THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ROLE AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR IN THE ACEH MONITORING MISSION

PERAN UNI EROPA SEBAGAI AKTOR INTERNASIONAL DALAM MISI MONITORING ACEH

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ABSTRAK
Keterlibatan Uni Eropa (UE) dalam Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) merupakan salah satu cerita sukses dalam penyelesaian konflik secara damai. Dalam misi ini, UE mampu menunjukkan kepada dunia bahwa mereka merupakan salah satu aktor signifikan dalam politik internasional. Harus diakui bahwa UE merepresentasikan uncertain image (gambaran yang kurang jelas) dalam politik internasional yang tingkatannya tidak dapat disejajarkan dengan negara-bangsa. Artikel ini menganalisis apakah UE memainkan peran signifikan sebagai aktor internasional dalam proses perdamai di Aceh melalui pendalaman terhadap kerja AMM. Dengan memandang UE sebagai entitas yang terlibat dalam isu-isu khusus dan dengan menekankan pada kehadiran UE di kancah internasional melalui keterlibatannya dalam AMM, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa UE memainkan peran signifikan sebagai aktor internasional.

Kata kunci: Uni Eropa, aktor internasional, Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)

INTRODUCTION
After three decades of conflict, the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) which was fighting for an Aceh independent state eventually agreed to end the conflict by signing the Memorandum of Understanding on August 15, 2005. The agreement, henceforth Helsinki Accord, was facilitated by the Crisis Management Initiative chaired by former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, with the support of the European Union (EU). In this peace process, the EU played a key role in fostering the Helsinki Accord, by supervising the implementation of
the agreement. The EU also led a peacekeeping mission, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) from 15 September 2005 until 15 December 2006 in cooperation with some of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) member states. This mission regards as a watchdog to ensure the peace process in Aceh.

This paper will critically examine whether the EU played a significant role as an international actor in the peace process in Aceh through an indepth-look at the work of the AMM. I will argue that the EU played a key role as an international actor in the AMM. This paper will be divided into three sections. The first section will examine the debate over the EU as an international actor. The second section will show the Aceh conflict as the background understanding of the peace process. The third section will examine the work of the EU through the AMM and its challenges.

The EU as an International Actor: the Debate

In contemporary world affairs, the EU presents a puzzling feature. According to McCormick (2005, 208), the EU is more than an international organization but less than a state and this feature often frustrated other international actors, whether they should think of 27 member states or regards as a single entity. The EU member states still maintain their sovereignty in many areas, such as defence and security issues. However, in particular issues, such as trade negotiations, other parties should deal with the EU because of member states willingness in allowing the EU Commission as the representative of their interest (McCormick, 2005, 108).

There are some challenges to assess the role of the EU in global politics. Caporaso et.al., (1998, 214-220) there are four components of actor capacity in global politics: recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion. First factor, is recognition by other actors, whether de jure or de facto, which accept and allows for presence in global politics. De jure recognition is diplomatic recognition under international law or formal membership in international organizations. Because of the EU is not sovereign, therefore, the EU does not have a full diplomatic recognition from third parties. Although the EU has high-level diplomatic contacts with almost every country in the world, it has not been granted the exact status as sovereign states.

By the same token, in international organizations memberships, the EU often confused third parties due to its unclear position whether it is competent enough to address any given issues and endorse responsibilities as a member of the international organizations. As a consequence, third parties does not grant full recognition to the EU through formal international organization membership. De facto
recognition can be seen from the sociality of global politics. The interaction between third parties and the EU can be regarded as an implicit recognition upon it (Caporaso, 1998, 216).

The second factor is the EU’s authority to act externally. Due to the fact that the EU is a creation of the member states, thus the authority derives from these states. In this regard, the authority is assigned to EU institutions by sovereign nation-states. The third factor is autonomy, which suggest independency from other state actors. Independence in this sense means that these institutions should work differently and independently from the basic expectation of a normal state system operating on the basis of power and interests. The fourth factor, is cohesion, to which the ability of actor to formulate and articulate consistent policy preferences. However, the EU can make a difference even without policy cohesion (Caporaso, 1998, 217).

In a slightly different way, Mackenstein et.al. (2005, 261-262) outline four factors to analyse the EU’s direction and capabilities as an international actor: legitimacy, the transatlantic context, the enlargement, and the attitudes of member states. The legitimacy discussions include the impact of international law and the relationship between the EU and its citizens. International crises such as in Kosovo, September 11 and Iraq provide challenges to international law and implies recognition that the EU should respond effectively to these crises.

Because of the role of the EU is very limited therefore the EU should increase its power to provide greater accountability in the EU external relations. The transatlantic context, in this regard, discuss the conduct of the EU as an international actor. The enlargement of the EU is also crucial factor, which include the pending 2004 round and future obligations, such as those taken on the SAP. New external relations challenges ranging from migration and new environmental threats through to strive for adapting the European security architecture and avoid outlining new dividing lines around EU frontiers (Mackenstein, 2005, 261).

Nevertheless, they argue that the most critical factor of all is the attitudes of its member states. In this regard, the significant factors will be how good and how bad the leading member states coordinate and cooperate with one another. For example, the Anglo-French rapprochement in the St Malo declaration was the most significant factor for the development of the EU’s security ambitions and capabilities from late 1990s. On the contrary, there is a significant loss of momentum in the Iraq crisis due to the aligning of Franco-German against British, Spain, and Italy (Mackenstein, 2005, 261).

Furthermore, they argue that the most important factor of all is political will, especially, the willingness of other international actor to recognize the EU as a legitimate international actor. And more important is the political will of the EU member states. In order to be an effective international actors and to be able to reverse its international presence into operational power, the EU need to have a common will, a common vision and trust. The common vision of the EU is lacking of broad principles and objectives, and there has been a political will deficit and lack of trust. As a consequence, the EU seems to present uncertainty feature as an international actor. It will consistently set apart in economic, politico-strategic and geographic reach. Its international ambitions and credibility will depend on the international events and there seems to be a contradictory in order to meet the rhetorical commitments and political will (Mackenstein, 2005, 262).

According to Vogler, et.al. (1999, 5), there are three categories to examine the external roles of the EU: presence, opportunity, and capability. Presence refers to the relationship between internal development of the EU and external expectations. Opportunity refers to factors in external developments that could enable and constrain actorness. Capability refers to the capacity to respond effectively to external expectations and opportunities. Following Allen and Smith rationale, the EU’s presence in international affairs has been significance. Presence, in this sense, refers to
the ability to influence; to shape the perceptions and expectations of others. Presence was not supposed to be an external action, but rather as a consequence of internal policies and processes (Vogler, 1999, 6).

By outlining from these point of view, the next section will discuss a case study about the EU’s role as an international actor in the Aceh Monitoring Mission.

THE ACEH CONFLICT

The roots of the Aceh conflict date back a long way. In October 1976 a separatist movement was created in the Indonesian province of Aceh on the island of Sumatra. This movement fought by GAM, strive to establish an Acehnese independent state. In the Indonesian history, there seems to be a paradox regarding to the fact that unlike the two other territories which created separatist movement, such as East Timor and West Papua, Aceh had contributed to the Indonesian nationalist movement and the creation of the Indonesian Republic. There is a broad consensus in Indonesian society, especially in Acehnese society that the Acehnese embodied Islamic values in a country which comprised 88% of Muslim population, and widely known as “Serambi Mekah” or “the Veranda of Mecca”.

By drawing upon Acehnese dissatisfaction toward the government, GAM created a separatist movement. The 1976 GAM operation failed to mobilize Acehnese grievances and by 1979 GAM was paralyzed by Indonesian military operations. In 1989, GAM was able to began its military operations. For about sixteen years, GAM was involved in the insurgency against the Indonesian army. The crucial dissatisfaction lies in the vertical conflict of centre-periphery led to a political, social, and economic grievances. The Acehnese grievances related to the unfulfilled promises of autonomy by the central government under Soekarno (1951 – 1959) and under Soeharto (1967 – 1998). The grievances become intensified in 1971 by the discovery of natural gas. Especially, under Soeharto, the revenue of Aceh’s natural resources flowed to Jakarta with small amount of wealth return to the province (Schulze, 2007, 2).

Furthermore, the population also felt discontent to the effects of the natural gas discovery, such as dispossession, dislocation, industrialization, pollution, foreign corporations, urban-rural migration, the arrival of non-Acehnese workers and enclave development in North Aceh. This led to the risen of prices and urban poverty. The harder grievances felt by Acehnese was the Indonesian military operation from 1976, particularly in the period from 1989 to 1998 when Aceh known as Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) or military operations area. During this period, the Indonesian army in order to pursue GAM, committed with human rights abuses towards Aceh population (Schulze, 2007, 2).

An opportunity for a peaceful settlement emerged by the changing of power in Indonesian civilian and military power after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. Before that, the Indonesian government was consistent to use military approach in dealing with conflicts within the republic. However, the tsunami disaster on December 2004 contributed to the shifting political approach in dealing with conflict in Aceh, especially under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The involvement of the EU through the Crisis Management Initiative chaired by Martti Ahtisaari contributed much to bringing the peaceful settlement to a successful outcome in July 2005.

THE ACEH MONITORING MISSION (AMM)

As a response to the official invitation by the Indonesian Government and supported by the GAM leadership, and despite initial doubts among some member states, the EU eventually decided to conduct its first mission in Asia. Learning from the past experience in East Timor, the Indonesian Government preferred a regional organization rather than the United Nations’ involvement and eventually the EU was a reasonable choice as if no Asian regional organizations capable to conduct such operation. The AMM was deployed on 15 September as an EU mission conducted together with five ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand),
and with contributions from Norway and Switzerland. It was led by the head of mission, Pieter Feith, who reported to the European Council and directly to Secretary General Javier Solana (Helly, 2005).

From 15 September to 31 December the AMM had 125 EU and 93 ASEAN monitors on the ground. At the end of the mission there were only 29 EU and 7 ASEAN monitors left. The AMM’s objective was to assist GAM and the Indonesian government with the implementation of the MOU and ‘to contribute to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh’1.

The AMM specific tasks were to:

- to monitor the demobilisation of GAM and the decommissioning of its weapons
- to monitor the redeployment of non-organic TNI and police
- to monitor the reintegration of GAM and the human rights situation as well as the legislative change
- to rule on disputed amnesty cases
- and to investigate violations of the MOU

According to Schulze (2007, 4), the key to the success of the AMM were the Commission on Security Arrangements (COSA) meetings, headed by Pieter Feith and attended by senior representatives of GAM and the Indonesian government, police and military. In addition, there were also meetings at the district level (DiCOSA). The purpose of these meetings was to provide a forum that could accommodate issues, questions, and complaints and resolve them before they turn to be real problems.

THE EU INVOLVEMENT IN THE AMM

The EU initiative and full support through the CMI is essential for the success of the Helsinki Accord. Its initiative also supported by some EU member states which sent their team in the AMM to show their strong commitment to the implementation of the Accord. Actually, the Helsinki Accord was the third attempts which involve international mediation to solve the conflicts in the region. The first peace negotiations were facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) that produced the ‘Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh’ of 12 May 2000.

The second negotiation produced the ‘Cessation of Hostilities Agreement’ (COHA) of 9 December 2002. Unfortunately, both negotiations failed to end the conflict. Unlike the previous accords facilitated by the HDC, the Helsinki Accord facilitated by the CMI had full support from the EU in legal and financial basis. The legal basis of the CMI found in the ‘Council Regulation No. 381/2001 establishing the Rapid Reaction Mechanism’ or RRM. The initiative legal basis found in the EU’s ‘RRM Policy Advice and Mediation Facility Decision 2002–2004.’ It can be argued that the quasi-state was the sole international mediator during the negotiations that end up in the Helsinki Accord (Gunaryadi, 2006, 89).

After five rounds of tough negotiations between January and July 2005, the Indonesian government and GAM eventually agreed on the Helsinki Accord. Aspinall (2005) emphasizes that the possibility for success of this accord is greater than the previous peace accords because it is different in fundamental way. The previous accords, such as The Humanitarian Pause for Aceh and COHA, called for ceasefires and demilitarization which followed by an open-ended dialogue on the political status of Aceh. Both parties remained in a different stand on the core issue of whether Aceh should become an independent state or remain part of the Indonesian republic.

On this critical circumstances, it was very difficult for both parties to build confidence and trust one another. Especially Indonesian military and government remained suspicious that the peace accords was used by GAM to strengthen its separatist movement. However, the negotiations become possible to be successful after GAM announced in February that they were willing to leave behind its independence goal and agreed to accept a “self-government” solution for Aceh within the Indonesian state (Aspinall, 2005, viii).

Furthermore, Aspinall (2005, viii) notes that compare to the previous accords, the Helsinki Accord outlines a comprehensive peace settlement. It deals not only with security dimension but also with broad terms such as a new political relationship between Aceh and the Indonesian state which is personified in a new Law on the Governing of Aceh. The Helsinki Accord also includes requirements concerning political participation, human rights, the rule of law, and economic matters as well as measures for the disarmament of GAM and its members’ reintegration into society. Indeed, with the involvement of the EU in Aceh Monitoring Mission and also supported by participating countries from ASEAN, the Helsinki Accord is more successful than the previous accords. The EU backstage roles in the process is significant in spite of Indonesia’s sensitivity to foreign intervention on its domestic affairs. The important thing then begin with the question why the EU took the lead in the process, compare to other organizations. To answer the question, it would be better to analyse the EU motivations.

THE EU MOTIVATIONS

Following Gunaryadi (2006, 92), the EU main motivations to take the lead of the Helsinki Accord are the political; and geopolitical and strategical considerations. From the political motive, there are three points need to be concerns. First, it can be said that the EU has ambition to be a global player where it requires ‘to lead, not to be led’ (Suryadinata, 1997). This ambition is natural in away of its appearance as an international actor and the pursuit of its global interest. He mentions several factors that endorse the EU as an international actor.

The most important factor is the EU has become a global power in terms of economic, trade and investment. It contributed 51% of world’s foreign direct investment outflows. It is the biggest and richest marketplace in the world with more than 454 million consumers, its exports of goods and services constituted 38% of the world market, controlled of 36% of the world’s GNP, provided 56% of official development assistance. Furthermore, the EU Member States build the largest block in the Bretton Wood institutions: 23% of the votes in the World Bank and 29% of the votes in the International Monetary Fund, it possesses the largest collective number of votes as well as a regional grouping in the World Trade Organisation (Van Reisen, 1999, 2). Moreover, the EU will remain influential in the global economy as the euro become established and become powerful competitor to the US dollar and the Japanese Yen.

The EU ‘actorness,’ is still debatable because it was usually referred to the role of a sovereign state, a level that would be hard to achieved by the EU. Thus, the concept of the ‘actorness’ should be go along with the notion of its international presence. The notion of ‘presence’ itself would compensate the EU’s inability to exercise it effectively in the pursuit of its global interests (Peterson, 1998, 3). The notion of ‘presence’ might become a more significant phenomenon that attract the perceptions and expectations of policy-makers in the international politics (Allen & Smith, 1991, 95-120). According to C. Hill (1994, 103-126) there are three capabilities underlining the EU international ‘presence’: its ability to agree, its ability to act, and the extent of resources dedicated to support those actions. The capabilities, in this regard, are divided into resources, instruments, and cohesiveness. Gunaryadi (2006, 93) argues that in the Helsinki Accord, the EU preserved all aspects that sustain its capabilities to act and to realize its ambition for global leadership. The EU commitment to support the Helsinki Accord through the Crisis Management Initiatives should be understood in political aspiration framework.

Second, the EU has an ethical obligation to realize its commitment to develop its cooperation with Indonesia which have a legitimate legal source under international law. It can be argued that the EU is consistent with its grand strategy on Indonesia. Although there is no special clause in the major documents regulating its relations with Indonesia to solve internal conflicts in a peaceful way, however, the Helsinki Accord is part of the main agenda, such as the EU’s support to good governance, local democracy, and sustainable management of natural resources. The EU often criticised human rights violations in Indonesia,
but it consistently support Indonesian territorial integrity and called for a peaceful and political conflict resolution in the country. Third, through the involvement in the Helsinki Accord, the EU is indirectly try to deliver message to the world, especially to the powerful country, such as the US, that conflicts can be solved peacefully rather than using military force (Gunaryadi, 2006, 93).

From geopolitical and strategic considerations, Gunaryadi (2006, 96) mentions two main motivations : the first motivation of the EU involvement is that the possibility for success is bigger after the tsunami disaster. The warring parties in Aceh were also hit by the devastation. This condition perceived by the EU and the CMI as a good opportunity which could accelerate the peace process in Aceh. Second, by the fact that Acehnese are predominantly Muslim, like the majority Indonesians, it can be said that the EU was willing to portray in sympathy among the Muslims and to reinforce the West-Muslim world’s relations and understanding in the context of economy, politics and the measures of combating terrorism. Third, the successful of the Helsinki Accord may improve the EU’s image and influence in Indonesia. This can be seen from the statement of Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner on March 2005:

The world must not forget the terrible devastation the Tsunamis brought to South East Asia.... Of the €350 million...available for post-Tsunami reconstruction I intend to devote over €200 million to Indonesia.... Europe and South East Asia are not just major trading partners...two regions can deepenthis... important relationship particularly on non-trade issues from the fight against terrorism, to protecting the environment and combating the drugtrade...how we can strengthen ties with Indonesia, and support it on its path to democracy, stability and prosperity (European Commission 2005 b, 4 March).

FINANCING THE AMM

Following the tsunami disaster in December 2004, Aceh become a region with many international presence, including the EU. It has taken the lead in relief effort and has given large contribution to humanitarian assistance and development aid. Since the tsunami, the EU and its member states have contributed up to 1.5 billion euros. On the EU side, particularly, 123 million euros were allocated to immediate humanitarian assistance to all countries affected by disaster and 207 million euros made available under the Asia and Latin America (ALA) program and the RRM to support the long-term reconstruction of Aceh. In the Aceh peace process, the EU had contributed well before the tsunami. In December 2002, it became a co-chair of the Tokyo Preparatory Conference for Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh where it financed the monitoring mission chaired by the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue which failed to end the conflict (Grevi, 2005, 29).

Furthermore, in March 2005, the EU mobilized up to 220,000 euro from the RRM in support of a project in drafting the Master Plan for the recovery of Aceh which involved local stakeholders and civil society. On April 2005, the EU delivered fund under the RRM, with a 270,000 euro ceiling to the CMI to conduct peace talks. On 29 July, the EU provided 30 million euros to support the projects for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the province. This project intended, not only to rebuilding houses, public infrastructures and restart the economy, but also to strengthening the capacity of the new Reconstruction Agency as well as the local government (Grevi, 2005, 29). Although, financial matters are oftenly become tough criticism in Brussels, the EU’s efforts and the AMM mandate might be regarded as complementary and mutually reinforcing.

MCHALLENGES OF THE AMM

The Helsinki Accord facilitated by the EU through the CMI is one of the successful story in the peace settlement, however, it also suffered some challenges. Schulze (2007, 5) addresses two important points : first, the disparity between the limited time to set up the mission and the lengthier and highly bureaucratic funding process in Brussels. Second, the training and selection of monitors. One of the greatest challenges is the financing of the AMM. When the CMI asked the
EU to involve in monitoring the implementation of the AMM, it came with different reactions. A positive reactions about a European deployment in Aceh came from The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), while The Political and Security Committee (PSC) was halfhearted. In this case, the EU member states were divided. Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and the UK were agreed for an EU involvement while the rest preferred the EU to concentrate on areas which had already the EU presence, such as in Balkans and Africa.

However, the EU Commission’s External Relations Directorate General continued to outline a proposal to finance the mission in July 2005 through a grant to a member state. This proposal attracted an intense debate between the Commission and the Council, not only about the contents but also the political consequences to the Commission for conducting the Aceh mission. As a consequence, the Council Legal Service rejected the proposal on legal, budgetary and political grounds. Thus, from this reaction, it was obvious that the Council felt the Commission had been overboard from the EU chain of command. The process to finance the AMM was slow during the debate due to some member states dubious stance on the Aceh mission. Because of Javier Solana’s personal intervention, the debate over financing the AMM swayed in favour of EU deployment and financing it from the CFSP budget (Schulze, 2007, 5).

Nevertheless, out of a total budget of 15 million euro, the CFSP could only cover 9 million euro, the rest had to be provided by member states. Only seven member states contributed to this mission for an overall amount of 5 million euro. For instance, Sweden gave 4 million euro for logistical support. However, in this critical situation, the largest contribution fell upon the UK through the British embassy in Jakarta since the UK held the EU presidency at the time. This financial challenges forced by procedural and time constraints, because the EU are not equipped to release the fund rapidly. In addition, the Aceh mission was operated at very short time, in only 18 days. Therefore, Schulze argues that the institutional struggle of power in Brussels, the lack of consensus among member states, and the unconventional way of raising the money for the mission, had consequences not only on the diplomatic level but also on the ground. This can be seen from the fact that when the assessment team arrived in Aceh in August 2005 they had no money to access and no mobile phones that worked. Unfortunately, the AMM lacked money for secretaries, offices, computers, and printers (Schulze, 2007, 5).

The training program for the mission was a challenges as well since it was not prepared sufficiently. Since the beginning, it only covered elementary issues in a three-day training program. It included briefs on Acehnesese society and culture, the conflict history, and an overview of the Indonesian military functioned. There was also training provided on emergency preparedness and humanitarian operations. The local languages also posed significant challenges. There were only a small number within the EU team who can speak Indonesian let alone Acehnese language. This become more burden with the fact that a few members of the AMM were not speak English adequately and therefore hindered communication among the monitors (Schulze, 2007, 5).

Despite the challenges along the process, the AMM was success in some ways. Its monitors and expertise contributed to make the implementation process of the Helsinki Accord easier and avoid the collapsed of the Aceh peace process. Due to the impartiality and the confidence inspired by the AMM in both GAM and the Indonesian military, it eventually smooth the way to the implementation of the crucial decommissioning and redeployment. Schulze (2007, 14) summed up five key points of the successful of the peace process: First, full commitment of GAM and the Indonesian government in the peace process. Due to the impartiality and the consent of both parties, the peace process will failed since the very beginning of the talks. Second, the leadership and impartiality of its head of mission, Pieter Feith, and the mission as a whole. Third, the support of individual member states, particularly the UK, Finland, and Sweden during the set-up phase of the mission. Fourth, the quick amnesty and the committee on security arrangements (COSA). Fifth, by not too much
focusing on the human rights implementation at the early process, it made possible for the AMM to complete its mission in the light of sensitive context of Indonesian domestic politics.

CONCLUSION

The EU involvement in the AMM was one of the successful story in the peaceful conflict settlement. In this mission, the EU has been able to show the world that it is one of significant actor in international politics. Admittedly, the EU represents uncertain image in international politics as if it can not be seen at the same level of sovereign-states. Nevertheless, by viewing the EU as an evolving entity which engaged in particular issues and by addressing its international presence in the context of its involvement in the AMM, the EU has played significant role as an international actor.

Furthermore, the willingness of third parties in the peace process, particularly the Indonesian government and the GAM leadership, to recognize the EU as a legitimate international actor and the political will of some EU member states to participate and contribute in the AMM also emphasized the EU’s role as an international actor. In conclusion, by viewing the EU as an evolving entity which engaged in particular issues and by addressing its international presence, it is argued that the EU has played significant role as an international actor in the context of its involvement in the AMM.

REFERENCES


