economic support for the regime. Winters (1996: 53) describes how Soeharto and his economic team shrewdly acted to obtain international economic support in the early years of his reign: "Several symbolic actions were taken immediately after General Soeharto took over effective power from President Sukarno in March 1966. The Sultan of Yogyakarta, one of Soeharto's close allies and a figure Western leaders trusted enormously, made a speech indicating that the government was abandoning the failed policies of hostility to foreign investors that had characterized the last years under Soekarno. Although anticommunist foreign governments, led by the United States, clearly wanted to tilt Indonesia in their direction, they had to move carefully". According to Winters (1996: 53), from the creditors' perspective, the first meaningful moves were allowing an IMF team back into the country in July 1966 and inviting a World Bank mission in August 1966 to identify which imports were most critically needed. Working closely with Indonesia's economists, the IMF officials and other foreign consultants processed what data there were and diagnosed the economy's ills". Satisfied that Indonesia had replaced words with actions, the creditor nations finally proposed \$200 million in new loans in February 1967. Summing up the US view of Soeharto's efforts, Ambassador Marshall Green reflected, "It was a great moment in history in which Indonesia, the world's fifth most populous country, strategically located at the junction of two continents and two oceans, reversed its course 180 degrees" (Winters, 1996: 54). A new Foreign Investment Law was enacted in January 1967. In early November 1967, an Indonesian economic team under the Sultan organized a meeting with chairmen of major foreign investors lead by James A. Linen, president of Time, Inc, a close friend of Indonesia's foreign minister, Adam Malik, in Geneva. The meeting, described in detail by Winters (1996: 60-76), was a successful beginning to drawing major global

capitalist interests into Indonesia. Apart from foreign investment, Indonesia received substantial development aid (loans and grants) provided bilaterally or by the international consortium of donor countries (IGGI) chaired by the Dutch government, and strongly supported by the IMF and the World Bank. Indonesia was treated as a strategic partner by the Western countries, while Nigeria, on the other hands, given its fragmented political institutions, was unable to attract the needed concerted international support.

8. The Economist-Technocrats Group

The period of 1960s and 1970s mark the heydays of modernization theories, strongly influenced by American economists and political scientists. The scholarship during those years can not be separated from the ideological polarization resulted from the Cold War politics. Modernization and developmentalism have become the contending perspective for socialism and Marxism that was propagated by the Soviet Union and the East European socialist countries. The emergence of Soeharto's anti communist government in the mid-1960s in Indonesia was obviously welcome to the US and the other Western countries. It is within such a political development that developmentalism became the practical ideology. Technocracy and pragmatism were the backbone of economic development under the Soeharto's authoritarian government. Sarbini Sumawinata, an economist, who briefly advised Soeharto on political matters in the early years of the New Order, explained to Winters (1996: 48) why Soeharto was so committed to economic development: "Soeharto realizes he must be development-oriented. If he learned nothing else from the failure of Soekarno, it was that his downfall was rooted in a neglect of economics. Obviously it's easier to stay in power if there is growth". The relatively remoteness of Nigeria from the centers of conflict, in comparison with Indonesia and the other Southeast Asian countries located close to scene of the Vietnam War, during the Cold War was perhaps one historical factor that made Nigeria less important from US strategic thinking. While an abrupt ideological change occurred in Indonesia in which a strong military, anticommunist's regime came to power, political change in the mid-1960s in Nigeria did not significantly alter the development paradigm as seen in Indonesia. While the leading universities in Nigeria have no doubt produced capable economists and technocrats to formulate and implement economic development, its politics apparently curtailed the technocracy to emerge as the vanguard of economic development. Technocracy has been basically constrained to play a decisive role in development by the divisive and fragmentation in the national political decision-making.

The Politics of Rural Development

Indonesia and Nigeria in the mid-1960s were poor, agricultural countries. In 1963 Arthur Lewis, as quoted in Watts (1987: 70) strongly argued that for

newly independent Nigeria, agricultural exports should become the “prime mover” driving the engine of growth. The subsequent trends however radically interrupted by three unexpected developments at the end of the decade. First, the outbreak of civil war in 1967 that not only leveled palm and root crop production in the southern war zone, but also contributed to a spiraling food import bill. Second, in 1969 it is proved to be the first in a run of severe drought years which brought harvest failures to the northern cereal zones, culminating in the famine of 1972-74. Third, by 1965 petroleum had begun to emerge as a central component in the national budget. According to Watts (1987: 71) production has increased from 5 million barrels (N9 million) in 1960 to almost 325 million barrels (N500 million) in 1970. Accordingly, the share of petroleum in total exports rose quickly, from 2.7 percent in 1960 to 57.6 percent at the end of the decade. In sum, one might say that the late 1960s were a hiatus between a prior classical export dependency, in which the agricultural sector was reaching the limits of growth based on household labor and limited technical improvement, and the subsequent period of relative stagnation associated with the oil boom of the 1970s. Furthermore, as explained by Watts (1987: 74), there are four reasons behind the uneven and often sluggish agricultural performance in the 1970s. First, is the result of the urban construction boom and the growth of the informal sector in which pulled the labor from the rural economy. Second, the rising value of petroleum and the increased federal spending that stimulated internal demand for non-tradable appreciated the real exchange rate. The overvaluation of the naira – estimated at 100 percent by the World Bank in 1979 – made imports attractive. Third, there were structural limits to large-scale or intensified food production even among progressive farmers to be capable of gaining access to heavily subsidized inputs. Fourth, government pricing may have compounded the problems.

Forrest (1993: 182) after critically reviewing several studies on agricultural development in Africa, argued that in Nigeria, the multiple economic, political, and social linkages between rural producers and the wider community and the diversity of socioeconomic conditions within the rural economy, cannot be reduced to summary statements about “the state”, “the peasantry”, and “capitalist” agriculture. He views that the fundamental problem in Nigeria was that agricultural policy has not generally been at the centre of the political agenda, nor have rural producers, small or large, mobilized themselves as lobbyists or as part of wider political movements. One reason for this is that policies have not generally had a direct impact on the livelihood of the mass producers. Another reason is the weakness of agricultural class alignments.¹³

¹³ The conversion of peasant societies from subsistence to a market orientation, rooted in the British colonial policy, eroded the foundations of traditional rule. Also, the development of a modern system of transportation and communication, necessary to stimulate commerce, encouraged the movement of people from the country-side to cities and from one part of the country to another, all under the protection of colonial authorities (Mundt and Aborisade, 2004: 695).

Had the government intervened heavily in the procurement of staple crops, the politicization of state policy would have been much greater. Among the reasons for the absence of intervention have been the sheer size and heterogeneity of farm output, the absence of a politically powerful group of wealthy farmers to actively support it, and the fact that the federal centre, burdened with many other commitments, lacked the capacity and funds to manage such a commitment. Another factor that should be considered in explaining the lack of policy intervention, according to Forrest (1993: 207) was the vast geographical dispersion of farming communities and the variation in social organization and culture that hampered the widespread mobilization of the peasantry as a class.

Apart from the profound geographical and social constraints, structural and institutional weaknesses have convoluted into the weak policy commitment among the technocratic elites to agricultural development in Nigeria. Officially, the Nigerian government has created a number of policies, such as Accelerated Food Production Project, Agricultural Development Project, River Basin and Rural Development Authorities, Operation Feed the Nation, Green Revolution, "Back to Land", Operation Food First; yet agricultural policy objectives have not been achieved, as evidenced by the general food scarcity. Obeta (1990:370) argues that "administrative underdevelopment" of agriculture is responsible for the poor performance of the agricultural sector. What is perceived as the administrative and managerial problems by Obeta was obviously related to the issues of ineffective technocracy and its wider political contexts. The political elites in Nigeria were too divisive and apparently perceived no threats from the poor masses. As clearly stated by Forrest, mass mobilization was nonexistent given the geographically diverse settlements and the fragmented character of the Nigerian peasantry. Looking from the Nigerian perspective, the Indonesian experience provides a very different perspective. Agriculture, and in a broader sense, rural development, became the focus of the Indonesian technocrats - led by Widjojo Nitisastro - over a long period since the late mid 1960s during the early years of the New Order.¹⁴ The New Order period is customary divided into four sub-phases, according to the dominant economic events and policy currents (Hill, 1999). First, the recovery and rehabilitation, 1966-72. Second, the oil boom, 1973-82

14 There is a great deal of analysis and publications on the technocracy, particularly on the heroic role of a group of economist- technocrats from University of Indonesia (dubbed by David Ransom in his famous article in Ramparts, as the Berkeley Mafia); yet in many instances the studies are mostly written by economists who tended to neglect the dynamics and the relationships between various factors that made the technocracy possible. The inner circle of Widjojo Nitisastro's economic technocrats consists of Mohamad Sadli, Emil Salim, Ali Wardhana, Subroto and J.B. Sumarlin.

Third, the reappraisal, recession and partial reform, 1983-1985. Fourth, the reform and export-led development from 1986 onwards.¹⁵ According to Hill (1996), Indonesia's economic development since the late 1960s can be perceived as a miracle, as the country arose from the so called "basket case" into "an emerging giant". In his book *The Indonesian Economy Since 1966: Southeast Asia Emerging Giant*, Hill stated in his introduction that "Indonesia in 1965 was a 'basket case', its economic problems at least as serious as those of today's least developed countries in Africa and Asia".¹⁶

Widjojo Nitisastro and his group decided that the rehabilitation of the agricultural infrastructures should become the driving force for economic development. Widjojo Nitisastro, an economic-demographer, is considered by many as the main architect of New Order's economic development, the chief of the Berkeley Mafia, fully aware of the serious problem arising from the large concentration of poor people in Java. During his postgraduate study at the University of California at Berkeley, Widjojo Nitisastro chose to write a dissertation on the subject of economic-demography, namely the various scenarios of the demographic trends caused by migration from Java to the other islands.¹⁷ The previous studies on Java (Boeke, Geertz) that analyzed the demographic dynamics and agricultural growth became his major concern.¹⁸ It is therefore very logical when he directed the economic planners to design

15 The sense of policy drift in the 1990s suggests that another phase might now be added - 'policy inertia, 1990 onwards'.

16 The book was praised by Thee Kian Wie, the foremost Indonesian economic historian as "... the first one which provides a comprehensive and highly competent account of the economic history of Indonesia over the whole New Order period since its beginnings up to the present". In his preface and acknowledgements to the second edition, Hal Hill (1999), noted that: "It will be obvious from the first edition that I did not foresee the set of events which unfolded after mid-1977". Furthermore he said that "It may be something of a consolation to observe that I am not aware of anyone else who did. ...As a result of the crisis, economics has become both more and less important: the former arising from the search for new policy approaches which will help to avoid the suffering occasioned by these events; the latter owing to the need for introspection and a healthy dose of humility in the wake of the profession's failure to foresee these events".

17 Widjojo's PhD dissertation was then revised during his sabbatical leave at Cornell University, into a book, entitled "The Population Trends in Indonesia", published by Cornell University Press.

18 As an economist-demographer that belief in the important role of economic development planning, Widjojo understood fully the need to have good and reliable statistics. It was under his leadership that a Demographic Institute was established at the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia. With regard to statistics, Nigeria is well known for its problem with reliable statistics. See, for example, a review article by Paul Mosley, "Policy-making without Facts: A Note on the Assessment of Structural Adjustment Policies in Nigeria, 1985-1990".

a national development plan; agriculture and rural development became his main focus.¹⁹ Another critical policy that was also important was controlling population growth through a family planning program. Rural development, particularly increasing rice production, and population control, were two major fundamental policies that seriously implemented since the beginning of the New Order. Widjojo's commitment to pro-poor policy, as among other manifested in his focus on rural and agricultural development is actually legendary among his colleagues.²⁰ Indonesia was also very fortunate, within months of Soeharto assuming executive authority, that a scientific event occurred in the neighboring Philippines. It was to alter profoundly the political economy of rice. A new rice hybrid was developed by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), in Los Banos, the Philippines, that had the potential of increasing several fold the traditional yields of irrigated land in tropical Asia. This new hybrid, the first in a series, was the beginning of what would soon become known as "the green revolution".

Since colonial times, Java has been the center of agricultural development. Primarily to promote the sugar industry, the Dutch invested heavily in agricultural research as well as in irrigation development. According to Bresnan (1993) at the turn of the century, Java was almost as heavily irrigated as Japan. No other part of tropical Asia was so well irrigated at the time. The Dutch colonial government also took an interest in the price of rice. Rice was needed to feed the workers on the rubber and other plantations, and because cheap labor was a major factor in the plantation economy, cheap rice was a

19 There are four factors, according to Irwan (2005: 40-41) behind the reason why Indonesia only halfheartedly adopted economic liberalization. First, there was no external pressure to liberalize the economy further. Removing the PKI and opening up the Indonesian economy to foreign investment were considered as adequate measures by the US and its Cold War allies. Second, Keynesian policies were considered politically necessary to prevent popular discontent against the capitalist system. Third, within the development theory circle in the former colonies, which included scholars such as Alexander Gerschenkron and Hamza Alavi, the dominant perspectives was to support state intervention in promoting economic growth. High economic growth being achieved in countries like Japan and South Korea added further support for state intervention in economic planning. Fourth, the military played a dual role in the country, both as a security and socio-political force, and since the national budget only covered about thirty percent of Indonesian military expenditure, state-owned enterprises were treated as cash cows by the military, and certain businesses were provided with protection and facilities in return for financial contribution.

20 See, colleagues tribute in celebrating the 70th year of Widjojo Nitisastro. One example is Permadi, in his article "Cross Check Langsung dengan Para Petani Mengenai Kelancaran Kredit Bimas, Pupuk dan Pstisida (Impromptu cross check with the farmers on the delivery of credit, fertilizer and pesticide)", in M. Arsjad Anwar, Aris Ananta & Ari Kuncoro (eds.) *Kesan para sahabat tentang Widjojo Nitisastro (Colleagues Recollection on Widjojo Nitisastro)*, pp. 221-226. Jakarta: Kompas-Gramedia. Apart from the tribute from 55 of his Indonesian colleagues, another book in English was also published on the same occasion, where 71 friends and colleagues from 27 countries paid tributes to Widjojo Nitisastro, among others Dr. Manmohan Singh (Prime Minister of India), Julius K. Nyerere (Former President of Tanzania), Lawrence H. Summers (President of Harvard University) and Noboru Takeshita (Former Prime Minister of Japan). The two books were supposed to be launched in 1997, but for personal reasons Widjojo postponed the launch until 2007.

major policy objective. In 1939 a government agency was created to buy and sell rice for the purpose of stabilizing its price at low levels to consumers. When the Japanese occupied the Indies in early 1942, it was in order to gain access to its raw materials. Their primary interest was in petroleum and rubber, the two ingredients essential to transportation and thus to the prosecution of the war that now extended across the entire Western Pacific and its East Asian littoral. But the Japanese also needed rice to feed their troops in the Southwest Pacific, and all of Southeast Asia was pressed to provide it. Forced-rice deliveries were imposed on the rice-growing villages of Java, as well as on the rice-surplus river deltas of the Southeast Asian mainland. The postcolonial government of Indonesia, aware of the central role of rice, continued the rice policy. Several major policy attempts were made, in 1956 and 1962, to achieve self sufficiency in rice, but these efforts were not successful. In 1965 rice production in Java was not much higher than it had been before World War II. Because the population had increased greatly during the same period, the availability of rice on a per capita basis was dangerously low. The situation in Nigeria is obviously very different from Indonesia where the majority of the agricultural communities are concentrated in the island of Java.

In November, 1985, President Soeharto was invited to address the 40th anniversary conference of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in Rome as the representative of the developing countries.²¹ The invitation was in recognition of Indonesia's remarkable agricultural achievements since the early 1970s, particularly in food crop production. According to FAO statistics, Indonesia's growth in per capita cereal production between 1974/5 and 1984/85 was the second highest in Asia after Burma (Booth, 1998: 1). A World Bank study of the effects of the oil boom on the economies of Indonesia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago and Algeria, found that Indonesia was the only country where agricultural performance improved significantly (Gelb, 1986 - quoted in Booth, 1998: 2). Whereas the other countries tended to invest their windfall gains in large industrial projects of dubious economic efficiency, and in ambitious construction projects, Indonesia alone devoted considerable budgetary resources to improving infrastructure serving smallholder agriculture, to the development and dissemination of new seed varieties, to expanding extension services and to subsidizing inputs such as fertilizers.

Booth (1998:2) argued that if Indonesian agricultural development performance is viewed in a longer term perspective, the remarkable growth performance of the two decades from 1965 to 1985 does not appear as a dramatic break with a past, characterized at best by stagnation, and more

21 Soeharto in 1985 was also awarded a UNFPA medal as Indonesia is regarded as a country successful in controlling its population growth.

often decline. Rather it should be seen as a continuation of a long process of relatively successful agricultural development during which farmers throughout the Indonesian archipelago responded positively to a series of challenges posed by demographic changes, by the advent of new crops and production technologies, and by the rise of new markets both at home and abroad. The interplay of agriculture and politics, however, can not be underestimated, "Agriculture does indeed still matter", warned Booth (2005: 411). Booth strongly argued that although the agricultural sector may never return to centre stage in the development strategies in many developing countries, "if policy makers neglect it, rural poverty and regional income disparities will continue to be serious problems, which may in turn lead to political instability and even secessionist movements".²²

Concluding Remarks

In the mid-1960s Indonesia and Nigeria experienced major political changes in which new military governments took power and began to restructure the state and development. In the following two decades (1965-1985) the politics and policy of the two countries developed into a very different path. Under General Soeharto, Indonesian politics was almost totally restructured in which ideological differences were curtailed and political parties were reformatted and controlled. While politics was held in check, the country's economy was redesigned under the ideology of pragmatism. It was during this period that a group of economic technocrats under the leadership of Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, became very influential in reshaping economic policy, and in turn, in improving the people's welfare. In Nigeria politics turned into endless power struggles between different factions in the military and political elites. The diverse characters of Nigerian elites along the lines of ethnicity, region and religion, formally reflected in the federal state formation. It constitutes the major difficulties to sustain any political regime in power. In Nigeria, power is illusive and politics has become a zero-sum game. Political instability have obviously resulted in the technocratic inertia and convoluted economic development. The Cold War's conjuncture however should also be considered in analyzing development trajectories in Indonesia and Nigeria.

The historical continuity is vital, and understanding the path of economic development is not possible without understanding structural processes and the institutional development of the state, society and its people. As Indonesia and Nigeria were basically agricultural countries, it is very important to understand the history of colonial policies on social and political development, particularly on rural development policy and agricultural development.

22 See Anne Booth's concluding review article on a book by Takamasa Akiyama and Donald F. Larson (eds) (2004), *Rural Development and Agricultural Growth in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand*, Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, in association with the World Bank.

The complex and multifaceted nature of development has caused many studies to focus on relatively limited aspects, arising skepticism on generalization and final conclusions. The specter of problems in comparison, the inconsistencies and incoherence of statistical data constitute major problems in comparative studies. While comparisons can be delineated to some extent, more rigorous comparisons are always problematic. Whatever problems are confronted in a comparative study on Indonesia and Nigeria, as well as the new challenges confronted in the current global environment, a rethinking in pro-poor and rural development policy appears to be unavoidable, since the bulk of people in both countries still live and work largely in rural areas and very dependent on agriculture-related activities. ●

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