

## Chinese Communities in Three Ports Cities in the 17<sup>th</sup> and the 18<sup>th</sup> Century: Batavia, Formosa and Nagasaki

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### *Abstrak*

Batavia, Formosa, dan Nagasaki merupakan tiga kota pelabuhan di Asia pada abad XVII, yang menghubungkan jaringan perdagangan Asia sampai ke Eropa. Kedatangan bangsa Belanda ke Asia pada awal abad XVII secara langsung maupun tidak langsung memengaruhi pertumbuhan ketiga kota ini. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan bagaimana komunitas masyarakat China membangun ketiga kota ini dan menggarisbawahi peran, posisi mereka, lebih jauh persamaan dan perbedaan komunitas masyarakat ini di ketiga kota. Untuk mengetahui keberadaan komunitas masyarakat China, peran dan posisi mereka di setiap kota, alasan kedatangan mereka akan diungkapkan dan bagaimana situasi politik maupun ekonomi yang terjadi pada saat itu. Lebih jauh lagi, akan dijelaskan pula bagaimana pemerintah setiap kota memperlakukan komunitas masyarakat ini dalam konteks penerapan suatu kebijakan yang mengungkapkan persamaan dan perbedaan perilaku komunitas masyarakat China di Batavia, Nagasaki dan Tayouan di Formosa.

**Kata kunci:** komunitas Cina, Batavia, Formosa, Nagasaki, Abad XVII-XVIII

### **Introduction**

Batavia, Tayouan in Formosa, and Nagasaki were three important port cities in Asia during 17<sup>th</sup> century, connecting trade along Asian waters and further to Europe. The coming of the Dutch to Asia in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century has both directly and indirectly influenced the growth of these three port cities. These cities have sheltered the Dutch international trade since they served not only as gateways to large portion of Java, China, and Japan, but also as nodes in the network of the largest western trading power in the region, the VOC (Blussé, 2008: 4).

Established in 1619, Batavia was the most important port city built by the VOC in Asia. Based on Governor-General Coen's idea, Batavia was functioned as the Dutch trading base in Asia, which taken care all trades around archipelago and the rest of Asia, before proceed to Europe. To keep the settlement functioning, Coen followed Manila's example by attracting

Chinese residents to live in the city. Batavia grew into a flourishing city with the help of its Chinese citizens, not only as city builders, but also as tax income (Blussé, 1981: 159-178).

Meanwhile to profit from lucrative silk for silver trade between China and Japan, the Dutch tried to seek locations to serve as their trading posts in China. Since they failed to replace the Portuguese in Macau and also could not set foot on the Chinese soil because of the rejection from the Chinese court, they decided to occupy a “no man’s island”, Formosa in August 1624. They located themselves in a sand-spit area on the southwest coast of Formosa, called Tayouan, and built a fortress named *Zeelandia*, which within few years became a profitable trading post for the Dutch (Ts’ao Yung-ho, 1997: 94-114). The Dutch invited the Chinese from the mainland to cross over and plough the land on Formosa. This resulted in the establishment of agricultural Chinese communities in Formosa.

Unlike Batavia and Tayouan built by the Dutch, the port Nagasaki was built by the Jesuits with the help of the local authorities in 1570. The Dutch entered Japan much later and established themselves in Hirado in 1609. Since it applied the *Sakoku* policy in 1630s, the Tokugawa regime of Japan expelled the Iberian Catholics and replaced them with the Dutch, who remained the only western country permitted to trade in Japan. However, Japan still kept its door open to Chinese traders and continued its relations with the kingdom of Ryukyu in the south and the Kingdom of Korea in the west. As a result, under the strict Japanese rule, both the Chinese community and the Dutch trading post were established in Nagasaki (Carioti, 2006).

Leonard Blussé has given an excellent description of the Chinese in Batavia from the opening of the city up to Chinese massacre in 1740 and further he has depicted Batavia, Nagasaki, and Macau as most visible port cities in Asia through the seventeenth and eighteenth century (Blussé, 1986, 2008). Tonio Andrade has extensively discussed how the Dutch in Formosa acted as co-colonizers with their Chinese subjects (Andrade, 2000) while Aloysius Chang has described the establishment and the role of Chinese interpreters in the Tokugawa period (Chang, 1970). This paper aims to explore **why and how** the Chinese communities established and flourished in these three port cities and to highlight the roles and position, further, similarities and differences of Chinese communities in Nagasaki, Batavia and Tayouan in Formosa.

In order to understand the presence of the Chinese community and further their role and position in each the port city, it is important to understand the reason of their coming, and current political and economy situation surrounding Asia. Furthermore, the way in which the ruling government of each city treated the Chinese community and policies applied to them, would define similarities and differences attitudes of Chinese communities in Batavia, Formosa and Nagasaki. In doing so, this study mostly relies on

available printed archives namely *Daghregisters*, *General Missiven* and travel accounts, and also secondary sources which discuss about Batavia, Formosa, and Nagasaki.

### **The Growth of Chinese Communities in Batavia, Formosa and Nagasaki Port Cities**

At the time European powers first started voyaging to Asia, China was ruled by the Ming Dynasty. The kingdom conducted any foreign relations symbolically according to the tributary system and sought to restrict maritime trade since it was considered as a potential threat to the legitimacy of the kingdom. This created an enormous economic burden for those Chinese in coastal areas whose livelihood was dependent on trade. As a result, some of these people resorted to piracy. Yet, the real threat to the dynasty emerged in the northeast of the country, Manchuria region. The Ming court, which had ruled China since the 14<sup>th</sup> century, was eventually conquered by the Manchu power in the Mid-17<sup>th</sup> century. During this political transition and period of economic turmoil, many Chinese decided to leave their motherland to find a better place to live in the surrounding area.

### **Prelude to Diaspora: Socio-Political Condition in Mother Country**

The Ming Dynasty began to rule China in 1367 and applied strict rules on overseas maritime trade. Unlike their predecessors, under the Yuan Dynasty, China was actively engaged in international trade and had opened its political borders which led to an increase in commercial traffic between China and Asia. In order to obtain full control over their borders, the Ming courts chose to close the country from foreigners and forbade all further Chinese emigration as well as forbidding all private Chinese to trade with foreign countries. The only way to have contact with foreigners was expressed in terms of a tributary relationship, in other words, by sending tribute and emissaries to the courts. According to Wills, this system was maintained from the 1420's to 1530 and was considered as the only legal means of maritime trade.<sup>1</sup>

During this same period, Japanese overseas trading activities often fuelled piracy, also referred to as *Wako*. Japanese pirates repeatedly pillaged and burned houses in coastal China, thus creating serious problems for the Ming Courts. Wills clearly explain that the policy of restricted foreign trade and the prohibition of Chinese trade was a defensive response in order to combat Japanese pirates (Wills, 1974: 5-7).

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1 This was a system which allowed the ships from foreign countries that paid tribute to the court to enter Chinese ports. Tributary trade had many restrictions with respect to the terms of tribute, the number of envoys and the number of ships. Further each embassy sent their tribute to the Ming Courts at the interval of three years, except for Japan, which at that time has bitter relations with China so it sent tribute at ten years intervals. John E. Wills, Jr. *Pepper, Guns and Parleys. The Dutch East India Company and China 1622-1681*(Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 1974), p. 1-10.

The Ming Dynasty's ban on maritime trade unsettled coastal people who relied on trade and fishing for a livelihood. Coastal China, especially Fukien, had long ago achieved in economic and cultural prominence through international trade and local economic expansion. This area was the leader in Chinese maritime technology and expertise in foreign trade during the Sung and the Yuan Dynasties. Furthermore, the life of the poor peasants and coastal residents of Fukien province in particular was more difficult, primarily due to geographic factors, including a predominantly hilly area bordered by a rocky and irregular shore line, which made the land available in the region for agriculture extremely limited. This uneven distribution of topographic features has led to the concentration of population at the sea board (Higgins, 1981). Thus people turned to maritime trade to supplement their income or as their sole means of livelihood.

Overseas trade in coastal areas led to the commercialization of agriculture and the development of local handicraft industries, such as pottery and porcelains. Agricultural specialization had focused on the export of products such as sugar, rice, and cotton. The Timber industry was also important for sustaining the shipbuilding industry that mostly employed the Fukiens. These factors contributed to a dramatic change in the provincial economy (Chang Pin Tsun, 1990: 63-81). The development of the South during these periods, contributed to the relocation of Chinese from North China that led to an increasing population during the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

The increasingly difficult circumstances due to high rents, extensive and heavy taxation, and corruption of the bureaucracy leading to the control of most farm lands by noble and wealthy classes, as well as the expanding pressure of the population—since the Ming courts also forced their subjects who live on the offshore islands to move inland—created a situation in which the Ming maritime prohibition policies may have contributed to a large number of Chinese from the Southeast coast of China, especially Fukien, to join into a collusion with the Japanese raiders (Higgins, *ibid*). They soon infested the ports of Chekiang, Fukien and Kwangtung. From these regions, the Japanese and Chinese pirates expand their illegal overseas trade to the East and South China Sea, with a range extending from Japan, to Formosa to Luzon.

The increase in piracy forced the Ming authorities to take measures by placing garrisons along strategic coastal spots in 1557 and attacking the pirates. The Ming court managed to control the Fukien coast by the year 1564 and the Kwangtung coast by the year 1566. In 1567 the number of piracy's attacks fell drastically and permanently after the Ming courts decided to revise its maritime policies by opening and legalized overseas trade (Wills, 1979: 210-212).

The reason why Coastal people wanted the Ming court to open trade was because the price of silks, porcelain and other Chinese products in other ports in Southeast Asia were twice as high. Moreover, a large number of unemployed

artisans had found a job in Manila, Bantam, and later in Batavia and Formosa. Thus, overseas trade opened up chances for emigration. Large scale emigration started at the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. This emigration was initially directed at the Philippines mainly, but later also Java. Moreover, in China frequent droughts and a series of floods sharply reduced grain production and were followed by epidemics in several different regions during 1610, 1630, and in 1640-1641. In South-eastern China, especially in Chekiang, Fukien, and Shantung, these conditions helped to cause serious foods shortage and famine (Atwell, 1998: 376-417). The economic decline contributed to the Manchu conquest in 1644. War and conflict spread throughout the country and the Ming dynasty was overthrown and succeeded by the Manchu. As a result of the harsh conditions in China, the population of Fukien and Kwangtung declined largely because of emigration (Tsuen-Kung Chang, 1956). In short, political turmoil, natural disasters, and economic crises all have contributed to the emigration influx of Chinese to surrounding port cities, which at that time were namely Batavia, Formosa, and Nagasaki.

### **The establishment of the Chinese Society in Batavia (1619), Formosa(1624), and Nagasaki (1571)**

#### ***Batavia***

In 1619, the Dutch occupied a port in West Java which called Jayakarta. Before the Dutch occupation, this city was owned by a vassal kingdom of Bantam under the rule of *pangeran* Fatahillah. The Dutch signed an agreement with the *pangeran* in 1610 to establish a lodge for the transshipment of goods. This agreement was made in order to escape the high toll that was being asked for by the new Bantamese authorities.<sup>2</sup> In 1615, the Dutch asked for permission to *pangeran Fatahillah* to build double storey buildings of brick, which they called Nassau and Mauritius, to be used as warehouse and residence and later remodelled these buildings into a fortress in 1618. After creating a strong fortress, the Dutch moved their lodge from Bantam to Jayakarta.<sup>3</sup> The Dutch took complete control of the city in August 1619 after defeating the joint forces of the natives and the British on May 30, 1619. They completely demolished

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2 Bantam at that time was an important centre for pepper production and inter-island trade, where traders from all over coastal Asia came to trade. The Dutch came to Bantam and established a trade lodge in 1603, following the British who had already arrived there in 1602. In 1608, a new *Pangeran* was appointed and whostarted applying a high toll to foreigners. Prince Fatahillah who at that time seeks for help in order to strengthen his kingdom against Bantam agreed to give a space for the Dutch's lodge without high toll as in Bantam. For details see Leonard Blussé, "Western Impact on Chinese Communities in Western Java at the Beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> Century" in *Nampo Bunka*, Tenry University, Volume 2, (Tokyo, 1975), p. 40.

3 The reason for the Dutch completely move from Bantam to Jayakarta was because they failed to monopolize the pepper trade and was facing resistance from both the British and the Bantamese. J.J. De Vries, *Jakarta Tempo Doeloe*, ( Jakarta: Pustaka Antarkota, 1988), p. 8.

the native town and court, telling the inhabitants to flee and expelling the British. Under the leadership of Governor General Coen, the city was called as Batavia and constructed a new fortified settlement on the east bank of Citarum River, which had formerly been the Chinese and the natives' settlement (Abeyasekere, 1989: 8-24).

According to Coen, the Dutch were required to follow Manila as an example in every respect by inviting Chinese to keep the settlement functioning. In order to achieve his goal of attracting Chinese labours, Coen used every possible means. This included persuading the Chinese to leave neighbouring Bantam, or ensuring that Batavia was used as a terminus by Chinese junks which come to Java from the North, as well as more extreme measures including resorting to kidnapping Chinese along the China coast (Dobbin, 1996: 47-48). A year after the establishment of Batavia, Junks from China began to supply Batavia with Chinese workers, thus the city's development continued to expand in proportion with the growth of its Chinese community.

### ***Tayouan***

Situated strategically on the southeastern coast of China, there is little information about Formosa until the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Visited mostly by Chinese fishermen, or Chinese and Japanese smugglers and pirates, only minor trade activities occurred on the island. The reason for its isolation was in large part because the number of marketable products that could be used to attract traders to visit Formosa was small. Moreover, its location was outside the network of Asian trade route at that time. It was not until the establishment of Macau by the Portuguese and Manila by the Spanish in the 17<sup>th</sup> century that the Asian trade route was significantly transformed including Macau, Manila, Japan, and South East Asia where Portuguese and Spanish ships, and Chinese junks were sailing back and forth across the Formosan straits, either along the coast going in a northern or southern direction. It was as a result of these changes that Formosa soon became situated in the heart of the multinational East Asia trade routes (Ts'ao Yung-Ho, 1997: 9).

In order to break up the trade monopoly of the Portuguese in East Asia, the Dutch attempted several times to ask the Chinese court for a base of trade, but they were repeatedly repudiated by the Ming Court. The Dutch moved instead to a nearby island named Pescadores (or Peng-hu Island) where they built a new base and continued their effort in opening trade relations with the Chinese. The Dutch presence on Pescadores Island infuriated the Governor of Fukien who claimed the island as a part of Ming territory. As a result, the Dutch were asked to leave the island and in return they were offered not only Formosa as alternative location but also the establishment of an informal trade agreement between them. After sending an expedition to Formosa, the

Dutch realized that this “no man’s island” actually consisted of several tribes. The Dutch finally left Pescadores in August 1624 and anchored in the Bay of Tayouan.<sup>4</sup>

On a narrow sandbar peninsula on the Southwestern coast of the island, the Dutch built a formidable stone castle called *Zeelandia*. However, they soon realized the weaknesses of the location they chose, especially because the warehouse building could easily be washed away by floods. There was less space for houses and buildings. Moreover, there was a lack of fresh water.

After reaching Formosa, the Dutch immediately established friendly contacts with a nearby native village, Sincan, from which they could obtain firewood, venison, and fish for food. Nevertheless in the area they were now living in, there was already existing a small Chinese village. This village was situated in front of the fortress, where Chinese fishers, bandits, and traders stayed and unloaded their cargo of textiles, food, fish, and other things to sell. This small settlement was the centre of the island’s Chinese commerce and it soon began to supply the Dutch with food, other supplies, and silk for export to Japan.<sup>5</sup> Realizing the importance of the Chinese, as both suppliers and workers, and in order to make a profit as soon as possible, the *Zeelandia* council was urged to follow the pattern of Batavia by inviting Chinese to come and settle in Formosa. Within a year, the city of *Zeelandia* and later also the *Provintia* was flourishing with the help of the Chinese.

### ***Nagasaki***

In the late 16<sup>th</sup> century, Japan was faced with the devolution of power. Japan was confronted with an internal war among feudal lords. The weakness of any central power had led to the emergence of a warrior society and their commercial and military power in western Japan, particularly in the Kyushu region. This region had for decades been the place where *the Wako* or Japanese pirates gathered and recruited Japanese, Chinese, and Korean to commit raids along the Korean and Chinese coasts (Jansen, 1995: 5).

The arrival of the Portuguese Jesuits—who first accidentally drifted ashore at Tanegasima in Southern Kyushu in 1543—was welcomed by the local feudal lord Omura Sumitada from the island of Kyushu. He was eager to establish commercial relations with Europe and this led him to convert to Christianity and grant the Portuguese a settlement in Yokoseura, offering them continual trade with Macau, and the opportunity to establish a port in

4 The Fukien’s governor agreed sending his people to trade with Dutch in Formosa and forbade his subordinate to visit Manila. Initially this agreement was advantageous for both sides, but later the agreement was broken by both sides because The Dutch burnt ships and attacked Fukien coastal area, and Chinese sent superior forces to Pescadores. Thus the Dutch were forced to leave the island under the threat of the Chinese. See Tonio Andrade, “Political Spectacles and Colonial Rule: The Landdag on Dutch Taiwan, 1629-1648.” In *Itinerario*, 21/3 (1997), p.57-93.

5 ARA Afd. Kaarten & Tekeningen VEL 1125.

Nagasaki. The construction of a port was fully supported by Sumitada and this port was chosen as the port in which to conduct trade with the Portuguese. The project began in March 1571 under the supervision of the Jesuits and was completed by August (Pancheco, 1970: 303-323).

The Warlord Oda Nobunaga wanted to unify Japan and breakdown all feudal barriers. However, the unification of the country was not completed until his successor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi. He conquered Kyushu in 1587 and took over all possessions of the city belonging to Omura Sumitada, including its growing port town, Nagasaki. From this period, the city was under central control and the first anti-Christian laws were introduced. The unification of Japan and its stability was finally obtained under Tokugawa Ieyasu with his victory in the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. Since then, Japan was ruled under "pax Tokugawa" which was referred to as a period of great peace (Sheldon, 1958: 2-4).

Sheldon points out that in the early years of the Tokugawa period, foreign trade was given a special attention. Hideyoshi granted licences to ships from Kyoto, Nagasaki, and Sakai to join the trade route in the commercial centres of the South China Sea and the South Sea. Further, Ieyasu continued this licensing system, welcoming foreign ships to Japanese ports and imposing no duties on foreign trade in Nagasaki. In 1616 he determined to concentrate all together foreign trade at Nagasaki. However, he became increasingly suspicious that the Europeans would occupy his territory using religion as a device. Thus, he continued the edict of Hideyoshi, by separating trade from religion. Since this was found unfeasible, Japan under Shogun Iemitsu issued seclusion edicts from 1633 to 1636, later called *Sakoku policy*, which closed the country to foreign contact, suppressed the number of Christians and missionaries, restricted trade with foreign ships, prevented ocean voyages, and forbade emigration. Japanese people abroad were also prohibited from returning to Japan. Further, the Japanese were strictly separated from the foreigners, where mixed marriages were forbidden and the children from mixed couples were separated from the mother. Following these edicts, the Portuguese were moved from the town of Nagasaki to the island of Deshima in 1636; later in 1639 they were completely expelled from Japan, and replaced by the Dutch.<sup>6</sup>

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6 The reason why the Dutch replaced the Portuguese was because they were able to convince the Japanese courts that their main reason was trade, not religion, furthermore the Portuguese were also their enemies. Meanwhile the reasons the Shogunal court wanted to promote *Sakoku* policies were mainly political, primarily the fear of the coalition of the local feudal lords with Europeans who were trading with them. Further, they were also afraid that Catholicism would lead the Japanese people to fight against their own leader, especially after the Christian insurrection in Shimabara 1637-1638. George B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, (New York: Knopf, 1950), pp. 177-178 and Sheldon, *The Rise of Merchant Class in Tokugawa Japan*, 15-22.

From 1641 onward, overseas trade was limited to the port of Nagasaki. The concentration of trade in Nagasaki had an impact on Chinese sojourners in Japan. Since 1540s Chinese merchants from Chekiang, Fukien, and Kwangtung provinces were exchanging Chinese goods for silver at ports in southern Japan. Moreover, the Chinese settlements were also spreading along the coast everywhere in Kyushu.<sup>7</sup> In line with the growth of Nagasaki port, they found it necessary to establish themselves as well, although some chose to return to China instead. Nagasaki became the main destination of the Chinese and has the largest percentage of Chinese occupancy in Japan.

### **Roles and Positions of the Chinese Society in Batavia, Formosa, and Nagasaki**

The Growth of Batavia, Formosa and Nagasaki into international port cities in the 17<sup>th</sup> century more or less relied on the presence of the Chinese. They were not only as a transporters of the demanded goods, the Chinese also played important roles in these three cities, as city builders, the middlemen and translators. Furthermore, they were providing a source of income for local governments.

### **Mutual Understanding: The Dutch- Chinese Relations in Batavia (1620-1799)**

The policies established by Coen proved to be effective since many Chinese, either from the coastal area of the mainland—mainly from Fukien and east Kwangtung province—brought by Junks or from Bantam, began to settle in the town. Accordingly, Coen appointed his Chinese friend, So Bing Kong, to become a leader—so called *kapitain*—for his countrymen in October 1619.<sup>8</sup> There were about 400 Chinese lived in the newly established town in 1620. They lived according to the laws and customs of their own country, under

7 From the 1530s until at least 1570, China's primary source of silver was western Japan, where substantial deposits of the silver were discovered throughout the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Since the Ming Dynasty banned all foreign trade, these flourishing silver trades were conducted by the Japanese merchant with the Chinese through illegal commerce. Thus the Chinese often stayed and established themselves in Japan, especially in Hirado, which at that time was a shelter for the Chinese smugglers. William S. Atwell, "International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy circa 1530-1650" in *Past and Present* Volume 95, (May 1982), 69-90.

8 So Bing Kong or Bencon or Su Ming Kang was a close friend of Coen. He already made profit in this region before the establishment of the city. Originally he traded at Bantam and could speak sufficient both Malay and Portuguese, thus he could easily traded with the native and Europeans. He had a wide network of partners and family, ranges from Manila, Formosa, Japan, and Siam. His close relation with Coen had brought him a superb life within the Company. Further he formally received his captaincy in 1625. In line with the growth of the Chinese, the little of lieutenant and major were added to help the captain so that formed Chinese officers system; see details in B. Hoetink, "So Bing Kong. *Het Eerste Hoofd der Chinezen te Batavia (1619-1636)*," in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië*, Vol.73 (1917), 344-385.

direction of a Chinese leader, who managed all their affairs with the company (Chrijs, 1885: 599; De Roo De La Faille, 1924: 303-324).

Unlike Manila, the Chinese in Batavia were permitted to live within the city walls. Most of the Chinese lived together in the western suburb of the town, near the great river, while others resided on the east side of the river. The region in which they lived was popularly known as *Roewa Malakka*, where mostly lived on *Chinese petakken*, a small square houses with a low roof. The area contained many streets and crowded with shops, where merchants and traders occupied the main street, while others inhabited the back streets (Valentyn, 1726: 233).

The number of the Chinese increased drastically, within a year doubled into 800 in 1621 and by 1629, there were about 2000 Chinese living in and around Batavia city (Hoetink, 1917: 362-370). In line with the growth of Chinese population, the Batavian government began to extract taxes, called *hoofd geld*, each person having to pay 1 ½ real per month. The taxes were collected by their own *Kapitein*, before he handed those in to the government. This tax was taken to help government strengthen the fortification of the town from the attack of the natives (De Roo De La Faille: 306).

Blussé extensively explained the heyday and the decline of junks coming to Batavia which always loaded with the Chinese who willing to stay in the town. These immigrants mostly stayed in certain period of time and returned to mainland. Nevertheless, many of them chose to stay and made alliance with indigenous women. The number of immigrant brought by the junks were varied. However, since too many immigrant arrived in the town, in 1666s the government tried to control the number of Chinese. In the 1706, still the number of newly arrived Chinese arose where mostly went to the agricultural areas surrounding Batavia—so called *ommelanden*—to work in sugar plantations. The government began to limit the Chinese brought by Junks where allowed only 80 people on small junks and 100 on large junks. This resulted to mounting problems in Batavia. To correspond to these situations, the Government again release a strict regulation in March 1717 to forbid illegal entry for Chinese in Batavia (Blussé, 1986: 113-131).

The Chinese had a variety of occupations which made them useful to the Dutch. In early years of Batavia, they carried out major construction works of the city, like digging of canals, buildings of the city walls and houses. Chinese trade received full support from the Dutch, hence Chinese trading centred in Batavia. A visitor, Johan Nieuhof was impressed how much they were addicted to trading, since they traded all articles that were not monopolized by the company. Some of them were wholesalers from whom the Europeans merchants procured their goods. Meanwhile, others acted as middlemen between the Europeans and the local inhabitants. In the early days at Batavia Chinese junks were released from port fees. This was to attract the junks to

visit the newly established town. The captain of the Chinese Batavia acted as middleman with the Junks that came to Batavian harbour. Most of them came from Hokkien-speaking area of Fukien, or the region around Amoy (Niehof, 1988: 275).

Valentijn described that in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century, the entire landscape of Batavia was filled by the Chinese who were extraordinarily ingenuous and diligent in handicraft trade, excellent blacksmiths, carpenters, brick makers, and a seat maker. They made all parasols used by the Batavians. Additionally, some worked for the Company as cooks for soldiers and sailors, or opened small restaurants. With their *Chinese prauw*, they sailed for fish or used to unload the cargo from the visiting fleets. With their carriages around the town or *prauw* in the canals, they brought everything from fresh water, vegetables, porcelain, lacquer work and tea for sale. They also brought merchandise from China made from copper, and a metal called *calin*, which sold very well. Other small industries of the Chinese in Batavia were leather tanning, shell-lime burning, and earthenware. All these Chinese industrial establishments were located on the west side of the town, near the shore (Valentyn, 1726: 249-250).

In agriculture, the Chinese were occupied in the cultivation of rice, corn, coffee, and garden crops. They were mainly involved in the sugar plantation and *arak* industry. The cultivation of sugar cane and management of sugar factories was mostly carried out by Chinese funded by rich Chinese traders in Batavia. Apart from this, the molasses from the sugar extraction were used for *arak* distilling, hence sugar and *arak* industry were closely connected to each other.<sup>9</sup> In 1710, there were 131 sugar mills in surrounding Batavia with no fewer than 7000 Chinese working in these plants. However, due to the wars, labour and firewood shortage and seasonal character of the industry, the number of mills decreased considerably so that at the end of December 1750 there were no more than 77 left, of which only 66 were in a good condition. Meanwhile, 12 *arak distillation* belonging to Chinese existed in 1712, but by the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century the number had risen to 20 (Stavorinus, 1798: 211-213, 323-326).

The Dutch applied the existing local tradition by linking the Chinese to finance the town, by issuing different government policies under the 'monopoly lease-system' which by the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century and continued to the 18<sup>th</sup> century, burdened the Chinese verging from *hoofd-geld* to gambling, incoming duties on rice, outgoing duties on sugar and pepper, farms on the

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<sup>9</sup> The Chinese were already involved in sugar cultivation before the region was occupied by the Dutch. Chang explains that there were about six sugar factories, which not only extracted from cane, but also from palms, available in 1602. Only after 1619, the Dutch began to monopolize the sugar trade by leasing lands to plant sugar cane to Dutch free burghers and to Chinese settlers. All the sugar produced was to be sent to the Company on a fixed price. Under these conditions, the sugar industry became important in Batavia, for details see Tsuen Kung Chang, *Historical Geography of Chinese Settlement*, 208-209.

distilling and selling arak, market taxes, salt manufacture and sale, road tolls and river crossings. All these taxes were collected by those who won the farm at the auction. In most cases these were belonged to the Chinese officers or rich traders. As explained by Dobbin, this condition created the Chinese mercantile elite in Batavia. Their roles as revenue farmers have raised their authority both in the Company and in Chinese society (Dobbin, 1996: 52-54). Since all activities were correlated to a licence, Chinese were obligated to carry a licence, as evidence that they had already paid the required taxes. In any chance if they were caught without the letter, the government would punish them with a fine or shorten the licence period (Plakaatboek, 1885: 80-81).

In public, the Chinese dressed after their own fashion, in a coat with wide sleeves, either calicoes or silk. They did not have their hairs tied according to the tartar fashion, but wear their hair long and neatly twisted. The Chinese in Batavia were closely connected through social, economic and religious associations' such as burials associations, regional associations, professional associations, association to assist new immigrant and so on. Through these associations, they improved their access to economy. Further, a unique identity evolved among Chinese in Batavia from the intermarriage with local women and from marriage within the community, the called *peranakan* – children of the country. Many *Peranakan* were actively engaged in local administration, either serving the company or in key administrative posts, serving various branches of the Javanese elites (Dobbin, 1996:56-57). Regarding social life, the government initiated a hospital for Chinese citizens for sick and aged persons in 1640. There was also hospital for orphans to raise and educate them, located next to the Chinese hospital.<sup>10</sup> To finance the maintenance of the hospital and orphanage, duties were mainly from marriages and burials, as theatre shows were added. Moreover, contributions from the rich Chinese merchants, either by voluntary contributions or legacies, helped to provide revenue for the hospital and orphanage. The management of this institution was taken care by two Dutchmen and several Chinese (Niehof, 1988: 272).

Although they played important role in economy, Chinese made limited contributions to the military or the educational fields. They conducted their own religious rituals in their temples, *klenteng*, which were not only meant for observance of religious duties, but also as material expression of the communities who support it. The organization of the *klenteng* as well as burials was under supervision of the Chinese officer. The presence of *klenteng* in

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10 The reason of instituting the hospital was because so many problems occurred connected to poor health conditions of Chinese immigrants, the increasing number of Chinese orphans whom were born mostly from alliance, with women slaves or Balinese women. Legal inheritance problems among Chinese citizens or with Dutch citizens made Governor General Van Diemen decide to establish a *college van Boedelmeesters* for the Chinese to settle these difficulties. This council was established in 1640, but formally instituted in 1655. This council consisted of both Dutch and Chinese members, details in Blussé, *Strange Company*, 82-83, P. De Roo De La Faille, *De Chineesche Raad Te Batavia*, 306-307.

Batavia in the 17<sup>th</sup> century was once complained by the board of religion in 1650, which resulted to demolition of a temple but later *klenteng* were again allowed in town in the following years of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>11</sup>

The harmonious relations between the Dutch and Chinese were disrupted, mainly because of the decline of sugar plantation and rumours about forced emigration for illegal Chinese to Ceylon in the 1730s. This condition finally mounted into Chinese plunder in the country side and threats to attack Batavia. This resulted into massacre in October 1740 when almost 10.000 Chinese were murdered. The chaotic situation led the government to forbid Chinese to live within the city wall. From then on, the Chinese lived in a specific quarter outside the city wall called *Chineesche Kamp*.<sup>12</sup>

It was obvious that the town became paralyzed without the Chinese. Hence, in 1742, the government decided to open the gate again only for limited number of 'necessary' Chinese under the strict rule that they must leave the city before night. Moreover, it also impacted the social life of the Chinese. Many of them converted to Islam and changed their name into Islamic sounding name in order to avoid strict regulation and further hazard toward them. The government responded strictly on this since this was not only to reduce the *hoofdgeld* income, but also facilitated cooperation between the Chinese and the natives. Accordingly, in 1742 and 1745 the government responded with strict rules by reverted their obligation on personal tax and banned to live with the natives. In 1770, one captain was appointed by the government to be a leader of this community, which was continued until 1827. In 1785 the government allowed this community to build mosque for them in *Krukut* region.<sup>13</sup>

Further as an act of goodwill after the 1740 incident, the government began to facilitate the administrative functions of the Chinese officers so that they could easily control their own ethnic groups by initiating the *Kong Koan* or the Chinese council in 1747. The duty of the council was to organize funerals, temples, marriage and divorce registrations and disputes amongst the Chinese. This council continued to serve the Chinese until it was disbanded by the Indonesian authorities in 1950s (Blussé and Chen Menghong: 2003: 15-16).

11 The oldest *klenteng* which still remain in Jakarta-current Batavia – was established in 1650 named after a Chinese officer *Jin de Yuan*. This place became the main worshipping place for China in Batavia at that time. Approximately there were 13 *Klenteng* built in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century around Batavia. See details in Claudine Salmon dan Dennis Lombard, *Klenteng-klenteng dan Masyarakat Tionghoa di Jakarta*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Cipta Loka Caraka, 2003), 16-19.

12 Regarding to this event, some historians have extensively discussed it, such as Blussé in *Strange Company* (1988), J. Th. Vermeulen, "The Chinese in Batavia and the Troubles of 1740" (translated by Tan Yeok Song) in *Journal of the South Seas Society*, Vol. IX(1), June 1953, 1-68.

13 The Chinese Muslims were already existed in Batavia since the 17<sup>th</sup> century, mostly those who came from Bantam which already converted, such as Jan Con, and Lim Lacco, who came to Batavia with his people and became second *Kapitain* in Batavia (1636-1645). Claudine Salmon dan Dennis Lombard, *Klenteng-klenteng dan Masyarakat Tionghoa di Jakarta*, 22-24.

### **Distrust Collaboration: The Chinese in Formosa (1624-1661)**

Unlike Batavia, the city of *Zeelandia* which was built next to the castle *Zeelandia*, was not surrounded by walls. The castle was fortified with bricks in 1632. From this small peninsula, the council of *Zeelandia* tried their best to extract revenues from all kind of trades and inland products (Blussé, 1994: 373). In 1625, Marteen Sonck, the first Governor in Formosa, immediately proposed a project to the Governor General in Batavia to build the foundations for a town on the mainland in order to strengthen their position and to facilitate their ultimate requirements, such as the construction of a town hall, church, and school. Soon afterward they succeeded in leasing the land belonging to the Saccam village which was located across their first base. Here, the Dutch began constructing a little house for livestock by using Chinese labor and invited other artisans and brick-makers from Batavia to come help construct Fort Provintia as they referred to it.<sup>14</sup>

In Formosa, the Chinese lived scattered near the castle at bay of Taiyuan and on mainland Formosa. Later as the number of Chinese coming to Formosa increased, they also lived around the second large city, Provintia, and elsewhere in countryside. Like in Batavia, the Chinese also played an important role in economy, but made limited contributions to the military and educational fields. Culturally the Chinese population lived in the same manner as they lived in China itself, such as the way they dressed, religious worshipped, tales and Chinese celebrations. One obvious difference was the way their hair was treated, some were neatly twisted and others were in Tartarian style (Dapper, 1670: 41-43, 51-53, 372).

For administrative purposes, the Dutch divided Formosa area into seven districts. In 1625, about 200 junks visited bay of Taiyuan for the purpose of fishing and trade (Chijs, 1925). In order to finance the settlement, the Dutch began to collect trade tolls from the existing Chinese and small Japanese traders' settlement. The Chinese were easier to cooperate with, as they were willing to pay taxes, but the Dutch faced trouble from the Japanese since they refused to pay the toll. This caused bitter relations to both sides in Formosa, which endangered the newly established settlement.<sup>15</sup>

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14 The decision to use Chinese from Batavia was because the number of Chinese artisans from the Mainland who came to Formosa was insufficient for such works, see detail in Ernst Van Veen, "How the Dutch Ran a Seventeenth-Century Colony. The Occupation and Loss of Formosa 1624-1662 in Leonard Blussé(ed.), *Around and About Formosa*, (Taiwan: SMC Publishing Inc., 2003), 140-160.

15 The quarrel occurred when the Dutch disarmed the Japanese ships which anchored in Formosa. Dissatisfied Japanese attacked the house of newly appointed governor, Peter Nuyt, and used him as hostage. He was released only after fulfilled their demand to restore their trade. This tragedy endangered the Dutch-Japanese relation since Tokugawa authorities were so infuriated, that beside restrained the Dutch in Hirado and stopped their trade, also demanded the Dutch to leave Formosa. This action indeed made Nuyt removed from the office and recalled by Batavian Council to explain what had happened. The relation between Japan and the Dutch improved again after he was extradited to Japan to ask for apologized from Tokugawa Shogunate. The tragedy in newly established settlement had shown that maintaining trade with Japan was considered to be more important than Formosan

After a difficult first decade, the Dutch managed to stabilize the settlement in Formosa. It was Governor Hans Putmans (1629-1636) who succeeded in giving the Formosan settlement its break-through. Having experienced from Batavia, Coen explicitly ordered Putmans to encourage Chinese immigrations. The Company put its attention to industries like sugar cultivation. The centre for sugar plantations was in the Saccam area. Considering the fertile soil of Formosa where opportunity to become sugar producers opened up, the Council, as an experiment, began to farm sugarcane by providing the Chinese immigrants small sums of money and company cattle to plow the land. Their first experiment was a great success. **With the help of their Chinese compatriots from Batavia, Su Ming Kang (So Bencon),** the company developed sugar plantations in Formosa. Since he was a native from Fukien, Bencon was able to recruit large numbers of Chinese agricultural labourers to Formosa. At the same time, Putmans authorized the leasing of farmland to Chinese immigrants (Veen, 2003: 148-149).

Deer hunting activities was engaged in long before the Dutch came by the indigenous population. The demand for deerskins was high in Japan, to be used for clothing and armor. Besides, the antler and the meat, dried and salted, were valuable goods in China. Attracted by promising profits because of the large demand, the Dutch in 1630s decided to issue hunting licenses to Chinese. In 1635 the Company officially issued a decree that all deerskin produced from the island must be sold to the Company at fixed prices (Andrade, 1997: 57-93).

The Company invited more Chinese to the island to cultivate the fertile lands of the western plains and followed by experimenting new crops, such as hemp and cotton. Later, indigo, tobacco, and rice were also cultivated (Strydom, 2003: 17-36). To make this possible, the Dutch invited as many Chinese as possible to work in agriculture. Nevertheless, since the policy of Chinese imperial authorities forbade the Chinese to leave China for more than three years, it was difficult to create a stable. Hence, the Chinese in Formosa were involved only in low investment activities, such as fishing, hunting and the sugarcane cultivations so that they could immediately send their profits to their families in China (Coolhaas, 1960: 81). In response to this, the Company promised that the Chinese did not have to pay tolls or residence taxes for the first four years and they would be paid 'a guaranteed price of 40 pieces of eight for every last of rice produced.' Encouraged by these policies, Chinese entrepreneurs built houses and farms near Saccam and brought laborers from mainland China. As a result, by early 1635 entrepreneurs were planting

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settlement itself. It was understandable since the settlement was yet contributed profit to the Company. Leonard Blussé, "Bull in a Chinese Shop. Pieter Nuyt in China and Japan (1627-1636)" in In Blusse, Leonard (Ed.), *Around and About Formosa*. (Taiwan: SMC Publishing Inc 2003), 95-110.

larger plantations. Hence, the Company mused that Formosa would soon become “the breadbasket of the Indies” (Strydom, 2003: 20-23).

The Dutch trade in Formosa greatly depended on Chinese junks that brought previous Chinese goods which later sold again in Japan. Since Chinese trade was in the hand of pirates along the coast of China, the Company has no other choice except to use these perilous channels, especially Cheng Chih Lung from Fukien.<sup>16</sup> However, the great influx of Chinese bothered Putmans, and he tried to remind Batavian council about Chinese rebellion in Manila in 1603. He stressed the interest to strengthen the Dutch colony in Formosa as a counterbalance of the Chinese in the island, by promoting the Dutch immigration and marriage with indigenous women. In spite of approving to this idea, the Batavian council promoted the ‘realistic’ policy which was already applied in Batavia, by levying a poll head tax to control the number of Chinese. They proposed to charge half of the poll tax to converted Chinese, but this was refused by Putmans, who decided only to levy one tenth on export goods.<sup>17</sup>

The investments began fruitful. The export of deerskin to Japan rose to 151,400 pieces and in Saccam’s fields produced 3,000 piculs (180,000 kg) of sugar in 1637. In the following years, as the area under cultivation increased and as rice harvests provided alternate sources of food, more and more sugarcane was milled, bleached, and exported. By the mid 1640s, the colony of Formosa was self-sufficient in agriculture and was exporting rice and sugar to China and elsewhere for profit.

Unlike from his predecessor who disagreed on the head tax, Governor Johan Van De Burgh gain his attention to the growing number of Chinese on the island and reconsidered the advice from the high government in Batavia.

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16 Cheng Chih Lung also called Iquan was one important figure involved in Sino-Dutch trade activities on Formosa. He once worked as Dutch translator, but then moved his activities into piracy. In 1627 his behavior distracted the Chinese authorities in Fukien province and he killed the Dutch representative in Amoy. In response they promised a reward if the Dutch helped them suppress Iquan. Countering the request, the Dutch sent four ships to attack him, but it was a botched attempt. On the contrary, he voluntarily agreed to Chinese government’s offer to defend the coast of Fukien from other pirates and in return he was appointed admiral of Fukien coast and furthermore became most prominent power in trade in the South China region. However the quarrel between the Dutch and Iquan continued, as in 1632-1633 the Dutch arrested and forced him to sign a trade agreement under their terms, and also burnt his ships. In contrast, he reversed by attacking Dutch ships and blockaded their trade. Accordingly once again the Dutch interests were menaced because the Chinese goods were their main commodity in trading with Japan. Hence for the sake of stable supply of Chinese goods, they agreed to negotiate with him in 1635-1636. From then on he was appointed to be main supplier of Chinese goods to the Dutch in Formosa. The commodities he brought were those that were high in demand such silk, gold, porcelain, and sugar. John E. Wills, “De VOC en de Chinezen in China, Taiwan en Batavia in de 17de en 18de eeuw” in Meilink-Roelofs(ed.), *VOC in Azie*, (Belgie: Unieboek, 1976), 167-168.

17 Putmans refused the idea because he believed that Formosan was in better position than Batavia so that it would be easily to attract profit if they allowed free trade compare from polling taxes from the inhabitant. See Ernst Van Veen, “How the Dutch Ran a Seventeenth Century Colony,” 140-160.

Hence, in December 1639, the Formosan Council decided to introduce a poll tax for Chinese residents and duties on the stalking of deer, the cutting of bamboo, the distilling of *arak*, production of bricks, on fishing and oyster harvesting.<sup>18</sup> The first collection occurred in August and September 1640, all the Chinese residents, except those who worked on special duty for the Company, had to have a *hoofdbrief* stamped every month upon payment. The policies of licenses and taxation regulated by the Dutch gave rise to what Tonio Andrade called 'a system of co-colonialism' where both closely depended to each other and essentially the settlement was a Chinese colony under the Dutch rule. By the late 1640s, the trading post in Formosa enabled to contribute profit and considered as one of most profitable settlements of the Company. It was estimated that throughout the most cost-effective years, forty percent of all income was as a result of taxation and tariff on Chinese traders, farmers, hunters, and laborer, while trade, in which once again the Chinese engaged a crucial part, yielded the other sixty percent (Andrade, 2007: 327-333).

The town of Provintia developed extensively. The city was built after the example of Batavia. Many Chinese lived in this city since the location was next to Saccam – the newly opened farmlands. The Chinese women began to migrate to Formosa in 1640s, encouraged by the government which exempted them from the poll tax. This was also the reason why mixed alliance between Chinese and indigenous women were limited. Hence, it did not created mixed identity like in Batavia. In 1648 approximately 20.000 Chinese, including more than 5000 women and 1000 children were living within this city. The Chinese both in Taiyuan and in Provintia were mostly lived on storehouses made from bamboo and straw. Nevertheless, some rich Chinese traders lived in a house made of bricks. **To organize the Chinese in Formosa, the Company instituted Board of Trustees or *College van Boedelmeesteren* in 1646.** As well as in Batavia, this institution settled down problems occurred on their Chinese subjects, such as debts, inheritances, marriages, and burials. This organization initiated after the company found a fraud case on the Chinese houses of mourning. The Chinese were represented by two out of nine on a Bench of Magistrates and three out of seven men on the Board of Trustees (Oosterhoff, 1980).

Unlike in Batavia where appointed person only one leader to handle the Chinese, there were 10 captains appointed in Formosa to be responsible for the well being of their people. The appointment of these *cabessas* began in 1645. The ten leaders were the most prominent Chinese in Formosa. They were mainly traders and ship-owners, who mostly acted as middlemen and financiers on agricultural matters. Before the appointment of these *cabessas*, the company were dealing with several rich merchants. Thus this system

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18 *Ibid.*

was created to simplify the organization of the Chinese subjects in Formosa (Blussé, 1994: 438r). In 1651, these ten *cabessas* asked to the Company to appointed only one leader since they competed with each other and caused to confusions, troubled and jealousy among Chinese (Coolhaas: 82). Nevertheless the problem was postponed for unknown reason. The meeting between Chinese and their *Cabessas* was held every Sunday, but later changed by the Company to Monday since the crowds of Chinese bothered the Dutch who went to the church. Since Chinese population was large, *Provintia* and *Zeelandia* became bilingual cities where every notifications and edicts from the Company were both in Dutch and Chinese.

From the time being, the Dutch were drawn further inland and claimed the sovereignty over the whole island. The number of village occupied by the Dutch rose from 44 in 1644 to 217 in 1646, and, from 251 to 315 in period 1648 to 1650. The Dutch assembled the headmen from all villages to yearly regional councils where their disputes were reconciled and maintained the peace among them, and telling the villagers not to attack Chinese in the fields. This ceremony was called *Landdag*. On the other hand, the Dutch detached the indigenous from Chinese in order to avoid any chance of cooperation in attacking the Company. Several measures were taken for this purpose. Chinese who had tilled the soil or lived nearby the villages were ordered to move to Saccam in 1645. Furthermore, in 1648, the council decided to prohibit Chinese gambling, followed by a prohibition to sell *arak* and other liquor to common soldiers, seamen, and ships officer of junior ranks in 1650 (Veen, 2003: 155-156).

Fear of Sino-indigenous cooperation never really existed, unrest mounted among the Chinese, because head tax system was enforced to them by using soldiers for inspection, who frequently made night visits which created much annoyance to Chinese settlers. Besides, they were vulnerable to exploitation and abuses by the soldiers. In contradiction to the company that reached its peak profit in 1650, the economy for Chinese settlers became troublesome, because of the fall of deer meat prices, the rise of rice prices, bleak situation of agriculture in 1651. Last but not least, a large Chinese influx was a result of the political turmoil in China. In short, these conditions led to a Chinese rebellion in September 1652 supervised by Quo Fa-Yi, a head of the settlement in Smeerdorp, two miles north of Saccam. The rebellion was easily overcome by the Dutch since several *cabessas* warned the Company for the sake of their own interest in Formosa. However, the uprising injured both trade and agricultural profits in Formosa and resulted in even more strict regulations on Chinese settlers (Huber, 1990: 280-284).

The event of rebellion happened to be correlated with the spreading rumor about an attack from China. The rumor spread as early as 1646, but from 1652 onwards it was said that Cheng Ch'eng Kung or Coxinga designed

to conquer Formosa to use it as a sanctuary from the approaching armies of Ch'ing Regimes. However, according to Johannes Huber's study, there is no direct historical evidence about correlation between these two events, and the involvement of Cheng Ch'eng Kung and his regime to the rebellion. The rebels were farmers who were heavily indebted and dissatisfied with the Company. On the other hand, Cheng Ch'eng Kung was around the same time frantically fighting the Ch'ing armies in Fukien.<sup>19</sup>

Apart from that, the economic condition in Formosa went into relative decline. Since 1658 only few junks called in Taiyuan, and the Formosan economy went sagging. Dreadful weather damaged the sugar crops, let alone the sugar prices fell in China. Rice yield had performed some improvement, but no junks came from China to buy the harvests. The rumor of attack was finally materialized in May 1661. Mistreated by the Dutch after the rebellion, most Chinese settlers welcomed Coxinga's arrival in Formosa. Hence, he easily besieged *Zeelandia*. After ten months of siege, the Dutch under Governor Coyett, surrendered to Coxinga in 1 February 1662. The attack ended 38 years supremacy of the Dutch East India Company on the island of Formosa.

The main interest of the Dutch was revenue from Chinese merchants and laborers. Since it followed the pattern of Batavia, this collaboration showed a remarkable similarity. Nevertheless, the collaboration ended in distrust due to ill-treatment from the company and the arrival of Cheng Ch'eng Kung from Fukien.

### Uninvited Guests: The Chinese in Nagasaki (1571-1704)

The relationship between China and Japan has been long and complicated.<sup>20</sup> Without official relations, the Chinese continued to establish themselves in Japan during Tokugawa Period (1600-1868). Nevertheless, the discussion will be limited only in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, a period when the Chinese community was officially recognized and systematically organized in Nagasaki.

19 *Ibid.* Cheng Ch'eng-kung, a son of Cheng Chih Lung or *Iquan*, regarded himself as Ming Loyalist and battled the Ch'ing in Fukien. He decided to attack Formosa since he considered that the island belonged to his lineage, since the Dutch had only borrowed it from his father. Thus, when he suffered a great loss in the siege of Nanking and faced supply shortages; he demanded the island back. On 30 April 1661, a huge Cheng fleet carrying over 25.000 well-trained armies appeared in front of Casteel Zeelandia, and within a few weeks his forces had taken control over the island.

20 There was an official relationship between Japan and China from 1404-1411, and again from 1423-1532 on the basis of the *tally trade*. The *tally* served to identify and authorize yearly embassies from Japan to the court in Peking. Nevertheless since there was lack of control of a central government from 1467-1590, the Japanese traders turned into piracy and often attacked the Chinese coastal region. This prompted the Ming court to cut off relations, but the result was a resurgence of piratical actions, both by Japanese and Chinese. Culturally, Japan was influence by China in viewing itself as a divine Kingdom, without peer. Japan as well as China considered the relationship was incompatible with their own dignity, thus both parties decided to cease in relations. See in W.J. Boot, "Maxims of Foreign Policy," in Leonard Blussé and Felipe Fernandez-Arnesto (ed.) *Shifting Communities and Identity Formation in Early Modern Asia*, (Leiden: CNSW, 2003), p. 8-23.

In the 16<sup>th</sup> century, silver for silk was the main reason why the Chinese and Japanese allocated on the Japanese littoral, mainly in Hirado. Before the port of Nagasaki was opened in 1571, an infamous Chinese pirates from Fukien, Wang Chih, who controlled entire fleets of trading vessels and were closely related to Japanese *Wako*, established himself in Hirado with the help of local feudal lord in 1540s. He began to build a number of Chinese styled houses. As a consequence, "china towns" of varying size were marked along the coast everywhere in Kyushu and several areas. Marius B. Jansen clearly described that the Portuguese set up their trading post in Hirado and later in Nagasaki because of connections with Wang Chih, since he acted as interpreter (Jansen, 1992: 7).

Chinese traders began to visit Nagasaki after the opening of the port by the Portuguese. At the time, they enjoyed greater freedom in Japan since the central power of Japan was weak. Nevertheless, after Hideyoshi succeeded to a get grip over Japan, the Chinese trade activities were restricted to Nagasaki. Only after the death of Hideyoshi in 1598, his successor Tokugawa Ieyasu realized that this trade could increase the income of his court, Chinese merchants were allowed to stay in Nagasaki. Accordingly, Nagasaki became a region under direct control of central government, so called *Tenryo*. The administration of the city was reorganized into 26 sections and entrusted to four town elders.<sup>21</sup>

Trade had transformed the small fishing village Nagasaki into a prosperous city. Since Nagasaki was appointed as the only open port for foreign vessels, the number of inhabitants largely increased. The prosperity of Nagasaki attracted Chinese migrants who came along with trade, pushed by the chaotic conditions in their home country. In response to the Manchu attack, the Ming court sent envoys to ask for help from the Japanese government, but this was refused by the Japanese, because this was considered as a Chinese domestic affair. Shortly after the Ch'ing conquered Peking in 1644, many Ming loyalists left China for Nagasaki as refugees. This gradually led to the expansion of the Chinese colony in Nagasaki. This explained why the Chinese who came to Nagasaki were not merely poor peasants and labourers from Fukien province, but also scholars and statesmen.<sup>22</sup>

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21 Before the incident of Korean invasion in 1592, Hideyoshi applied *Shuinsen* policy or vessels licence, where only vessels with the licence from the Shogun could sail for trade with surrounding Southeast Asia ports, namely Taiwan, Luzon, Malayan peninsula, Cambodia, and Siam. Among others, Chinese merchants were also participated in this system. Nevertheless only after the death of Hideyoshi, the Chinese could actively re-joined to this system. Between the period 1614-1620, there were about 25 Chinese vessels' went abroad with this seal system, as this was a period of better freedom from Chinese merchants. Chang, *the Chinese Community of Nagasaki*, 60-62; 110.

22 Chu Shun-shui was most prominent Confucian scholars among others which best remembered both by Japanese and Chinese. He contributed most to Japanese education and intellectual history, while he chose to remain faithful to the Ming dynasty. See Julia Ching, "Chu Shun-shui, 1600-1682 A Chinese Confucian Scholar in Tokugawa Japan," in *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 30 No. 2, (1975), p. 177-191.

The growth of Chinese population was followed by the development of a religious centre in Nagasaki. Additionally, three different temples were constructed before the *sakoku* policy was promulgated. These temples built on the basis of provincial needs, where commonly known as the Nanking, Changchow, and Foochow temples. These institutions affected the group formation of the Chinese community, who were mainly characterized by their place of origin and dialects. Further, their requests to the local authorities to use the temple as meeting point for formal and informal activities of the Chinese and to buy a piece of land near the temple for Chinese burials was accepted (Chang, 1970: 63-64, 107-109).

The number of Chinese inhabitants rose in line with the increased number of Chinese trading vessels, from 20 people to over 2000 people from 1608 to 1618, but they lived in all parts of Nagasaki. Problems occurred as a result of intense contact and language barriers between the natives with Chinese. In response to this, the local courts decided to appoint Chinese interpreters in 1603, whose number later were increased in proportion to the increasing numbers of ships from Southeast Asia. They played important roles to settle problems, not only in trade but also in social activities. Their main tasks were to translate, to keep peace and order, to do intermediary and supervised commercial transactions, under the strict supervision from the Japanese (Ibid).

Furthermore, the number of Chinese ships entering Nagasaki harbour in 1631 was 80 and rose to 194 in 1688. Around this period, some 10.000 of the 60.000 people in Nagasaki were Chinese. However, since 1639, the Chinese were demanded to move in specific sections in the city. The local authorities restricted the Chinese inhabitants to 5000 and ordered them to live in only one settlement, which became known as *tojin yashiki* or *tokan*. The construction of this settlement began in 1688 and occupied soon after it was finished in 1689. This special settlement followed the example of Deshima, the settlement for the Dutch (Jansen, 1992: 11-13).

Due to the large number of Chinese inhabitants, the quarter of Chinese came to occupy an area larger than seven acres. As described by Jansen, the settlement was surrounded by a palisade, had an inner area surrounded by a moat, and equipped with stalls, offices and rooms. Its gates locked from the outside and guarded by at least 300 men. Only prostitutes from the Nagasaki Murayama quarter could enter the settlement. The local authority allowed Chinese to leave the settlement only for authorized purposes under supervision of Japanese petty officials, in order to handle freight, service ships, or visit temples. Despite such residential restrictions, the Chinese were fairly free to move around the city. The requirement to house all Chinese in one place was the expression of the regime's desire for a better share of the profit combined with a better grip on the administrative system. For further implementation of

this, in 1689 the *bakufu* reduced the number of Chinese ships allowed to anchor in Nagasaki into 30. Accordingly, the *bakufu* developed a structural access to the latest news from the outer world by ordering the crews of the Chinese junks and the Dutch ships to prepare reports, the so-called *fusetsugaki*.<sup>23</sup>

The existence of Chinese culture in Nagasaki was accepted by the Japanese since Chinese festivals, dramas, paintings, and dragon dance, which accompanied the festivals, were also a part of Nagasaki life in the Edo period. Japanese style of painting was also influenced by the Chinese, since some 130 Chinese painters came to Nagasaki during this period. They mostly served to enrich the taste of well-to-do and cultured Japanese townsmen. The audience of these cultural exhibitions were not merely Chinese but partly were Japanese. Further, Chinese songs were popular among Japanese, which sometimes can be traced in their lyrics (Malm, 1975: 147-172).

In the early 18<sup>th</sup> century Shogun *Yoshimune* invited many Chinese gazetteers and doctors to fulfil his interest on knowledge, mainly in botany and medicine. Moreover, he also asked to be taught on Chinese medicine (*ginseng*) and sugar cultivation. Thus, he managed to benefit the presence of Chinese in Nagasaki. In commerce, the Bakufu began to restrict silver export because of fears over the outflow of silver, and later also limited its copper export. During the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the number of Chinese ships permitted to enter Nagasaki was reduced from 40 in 1717 to only 15 in 1747, not only the number but also the amount of the goods trade was limited (Jansen: 34-37).

The only western traders allowed after the implementation of Sakoku were the Dutch. Just like the Chinese, they were also ruled by the Japanese in a very strict manner. Unlike Chinese who established themselves in Nagasaki since the opening of the port, the Dutch—which first stayed in Hirado in 1609, moved to Deshima in 1641. Smaller number than the Chinese settlement, Deshima only housed some 11 Dutchmen, carrying on business under the Chief of the factory. Unlike the Chinese which relatively free even after the establishment of their special settlement, the Dutch were severely restricted from going out and making contact with the Japanese people, except for prostitutes and interpreters for their business matters. In trade, the *bakufu* also limited the volume and number of Dutch ships. Nevertheless, the Dutch enjoyed better treatment since they were part of the system of annual attendance at the Edo court and thus dealt with major officials. They presented themselves to the Shogun and offered a gift once a year, but later this visit was allowed only once in five years. On the contrary, the Chinese were without official standing and dealt only with low-ranking officials at the port (Numata, 1964: 235-242).

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23 By these reports, the Japanese authority not only updated latest news of outer world but also well-informed about the administration of these two nations. *Ibid.*, p. 30-33.

The curiosity of Japanese to European knowledge created interesting relationships between the Dutch and Japan. As well as with Chinese, the contact between the Dutch and the Japanese resulted in an increasing number and variety of book translations - from Dutch to Japanese, and popularizations of western knowledge - through *Rangaku* system. As the result, the Dutch as the trader and 'the tutor' gave a new dynamism to Japanese social, politic, economic, and culture (Jansen, 1957: 568).

Due to their position as traders, Chinese and the Dutch were often involved in competition. During their stay in Japan, they had absolutely no contact established between them, since the Japanese authorities closely keep on eyes on them. Nevertheless after the fall of Formosa, the Dutch attacked and confiscated the cargoes of the Cheng Ch'eng-kung's Chinese Junks. These actions were complained by the Chinese to the Japanese authorities. The Dutch convinced the Japanese courts that their action were conducted outside the Japanese water, thus outside the Japanese laws. Yet, since the *bakufu* allowed Chinese Junks to sell twice as much as the Dutch, the Chinese cargoes, mainly copper, became source of supply for the Company. They visited other Dutch ports, such as Batavia and Formosa and traded their cargoes with sugar, which was demanded by the Japanese authorities. Additionally, it turned out that Chinese and the Dutch traders often cooperated outside of Japan.<sup>24</sup> Thus, the Dutch and the Chinese played important roles in Japanese society during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century, not merely in the economics here, but also in the fields of culture and science.

## Conclusion

The coming of the European to Asia in the 16<sup>th</sup> century led to the opening of new port cities along Asian waters, namely Nagasaki in 1571, Batavia in 1619, and Formosa in 1624. In order to involve in the intra Asian trading network, the Europeans heavily depended on the Chinese trade due to their highly demanded commodities, mainly on silks and porcelains. The way in which they played their roles and positions in each city greatly depended on the policies applied by the local government.

Along with the cargoes came the immigrants. The difficult situation in the mainland was the impact of civil war, famine and drought in the early 1640s. Subsequently, the change of regime from the Ming to the Ch'ing in 1644, has led to a large number of migrants, mostly from Fukien province.

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24 The action of attacking and confiscating Chinese Junks already occurred during early period of the Dutch in Japan, mainly on period 1615-1620. Further it was reoccurred during 1640s. These cases were brought to the Japanese court where the Dutch were interrogated. These problems were mentioned in the Dutch diary kept in Deshima so called Deshima Dagregister. See detail in Leonard Blussé and Cynthia Vialle (Ed.), *The Deshima Dagregisters: their original tables of contents*, (Leiden: Institute for the History of European Expansion, 2003), Volume VII (October 1642-November 1643), 150-159; Volume XI (November 1647-1649), p. 56.

They came to these growing cities in search for a better future. On the other hand, cities such as Batavia and Tayouan welcomed these refugees due to the shortage of man power to build the new established settlement. However, in the case of Nagasaki, it was cultural ties which opened the door for them.

Established by the Dutch, both the Batavian and Tayouan council applied similar policies to their Chinese settlers. Due to the lack of cooperation from the natives, they invited the Chinese into established towns to work as city builders and tax payers. To achieve their pursuits on the basis of profit and prosperous life, mutual understandings were built up among the Chinese migrants and the Dutch authorities in Batavia and Tayouan through relatively relaxed policies. Besides trade, they also relied on agriculture industry as sources of income, which meant an even larger demand for migrants. This was answered by the influx of Chinese to these two cities. As the number of Chinese grew rapidly, the Dutch authorities began to promulgate restraining policies on the Chinese. Heavy taxes and harassment by tax farmers and officers had created hatred and dissatisfaction among the Chinese toward their Dutch patron. As a result, collaborations were ruptured and led to rebellion in Tayouan in 1652 as well as in Batavia in 1740. Owing to the superior administrative of the Dutch, they managed to handle the disruption in Batavia and further maintain law and orders. Nevertheless, the Dutch in Formosa were not as lucky as their countrymen in Batavia, since they could not handle surprised attack from Cheng Ch'eng Kung with his heavily armed ships in 1661. The attack ended up 38 years reign of the Dutch authority in the island.

On the contrary, the presences of Chinese were in accordance with devaluation of power in Japan. Without invitation, Chinese willingly came to Japan for silver traded with silk. They established themselves in Hirado with the help of local authorities and later in Nagasaki after the port was appointed as the only port allowed for foreign vessels in Japan. As explained by Marius B. Jansen that "Nagasaki trade was Chinese trade," thus Chinese were always welcomed in Nagasaki (Jansen, 1992):23). This resulted to the growing number of Chinese in Nagasaki who lived scattered around the city. The intense contact between the Chinese and Japanese brought problems which made the Japanese authorities decided to appoint interpreters, limited their number, and further ordered them to live in specific settlement called *Tojin yashiki*.

As well as the Chinese, the Dutch also established themselves in Nagasaki in 1641 replacing the Portuguese settlement in Deshima on the basis of trade. Unlike what happened in Batavia and Formosa, the relation between the Dutch and Chinese in Nagasaki was under the strict regulation of the *Bakufu*, where contact among them was forbidden. Only outside the jurisdiction of Tokugawa, they conducted contacts intertwining between competition and corporation. To sum up, the presence of Chinese in these new opened cities

in the 17<sup>th</sup> and the 18<sup>th</sup> century was a result of trading activities, which later widened into business, social, and cultural networks. To sum up, the Chinese were so adaptable so that they were able to fit in each of these three port cities and established their own communities. ●

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